

fought. Her stirring yet at the same time impeccably scholarly account should be read by all those interested in recent history of Central and Eastern Europe. A few centuries ago, translations of Flavius Josephus's *Jewish War* were among the most widely read books in Muscovy, in the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom, in Bohemia, and in neighboring lands. It is sad and incongruous that Professor Dawidowicz's volume, which deals with a more recent war against the Jews fought largely on the territory of these countries, is not likely to be published in any of them.

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OPERATION KEELHAUL: THE STORY OF FORCED REPATRIATION FROM 1944 TO THE PRESENT. By *Julius Epstein*. Introduction by *Bertram D. Wolfe*. Old Greenwich, Conn.: The Devin-Adair Company, 1973. xv, 255 pp. \$8.95.

THE LAST SECRET: THE DELIVERY TO STALIN OF OVER TWO MILLION RUSSIANS BY BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. By *Nicholas Bethell*. Introduction by *Hugh Trevor-Roper*. New York: Basic Books, 1974. xvi, 224 pp. \$8.95.

The years 1971 and 1972 were important in the historiography of World War II, for it was then that nongovernment researchers finally were given access to much of both the American and the British archives concerning the forcible repatriation in 1944-47 of about two million Russians and Ukrainians. Bethell's *The Last Secret* resulted directly from such access; Epstein's *Operation Keelhaul* had the misfortune to be substantially completed before that access was granted.

Forcible repatriation was too big and too shocking to be kept really secret, despite Solzhenitsyn's use of that label and Bethell's borrowing of it for his title. Many American and British servicemen spoke publicly of their disgust at having been ordered by their superiors to deceive, betray, and violently deport Russian and Ukrainian prisoners from Germany and Austria—prisoners who in many cases chose suicide rather than return to Stalin's rule. Much information came also from Germans and from Soviet refugees in Germany and the United States. Consequently, professionals in the Russian field, especially after the publication in 1952 of George Fischer's *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*, were aware of the general outlines of the story. And any reader of the Russian émigré press has encountered, each May and June, poignant reminders of the "Lienz Tragedy" and related events of 1945, when British troops forcibly delivered into Stalin's hands over 30,000 Cossacks, many of whom had been émigrés since 1920, had never been under Soviet rule, and were not liable to repatriation even under the official Soviet interpretation of the Yalta agreement.

Yet it is shamefully true that the harrowing drama of forced repatriation, equivalent in human suffering to hundreds of My Lais, has remained long unknown to most of the American and British public. For this, the lack of early and full access to government documents on both sides of the Atlantic has been partly to blame. The two books under review constitute a welcome corrective, supplemented coincidentally by Mark R. Elliott's article in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 88, no. 2 (June 1973):253-75.

Julius Epstein, who died as this review was in preparation (July 1975), was a journalist of Viennese origin, educated in pre-Hitler Germany. His career included service as a foreign correspondent for Swiss and West German newspapers, as an editor in our Office of War Information during World War II, and as a research associate at the Hoover Institution. Himself a political refugee, he devoted a large part of his energies from World War II onward to publicizing the plight of other political refugees, especially those from the Soviet bloc. In the late 1940s he had a sizable role in bringing to public attention the Katyn Forest massacre. Over the period from 1954 to 1969 Epstein published several dozen articles on forced repatriation, meanwhile campaigning persistently but in vain for the release of relevant official documents.

In *Operation Keelhaul* he pulled his data together, taking his title from the expressive code name used by our army for one part of the forced repatriation (but not for the whole process, as Epstein incorrectly states).

