

# Praise of Astrology

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By the end of the seventeenth century, high culture had banished astrology as a mixture of superstition and imposture. The great astrological treatises of the past – in particular the Ptolemaic *Tetrabiblos* (whose very authenticity was cast into doubt) – stopped being published; a hodgepodge of minor writings, mostly preserved in manuscript form, lay mouldering in oblivion in the far recesses of libraries. It was only in the latter decades of the eighteenth century that the learned world began once again to pay attention to the ancient art, when historians of ancient religions and science began to realize the impossibility of exploring their subjects without taking into account a presence that could be neither denied nor underestimated. The history of astrology then began to take shape as a specific field of study, and historico-philological research was able to employ it as a tool for penetrating the tie between *mythos* and *logos*, at the origin of western civilization. Along with the image of the Greek miracle, an overly simplistic and schematic definition of reason and science began to decline. It was necessary to isolate, as Hermann Usener sought to do, the “wild germ of science” and to acknowledge the fact that logic and magic bloom on the same stem, as Aby Warburg has often reminded us, with reference to Jean Paul.

Along the trail that Usener began to blaze in the 1870s, it was above all Franz Boll (who with all the necessary philological rigor demonstrated the authenticity of the *Tetrabiblos*<sup>1</sup> and the inauthenticity of the *Karpos*), Franz Cumont (the promoter of the great *Catalogus codicum astrologorum graecorum*, the first volume of which was published in Brussels in 1898), and Auguste Bouché-Leclercq (the author of a major 1899 study, *L'astrologie grecque*) who reopened the debate on astrology.<sup>2</sup> Their writings made it possible

to shed light on the breadth and the decisive nature of astrological contributions to religious conceptions and images of the world, over a period spanning several millennia, from ancient Mesopotamian civilization to the high Middle Ages and the entire Renaissance era. In a series of *excerpta* from the Byzantine period, consigned to oblivion for centuries, Boll discovered in particular a map of the sky (*sphaera barbarica*) that was clearly different from the *sphaera graecanica*, which was based on the twelve constellations of the zodiac, and which Greek astronomers had drawn from the most ancient Babylonian observations. By dint of long painstaking investigations, he demonstrated that the *sphaera barbarica* derived from the list of stars (*paranatellonta*) that accompanied the rising of the zodiacal constellations, established in the first century B.C. by Teucre of Babylon, whose work had reached Islamic astrologers via Persia. In the ninth century, Teucre's catalogue was incorporated by Abu Ma'shar into astrological treatises that, translated into Latin, greatly influenced the revival of astrological studies in the West, beginning in the thirteenth century. Reconstructing these developments in his fundamental work, *Sphaera* (1903), Boll wrote an important page of the history of ideas, bringing back to light the long and extraordinary voyage of astrology, from its distant Babylonian roots to its codification in the Greek world, to its multiple rewritings in late antiquity, in the Islamic world and, later, once again, in the West.

Aby Warburg used these decisive advances in her memorable 1912 work on the frescoes of Schifanoia palace, opening up a new chapter in studies on the art of the Renaissance and the history of ideas in the Western world. The study of astrological illustrations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries not only enabled her to bring to the fore verifiable stylistic transformations over centuries, around a core of constant content; it also made it possible to discern, in a more general perspective, an important presence of ancient elements at the root of the modern world. Along the same lines, Fritz Saxl was later able to extend the boundaries of the investigation on the transmission of the classical figurative tradition to include the Middle Ages. Finally, an important point was marked by the collaboration between Erwin Panofsky and the same Saxl, on the production of a memorable 1923 study of *Melan-*

*colia* by Albrecht Dürer, which made it possible to confirm a point of great importance: the extent of the connection, in the artistic imagination of the Renaissance, between the motif of melancholy and the astrological theme of Saturn, thereby confirming the importance of the role played through the centuries by astrological motifs embedded in philosophical reflection and artistic inspiration. At the same time, it put forward the premises of a more extensive investigation into the long history of the theme of Saturn and the saturnine temperament, from Antiquity up until the modern age; a project that, after undergoing many vicissitudes, was finished after the Second World War by Panofsky and Klibansky.<sup>3</sup>

