

PROVINCIAL ORIGINS OF THE
BRAZILIAN STATE:
Rio de Janeiro, the Monarchy, and National Political
Organization, 1808–1853*

Jeffrey D. Needell
University of Florida

Abstract: This study addresses the provincial origins and role of the reactionary party that legislated the reconstruction of the Brazilian monarchy, perhaps Latin America's most stable nineteenth-century political regime. The study locates the party in terms of regional power, taking into account social, economic, and political factors. It analyzes the party's ideology in the historical context of the Regency (1831–1840) and its immediate aftermath, an era of destabilization, social war, and secessionism. The study also demonstrates how the party mobilized partisan support nationally to consolidate party and state power, the unexpected impact of patronage, and the increasingly autonomous quality of state power over time.

Brazil represents something of a success story in nineteenth-century Latin American political history, but the nature of its success is still debated for the nation and only poorly explored for the provinces. Even the most sophisticated political analyses of the Brazilian Empire have necessarily focused on the salient features of the state rather than on the political complexities of the state's relationship with the provinces or on the provincial

*This research note is a revised version of a paper presented to the Conference for Latin American History in Chicago, 5–9 January 2000. It benefited from earlier comments and criticism by Judy Bieber and Jeffrey Mosher and from Timothy Anna's remarks at the panel presentation. Three anonymous *LARR* readers' reports have strengthened the piece in many ways. The author sincerely thanks all these colleagues. Remaining imperfections are his responsibility alone. The analysis derives from research made possible by awards and fellowships from the Division of Sponsored Research at the University of Florida (1988, 1996–1997), the American Philosophical Society (1988, 1996), the National Endowment for the Humanities (1990–1991), and the Social Science Research Council and the National Endowment for the Humanities (1996–1997). Research was also facilitated while acting as a visiting professor of Brazilian studies in 1994 at the Vakgroep Talen en Culturen van Latijns Amerika of the Royal University of Leiden in the Netherlands and as a 1997 Fulbright lecturer and researcher at the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Antropologia e Ciência Política of the Universidade Federal Fluminense in Niterói, Brazil. The author is very grateful to all these institutions. He also notes his debt to Richard Phillips and Peter Stern of the Latin American Collection at the University of Florida.

origins and operations of the two political parties that dominated imperial politics from the 1830s until the fall of the monarchy in 1889.¹

This preliminary study touches on each of these lacunae, and necessarily so. Analysis of the imperial state and its origins has partly to do with the origins of the Conservative party. That party cannot be understood without reference to its provincial origins and national mission as a party born in the Câmara dos Deputados in Rio by 1837, rooted in the province of Rio de Janeiro by 1844, and established as the dominant party of the entire empire by 1853.² I hope to demonstrate here the direct linkage between the party's founders and the merchant-planter interests of Rio and its hinterland, the nature of partisan political organization, and the party's ideological cast and impact on state formation. The study will conclude by examining the contradiction between the goals of the party and the increasingly autonomous quality of state power in Brazil.

Origins of the Party, 1808–1837

The Conservative party was known by a more revealing name until the late 1840s, the *partido de ordem*. The order assumed by its leaders had much to do with a socioeconomic and political order emerging between the late colonial era (circa 1750–1822) and the 1830s. In this period, two older oligarchies related to a newer one dominated the society and economy of

1. The classic history is Joaquim Nabuco, *Um estadista do imperio, Nabuco de Araujo: Sua vida, suas opiniões, sua epoca*, 3 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1897–1899). Recent scholarship includes Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *História geral da civilização brasileira*, tomo 2, *O Brasil monárquica*, vols. 2–5 (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1967–1972); Paula Beiguelman, *Formação política do Brasil*, 2d ed. (São Paulo: Pioneira, 1976); José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: A elite política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1986); Murilo de Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras: A política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ and Vértice, 1988); Thomas Flory, *Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808–1871: Social Control and Political Stability in the New State* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); Emília Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, 1985); Ilmar Rohloff de Mattos, *O tempo saquarema* (São Paulo: Hucitec and Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1987); Roderick J. Barman, *Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798–1852* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Eul-Soo Pang, *In Pursuit of Honor and Power: Noblemen of the Southern Cross in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988); and Richard Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, 1990). Provincial analysis is just beginning. See Alcir Lenharo, *As tropas da moderação: O abastecimento da Corte na formação política do Brasil, 1808–1842*, 2d ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Carioca, 1991); Judy Bieber, *Power, Patronage, and Political Violence: State Building on a Brazilian Frontier, 1822–1889* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1999); Marcus Joaquim Maciel de Carvalho, "Hegemony and Rebellion in Pernambuco (Brazil), 1821–1835," Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1989; and Jeffrey C. Mosher, "Pernambuco and the Construction of the Brazilian Nation-State, 1831–1850," Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1996.

