

Gabriel Marcel, philosopher of mystery: a centenary appraisal

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Gabriel Marcel was born one hundred years ago this year. It seems fitting, then, to attempt a re-evaluation of a philosopher who was one of the seminal minds of Catholicism in the mid-twentieth century. For it follows from the nature of Catholic tradition, as an organically developing communion in Christ and his Spirit, that no such mind ever becomes 'irrelevant': that is, out of relation to other spirits that follow it in history. The difficulty with introducing Marcel's religious philosophy, however, lies not so much in any seeming obsolescence, but in the character of that centre to which, again and again, Marcel returned. He was a 'philosopher of mystery'.

Notoriously, he disliked philosophical systems, which he regarded as an affront to the Socratic spirit of continuous questioning in the search for truth. As a result, Marcel nowhere offers a systematic exposition of his own philosophy of religion. He preferred to present many of his reflections in the deliberately unsystematic form of a journal, a diary or an occasional article. At times, his meditations sprang from crucial events of his own life-time. But undergirding everything he wrote lies a constant concern to highlight the unchanging and ultimate issues of existence. He wanted to restore to words a power of signifying of which, he felt, they had been denuded. In so doing, he would help give back to language its power to reveal *le poids ontologique*, the 'ontological weight', of human experience. This 'weight' produces a bias—*pondus meus, amor meus*, inverting Augustine's adage about how love carries one away—and this bias, if we follow where it tends, directs us towards the reality of God. In this essay I shall try to retrace the Marcellian path to transcendence whose crucial steps are three: the mystery of human personhood, the mystery of inter-subjectivity, and the mystery of hope. But let us begin with a word about the man and his setting.

Biographical sketch, and starting-point

F.H. Heinemann, the chronicler of twentieth-century Existentialisms, has described the conversations in Marcel's home in the 1920's where and when, in discussion with Nicholas Berdyaev, Louis Lavelle and René La Senne, Marcel worked out many of the basic themes of his writing. It is characteristic of the Christian Existentialism of Marcel that it should

derive in this way from dialogue—or, rather, polylogue—with Orthodox and Catholic thinkers in a setting which can be called, therefore, corporate and ecclesial. Heinemann summed up the man as ‘a complex and polyphonic nature’.¹ Dramatist and critic, composer as well as lover of music, if primarily philosopher, Marcel could scarcely have been less than many-faceted. In his autobiographical essay ‘Regard en arrière’ he sketched what he himself took to be significant in his personal background.² Born in December 1889 in a privileged section of French society, his father a diplomat and later administrator in the arts, Marcel’s childhood was tense and unhappy. His mother, a Jew, died when he was four, and his father, an agnostic of Catholic background, married his deceased wife’s sister. A silence fell on his mother’s memory, due to fastidiousness or perhaps despair (he claimed he did not know which). Against the foil of this experience, the two other principal features of his boyhood stood out the sharper: the dominativeness of his aunt-stepmother and the total impersonality of his schooling. He wrote later:

A mind is metaphysical insofar as its position within reality appears to it essentially unacceptable. ... It is in a false position. The problem is to correct this or to bring about an easing of the tension. Metaphysics is just this correction or this relief.³

Père Roger Troisfontaines, whose massive study of Marcel’s thought is based, like Heinemann’s essay, on personal conversation as well as published texts, stresses the role of the First World War in bringing home to Marcel the full force of this bereavement and so providing him with the departure-point of his philosophy.⁴ Because of his indifferent health, he was not conscripted when war broke out, but spent the war years in the service of the French Red Cross. His work was to trace missing soldiers and it often brought him into contact with bereaved families and their anguish. The reactions of his ‘clients’ drew out of depths of memory his own childhood question: ‘What becomes of the dead?’⁵ He called these encounters ‘a first apprenticeship in inter-subjectivity’⁶. Biological extinction was undeniable; yet the sense of inter-subjective communion seemed often to rise above it. Once again, the ‘false position’, the apparent antinomy which engenders metaphysics, lay round about him.

