

their visits there were thirty years apart, John Dos Passos and Eleanor Roosevelt report similar feelings of relief upon departing. Max Eastman judges Stalinism to be worse than fascism, but Norman Thomas finds communism to be "far superior" to fascism. Hubert Humphrey, speaking in 1967 in Fulton, Missouri—the site of Winston Churchill's dour "iron curtain" speech twenty-one years earlier—views the future of American-Soviet relations optimistically.

The book's deficiencies should be noted. First, since the United States is diverse and the period covered is long, the book fails to mirror every facet and phase of American opinion. Second, the anthology does not treat narrow topics in detail: the broad nature of détente is portrayed, but the fine points of SALT are not. Third, one might wish for an introduction that attempts a sophisticated analysis of American views concerning the Soviet Union, such as William Welch's *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy* or Daniel Yergin's *The Shattered Peace*. Instead, Grayson merely charts the basic trends in the USSR and the corresponding shifts in American perceptions of the Soviet Union and thrusts the task of analysis upon the reader. In this respect, the present anthology may be useful as a supplementary text in academic courses on U.S.-Soviet relations.

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FIVE IMAGES OF THE SOVIET FUTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS. By *George W. Breslauer*. Policy Papers in International Affairs, no. 4. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1978. vi, 78 pp. \$2.50, paper.

During the last dozen years, Western analysts of the Soviet scene have expended considerable energy identifying and examining what they consider to be the basic characteristics of the contemporary Soviet sociopolitical system and forecasting the paths which that system may follow. In this book, George W. Breslauer, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, constructs an analytic framework in which to examine a number of current scholarly assessments of the Soviet present and future. He points out what he considers unanswered or ignored questions that these assessments raise. He concludes that the prospects for stability and durability of the system seem fairly high in the absence of prolonged and serious multiple crises that the leadership would be unable to contain or resolve.

Breslauer correctly suggests that predictions about the Soviet future must be based on a sound evaluation of the Soviet present. Thus, predictions of the Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov variety—based on the path each writer would like the Soviet system to take—are not very useful, for each spends precious little time analyzing the current situation or indicating how the system is likely to progress from what exists to what each prefers. Similarly, although Breslauer has chosen to include such authors as Amalrik and Yanov, who have a vision of the future and describe current trends so that they will almost necessarily lead to that future, their views are not very helpful in contributing to our understanding of the likely evolution of the system.

In addition to Amalrik and Yanov, Breslauer reviews the recent writings of a number of prominent scholars, including Brzezinski, Connor, Hough, Bialer, Lowenthal, and Roy Medvedev (he treats some more thoroughly than others). He subjects each writer's contributions to a scrutiny of such factors as the nature of interest group activity and the extent to which groups have been polarized within both the ruling elite and the larger society; the capability of the ruling elites to manage difficulties and crises (economic decline and consumer expectations, nationality aspirations, and so forth); the relationship of the elites to the masses and the extent to which the

latter are dissatisfied or disaffected; and the likely impact of various external events on the nature of Soviet rule. Since no one knows the correct assessment of all these elements, the best that anyone can do is to provide a reasonable analysis based on what is known or can be deduced. Each analysis is therefore open to debate and disagreement, and Breslauer painstakingly calls attention to the absence of supporting data, unlikely assumptions, and illogical arguments offered by each scholar. He is severely critical of scholars who predict instability based on the leadership's inability to handle multiple crises and of scholars who forecast incremental change despite increasing differentiation and polarization of interests as the likely future course. Moreover, he is unsympathetic to the theorists who anticipate a right-wing reaction—dictatorial in form, Russian nationalist and possibly militarist in content. (It is interesting that this view has been promoted primarily by Soviet émigrés and has not been embraced by respected Western analysts.)

On the whole, Breslauer's monograph is a useful, well-organized—though occasionally repetitive—review of the main contemporary lines of analysis regarding the probable evolution of the Soviet system. Discussions and debates on this topic have taken place for a number of years at dozens of scholarly conferences and at seminars conducted at the main centers for Soviet studies in this country and in Europe. They have also appeared in a number of widely circulated journals devoted to Soviet affairs. Thus, most interested scholars and observers are quite familiar with virtually all the arguments that Breslauer raises. His proposition (p. 2) that theorists, area specialists, and policymakers who read this short volume will acquire basic insights thanks to the methodology, classifications, analyses, and critiques included seems rather too ambitious. It is unlikely that many readers who are unfamiliar with most of the writings he analyzes will be inclined to peruse this monograph.

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CRISIS ON THE LEFT: COLD WAR POLITICS AND AMERICAN LIBERALS, 1947–1954. By *Mary Spering McAuliffe*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978. xii, 204 pp. \$12.50.

This short, modest book is not so much about the Cold War itself as it is about American liberals' and leftists' political reaction to deteriorating Soviet-American relations. International events enter into Professor McAuliffe's history as events triggering the various shifts and splits which divided "the American left." The focus is on the division between popular front liberals and those who insisted on breaking with, and in some cases on an all-out attack on, the American Communist Party and its Soviet overseers. The main actors are such groups as the Progressive movement, Americans for Democratic Action, the American Civil Liberties Union, various labor unions, and liberal journals. If the book has a theme it is that "in response to grave international danger as well as attacks from the political right, the majority of liberals at mid-century became reluctant to defend the rights of the least popular left-wing minority." The author finds this "liberal failure" to be "explainable and even understandable," but her accusatory tone earlier in the book implies otherwise: she claims that the liberal failure "marked a loss . . . for the nation as a whole," but she does not really elaborate or defend this proposition (p. 147).

*Crisis on the Left* covers some ground which will be familiar to readers of earlier works, such as Alonzo Hamby's *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*. Perhaps most interesting for students of U.S.-Soviet relations is McAuliffe's treatment of an earlier counterpart to the current debate about Cold War and détente. The continuities and parallels between revisionist historians