2. See Boris Fausto, *História do Brasil*, 5th ed. (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo and Fundação do Desenvolvimento da Educação, 1997), 180–83; and Jeffrey D. Needell,

the Rio de Janeiro region and its hinterland in southern and western Minas Gerais. One of the first two oligarchies had grown in the sugarcane planting areas of the *fluminense* lowlands (the *baixada*), the areas surrounding Guanabara Bay and stretching along the South Atlantic coast to the swampy region behind the mouth of the Rio Paraíba do Sul. This oligarchy was made up of older planter families and younger immigrant Portuguese merchant families in Rio. These families were intermarrying by the late eighteenth century and growing rich from slaving, sugar exports, and coastal and interior domestic trade.³

The second oligarchy had coalesced out of the commercial traffic between the port of Rio and the old mining areas of southern and western Minas. After the hinterland mines were exhausted, merchant families and landholders who had been growing crops and raising animals for the mines and importing slaves to work the mines shifted their focus to supplying Rio's growing urban population. They continued to import captives, raise crops, and breed pigs, but they used the captives increasingly to raise food for *cariocas*.⁴ This oligarchy lacked the wealth and proximity of the sugar and merchant oligarchy of the lowlands and port, wealth and proximity that allowed greater access to the viceregal court and, after 1808, to the exiled Portuguese court in Rio. The lowland and port families were the ones who integrated successfully with both courts and thus gained superior leverage in court favors, honors, and policy making.⁵

The third oligarchy, rooted in the late eighteenth century but flourishing in the 1820s and 1830s, consisted of members derived from the older oligarchies. This newer oligarchy dominated the planting of coffee in the

"Conservative Party," under "Brazil: Political Parties," *Encyclopedia of Latin American History*, 4 vols. (New York: Scribner's, 1995), 1:455. See also Murilo de Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras*, esp. chap. 5. The party's origins are discussed in Jeffrey D. Needell, "Party Formation and State-Making: The Conservative Party and the Reconstruction of the Brazilian State, 1831–1840," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81, no. 2 (May 2001), forthcoming.

3. On party names, see *Annaes do parlamento brasileiro: Câmara dos srs. Deputados* (hereafter *Annaes*) (Rio de Janeiro: various houses, 1876–), May 1838, May 1839; Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão (hereafter Honório), *Jornal do Comércio*, 15 May 1844, p. 2; and *O Brasil*, 23 Nov. 1847, p. 4. On the first oligarchy, Joaquim Ribeiro Fragoso, *Homens de grossa aventura: Acumulação e hierárchia na praça mercantil do Rio de Janeiro (1790–1830)* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 1992), chaps. 2–4; and Manolo Garcia Florentino, *Em costas negras: Uma história do tráfico atlântico de escravos entre a África e o Rio de Janeiro (séculos XVIII e XIX)* (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 1995), esp. 28–34, 147–225.