In Usener, the germ of interest in astrology was motivated by the reorganization of overly rigid oppositions between the mythico-religious approach and scientific thought, and by the conviction that a mythical dimension was to some extent inseparable from science itself. Astrology appeared to him as the very locus of the simultaneous, and perhaps inescapable, presence of the two approaches: insofar as it was rooted in the stock of European mythology, astrology clung to a primitive faith in the stars; at the same time, it used complex mathematical tools in a unique mix of rationality and superstition. Acknowledging the two faces of astrology meant restoring it to its place at the heart of a vast problematic, in connection with the nature of various forms of culture and their relations with one another.<sup>4</sup> This process also meant establishing the premises for a later reflection upon the cognitive status of astrology. In what sense, and on what levels, could it be configured as a science, and in what sense, and on what levels, as a religion? Where were the boundaries between its two faces?

These interrogations did not however play a central role in the research of Boll and Bouché-Leclercq, Cumont, Warburg, and Saxl. The characterization of astrology as a mix of religion and science, rationality and superstition, formed the backdrop for precise investigations into various aspects of a history that in the end ceased to appear as a chapter in the history of human stupidity; but at the same time it reinforced its image as a structurally hybrid form of knowledge. This is precisely the image that Ernst Cassirer revived in his analysis of the complex interrelations between the mythical approach and the rational approach, understood as typical forms

of thought. Its mix of mathematical exactitude and “fantastical and abstruse mysticism” made astrology, for Cassirer, like a sort of midpoint between the two extremes. Its way of bringing every event back to its relation with the stars made it “one of the most grandiose efforts ever undertaken by the human mind.” Astrological thought was halfway between myth and science, inasmuch as it was no longer content to collect cause and effect as contents, in the manner of myth, but rather sought to ground their relation in a general rule. Its limitation lay in the attempt to apply the universal category of legality to the particular case, which resulted in fantastical and extravagant procedures, instead of transforming all contents and all events into a complex large enough to achieve the pure universality of mathematical law. The laws of astrology were arbitrary and inconsiderate generalizations, and the power it had wielded over the greatest minds, including Tycho and Kepler, was virtually incomprehensible. In the culture of the Renaissance, the reconquest of the Olympian side of Antiquity had taken place in opposition to astrology – it could not have been otherwise – through a progressive distinction between philosophy and science on the one hand, and astrology and magic on the other; and through the affirmation of the modern concept of nature as against the astrological concept of destiny.<sup>5</sup>

With Cassirer, the relation between astrology, science, and philosophy at the beginning of the modern age became a specific object of investigation. Others also pursued this line of research: we need only recall Eric Weil’s dissertation on Pietro Pomponazzi, written under Cassirer’s direction and defended in Hamburg in 1928; or the same Weil’s later work in Paris on Pico della Mirandola and the critique of astrology.<sup>6</sup> But it was Eugenio Garin above all who extended the horizons of research, by investing large zones of late medieval and Renaissance culture in precise studies. The range of field thus defined is what enabled Garin to establish the precise framework for interpreting the relation between astrological tradition and the birth of modern thought, which thus became a field of study unto itself. Was the value of certain great critical and polemical works between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries really, as Cassirer would have it, in their desire to affirm themselves by eliminating any residue of ancient astral cults from

the conception of the sky and stars, in such a way as to edify rational, scientific, purely psycho-mathematical vision? Or rather were things less simple than this scheme suggests, and was there instead cause for more considered reflection on the fact that the postulates of astrology are independent of geocentrism, and that astrology did not completely disappear with the advent of the Copernican system?<sup>7</sup>

The questions thus posed were of the greatest significance; decades later they have lost nothing of their currency. The tendency to see in the astrologers' planets the planetary divinities of the ancient Mesopotamian religions (generators of abstruse divinatory practices) undeniably entailed reducing the long history of astrology, with its multiple and often divergent networks of development, to a sort of eternal repetition of the norms of the ancient astral religion. Once again, the emphasis on the connection to planetary cults and pagan divination resulted in astrology being seen as the prelogical ancestor of astronomy: a characterization that inverted the true historical link between the two disciplines, as Usener had already underlined. In the same way, numerous reconstructions of the history of thought and of modern science have taken as indisputable the equally unfounded idea that, in a studied symmetry, the irreversible decline of astrology corresponded to the birth of modern science. But above all there persisted the scheme according to which the predominance of the religious, fantastical element is characteristic of the primitive phases of the development of civilization, while the predominance of the logical, rational element is considered as peculiar to the more evolved phases: in the course of history, the imaginative approach and the scientific approach are seen as taking their places along a timeline, with one at the beginning and the other at the end. In keeping with this scheme is the thesis holding that astrology belongs to the first part of the sequence and is extraneous to the second. It has thus been taken for granted that astrology coincided with a belief in the stars, astral divination, a fatalistic vision of existence, a conception of the world based on the idea of astral influences – and that astrology was inherently linked to magic and occultism.

