have been called 'broken patterns' in Matthew (notably in the anti-theses of the Sermon on the Mount) is harder to dispose of than Goulder's treatment allows, while the sayings in the gospel which express strict Jewish-Christian attitudes to, e.g., the observance of the Mosaic law or the evangelisation of the Gentiles can only be claimed as the evangelist's own, as the hypothesis demands, if he was himself that kind of unemancipated Jewish Christian. Goulder is not alone in maintaining this, though he takes an extreme position in arguing (in the teeth of the implications of Mt. 15^{1-20}) that Matthew's church actually observed not only the written but the Pharisaic oral Torah; but the position is hard to reconcile either with other parts of the evidence or with other aspects of his own case. It is improbable, for instance, that a church that still formed part of a federal union of Jewish synagogues (a point itself contradicted by Matthew's repeated reference to '*their* synagogues') would have read the letters of St Paul for instruction of life and manners. (His contention that 'Matthew, like the rabbis, assumes that the Temple will soon be rebuilt' (p. 397) is demonstrably false.) But the alternative is that Matthew included in his gospel sayings which did not fully represent his own point of view, and this implies access to a tradition of some sort, even if it was not very extensive. And if it was in Aramaic, a translator would necessarily have used his own characteristic vocabulary.

(iii) Whether Goulder's lectionary hypothesis for Matthew will fare any better at the hands of the experts on the first century synagogue than Carrington's for Mark or Guilding's for John remains to be seen. On the scores of research and coherence I would say that it deserves to. But the suggestion which he has picked up from Carrington, that the headed divisions of the text in *Codex Alexandrinus* and other ancient manuscripts not only have a lectionary basis (which is fine) but go back to the evangelists (which is problematical), may turn out to be the Achilles heel in his whole reconstruction, since it would seem to commit him to a lectionary origin not just for Matthew but for the other synoptics too, which trebles the difficulty of establishing the thesis. He offers an outline scheme (half-yearly) for Mark; the case for Luke (and Acts?) must wait for his next instalment.

He has thrown in a number of other hostages to fortune: what can only be called a highly idiosyncratic account of the early history of the apostolic church; large claims for the genuineness and in particular for the early circulation of the entire Pauline corpus (the Pastoral epistles alone excepted); a readiness to accept as authentic the sayings attributed to Jesus in Mark which assorts oddly with the stringency of his evaluation of those in Matthew. None of these is fairly confronted with the views which currently hold the field, let alone shown to be superior. Moreover, the brilliance of his style is like a covering of snow spread evenly over the thin and the solid ice, and some readers may complain of being unfairly dazzled by it. I enjoyed the humour of the lecturer's asides which he has admitted to the published text, but I fear that their effect on the German academic mind may be to discourage it from taking his case with the seriousness which the essentials of it deserve.

H. BENEDICT GREEN CR

THE SECOND GIFT: A Study of Grace, by Edward Yarnold. *St Paul Publications*, Slough, 1974. 217 pp. £2.50.

Perhaps in no other field of Catholic theology has the categorising zeal of the theologians been more misleading for the ordinary faithful than in the matter of grace. It is still the common belief that God's grace is like some substantial medicine which comes in distinct varieties for different occasions: actual grace, habitual grace, sanctifying grace, extraordinary grace, etc., and that it is the object of the Christian life to get as much of them as possible. The worst of it is that, as a result of this preoccupation with a substantialised grace, attention is distracted from what really matters: God himself on the one hand and ourselves transformed by him on the other. If the Christian life is a matter of God's self-communication with us, making us able and willing to communicate ourselves to him in return, there cannot be some third thing permanently interposed between us.

Any study of grace which helps to re-establish its unity and which shows it to be God's own gift of himself to man, thus enabling man to give himself to others, should be welcomed without

reserve. This is such a study. It is an extremely intelligent handling of the tradition, bringing out what is important in the distinctions and what their true status is for our understanding of the reality. Father Yarnold is not afraid of the plurality of theologies, showing how each honest attempt to account for the reality of our salvation yields only partial understanding. Orthodox and Lutheran objections to the Roman tradition are very sympathetically treated. The main intention of the book is to show that the transformation brought about by God's free gift of himself is 'not realised in experiences which are distinguishable from natural human experiences': that the acts I perform in virtue of God's grace are still *my* acts, freely done. The very illuminating chapter on the sacraments is the place where this truth is most clearly established. But the book, which represents the Sarum Lectures of 1973-74, covers many other important theological topics in the process. Give a copy to your parish priest or local Catholic teacher, even if you have to do it without saying it was recommended in *New Blackfriars.*

ROGER RUSTON OP

CONSCIENCE, by John Donnelly and Leonard Lyons, ed. *Alba House*, New York, distrib. *T. Shand Publications*, London, 1973. x & 249 pp. £2.50.

This well chosen collection of published papers on conscience gives a good sample of what has been written on conscience within the analytical tradition—and a bit beyond—in the last forty years or so. The papers of C. D. Broad, Professors Ryle, A. Campbell Garnett and A. Duncan-Jones, and the extract from Professor Nowell-Smith's *Ethics* are well enough known to require no commendation here. (In the case of the Broad and Ryle papers no great commendation would have been given. They are not papers by which those admirable philosophers should wish to be remembered.) Peter Fuss ('Conscience') suggests that 'the distinctive role of conscience in [a man's] moral life is to establish a felt need or disposition to act in accordance with his knowledge or belief, giving him a sense of integrity when he does as best he can, and a corresponding sense of inner failure, frustration, or guilt when, through some fault of his own, he fails to do so' (43). The analytical work in this paper could be better, and the phenomenological sections are too bald to be convincing. And how does one distinguish phenomenologically between failure through one's own fault and (what would otherwise be the same) failure not through one's own fault? Yet this is a stimulating paper. J. F. M. Hunter ('Conscience') briskly demythologises beliefs that seem to involve reference to some special entity called conscience: a little too simplistically, perhaps, yet well representative of a certain style of analysis. David Jones's 'Freud's theory of moral conscience' should be read, though it would have benefited from some historical scene-setting on theories of conscience. The Bishop Wand paper ('The content and function of conscience') comes down to doing some of what Mr Hunter was doing, and doing it less clearly than the latter was doing it.

What the Martin C. McGuire paper ('On conscience') seems to wish to say is not quite the same as what it does say. And had the author understood better what Professor Hare was saying, he could have put more clearly what he, Mr McGuire, wished to say, and could have avoided the kinds of infelicity to be found near the bottom of p. 150. The John Donnelly paper ('Conscience and religious morality') gives some historically dubious interpretations of Aquinas and Ockham on conscience. D. O. Thomas ('Obedience to conscience') wishes to argue that conscience requires that we do what we ultimately think we ought to do, and that it [text: 'is'] may be consistent with conscience to defer to the judgment of another' (184). I liked this paper: but will the distinction between 'private judgment' and 'ultimate judgment', crucial to the argument, serve its purpose? How, for instance, does what 'my adviser' thinks fail to come under *'all* the relevant data and reasons. . .'. (182) or, rather, why should that factor alone be weighted so differently from the others? The point is neither properly explained nor argued for. The John T. Granrose paper ('The authority of conscience'), trying to make sense of the notion of an 'authority' for conscience, could have done with closer attention to what it meant (and what it might otherwise sensibly have meant) by 'authority':