4. See Fragoso, *Homens de grossa aventura*, 131–47, 208–18; and Lenharo, *As tropas da moderação*, esp. chaps. 1–4.

5. See Riva Gorenstein, "Comércio e política" in Lenira Menezes Martinho e Riva Gorenstein, *Negociantes e caixeiros na sociedade da Independência* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Carioca, 1993); Maria Odila da Silva Dias, "A interiorização da metrópole (1808–1853)," in 1822: *Dimensões*, edited by Carlos Guilherme Mota (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1972), 164–65, 169–71, 173–74, 177–79; Florentino, *Em costas negras*, 187–225; and Fragoso, *Homens de grossa aventura*, 283–89.

tropical highlands back from the coast, the Serra Acima, which cradled the Rio Paraíba do Sul for most of its length, roughly paralleling the coast and approaching the borders separating the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo. Among the pioneer families in these more temperate mountain valleys were families grown wealthy from sugar planting and slaving in the lowlands as well as families enriched by running *mineiro* mule trains and supplying domestic foods.⁶

The political complexities of the 1820s and 1830s may be reduced rather summarily in terms of these oligarchies. The lowland sugar and merchant oligarchy enjoyed great influence in the Primeiro Reinado of the Brazilian monarchy (1822–1831) because of the relations established with prominent Portuguese during the late-colonial and early-independence periods. With the 1831 abdication of the first monarch, Dom Pedro I, the lowland sugar and merchant group lost political leverage but not socioeconomic power to the second oligarchy and its more distant provincial allies, all of whom resented the exclusive centralist power characteristic of the Primeiro Reinado and associated with the Portuguese. The second oligarchy mobilized under liberal nativist leadership and successfully attacked the Primeiro Reinado's centralized authoritarianism and the apparently exclusive control of the state by individuals generally linked to Portugal by birth, education, and career.⁷

By 1834, however, members of both oligarchies and the third as well had become convinced that the dangers posed by the liberal reforms of the late 1820s and early 1830s were threatening the empire and the local socioeconomic hierarchies that they dominated. The oligarchies attacked the liberal reforms as leading to legislative confusion, undermining state authority, and encouraging "anarchy." By 1835 these groups could point to secession, rural and urban rebellions, and large-scale social warfare as indicating the abyss they feared. In the Câmara dos Deputados, which had dominated both the executive and legislative branches of the state since 1831, certain leaders of the liberal second oligarchy as well as the first and third oligarchies

6. See Stanley J. Stein, *Vassouras, a Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900: The Roles of Planter and Slave in a Plantation Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), chaps. 1–2, esp. 7–13, 118–21. See also Afonso de E. Taunay, *Pequena história do café no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Maranguape, 1943), chap. 2; Warren Dean, *With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1995), 178–87; Fragozo, *Homens de grossa aventura*, 278–99; Gorenstein, "Comércio e política," 203–4; and Lenharo, *As tropas da moderação*, chap. 2.

7. On the lowland oligarchy's early political role, see Silva Dias, "A interiorização da metrópole," 164–65, 169–71, 173–74, 177–79; and Lenharo, *As tropas da moderação*, chaps. 1–4. On the liberal and Lusophobic challenge of the second oligarchy and its provincial and urban allies, see Lenharo, *As tropas da moderação*, chaps. 2, 5; Mosher, "Pernambuco," chaps. 1, 4; Maciel de Carvalho, "Hegemony," chaps. 1, 4, 5, 6; R. Barman, *Brazil*, 111, 152–53; Theophilo Benedicto Ottoni, *Circular dedicado aos srs. Electores pela Provincia de Minas Gerais*, 2d ed. (1860; reprint, São Paulo: Irmãos Ferraz, 1930), 20–33; and *Annaes*, 1831, vol. 1, 14–26 May.

broke with reformism. Those who abided by liberal reforms or opposed the renegade leaders personally attacked this shift as “*um regresso*,” a reaction.⁸

By 1837 these Câmara leaders had won the support of a majority of the deputies and could obstruct the liberal reformist regent of the time until he resigned. The Câmara of 1837 and the cabinet that emerged from these events then set about a legislative reaction (1837–1841) that restored and strengthened the highly centralized and authoritarian monarchical state originally envisioned in the Constitution of 1824. The reactionary leaders responsible for this reconstruction of the monarchy were noted orators representing Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, strongly supported by key deputies from Bahia and Pernambuco. These four provinces, the most populous and wealthiest in the empire, were all involved in exporting coffee, sugar, tobacco, and cotton, and all of them depended on purchasing slaves. They formed the electoral basis for the party of reaction. But the base and origin of the party in terms of national-level leadership and electoral solidarity was Rio de Janeiro. In the other three provinces, the electorate was either divided by local opposition associated with opposition to the regresso or not yet organized politically, remaining independent of either of the parties disputing the Câmara.⁹