Anyone attempting to problematize this collection of assumptions and to confront the questions raised by Garin would find a

well-marked path ahead of him: that of a more thorough investigation of astrological discourse. After all, in the course of a history that has, with various vicissitudes, traversed all the phases of Western civilization, astrology has remained an object of interest to individuals of great intellectual energy. How can an interest in something that was merely a collection of absurdities be explained? Naturally, any disagreements with an author, or anything that defies explanation, can always be chalked up to the prejudices of his or her period; thus one can easily continue to maintain that Ptolemy and Campanella pursued astrology only by virtue of its organic connection with an image of the premodern world. But what can be said of those protagonists of the scientific revolution – Copernicus, Galileo, Tycho, and Kepler – who studied and practiced astrology; or of a post-Copernican such as Campanella; or of a twentieth-century psychiatrist, such as Carl Jung? Isn't the interest in astrology in these cases just an unexamined residue of the past, attesting to a lack of rational discernment? In reality, the fact of its survival over the centuries would all by itself be sufficiently noteworthy to awaken at least a suspicion. And what if the fatalism, superstition, and irrationality were but the fruit of philosophical interpretations and conceptions of astrology, which could be countered by other interpretations and other conceptions? What if there were, within astrology itself, nodes of exploration that were sufficiently articulated, and intellectually stimulating, to engage the legitimate interest of those who study it? If there were cause for asking the question of foundations, while wondering afresh what astrology really is? There would then be a whole group of questions that would have to be rethought from the beginning. What connection is there between belief in the stars and astrology as a specific discipline? What are the elements, both in technical terms and in terms of the goals and the meaning of research, that distinguish astrology from astral divination? Are the concepts of destiny and of astral influences intrinsic to astrology, or rather do they derive from specific philosophical interpretations of astrology? What is the relationship between astrology and the ancient philosophies of nature; and, more generally, between astrology and philosophy? In order to answer such questions, we must investigate astrology with a fresh

eye, but this time by restoring to it its character as an “art,” an operative knowledge whose multiple techniques must be explored with the requisite attention.

In most cases, the historians of science and of ideas who have dealt with astrology had only partial knowledge of its procedures and its structure as a discipline. And for good reason: since it was taken for granted that astrology was merely superstition and credulity, incompetence in the field could, unexpectedly, become a virtue. Thus, in a famous study of the sociological aspects of contemporary practice in astrology, Theodor Adorno had only to make a single, uneasy use of vaguely technical, specialized terms, such as quadrature, conjunction, opposition (terms actually used quite a bit more by astronomers than by astrologers) in order to give the impression that simply introducing them would surreptitiously transform the austere scientist into a credulous adept.<sup>8</sup> Authors of important histories of astrology have given ample proof of radical confusion about the rudiments of the discipline, with their misunderstandings of the meanings of terms such as house, dwelling place, decline; confusing the techniques of horary astrology with the study of transits; using the term progression ill-advisedly. When, in a crowning show of audacity, someone later showed that he knew how to follow the interpretation of a natal theme, he did so with a thousand disclaimers, virtually apologizing, in the role of the learned scientist amusing himself by trying his hand at a childish pastime that had nothing to do with his usual occupations. The histories of astrology have often taken shape as classic examples of external history. They have thoroughly explored, with results of major importance, the relations between astrology and culture, astrology and art, astrology and philosophy, astrology and literature; rarely have they asked questions about astrology itself, about its methods, about its periods and the ways in which they embody progress, about the friction between various tendencies, about the waxing and waning of attention devoted to various questions. The description of astrological techniques has too often remained sketchy, to the point that astrologers could not recognize their own procedures in such techniques. In one sense, this is understandable: the internal history of astrology presupposes a competence that the historians of

ideas do not ordinarily possess. This is why – as Cardan knew well<sup>9</sup> – studies of astrology prove difficult; this is also why we are a far cry from leaving behind the conviction that, although a concern for the interaction between astrology and culture is not misplaced, it is highly inappropriate to be concerned with astrological methodology. And yet, how can one write the history of something of which one has only indirect knowledge? Since, as Marx said so aptly, ignorance will never be an argument, it is necessary to concentrate our attention with equal seriousness on the techniques, procedures, and modalities of astrological work, and to study astrology, this unknown entity, with the same rigor that one would apply to any other object of study.

