

be called those of adoration. On this occasion Stalin advanced the proposition that the main factor in Russia's defeat of Germany was that Hitler had been compelled to mobilize 16 percent of his population (including losses) in his armed forces. "Such a high percentage of mobilization," Shtemenko quotes Stalin as saying, "represents either adventurism or an ignorance of the objective laws of warfare."

Shtemenko fails to provide the equivalent Russian percentage, but if prewar Russia had a population of 194 million and if the Soviet maximum military strength was a bit more than 11 million (as he says) and if Soviet war casualties were only 20 million (as is officially claimed) the percentage would almost precisely match Germany's 16 percent. Perhaps that is why Shtemenko does not provide the arithmetic.

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THE POLITICS OF SOVIET POLICY FORMATION: KHRUSHCHEV'S INNOVATIVE POLICIES IN EDUCATION AND AGRICULTURE. By *James B. Bruce*. Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 13: CHANGE AND SURVIVAL: STUDIES IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEF KORBEL, Book 4. Denver: University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, 1976. xx, 138 pp. Paper.

This short monograph is a welcome and timely addition to the literature on Soviet policy making. It is an innovative attempt to place case studies of specific decisions within a larger framework informed by decision-making theory. The two cases chosen for reinterpretation in these terms are the Virgin Lands decision of 1953-54, and the Production Education reforms of 1958. Mr. Bruce does not reinvestigate these decisions through personal research into primary sources; rather, he relies upon case studies already published (by Mills, Ploss, Little, Stewart, Schwartz and Keech) to inform him as to the sequence of events and the positions of the actors involved, or to guide him to the relevant sources. His main concern is to determine the scope and nature of political participation at different stages of the policy-making process. He finds that the top political elites dominate the initial stages of "policy proposal" and "decision in principle," thereby defining the basic direction of change. However, the subsequent stages of "policy controversy," "formal decision," and "implementation directives" are largely shaped by the interests and political activity of lesser-ranking elites, which Bruce dubs "affected participants." In addition, Mr. Bruce raises and explores vitally important questions about the political behavior of participants: are their positions on these issues dictated by their backgrounds, their political connections, or their bureaucratic roles? Predictably, he finds major differences on this score between Presidium members and lower-ranking elites.

On the whole, Bruce's effort strikes me as successful. It is suggestive and well executed, and fulfills the author's intention to provide a framework for "multiple case studies similarly conceptualized" (p. 3). Although a short review cannot do justice to the nuances, and cannot explore the shortcomings in depth, let me nonetheless indicate a few caveats. First, the reliance upon existing Kremlinological literature for identification of the positions of actors may be hazardous. Some of that literature is very good indeed; some is sloppy. So the theory builder should beware of compounding errors. Second, I have misgivings about the utility of exploring only the short-term processes of consensus building at the initial points of decision. These processes are often manipulable in accord with personal political styles (for example, expanded plenary sessions). Less manipulable are the longer-term processes by which policies are deflected or reshaped in the course of implementation—by both bureaucratic inter-

ests and social forces. The theoretical payoff of a study of this kind would be enhanced by case studies that take a longer view, combining a focus on the politics of decision (and redecision) with an exploration of what is necessary for policy changes to take effect in the bureaucratic and social context.

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KHRUSHCHEV AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE: THE VIRGIN LAND PROGRAMME 1953–1964. By *Martin McCauley*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976. xiv, 232 pp. Maps. \$24.00.

The title of this book is somewhat deceptive. Although the main title implies a rather broad treatment of the Khrushchev years, the subtitle does not. At the outset, the author states that "this study is concerned with the economic and political record of the Virgin Lands over the years 1953–64." However, the book covers a much longer span of years than that suggested in the subtitle, and the broader treatment of the Khrushchev years does not materialize.

In regard to the Virgin Lands program, the author has done a good job. This work falls between those that analyze the upper-level political decision-making process and those that would look only at such a program on a cost-benefit basis. The author provides an excellent background discussion and succeeds in presenting a rich picture of the political, economic, and technical dilemma facing Khrushchev in the 1950s. Even in the face of limited data, most will be able to accept the author's conclusion that "Khrushchev's bold *démarche* in going east in 1954 was correct."

Insofar as the author attempts to deal with the broader questions of Soviet agricultural development during the Khrushchev years, this study is less satisfactory. There is, for example, considerable discussion of extensive versus intensive development of agriculture, paths of development which are said to appear contradictory (p. 122). Surely, however, any such transformation from an extensive to an intensive path of agricultural development will be gradual, so that during any transition period both policies may in fact be operative. In this context, the author does not devote enough attention to the efforts toward intensification made during the Khrushchev years. There was considerable effort to improve the *quality* of the labor input (especially at the managerial and technical levels) during that period, but Western studies on the subject (for example, Millar's *The Soviet Rural Community*) are not mentioned. The author emphasizes the then prevailing Soviet view of the need for *control* in the countryside, but one of the most important mechanisms of such control, namely the MTS, is mentioned only briefly, and standard works, such as Miller's *One Hundred Thousand Tractors*, are not cited.

One could note other examples. Khrushchev emphasized (as the author notes) the need for the improvement of material incentives in agriculture. In large measure, however, Khrushchev's emphasis was translated into reality, though the author does not cite the available data on this matter. Finally, the reorganization of collective farms is given only brief mention, even though the sharp increase in the volume of inputs over which a typical farm manager had control during the Khrushchev years must have drastically altered the manner in which farm decision making was being carried out.

All of these areas of Khrushchev's emphasis were overshadowed by the more grandiose nature of the Virgin Lands program. But for the long-term development of Soviet agriculture, Khrushchev's efforts toward intensification must be taken seriously. Judged in a broader perspective than simply the Virgin Lands, this reviewer would be hesitant to accept the author's conclusion that "taken as a whole, Khrushchev's