Initial Party Ideology and Organization, 1834–1848

The pertinent historiography has often dismissed partisan ideology and distinctions in discussing the monarchy. It has emphasized patronage instead and reduced the national government to an instrument of ruling-

8. For details of the politics, see Needell, “Party Formation,” pt. 2. On threats to the established order, see Murilo de Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras*, 12–18; R. Barman, *Brazil*, chap. 6; Hendrik Kraay, “‘As Terrifying as Unexpected’: The Bahian Sabinada, 1837–1838,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 72, no. 4 (Nov. 1992):501–27; Maciel de Carvalho, “Hegemony,” chap. 6; Mosher, “Pernambuco,” chap. 1; João José Reis, *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); David Cleary, “‘Lost Altogether to the Civilised World’: Race and the Cabanagem in Northern Brazil, 1750 to 1850,” *Comparative Studies in History and Society* 40, no. 1 (Jan. 1998):104–35; and Matthias Röhrig Assunção, “Elite Politics and Popular Rebellion in the Construction of Post-Colonial Order: The Case of Maranhão, Brazil (1820–1841),” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, pt. 1 (Feb. 1999):1–38.

9. On the fluminense case, see Needell, “Party Formation,” pt. 2. The other provinces are discussed in the text and in subsequent footnotes. With respect to Minas, however, note that the dependence on exports was more indirect. The mineiro economy was more involved in supplying the domestic market in Rio de Janeiro than in cultivating coffee. Moreover, although coffee planters in Minas bought Africans, most captives worked in the domestic-market economy. See Lenharo, *As tropas da moderação*; and Douglas Cole Libby, *Transformação e trabalho em uma economia escravista: Minas Gerais no século XIX* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1988); Florentino, *Em costas negras*, 46–47; and Amílcar Martins Filho and Roberto B. Martins, “Slavery in a Nonexport Economy: Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais Revisited,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 3 (Aug. 1987):542–43, 548–49.

class interests or political figures to agents of an autonomous state. The present study of what became the Conservative party and of the state over whose definition the party's leaders struggled contradicts many of these conclusions.¹⁰

The reactionaries of 1837 responded explicitly to the liberal reforms of the late 1820s and early 1830s. Their negative reading of that reformism was central to the party's ideological identity in that the reactionaries' ideology simply reversed the reforms of the Regency. During this era, many moderate liberals and the more radical *exaltados* had called for social and political innovation and a more democratic political structure. Their movement mobilized citizens and their representatives to reform the Constitution of 1824. These proposals would have radically weakened the monarch and the state through severe limiting of the emperor's constitutional role, decentralization emphasizing devolution of state rights and powers to the provinces, and a reform in which the executive and the Crown (the regent in 1834) owed their legitimacy to an electoral process.¹¹

The partido de ordem became associated explicitly with reversing each of these outcomes. Each reversal was phrased in a positive way and combined with others to establish the party's principles—its ideology. Party leaders enunciated this ideology as a set of related beliefs in the Câmara dos Deputados and in the party's subsidized periodicals. In this way, the party and its adherents, called *amigos e coreligionários* (friends and fellow believers), defined and identified themselves while justifying their policies and legislation.