Whoever decides to open a good manual on astrology, and acquires a sufficient mastery of the basic techniques, is exposed to an undeniable surprise: the *royal art* is far from being a jumble of arbitrary generalizations or chaotic associations of ideas. True, it does consist of a group of techniques that have various origins, objectives, and structures, some of which bear the mark of divinatory interpretations and practices. But within the field, the fundamental procedures, those at the base of the *coupure*<sup>10</sup> from the oldest forms of astral divination, are perfectly formalized and coherent. These are the procedures of the horoscope, or genethliac astrology, the object of which is to establish and analyze the natal theme: precise mathematical methods, whose logic leaves no room for fantasy, nor does it require compromise with what belongs to the realm of illumination. The goal of genethliac astrology is to describe the individual temperament according to the hypothesis of correspondence: that, between the planetary positions at the moment and place of birth on the one hand, and individual dispositions on the other, it is possible to presume a connection in virtue of which the study of the former would make it possible to formulate reasonable conjectures as to the latter. To every sign, every planet, every distance among the planets that is considered as significant, astrology assigns a bundle of significations that are then explored in their countless combinatory possibilities, until a full description of each unique personality has been obtained. If this is a basic astrological technique, the consequences it has for the historian of ideas are extremely important. The first of these conse-

quences is that astrology is neither a religion, nor a world system, nor a philosophy, even if it may have had and may still bear a connection to all of these; on the contrary, it is properly speaking a technical craft. The second consequence is that at least some of the procedures that it employs are of a logico-mathematical nature, without any connection whatsoever to the universe of occultism and magic. The third is that astrology begins with the ancient astral religion, but secularizes its contents by using the planets alone as a key to reading the human inclinations with which they are considered to correspond. From this perspective, there is reason to contemplate another of Jung's observations: that astrology is something like a *summa* of all the psychological knowledge of Antiquity, and its historical function has been to secularize the reference to the ancient deities that it has properly transformed into human attributes (martial, jovial, saturnine, erotic, logical, lunatic, and so on).<sup>11</sup> Moreover, as far as the relation with astronomy goes, astrology, the daughter and not the parent of Greek astronomy, contains no element that would make it incompatible with Copernican astronomy. As for the connection with magic: astrology is not a magical discipline, even forms of astral magic have been known to exist that have introduced certain astrological themes into another context. In sum, concerning its specific research status: it is a discipline endowed with a logical foundation, the first to have attempted to grasp, according to defined rules, the difficult object of investigation that is the human psyche.

The recognition within the field of astrology of a logically constituted, powerful core of knowledge enables the historian to cease tracing a line of demarcation – which would likely crop up several times within the same work – between what belongs to astrology (and thus to superstition and the irrational), and what is on the contrary rational and scientific. We are no longer obliged to suppose, with Gassendi, that there were two Ptolemies, a serious scientist who authored the *Almageste* and a credulous astrologer who wrote the *Tetrabiblos*; nor must we advance the even more radical hypothesis that the *Tetrabiblos* was not the work of Ptolemy. We no longer need play down the interest shown by major figures in astrology, to the point of censoring from editions of their works the pages devoted to astrology – as happened with Favaro, the major-