An outstanding contemporary interpreter of Marcel summed up the departure-point of his philosophy in this way:

For Marcel, philosophising begins in dissatisfaction with the situations in which we find ourselves. He likens the metaphysician to a sick person who is tossing and turning to find a comfortable position. If there is no discomfort, that is, if there are no antinomies in our experience, there is no need and in fact no sense or possible meaning in trying to make the antinomic intelligible by philosophical reflection.⁷

In 1929 the resources of meaning Marcel could bring to these seeming contradictions in experience were to be enlarged. Under the influence of the novelist François Mauriac, he presented himself for baptism in the Catholic Church. His Christian faith appears to have come to him through a sense of the imaginative power of the Gospel to interpret existence. He ascribed it (in all seriousness) to the Cantatas of J.S. Bach. The orientation to Catholic, rather than Protestant, Christendom was by no means a foregone conclusion. But in the end he felt he divined in Catholicism a stronger echo of his own sense of inter-subjectivity, *communio sanctorum*.⁸ His faith was to be not so much the object of his philosophical exploration as its energy. He was not in any classic sense a Christian apologist, but he discovered in faith *le point de rajeunissement absolu*, 'the absolute point at which youth is renewed'.⁹ His own death took place in 1973.

The mystery of human personhood

Marcel's most characteristic writing, so far as style reveals the man, is his *Journal métaphysique*, a diary filled with day-to-day reflections on philosophical problems, scattered seeds of thought cracking open in germination, drafts of prospective metaphysical essays. Philosophy was never likely to be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, a line neatly ruled across the page, since its central questions are not so much problems as 'mysteries'. Fragments, not treatises, are therefore the proper literary form of the philosophical enterprise. It is not too much to say that for Marcel the central philosophical questions *are* mysteries because they are all aspects of the single concrete mystery of man himself.¹⁰ To convey his understanding of the human situation, Marcel often invokes the symbol of a traveller or pilgrim. *Homo viator* is en route to a destination which he will not reach during his temporal existence but towards which he is inexorably drawn. For the moment, however, we should concentrate not on the antinomy travelling/arriving but on the mysteriousness of human personhood which requires it to be thought in terms of a symbol, not a concept.

So little does Western society cherish the human person, according to Marcel, that the very idea of personhood is becoming ever harder to grasp. The mastery over nature which technology has brought tends not to enhance and liberate human beings but to debase them into units or objects. Persons are treated as though their reality could be expressed in terms of the functions they perform.

The present age seems to me to be characterised by the misplacement of the idea of function. ... The individual tends to appear to himself and to others as a simple bundle of functions ... an aggregate of functions whose inner order is bafflingly problematic.¹¹

At the root of the abuse of science Marcel identified what he called the 'spirit of abstraction' in philosophy. This spirit is present whenever there

is an exclusive emphasis on one particular aspect of reality, coupled with a deliberate policy of refusing even to raise questions about adjacent regions of existence thereby excluded. The inevitable outcome is a distorted and truncated philosophy of the person. To come to terms with personhood, the partiality and myopia of current ideology must be overcome by a process Marcel termed 'recollection', *receuillement*. Through this process a person can regain his self-possession in the most fundamental sense of the word. But here the questioner, the man who wants to know what 'personhood' is, finds himself inextricably involved in his own question¹². There is no possibility of a detached stance. Instead, we are faced not with a problem but with a mystery. This is the classic instance of a Marcellian mystery, defined as 'a problem that encroaches upon the intrinsic conditions of its own possibility (and not upon its data)'.¹³

No doubt that many people would say that to make the human person into a metaphysical 'mystery', bathed in some transfiguring light, is evidence of a good heart rather than of a strong mind. Marcel disagrees, and goes to some lengths to show that the 'recuperative' thinking he recommends is no less solidly based than more analytic or systematic styles of philosophising. He begins by making a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' reflection. A first level of reflection by which we distance ourselves from lived experience, separates us from the objects of our experience—albeit often for desirable, even necessary, purposes. Analysis makes it possible for us to recognise those objects as other than ourselves, and to recognise ourselves as subjects, distinct from the objects of our experience. But the clarity we achieve in this way is bought at a price. It does not really belong to our lived experience: it is a mediation of that experience through deciding to don thinking-caps. Within this modification of experience empirical science and common sense are rightly monarchs of all they survey. But we must reserve the right to ask how it was possible for us to make this useful distinction of subject and object in the first place. And in putting this question, a 'secondary' level of reflection opens up. We discover that the distinction and separation of subject and object rest upon a more fundamental belonging together, a *commercium* in lived experience. In this way thought can become recuperative, a therapy helping us to recover from the ruptures in our account of experience which primary reflection generates.¹⁴

