

The United States looked upon the placement of offensive nuclear missiles only ninety miles away as a dangerous tipping of the world balance of power. Now, for the first time, the Soviet Union would have the capability of delivering nuclear warheads to any part of America—an advantage enjoyed up to then only by the United States in regard to the Soviet Union. Not only was there a Communist government in the Western Hemisphere, but there was a Communist government effectively armed.

Dinerstein, who made extensive use of contemporary news reports in the American, Cuban, and Soviet press, points out the differences of opinion within the three countries on the Cuban revolution and the subsequent placement and use of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. Castro looked upon the revolution as a social movement and shunned the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), the Cuban Communist party. Ignoring the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, Castro based his reform not on the proletariat but upon a combination of the middle class and the peasantry. Only much later did he become “radical with a rush,” out-radicalizing even the most fervent Communist revolutionaries and absorbing the PSP into the revolutionary government.

Within the councils of the Soviet Union, the hawks and the doves debated the situation much as their counterparts did in the United States. When a Soviet SAM-2 missile shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over Cuba in October 1962, it is unknown, according to Dinerstein, whether this was an act of the Soviet military faction showing its muscle contrary to the more moderate Khrushchev, or whether Khrushchev supported the action. It could even have been, Dinerstein speculates, the act of an individual trigger-happy missileman.

In the United States a congressional election was coming up and the air was full of campaign rhetoric. The Soviets were unsure whether Kennedy knew that missiles were being placed in Cuba and was maintaining silence until after the election, or whether he was still unaware of the missile installation. It is clear from Dinerstein's account that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States enjoyed the prospect of a world holocaust over this issue. The Russians thought that Kennedy would back down from such a prospect when presented with the presence of the missiles as a *fait accompli*. Politically, as well as strategically, Kennedy could not tolerate their proximity. There was even talk of impeachment were he to do so.

Through it all, Castro had at last found the protection he sought against an American invasion and counterrevolution.

The crisis ended in a victory of sorts for all. The Soviets were happy to get out unscathed when they saw that they had badly miscalculated Kennedy's reaction. The United States was relieved to have the missiles withdrawn after the showdown. And Cuba profited from an agreement, however informal, that the United States would not again sponsor an invasion of Cuba. “The antagonists frightened each other into their senses—a rare instance in the history of human folly,” says Dinerstein.

The Making of a Missile Crisis should be required reading for the student of world diplomacy and Russian, Latin American, and United States foreign policy.

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THE CITY IN RUSSIAN HISTORY: Edited by *Michael F. Hamm*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1976. x, 350 pp. Maps. \$15.00.

Urban history has often been neglected by Western students of Russia. This collection is meant as “the first attempt outside the Soviet Union to examine the character of the Russian town . . . from the medieval period to the present” by “a new generation of specialists” (p. 1).

The first four essays cover very briefly the period from 1200 to 1800, starting with an explanation of the differences between medieval cities in Western Europe and those in Russia where the contrasts between town and country were less pronounced, among other things because serfdom arrived much later. Two essays deal factually with the effect of the central government on seventeenth and eighteenth-century Russian cities, but do not clearly explain either the scope of community self-rule or the burden of community services to the state. Gilbert Rozman's digest of his subsequent book *Urban Networks in Russia 1750–1800*, by far the most rigorous essay, analyzes the demography and spatial distribution of late eighteenth-century cities, showing that they contained up to 8.5 percent of Russia's population, about twice as much as Miliukov and other traditional historians had reckoned.

Six essays are devoted to the nineteenth century, beginning with a description of municipal government and its evolution following the reform of 1870 and the counter-reform of 1892. Richard Rowland's investigation of migration, based on the census of 1897 suggests that jobs in services, rather than jobs in factories, contributed most to urbanization at that time. By contrast, Roger Thiede demonstrates that, in the region of so-called New Russia at least, manufacturing growth did have a very strong impact on urbanization between 1860 and 1910. In addition, a case study is devoted to the development of New Russia's principal city Odessa, which grew from 7,500 people in 1800 to 656,000 in 1915. While this essay focuses on the interplay between the central and the local governments, an informative case study of Moscow deals with the spatial distribution of retail trade.