Operation Keelhaul contains much useful information, including a lengthy bibliography. But regrettably it has many defects. Some of these stem from accidents of timing. Although Epstein's footnotes include references to articles as late as January of 1973, he apparently had not learned by then of the partial declassification of documents in 1971 and 1972, and he did not exploit the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes published in 1967 and 1969, containing material on repatriation in 1945 and 1946. Moreover, Epstein appears not to have used Russian sources. The bibliography omits works in Russian, and Russian names in the text are given in a mixture of English and German transliterations. Owing perhaps in part to his incomplete access to sources, Epstein tends to dismiss as fools or villains those who were responsible for the repatriation. No doubt there was plenty of ignorance to go around, but the policy did have the support of some able and intelligent leaders, and it needs to be explained in ways that permit the reader to see how that could have happened. Another kind of weakness stems from Epstein's attempt to cover not just the forced repatriation of Eastern Europeans in 1944-47 but also similar cases in other places and more recent times. This leads him to discuss, in my opinion unsuccessfully, the problem of how one can decide which refugees are truly "political." Also, he does not cope with or even acknowledge the difficulty of deciding what scale of immigration can be accepted by the United States and other havens of relative freedom. One can conceive of political emigration on a scale that would not be easily handled by the rather indiscriminate open-door solution that Mr. Epstein advocates.

Nicholas Bethell, a Briton in his late thirties, has previously written a biography of Wladyslaw Gomulka and *The War Hitler Won*, which deals with the earliest stage of World War II. He collaborated with David Burg in translating Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward* and has done other translations from Russian and Polish. His book, which rests on wide though not exhaustive research, has the great merit of having made use of both American and British documents declassified in 1971-72 (some American documents were evidently withheld from him), as well as interviews with some of the participants. While its topical and chronological focus is narrower than Epstein's, its approach is in certain ways broader. It reflects an excellent comprehension of the historical setting and of the process of policy formation. Bethell depicts Anthony Eden and others as being surprisingly naïve about Stalin's government in 1944 and 1945; however, as befits one who has himself been in politics, Bethell displays a sympathetic appreciation of the problems

Eden faced and the absence of any easy solution. Where Epstein, with some reason, arouses the reader's indignation, Bethell imparts a fuller understanding coupled with deep sympathy for the victims.

Bethell's admirable book may be considered definitive on the role of the British in the repatriation from southern Austria, but it is sketchy on some other aspects of the story, especially those concerning the Americans. Fortunately, the above-mentioned Elliott article, which evidently appeared too late for either Bethell or Epstein to use, helps to fill that gap—bringing out, for instance, the ignorance and poor judgment displayed on this issue by President Roosevelt and our joint chiefs of staff as compared with knowledgeable State Department figures like Dean Acheson and Joseph Grew, whose protests were disregarded. Further clarification of the American role must await the publication of archival material incorporated in Elliott's dissertation of 1974 and the release of the remaining American documents.

In combination these works, revealing among other things the extraordinary lengths to which American and British leaders went in order to placate Stalin, should advance the continuing debate over the origins of the cold war, and should much improve the general public's awareness of one of the great tragedies of this century.

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THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, 1918–1956: AN EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION, I–II. By *Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn*. Translated from the Russian by *Thomas P. Whitney*. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. xii, 660 pp. \$12.50, cloth. \$1.95, paper.

THE STALINIST TERROR IN THE THIRTIES: DOCUMENTATION FROM THE SOVIET PRESS. Compiled with an introduction by *Borys Levvitsky*. Hoover Institution Publications, 126. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. xxvii, 521 pp. \$14.50.

The subtitle of Solzhenitsyn's book should warn the reader that this is no ordinary memoir, historical study, or political analysis, and it points to the difficulty of defining the work in terms of genre. Based not only on the author's own experience and the reports and memoirs of 227 former prisoners but on many types of published materials—Lenin's writings, Soviet laws, trial transcripts, jurists' studies, and more—the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago* describes the process of incarceration in Soviet labor camps through the stages of arrest, interrogation, trial and sentencing, and transportation to transit camps, from which prisoners were convoyed to their final destination—the "corrective-labor" camps. Here the first volume ends. (The recently translated second volume deals mainly with the camps themselves.)

One aspect of Solzhenitsyn's method of "literary investigation" is a skillful fusing of diverse materials into a narrative that combines immediacy and concreteness of presentation with analysis and generalization and gives a sweeping picture of a larger whole. Using the story of his own arrest and imprisonment as a means of unifying his narration, Solzhenitsyn describes in vivid detail the experience of scores of others, rendering unforgettable as individuals many of those whose fates