Marcel was perfectly well aware that other philosophical options available in contemporary France resembled his in rejecting an uncommitted, neutral stance towards these questions of personal identity, but, unlike his, returned to the most pessimistic of answers. Above all, there was the formidably influential figure of J.-P. Sartre. At the root of Sartre's nihilism lies a vivid experience of existence as contingent, absurd, superfluous, a distorted version of Heideggerian philosophical sensibility. On this nihilism Professor Gerald Hanratty has

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written:

Marcel does not doubt that this initial experience is genuine. Rather his objection is that Sartre succumbs completely to it and makes no attempt to question its validity and finality. The initial experience is buttressed by a refusal to be consoled, by a rejection of all possible sources of light and hope.¹⁵

Marcel responds to the Sartrean challenge by pointing out that such stark despair itself witnesses to an urgent need for deliverance and fulfilment in the depths of the person. The denial of intelligibility, in which the core of nihilism consists, is conditional on an awareness of the possibility of affirmation. To experience the void is only within our powers if at the same time we have a notion of what fulfilment might be. In this way, Marcel coaxes us into adverting to a thirst for meaning within us, termed by him a 'demand', 'exigence', 'appeal' or 'need' for being.¹⁶ Seen in this light, the metaphysician has what amounts to a quasi-salvific role vis-à-vis humanity. Metaphysics is 'the exorcising of despair', a despair characterised as:

total submission to (the) void, in such a way as to allow oneself to be dissolved interiorly by it. The closed time of despair is a sort of counter-eternity, an eternity forced back on itself, the eternity of hell.¹⁷

But what reasons are there to suppose that to our 'desire for being', or thirst for meaning, there corresponds some appropriate depth and reliability in reality itself? Marcel refuses to give this question an answer that is independent and free-floating from the person who posed it. He will not claim to show that this depth in being exists 'out there' in a way which brackets off the questioner himself (thus confining the mystery to the limits of a problem). But he is not simply saying that psychologically we are so structured that we must act *as if* being had such a character. Deeper than our conscious experience, though pointed to by it, our ontological structure testifies to the fact that this is what the wider reality in which we are placed is genuinely like. First of all, our ability to raise the question of personhood itself indicates our 'spiritual' nature. We are involved in the world of things, but we also transcend that world and are aware of doing so. Secondly and more profoundly, when I put the question 'What am I?' I give voice to an appeal for meaning which stems from the depths of the self: but this appeal doesn't make sense unless an answer could be simultaneously certain and yet rooted in my own inner being.

I can only refer myself without contradiction to a judgment which is absolute, but which is at the same time more within me than my own judgment. ... Perhaps in proportion as I take cognizance of this appeal *qua* appeal, I am led to recognise that the appeal is possible only because, deep down in me, there is something other than me, something further

within me than I am myself—and at once the appeal changes its index.¹⁸

But this highly Augustinian approach to transcendence through personal interiority is hedged about with a number of ‘perhaps’-es in Marcel’s text, and it is not in fact his *distinctive* account of the relation between personhood and transcendence.

The mystery of inter-subjectivity

Marcel’s principal reason for regarding man’s thirst for meaning as ontologically informative is more characteristically his own. He points out that our language is full of verbs of promising, engaging, committing, vowing faithfulness and the like. We have a capacity to bind self with a promise, to commit self so unconditionally that the remit of commitment can extend to the sacrifice of life itself. Marcel takes this as evidence for what he calls the ‘supratemporal identity of the subject’. Our picture of the universe must take into account the fact that it has nurtured a finite being who yet transcends time. The account of interiority just cited from *Being and Having* does not do justice to what is most intimately constitutive of our existence as persons. Marcel deliberately displaces the Cartesian *cogito* and replaces it with his own *sumus*: ‘we are’.

