

to feudalism, capitalism and socialism. It is extremely doubtful whether Marx, himself, adhered to any such supra-historical theory, and it is certain that the Bolsheviks did not" (p. 21). If this claim were true, it would be difficult to explain why the CPSU still bothers to teach the doctrine of historical materialism. In fact, of course, Horowitz wrongly assumes that Lenin did not accept that conception of history which Marx described in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Lenin, in *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats*, carefully quoted the passage from Marx which Horowitz evidently considers unimportant: "It is obvious that Marx's basic idea that the development of the social-economic formations is a process of natural history cuts at the very root of this childish morality which lays claim to the title of sociology. . . . 'In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society.'"

Whether or not modern scholars accept their conclusions, Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, and many prerevolutionary Russian radicals considered Russian society "Asiatic" or "semi-Asiatic" in nature. A number of scholars have discussed the problem of Russia's "Asiatic" institutional and cultural heritage, and have also dealt with the Marxist concept of the "Asiatic mode of production" as it concerns the various formulations of historical materialism—among them Karl Wittfogel, Stuart Schram, Samuel Baron, Shlomo Avineri, and the undersigned. It is doubly unfortunate that Horowitz overlooks this literature. He both misleads his readers about the complexity of Marxist social theory and fails to apply certain Marxist insights to his own analysis of Soviet history. For example, he fails to explain (either in Marxist or in any other terms) the survival and even the strengthening of bureaucracy under Lenin and Stalin. Horowitz contends that nationalism "can serve as a vehicle both for imperialist chauvinism and revolutionary self-determination . . . , its bias (counterrevolutionary, revolutionary or reformist) being determined by the configuration of other social factors, particularly the balance of class forces" (p. 165). Yet in examining "the resurgence of Russian nationalism" (p. 140) Horowitz fails to indicate which type of nationalism Stalin resurrected or which social class caused its virulence.

No one can deny that tensions between classes and national power centers have characterized much of twentieth-century politics. A serious application of Marxist insights can be very helpful in discovering the basic trends of this phase of world history. The Leninist theory of imperialism, however, intellectually indefensible even at the time of its formulation, has failed to gain the necessary sophistication or empirical base to deal with the complexity of the modern world of politics and power, even as it has become increasingly comforting ideologically. This book will find many readers, thanks to the current popularity of national masochism and misunderstood Marxism. It will change few minds and enlighten none.

JOSEPH SCHIEBEL  
Georgetown University

THE RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN SYRIA AND PALESTINE, 1843–1914:  
CHURCH AND POLITICS IN THE NEAR EAST. By *Derek Hopwood*.  
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. viii, 232 pp. \$7.00.

In the years 1843–1914 Russia's involvement in Syria and Palestine was a minor aspect of her policy toward the Ottoman Empire. Though the tsars had long been

considered defenders of Orthodoxy in the East, Russia's national interests were focused on the Balkan Christians, whose numbers and geographic location made them the natural allies of the expanding Russian Empire. The Orthodox population of Syria and Palestine, whether Greek or Arab, was of relatively little importance, and the attraction of the various holy shrines was somewhat diminished by the presence of rival claimants—the Catholic and Protestant churches.

The story of Russia's halfhearted attempts to establish her presence in Syria and Palestine is devoid of drama and of major significance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whether under the Anglican Nesselrode or the Orthodox Gorchakov, pursued a policy of caution. Only a few individuals at court and in the scholarly community developed an interest in establishing Russian church missions, schools, and pilgrim houses in the Holy Land. The intrigues and struggles incidental to the appearance of the Russians there were mostly those of Russian church agents against the Greeks. The energies of the various representatives of St. Petersburg were spent largely in fencing with the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem. The Turks watched the scene with customary apprehension, while the European powers were, as usual, "alarmed."

Derek Hopwood has produced a thorough study of a minor topic, showing that Russia's involvement in Palestine was minimal. The main interest of his book lies in the chapters on the Orthodox Arabs. Here he breaks new ground. The attachment of Orthodox Arabs to Russia comes as a surprise. Their sympathy for Russia in the Russo-Japanese War is unexpected and stands in sharp contrast with the pro-Japanese sentiments of the Muslims. Mr. Hopwood's use of Arabic sources and the attention he pays to the Arabs enhance the value of his study. More careful editing would have eliminated stylistic infelicities and certain peculiarities of transliteration (such as "Kruschev").

FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH  
Yale University

DAS DEUTSCHE KAPITAL IN RUSSLAND, 1850–1894. By Joachim Mai.  
Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1970. 255 pp. DM 35.

This advanced doctoral dissertation (*Habilitationsschrift*) uses German foreign investment as a focus for a broad re-examination of Russo-German economic diplomacy and economic relations under capitalism. Such rethinking of the origins of the friendly cooperation presently existing between the Soviet Union and the (East) German Democratic Republic will further strengthen that cooperation, since it "exposes the motivating force of the German ruling classes in the policy of profit, theft, and conquest vis-à-vis the neighboring eastern peoples in the second half of the nineteenth century" and absolves—at least implicitly—the German people as a whole to some extent. This class-based aggression is clearly seen in the areas of politico-commercial negotiations and foreign investment, both of which are examined in detail.

Although the discussion of commercial negotiations is adequate, the work must stand or fall on the investigation of German capital. The treatment here is a continuous listing of loans, firms, and entrepreneurs with short comments or histories of each. Considering Mai's two years in the Soviet Union, his use of archives there and in East Germany, and his thorough use of printed sources, the results are rather meager. With the possible exceptions of banking operations and railroad loans, there is little evidence to support claims of superseding earlier monographs,