Discussion of the prerevolutionary period is marred by unsubstantiated assertions in the concluding essay by Michael F. Hamm. He writes that "at the beginning of the twentieth century, Vitebsk had no elementary school" (p. 186). A look at the *Brokgauz-Efron* encyclopedia shows that in 1888, long before the broad expansion of public education in the Duma period, Vitebsk had nine elementary and six secondary schools. He holds up as an example large local government expenditures for the upkeep of troops in the garrison town of Brest Litovsk (p. 184), but fails to mention that such expenditures averaged about 10 percent of municipal budgets nationwide. He grandly hypothesizes "a breakdown of urban modernization" and a general "deterioration" of urban conditions in Russia in the two decades preceding World War I (pp. 182–83, 186, 198), but fails to say that between 1904 and 1913 alone, municipal expenditures doubled in constant rubles, and increased 55 percent on a per capita basis. Obviously, the *level* of municipal expenditures in Russia was far below Germany or England, but the *trend* was one of expansion, despite the ill effects of the counterreform of 1892. This trend belies Hamm's "stagnation" hypothesis.

Five essays are devoted to the Soviet period, starting with an overview of urbanization in Russia and the USSR in a world context. "In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the pace of urbanization in Russia was, like the level of urbanization, apparently higher than world standards . . . since the turn of the century, the pace of urbanization in Russia and the USSR has been much higher than that of the world" (p. 207). Unfortunately, this essay lacks statistical tables and charts, limiting its use as a reference source. It is followed by articles examining the intellectual well-springs of Soviet urban planning: Frederick Starr deals imaginatively with the traditions of imperial classicism and the garden city, while Milka Bliznakov gives a more conventional treatment of Marxism and constructivist architecture. Concerning Soviet planning practice, David T. Cattell presents a sharply critical, if somewhat captious, account of the supply of housing, municipal services, and consumer goods; B. M. Frolic offers a very superficial discussion of the Moscow master plan.

Taken together, the compendium should interest both students of urbanism and students of Russia, providing an impetus for further research. Establishing the basic

demographic framework in the spirit of Gilbert Rozman and the work Chauncy D. Harris has published elsewhere seems to be a clear priority; clarifying the changes in municipal performance during the first two decades of this century is another fruitful subject; investigating the urban collapse of 1917–20, when Russian cities lost over 20 percent of their population, may be increasingly feasible. William L. Blackwell prefaces his conclusion, which fills in many gaps and provides an overview of the issues and is by far the most readable piece of the series, by saying that the compendium is but “a beginning” (p. 242).

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PATTERNS OF URBAN GROWTH IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By *Thomas Stanley Fedor*. Research Paper no. 163. Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1975. xxvi, 245 pp. Tables. Illus. \$6.00 (\$5.00, series subscription), paper.

This is a realistic study of urban growth in the Russian Empire during the nineteenth century. The author attempts to evaluate the urban data from the *revizii* and other civil administrative authorities, as well as to investigate the problems of delimiting urban settlements, and displays appropriate skepticism about the accuracy of the data. Even though a definitive appraisal of the data is impossible, he should be commended for his efforts, because all too frequently data are accepted without reservation or the slightest effort to evaluate them. The author then measures aggregate and regional urban growth for the overall period from 1810 to 1910 and for various intervals during the nineteenth century, largely delimited by the availability of data.

The chief purpose of the book is to establish the relationships between urban and economic growth in general and urban and industrial growth in particular. These objectives are accomplished in a very broad manner, without the use of mathematical statistics, which probably is a realistic use of the available urban, work force, and economic data if one is concerned mainly with changes over time. A more detailed investigation of data from the 1897 Census, however, would have added depth to the analysis of the processes involved. Urbanization in the nineteenth century is also briefly investigated. In the nineteenth century, there appears not to have been a significant relationship between urban growth or urbanization and industrialization in Russia, largely because most of the industrial employment was in rural areas. The last chapter is devoted to an explanation of this phenomenon. Although the interpretation in this chapter is interesting and valid, the author could also have investigated the expected relationships in countries in a similar stage of economic development. It is true that there are particularistic reasons for the absence of a relationship between urban growth and industrialization in Russia, but an understanding of the universal experience—that is, the available theory—would have contributed to the explanation of these processes, in that a relationship between these processes is generally not to be expected in the early stages of economic development.

This study is a significant contribution to our knowledge of urban processes in Russia in the nineteenth century. It should be of interest not only to students of nineteenth-century Russia, but also to those concerned with early urban development.

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