A complete concrete knowledge of oneself cannot be self-centred; however paradoxical it may seem, I should prefer to say that it must be centred in others. We can understand ourselves by starting from the other, or from others, and only by starting from them... Fundamentally I have no reason to set any particular store by myself, except in so far as I know that I am loved by other beings who are loved by me....¹⁹

In its own intrinsic structure subjectivity is already, and in the most profound sense, genuinely inter-subjective....²⁰

To live a personal existence is to live in communion with others. In his search for transcendence, Marcel relies much more on experiences of interpersonal communion than on an analysis of pure interiority. He concentrates on the experiences of faithfulness, love and—above all—hope, as crucial and complementary features of inter-subjective relationship. Reflection on these experiences at their highest and most creative testifies that they are grounded in fidelity to, love for and hope in the eternal and absolute Being without whom they remain destined to ultimate frustration.

The approach to transcendence by way of *fidelity* proceeds by a meditation on the nature of promising. As Nietzsche had recognised, man is the only being in nature who is capable of making a promise. This power to bind self by a promise gives man a certain transcendence over the flux of time. But fidelity cannot be defined in terms of the individual. It resists identification with such limited virtues of the agent as resoluteness, constancy, reliance on one’s own resources. Fidelity is

always a gift of self to another who is at once present to the self and accepted by it as a unique person—in Marcel's favourite word, a 'thou'. But in all such faithful relationships there is always a tiny seed of deception and betrayal. No one can be absolutely sure that such a relationship will not perish from within. In addition, there is the external threat of death, the gravest of all threats to communion. Fidelity is vindicated only if it triumphs over these hostile powers. If fidelity is really to be a total, irrevocable commitment of self, then it has to be grounded in a Presence which cannot fail.

It is in this way that fidelity reveals its true nature, which is to be an evidence, a testimony. It is in this way too that a code of ethics centred on fidelity is irresistibly led to become attached to what is more than human, to a desire for the unconditional which is the requirement and the very mark of the Absolute in us.²¹

In its highest reaches, then, fidelity is a sharing in the infinite faithfulness of an absolute Presence or 'Thou'. And Marcel hazards that there may be a kind of negative confirmation between loss of belief in God on the one hand and an increasing incidence of lack of fidelity between persons on the other. By contrast, the contours of fidelity are seen at their sharpest in the case of the martyr who witnesses on behalf of others to his total confidence in God.

The theme of fidelity leads on naturally to that of *love*. For Marcel our earliest tutoring in love takes the form of hospitality. In receiving a guest we ask no precise information about his status, nor do we expect anything in the objective order from his coming. Instead, we convey to him the sense that we welcome him without conditions, freely and entirely.

To receive a guest is, no doubt to enrich him, but it is also to enrich oneself—not on the plane of the immediately useful but on that of the communion of 'I' and 'thou'. Hospitality reaches out to that in man which goes beyond the domain of having, it reaches the realm of being and so it is the beginning of love.²²

As human love grows its affirmations change their inflection. They become charged with an unconditionality which is the mark of absolute co-presence. Love says, under many metaphors and turns of phrase: 'Thou, thou at least shalt never die'. Thus love leads of its nature to a proclamation of the indestructibility of communion. In this sense, Marcel unforgettably remarks '*metaphysics is our neighbour*'. Belief in immortality is, therefore, the most common symptom of the existence of genuine love, for love refuses all objectification of the beloved (including an objectification in terms of '*mortal organism*') in favour of the act of pure presence.

The dead person can no longer show himself, not because he has fallen back into nothingness but because his mode of

presence implies precisely that he cannot descend to the level of the inventory-list (*l'inventoriable*). The caricature of love sketched in terms of 'having' is situated entirely in the register of the 'him'; but 'mystery' plunges us into the world of the 'thou'.²³

The mystery of hope

From here we move effortlessly to the motif of hope in Marcel, and so we return to the content rather than to the mode of the symbol of the wayfarer, *homo viator*. Thinking perhaps of his war-time work among the relatives of captured or fallen French soldiers, he wrote:

If it is true that man's trial is infinite in its varieties and can assume the innumerable forms under which we can know privation, exile or captivity, it is no less certain that, by a symmetrical but inverted process, each one of us can rise by his own special path from the humblest forms of communion which experience offers the most despised to a communion which is both more intimate and more abundant, of which hope can be regarded equally well as the foreshadowing or the outcome.²⁴

To clarify the specific qualities of hoping, Marcel is at pains to distinguish it from desire. Whereas desire is always geared to definable objectives, hope is not concerned with particular states of affairs. Desire is the anticipation that we will acquire a given object, whereas hope does not predict or even try to imagine outcomes. Far from basing itself on calculation of what is possible in this or that situation, hope consists in a refusal to be bound by the limits which calculation would set. As such, it is for Marcel our most direct means of apprehending the meaning of the word 'transcendent'.

For hope is a spring; it is the leaping of a gulf. It implies a kind of radical refusal to reckon possibilities, and this is enormously important. It is as though it carried with it, as postulate, the assertion that reality overflows all possible reckonings; as though it claimed in virtue unknown secret affinity, to touch a principle hidden in the heart of things, or rather in the heart of events, which mocks such reckonings.²⁵

Hope is a 'piercing through time', a river flowing through and beyond the empirically accessible, and having 'estuaries (which) do not lie entirely within the bounds of the visible world'.²⁶ To hope, in the pregnant Marcellian sense, is to have an 'absolute', not a calculating, confidence.

We can ... conceive, at least theoretically, of the inner disposition of one who, setting no condition or limit or abandoning himself in absolute confidence, would thus transcend all possible disappointment and would experience a security of his being, or in his being, which is contrary to the

radical insecurity of *having*. This is what determines the ontological position of hope—absolute hope, inseparable from a faith which is likewise absolute.²⁷

Such 'absolute hope', though statistically unusual, cannot be deemed humanly abnormal. Human hope has always exerted itself most forcefully in the face of experiences that appear to spell utter defeat. Marcel bids us ask how such hope can arise, and what are the conditions which render intelligible hope's refusal to be overcome by circumstances. He holds that such features of the human landscape only make sense if they are contextualised within a wider whole. What he says in this regard of fidelity is equally pertinent to a discussion of hope.

In order for my limited acts of fidelity to be meaningful they must find their place in an order of reality in which it is already given that fidelity is preferable to infidelity. It is this givenness of fidelity, in which my fidelity partakes, which is the unconditional basis for my finite fidelities, and which is ultimately the 'place of being'.²⁸

In the language of John Henry Newman in the *Grammar of Assent*, we have here an exercise of the illative sense, apprehending through the particularities of experience a transcendent ground of hope and fidelity. Here our 'ontological exigency', or thirst for meaning, comes into contact with its own satisfaction. All attempts to 'demystify' such absolute and unconditional fidelity, with a view to undermining the move to transcendence which they trigger off, are reductionist: they reduce to something less than itself the reality of experience. Yet the reality of experience, when critically tested and explored, is also the experience of reality.

The preservation of our humanity has certain transcendental conditions. The artist striving to complete a creative act against all odds and in failing health; the person who risks life and limb to defend innocent victims of oppression; the man or woman who sacrifices their own interests to come to the aid of their afflicted fellows: all of these are practising a hope-filled courage which is a pointer to an ultimate Providence. Professor Peter Berger in a Marcellian moment in his *A Rumour of Angels* echoes through such examples the interconnected themes we have been considering: the mystery of personhood, inter-subjectivity and hope:

Man's 'no!' to death—be it in the frantic fear of his own annihilation, in moral outrage at the death of a loved other, or in death-defying acts of courage and self-sacrifice—appears to be an intrinsic constituent of his being. There seems to be a death-refusing hope at the very core of our *humanitas*. ... In a world where man is surrounded by death on all sides, he continues to be a being who says 'no!' to death—and through this 'no!' is brought to faith in another world, the reality of which would vindicate his hope as something other than illusion.²⁹