10. The historiography of the monarchy would require separate treatment. Graham emphasizes patronage and class interests in *Patronage and Politics*, esp. 129–30, 148–49, 210, 232; Costa emphasizes class interests in *Brazilian Empire*, 61, 69–70, 216. State autonomy is central to Pang, *In Pursuit of Honor*, chap. 8. Murilo de Carvalho provides a much more nuanced analysis of relative state autonomy, class interests, and the political elite in *A construção da ordem*, chaps. 1 and 3, esp. 38–39, 44, 84, 158–61, 164–66, 171–76. See also his magisterial analysis of ideology, region, and class interest in *Teatro de sombras*, chap. 2. Rohloff de Mattos conflates parties, ideology, state, and the seigneurial class in *O tempo saquarema*, 3–4, 45–57, 86, 90–93, 125–26, 157, 163, 171, 179, 185–87, 189–91, 216, 275, 283. Flory's position is nuanced, but he distinguishes between a judicial oligarchy and the socioeconomic elites. Nonetheless, his analysis is informed by emphasis on ideology and partisan politics in *Judge and Jury*, pt. 3 and the conclusion. My work extends from that of Roderick Barman (in *Brazil* and elsewhere) and Murilo de Carvalho. Like them, I attempt historically specific analysis to recover the complex process of state-making, in which socioeconomic context, individual interests, institutions, and ideology are all interwoven.

11. See Ottoni, *Circular*, 20–33. See also *Annaes*, 1831, vol. 1, 21–24 May; vol. 2, 9 July, 9 Sept.; and 1834, vol. 2, 161–65; Visconde do Uruguay, *Estudos practicos sobre a administração das provincias no Brazil*, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Nacional, 1856), 1:xii–xviii; J. M. Pereira da Silva, *Historia do Brazil: Durante a menoridade de D. Pedro II., 1831 a 1840*, 2d ed. (1879; reprint, Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1888), 23–24, 43–44, 106–10, 156–58; R. Barman, *Brazil*, 172–73, 176–78; and Flory, *Judge and Jury*, pt. 2.

Their beliefs were simple and mutually reinforcing. Political order was indispensable to maintain social order. Political order derived from embracing the Constitution of 1824 and the rule of law. The state enforced this law and should do so unimpeded throughout the country. The nation, its geographical integrity, and its constitutional order were made possible and represented by the legitimate monarch and the state over which he presided. Society shared in the governance of this state through a representative parliamentary form of government in which the cabinet had to have the support of the majority of the Câmara and the monarch.¹²

This reactionary ideology became the banner of the leaders, their supporters, and their party in the Câmara. The consequent organization of the reactionary party differed from what scholars today associate with party organization. Such organization had at least three models in Rio in the 1830s. The first was the party of liberals (*moderados*) (1831–1835) that had dominated the early Regency and come into existence in the Câmara, recruiting subsequent support out and down into the rest of society. The second consisted of the three associations of political clubs and periodicals established in the early regency to defend and promote the ideas of the three parties that emerged in the aftermath of 1831: the *moderados*, the *caramurus*, and the *exaltados*. The third model consisted of the freemason secret societies that had served as organizational vehicles for partisan recruitment

12. As Murilo de Carvalho has pointed out, political programs were unwritten until 1864, and thus ideology must be searched for in debate and polemic. See Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem*, 59. My summation of the reactionaries' ideology is based on the words of their acknowledged leaders. See Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres (hereafter Rodrigues Torres) and Paulino José Soares de Sousa (hereafter Paulino) in *Annaes*, 1836, vol. 1, 6 May; and 1837, vol. 2, 10 July; Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos (hereafter Vasconcelos) in *Annaes*, 1838, vol. 1, 14 May, 21 May, 25 May; and José Clemente Pereira in *Annaes*, 1836, vol. 2, 29 August. Also Paulino in *Annaes*, 1836, vol. 2, 30 Aug.; Honório et al. in *Annaes*, 1836, vol. 2, 31 Aug.; Vasconcelos in *Annaes*, 1837, vol. 2, 9 Aug.; Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida (hereafter Calmon) in *Annaes*, 1837, vol. 2, 23 Sept.; and Honório in *Annaes*, 1837, vol. 2, 27 September. See also Vasconcelos, *Jornal do Comércio*, 14 May 1838, pp. 2–3; Rodrigues Torres, *Annaes*, 1839, vol. 1, 10 May; Honório, *Annaes* 1839, vol. 1, 27 May; and Rodrigues Torres, *Annaes*, 1839, vol. 1, 5 June, 8 June. For political journalism, see *O Brasil*, 23 May 1844, pp. 1–2; 25 May 1844, pp. 2–3; 28 Sept. 1844, pp. 1–2; 30 Oct. 1847, pp. 1–2; and 23 Nov. 1847, pp. 2–3, 4–5. See also Moreira de Azevedo, "Origem e desenvolvimento da imprensa no Rio de Janeiro," *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* 28, 2d pt. (1865):169–224. Justiniano José da Rocha (1812–1862) was editor and chief writer for *O Brasil*, the reactionaries' great paper in the defining era (1840–1852). In the early years, he published *O Chronista* (1836–1839) with Jesuino do Nascimento Silva (1811–1886) and Firmino Rodrigues da Silva (1816–1879). All three were lowland fluminenses. I disagree with Rohloff de Mattos's interpretation of Saquarema ideology. He views the state as consciously created by the Saquaremas as a tool for creating a ruling class and a national society. I found the Saquaremas to be organic intellectuals of a regional ruling class. Their words make clear that they saw the state as an instrument for preserving and improving the national society from which it derived, within a framework of constitutional, representative institutions.

