

the English 'do' and 'make' is a great embarrassment to the translator of this text; in some cases 'do' is the more natural translation, in others 'make'. Dr Henry uses 'do so that *p*' for '*facere esse*', but even so he is not always able to sustain 'do' in passages which he considers later in the book where the distinction is being applied. Anselm's main distinction is between the four forms: do so that *p*, do so that not-*p*, do not do so that *p* and do not do so that not-*p*; he is interested in examples where the first form is improperly used where one of the others would be more exact. In the final part of the fragments, the distinction is extended from '*facere*' to '*velle*', for which four parallel forms are provided. It is, I think, a pity that instead of giving us a translation of each part of the fragments which he cites, Dr Henry sometimes provides an analysis instead; this would have been better in the commentary, so that the reader without Latin could have satisfied himself as to the correctness of the analysis.

In the two following chapters, Dr Henry presents a great deal of evidence from the other works of Anselm to show that he was constantly applying the analysis of the fragments to a wide variety of problems. Both here and in the chapter on paronymy Dr Henry has recourse to Lesniewski's ontology in order to elucidate Anselm. This logical system is introduced rather baldly, with little discussion, and the reader may feel that the sign 'ε' used to represent 'is' merely reproduces in symbols

the latter's ambiguity. One of the great virtues of Frege's logic is that it represents differently 'is' occurring as part of a predicate and 'is' as the sign of identity ('is no other than'). If Anselm's arguments can only be represented in a logical system which fails to make this distinction, one is inclined to say: so much the worse for Anselm!

The concluding chapters deal with four lesser topics from a logical point of view. The most interesting is perhaps that on *Truth and Ethics* in which Anselm's doctrine of *rectitudo* is compared with the ethical views of William Wollaston, later attacked by Hume. However, *rectitudo* is a large topic, and Dr Henry only nibbles at its fringe. It is the central concept of Anselm's dialogue *De veritate*, but perhaps Dr Henry did not want to digress into the philosophy of logic as distinct from logic proper. I was, however, in general disappointed that the emphasis throughout the book is on interpretation and that there is not very much discussion of Anselm's doctrines as such. Nevertheless, anyone who wants to consider Anselm's views in future will have to take this analysis of his logical methods seriously. In particular, Dr Henry shows that Anselm is no ordinary-language philosopher and is sometimes prepared on logical grounds to assert what on an ordinary-language basis would be nonsense. In this, Anselm presents a challenge to much contemporary British philosophy.

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THE NEW THEOLOGY AND MODERN THEOLOGIANS, by Hugo Meynell. *Sheed & Ward, London, 1967.* 214 pp. 16s.

The title of this book suggests, and the cover asserts, that it offers 'the interested beginner' an 'introduction to the theologians and theological issues of today.' It is important at the start to make clear that it does no such thing. The 'interested beginner' will finish the book at least as ignorant of most of modern theology as he began. Rather, Dr Meynell offers a slightly miscellaneous collection of essays, united by concern to warn the Church against certain general 'tendencies' of 'modern theology'.

The 'modern theologians' actually mentioned turn out without exception to be Protestants. Since I am a Protestant, this puts me in an odd position. I am unable to judge whether or not the Roman Catholic Church needs this warning against protestantizing. And I am in danger of appearing denominationally biased and defensive when, as I must,

I judge Dr Meynell's analysis and critique unfortunate.

Even within Protestant theology, Dr Meynell's criticism is very narrowly based on the 'dialectical theology' of the twenties as continued in the systematics of Bultmann and in some aspects of Tillich and Barth. Dr Meynell himself never makes this clear, leaving the impression that modern theology in general is being discussed.

The author's material charge against 'modern theology' is that it narrowly interprets all the gospel's claims 'in terms of my existence here and now', eliminating its factual basis in past events and its factual claims about what is to come as the last destiny of man. As a positive programme, the demands for recovery of the theological relevance of historical inquiry, and for recovery of an eschatology

whose material content penetrates piety and theology, are demands I share. But they are hardly appropriate as a critique of recent Protestant theology, since the programme is equally necessary over against medieval theology or Protestant scholasticism. Moreover, Dr Meynell's critique itself is inadequate at three levels.

First, these very concerns have been those of much of 'modern theology'—even in Dr Meynell's sense—for some time. The first concern has been the dominating concern of the Bultmann school. The second concern is Jürgen Moltmann's who come from Barth. Both together are the very definition of the movement led by Wolfhard Pannenberg—to name only the more obtrusive possibilities. It is inadmissible for one who wants to make Dr Meynell's critique to ignore all this.

Second, the critique is analytically inadequate. Let me select one central example. He objects to Bultmann's reduction to 'present existence'. This is undoubtedly the place where critique of Bultmann must focus. But Dr Meynell turns out to mean by this that Bultmann eliminates the dimensions of past and future and reduces faith to subjective experience. This is to *ignore* the entire theological labour of Bultmann and such of his school as Fuchs and Ebeling, rather than to criticize it. For what these men *mean* by 'existence' is exactly life lived by and for the insecurity of the future, a life to which we can be challenged only by a word from the past. Nor is there anything vague or esoteric about this terminology; it has a long and generally known tradition. As for subjectivism, the project of the school is precisely to establish the metaphysical priority of this *word*, to create an ontology in which God and we are understood in terms of the prior reality of the word, over against which we live. Perhaps they fail in this, but then this failure would be what needed to be pointed out.

MORAL NOTIONS, by Julius Kovesi. *Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967.* 161 pp. 20s.

This book is a study of the nature of general concepts, with particular reference to the way in which moral concepts are formally different from non-moral concepts.

The author introduces the Aristotelian terms 'form' and 'matter' in a Pickwickian sense to distinguish between two inseparable but logically distinct elements in most of our general concepts. In so far as I can make, not directly from memory or from present observa-

Third, one cannot escape the suspicion that the author does this sort of thing because he has inadequately acquainted himself with the work of those he criticizes. Again, one example. Dr Meynell 'wonders' whether Tillich 'really means by "giving meaning to human existence" anything more than the importing of a *feeling* of reconciliation with the world. . . .' (p. 152.) This is manifest nonsense. And there seems to be a clear bibliographical basis for the nonsense. One would expect a thinker like Tillich, constructing a classical system, to handle this question in his pneumatology. Volume III of the *Systematic Theology*, containing the pneumatology, was published in 1963. Dr Meynell lists only volumes I and II in his bibliography and uses only volume I in his text, although his publication date is 1967 and he cites his own and other work published in 1965 and 1966.

Dr Meynell's own proposal to deal theologially with the problem posed by our secular civilization is 'theology of the secular' as opposed to 'secularized theology'. 'Theology of the secular' proves to be an interpretation of the schema of 'primary' and 'secondary causes' which lays heavy emphasis on the reality and worth of the secondary causes. He gives no hint of how he proposes to overcome the notorious difficulties of this schema. And, of course, exactly those aspects of 'modern theology' to which he objects are in fact last-ditch attempts so to conceive the reality of God within this fundamental schema as to guard at once the deity of God and the reality of man. If these attempts fail, the last thing we require is to start at the beginning of the same weary way.

This review has been harsh. But surely in these matters openness is required. Dr Meynell, who himself accepts this requirement so fully, will understand that the same duty is laid on others.

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tion, an indefinite number of drawings of tables of different sizes, shapes and designs, I show an understanding (a) of what tables *are* (the formal element in my notion of a table), and (b) of the sort of features an object must have if it is to count as a table (the material element in my notion of a table). I could not have either of these understandings without the other, but the formal element has logical priority, since it is what tables are that deter-