Marcel's theological legacy

These Marcellian themes were quickly picked up by theologians, especially in the renaissance of theological activity which marked, from the 1930's to the 1950's, the Jesuit study-house of Lyons-Fourvières. Here Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs von Balthasar (still, at that time, a member of the Society) and Jean Daniélou were the great names. De Lubac made no secret of his debt to Marcel in chapter 11 of *Catholicisme*, which treats the theme of 'person and society'. There de Lubac stressed that, despite the social aspects of dogma (the sub-title of his great study), and the 'unitary' character of the Catholicism that would flow from them, Christian salvation is also an irreplaceably personal issue for which each one of us must take responsibility. While de Lubac's confidence that person and society are only *apparent* antinomies, *seeming* contradictions, is based fundamentally on the doctrine of the Trinity, he is also encouraged to pursue this line of reflection by the findings of 'Christian philosophy'—in which, as the footnotes of *Catholicisme* indicate, Marcel is most certainly included. For the human person, as Marcel's work showed de Lubac, is not a transcendent monad: each needs another.³⁰

This psychological truth is the symbol of one more profound: we must be *looked at* in order to be *enlightened*, and the eyes that are 'bringers of light' are not only those of the divinity.

To be a *person*, as the word's etymology suggests, is to play a role, and for de Lubac my personal part is to

enter upon a relationship with others so as to converge upon a Whole. The summons to personal life is a *vocation*, that is, a summons to play an eternal role.³¹

In this perspective, emphasis on the social and historical character of the Christian destiny does not counteract my personal contribution, but underlines its reality. The irreversibility of the flow of time grants to every action a special dignity and gravity. Because the world is a single history, each individual life is a drama.

Balthasar's theology of history resembles de Lubac's in that, so far from originating in a desire to overcome an emphasis on personal salvation, in the name of the superiority of the social, it finds its inspiration in a Christian personalism conceived on Marcellian lines. In Balthasar's case, a theology of personal existence and a theology of world history belong together, since the key to the latter is the distinctive Christian experience of *time*, as found in the personal experience of faith in Christ as 'norm' of history. In Balthasar's view, existentialist philosophy, in its religious form, had gone beyond a Platonism hitherto endemic in the philosophical tradition by 'turning it round': existence becomes the 'surging out of essence into time and history'. This dimension of time is, at the religious level, at once openness to encounter with God's Word, and the ultimate ground of man's being human. Balthasar considered the possibility that

this form of thought is a Christian derivative in the sense of being a secularization of Christianity (meaning an illegitimate transference of what belongs originally to revelation onto the level of general creaturely truth and philosophical speculation).

But he considered it 'less superficial and more just' to see it as a legitimate description of modes of activity which emerge in the light of revelation as a consequence of Christian existence.³²

Balthasar's *Theodramatik* will eventually display the value of de Lubac's intuition, suggested by Marcel, that world history and the individual drama of personal biography belong together. By bringing together the history of the theatre, and the central story-line of Scripture, Balthasar indicates how we are actors, with irreplaceable roles, as well as engaged spectators, in the 'play of the world'.³³ Moreover, it is in the 'decisive event' of the Son's Incarnation, by which the Father's plot is staged on the floorboards of the world, that there opens out before our eyes the 'joy of an essentially universal union'.³⁴

So far as Daniélou is concerned, the influence of Marcel may be discerned in the future Jesuit cardinal's decision to end *The Lord of History*, an 'essay on the mystery of history', with a chapter on *hope*: not, at that time, the favoured topic it would later become, thanks to the influence, not least in liberation theology, of the work of the Lutheran Jürgen Moltmann. Human hope, for Daniélou, is compounded of humility and trust:

It takes us out of ourselves, so that we may rest in God; but only by an act of heroic renunciation: it requires of us an absolute dispossession of self, keeping nothing back.

Transmuted on to the level of biblical faith: God has 'answered the appeal [one of Marcel's most favoured words] of mankind', so that 'our hope is now grounded in God's fidelity [more Marcellian overtones] to his own word'.³⁵ Though Daniélou was mainly concerned with the theological riches of patristic exegesis, he did not hesitate to commend Marcel's work as an important propaedeutic to biblical revelation for an age which, substituting technological means for the human end, loses sight of the 'irreducible, inviolate mystery of Being'.³⁶

The use made by this remarkable theological trio of Marcel's philosophy of personal yet inter-subjective hope may still serve as a paradigm for Catholic theology today.³⁷ Perhaps the gravest temptation faced by that theology (together with its handmaids philosophy and spirituality) is the counter-posing of person and society, individuality and solidarity, biography and politics, the subject and the structures. When the components of each of these pairs are prized apart, the Christian understanding and practice of salvation cannot stand.