ity of whose manuscript on Galileo, the *Astrologica nunnulla*, was left unpublished; or with Amabile, who refused to exhume from its entombment in libraries one of the most important fruits of Thomas Campanella's astrological work, the nativity of Filiberto Vernat. Finally, we are no longer obligated to attribute to economic difficulties, rather than to true intellectual interest, the horoscopes drawn up by Galileo and Kepler; nor to invoke weakness of character as the reason for Marsile Ficino's inability to detach himself from the passion of astrology, which as a philosopher he had nevertheless condemned. It becomes equally possible to distinguish with the greatest precision between astrology, as a technical craft, and conceptions of astrology that have been built upon the relation it enjoyed with various philosophies. It is undeniable that the astrological hypothesis of correspondence suggests a series of philosophical questions. One can wonder whether it refers to a direct influence of the stars upon man – as suggested by the term influence – or rather whether it should be interpreted as a concomitance that, while irreducible on the level of causality, calls for reference to another level of being. Must astral influence, if that is what we wish to retain, be understood as a physical fact that is internal to the natural world, or must it be interpreted as an effect that, while intervening on a physical level, is the vehicle for providential intervention? To take up the terms of an ancient debate: are the stars causes, and in what sense are they causes; or are they signs; or are they both causes and signs? Or again: what relation is there between the natural inclinations that can be diagnosed by astrology, on the one hand, and personality or true character, on the other; between the inclinations and the experience of existence? In what way does astrology really insert itself into the discussion of themes such as destiny, masks, and the world as a stage?

It is not surprising that, over the centuries, various interpretations have been constructed and various philosophical images of astrology have been born. But it has also happened that one or another of these interpretations or conceptions has been identified, either by astrologers or by philosophers, with astrology *tout court*.<sup>12</sup> First between astrology and stoicism, and then between astrology and late peripateticism, such all-encompassing relations have been described that they gradually came to represent, in sto-

icist fatalism and particularly in peripatetic cosmology, a sort of spontaneous philosophy of astrologers, and to render inconceivable the survival of astrology outside of the forms thus established. That astrology coincides with a specific vision of the world; that it is inseparable from the theme of universal necessity; that it is inherently linked to particular cosmological presuppositions, such as to geocentrism and to anthropocentrism: these are all conclusions that derive not from the specificity of its technical craft, but rather from so many images, from so many philosophical interpretations of astrology. A knowledge of the procedures of this craft thus makes it possible to evaluate better the characteristics and limits of each of these conceptions; to focus on the conflict that is so often found within a single author (it sometimes happens, as in Ficino's case, that one conception of astrology is rejected while another one is accepted); to evaluate the influence that one or another conception may have exercised upon the development and articulation of its techniques.<sup>13</sup> External history and internal history thus become singularly interconnected; it is not to be doubted, for example, that fatalistic interpretations of astrological prediction, influenced first by stoicist thought and then by the Islamic realm, took the form of a proliferating series of technical references aimed at predictions of the future that claimed perfect accuracy. But among the numerous problems that a more direct knowledge of astrology enables the historian to see in a new light, there is one more that must be mentioned: the relation between astrology and the Copernican revolution.

If we admit that the process of mathematization constitutes the main axis of the scientific revolution, it must be remarked that astrology accomplished its own revolution when it distinguished itself from ancient Mesopotamian divination, from which it had indeed drawn a series of points of reference, by defining the procedures of the horoscope; a development that took place in the Greek world beginning in the fifth century B.C. As for its techniques, they remained fairly stable in their general outlines, and they were transmitted with a remarkable degree of impermeability over the centuries. The moments of innovation in the history of astrology are tied to reciprocal relations between the different traditions, as occurred at the time of contact between Greco-Babylon-

ian astrology and Egyptian divination, which gave rise to the first definition of the procedures of house division, or within the Islamic domain, which was open to other procedural suggestions of Indian origin; or again, these moments are linked to philosophical conceptions of astrology, such as the fatalism discussed above. No decisive change in astrology – the establishment of new and more precise ephemerides cannot be included in this category – is linked to what is called the Copernican revolution. As for astrology's divorce from high culture, at the close of the seventeenth century, this stemmed not so much from a crisis internal to astrology as from the collapse of the natural philosophy to which astrology had, from a certain point on, seemed indissolubly linked – the collapse of an Aristotelism that was henceforth supplanted by the triumph of the mechanistic interpretation of the world. It was therefore not science, but at most the new philosophy, that placed astrology at the margins of the university.