- 1 F.H. Heinemann, *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament* (New York 1958²), p.135.
- 2 G. Marcel, 'Regard en arrière' in E. Gilson et al., *Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel* (Paris 1947).
- 3 G. Marcel, *Journal métaphysique* (Paris 1927), p.279
- 4 R. Troisfontaines, *De l'Existence à l'être. La philosophie de Gabriel Marcel* (Louvain 1953), I. pp.22—3.
- 5 C. Moeller, 'Gabriel Marcel et le mystère de l'espérance', *Littérature du XXe siècle et christianisme* IV. pp.149—157.
- 6 G. Marcel, *En chemin, vers quel éveil?* (Paris 1971).
- 7 C. Pax, 'Marcel's way of creative fidelity', *Philosophy Today* Spring 1975, pp.12—21; c.f. G. Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (London 1950), pp.42—3.
- 8 R. Troisfontaines, *De l'Existence à l'être. La philosophie de Gabriel Marcel* op. cit. II. pp.304—5.
- 9 G. Marcel, *Being and Having* (London 1965), p. 29.
- 10 The nature and destiny of human persons is taken by Marcel to be integrating focus of philosophical investigation. See J.B. O'Malley, *The Fellowship of Being. An Essay on the Concept of Person in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel* (The Hague 1966).
- 11 G. Marcel, *Le Monde cassé* (Bruges-Paris 1933), pp.256—7.
- 12 *Being and Having*, op. cit., p.127.
- 13 *Ib.* p.137.
- 14 C. Pax, 'Marcel's way of creative fidelity', art.cit.
- 15 G. Hanratty, 'The Religious Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel', *Heythrop Journal* XVII. 4 (October 1976), p.399.
- 16 See especially G. Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* (London 1960), II. pp.37—57.
- 17 G. Marcel, *Structure de l'espérance* (Paris 1951), p.76.
- 18 *Being and Having* op. cit. pp.135—6.
- 19 G. Marcel, *The Mystery of Being* op. cit. II. p.8.
- 20 *Ib.* I. pp.182—3.
- 21 G. Marcel, *Homo Viator* (London 1951), p.134.
- 22 C. Moeller, 'Gabriel Marcel et le mystère de l'espérance', *Littérature du XXe siècle et le christianisme*, op. cit. IV. p.224.
- 23 *Ib.* p.211.
- 24 *Homo Viator* op. cit. p.60.
- 25 *Being and Having* op. cit. pp.86—7.
- 26 *Ib.* p.84.
- 27 *Homo Viator* op. cit. p.36. The essay 'Sketch of a Phenomenology and a Metaphysic of Hope' in this collection, pp.29—67, is Marcel's most important text on this subject.
- 28 C. Pax, 'Marcel's way of creative fidelity' art. cit. p.19; c.f. *Being and Having* op. cit. p.19.
- 29 P. Berger, *A Rumour of Angels. Society and the rediscovery of the supernatural* (1969: Harmondsworth 1971), p.83.
- 30 H. de Lubac, *Catholicism. Christ and the Common Destiny of Man* (ET London 1950; 1962), p.181, with reference to Marcel's 'Acte et personne', in *Recherches philosophiques*⁴ (1934—5), p.160.
- 31 H. de Lubac, *Catholicism*, op. cit., pp.181—2.
- 32 H. U. von Balthasar, *A Theology of History* (ET London 1963), pp.19—20.
- 33 *Idem.*, *Theodramatik* (Einsiedeln 1973—6).
- 34 C.f. H. de Lubac, *Catholicism*, op. cit., p.188, a reference to Marcel's *Du refus à l'invocation* (Paris 1940), pp.11—14.
- 35 J. Daniélou, *The Lord of History. Reflections of the Inner Meaning of History* (ET London 1958), p.344.
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp.89—90.
- 37 For an evocation of their shared ambience, see the preface to H. U. von Balthasar, *Henri de Lubac. Sein organisches Lebenswerk* (Einsiedeln 1976).