However, the ancient art, though long relegated to the margins of culture, succeeded in surviving this crisis as well; and the new astronomical discoveries – of Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto – subsequently forced astrologers at the end of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century to redefine some of their references, and above all to rehabilitate the astrological signification of Saturn, the evil entity of ancient astrology. Not even the birth of modern psychology, the discipline that, more than any other, could specifically challenge astrology on its own turf, vanquished it in the end; rather, astrology absorbed numerous psychoanalytic and psychological references, with sometimes mixed but also surprisingly innovative results. More precise investigations, freed not only from conventional notions but also from quantities of entrenched misinformation, call into question the stereotypical antagonism between astrology and modernity, and offer further proof – if any more were needed – that the paths of intelligence are more complex than simplistic models would lead us to believe.

*Translated from Italian into French by Denis Trierweiler  
Translated from the French by Jennifer Curtiss Gage*

## Notes

1. For a modern English edition, see Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, ed. by T.E. Robbins, London, Cambridge.
2. The reader is referred above all to Usener's 1873 essay on Censorino and to his 1901 review of A. Bouché-Leclercq's *L'astrologie grecque*, both found in H. Usener, *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1912), vol. 3, pp. 11-21 and pp. 372-376. The question of Ptolemaic texts is discussed in F. Boll, "Studien über Claudius Ptolemaeus," *Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie*, Suppl. vol. 21, 1894, pp. 52-244.
3. A. Warburg, "Art italiana et astrologie internationale au Palazzo di Schifanoia à Ferrara," in Aby Warburg, *Essais florentins*, intro. Evelyne Pinto (Paris, 1990), pp. 197-220 ("Arte italiana e astrologia internazionale nel Palazzo Schifanoia de Ferrara," 1912, in *La Rinascita del paganesimo antico* [Florence, 1980<sup>2</sup>]; again in M. Bertozzi, *La tirannia degli astri: Gli affreschi astrologici di Palazzo Schifanoia* [Livorno, 1999<sup>2</sup>]); F. Saxl, *La storia delle immagini* (Bari, 1982/2), and *La fede negli astri. Dall'antichità al Rinascimento*, edited by S. Settis (Turin, 1985). The essay by Panofsky and Saxl, *Dürers "Melencolia I": Eine Quellen- und Typengeschichtliche Untersuchung*, *Studien der Bibliothek Warburg*, II (Leipzig-Berlin, 1923), underwent long and adventurous reworkings before finally being published as R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art* (London and New York, 1964).
4. F. Boll, *Sphaera. Neue griechische Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Sternbilder* (Leipzig, 1903; Hildesheim, 1967).
5. E. Cassirer, *La forme du concept dans la pensée mythique. Oeuvres VI* (Cerf, 1997), p. 73; *The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. M. Domandi, Oxford, 1963. (*Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance. Studien der Bibliothek Warburg*, X [Leipzig, 1927]).
6. E. Weil, *La philosophie de Pietro Pomponazzi. Pic de la Mirandole et la critique de l'astrologie* (Paris, 1985).
7. E. Garin, *Astrology in the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life*, trans. C. Jackson and J. Allen (London, 1983). (*Lo zodiaco della vita. La polemica sull'astrologia dal Trecento al Cinquecento* [Roma-Bari, 1976/2 (1943)]). But at least two other essays by Garin should also be consulted: "Magie et astrologie dans la culture de la Renaissance" and "Considérations sur la magie," in *Moyen Âge et Renaissance*, trans. Claude Carme (Paris, 1969) (*Medioevo e Rinascimento*, Bari, 1954).
8. Theodor W. Adorno, "The Stars down to Earth: The Los Angeles Times Astrology Column, A Study in Secondary Superstition," in *Soziologische Schriften*, II (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1975).
9. "Est igitur Astrologia, ut pulcherrima, sic laboriosissima et difficillima," G. Cardano, *Aphorismorum astrologicorum segmenta septem, 1547*, in *Opera Omnia* (Lugduni, 1663), vol. 5, p. 31.
10. In French in the original Italian text.
11. Carl G. Jung, *Nécrologie de Richard Wilhelm*, in *Oeuvres*, vol. 13 (1930); *Études sur l'alchimie; commentaire du secret du nombre d'or* (1929). Italian version in *Opere*, vol. 13, *Studi sull'alchimia* (Turin, 1988), p. 70; *Commeno al Segreto del fiore d'oro*, *ibid.*, p. 45.
12. In French in the original Italian text.
13. For more in-depth development of these observations, the reader is referred to O. Pompeo Faracovi, *Scritto negli astri. L'astrologia nella cultura dell'occidente* (Venice, 1996).