and plotting since the early 1820s. The reactionary party followed the first model of organization. It emerged after 1834 from the moderado leadership and recruited and organized as the moderados had done. According to the little that is known about the third model, freemasonry, it seems to have had only a support function as a secret club for party chiefs and followers as the reactionaries and their opposition emerged as two parties over the 1830s and 1840s. I found no record of a supporting association of clubs like the second model sustaining either party. Rather, national political leaders seem to have met informally in Rio, organized propaganda, and written directions for provincial electoral slates from there.¹³

Thus this new reactionary party was born of fear, personal prestige, and propaganda. During the Regency in the Câmara in Rio, well-known orators among the most prominent moderados began to criticize former colleagues in the cabinet and the regent himself. Given the milieu of social and political disorder, their critiques exerted dramatic appeal, as did their calls for what they proclaimed as “verdadeira liberdade,” impossible without “religioso respeito à autoridade dos leis.” They made their case directly to other deputies in the Câmara, while their speeches, published in the *Jornal do Comércio*, extended their appeal to the provinces. Their success in the Câmara, demonstrated by a series of votes in 1836 and 1837, signified the emergence of a Câmara party opposing the cabinet, a party that enjoyed majority support. The party at the time consisted of a majority of deputies in Rio, many or most of whom had voted as moderados in 1833 but now

13. On early party organization, see Needell, “Party Formation,” pts. 1–2; and R. Barman, *Brazil*, 165, 171. On the clubs and periodicals, see Flory, *Judge and Jury*, 12–13; Nelson Werneck Sodré, *A história da imprensa no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966), 123, 125, 138–48; Moreira de Azevedo, “Origem,” 192–93; Pereira da Silva, *História do Brasil*, 26; and O. T. de Sousa, *Evaristo da Veiga* (São Paulo: Nacional, 1939), 162–66. On freemasonry, see R. Barman, *Brazil*, 165, 171; and Jorge Caldeira, *Mauá, empresário do Império* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1995), chap. 11. On the organization of elections, see Honório to anonymous, Rio, 12 Jan 1833, Coleção do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (hereafter IHGB), lata 274, pacote 15; Honório to José da Costa Carvalho, Rio, 9 Oct. 1834, IHGB, lata 219, doc. 49, no. 1; Paulino to Francisco Peixoto de Lacerda Verneck, S. Domos., 29 Nov. 1837, in Arquivo Nacional (hereafter AN), Coleção Família Werneck (hereafter FW), caixa 379, pacote 1, doc. 235; Paulino to Francisco Peixoto de Lacerda Verneck, Nichtheroy, 25 Mar. 1838, AN, FW caixa 379, pacote 1, doc. 235.4; Honório to Paulino and Vasconcelos, Aguas Virtuosas, 5 Sept. 1847, IHGB, Arquivo do Visconde do Uruguai (hereafter VU), lata 3, pacote 10, 114/31; and Honório to Paulino and Vasconcelos, IHGB, VU, lata 3, pacote 10, 113/30. On propaganda, see the correspondence quoted in Nelson Lage Mascarenhas, *Um jornalista do Império* (Firmino Rodrigues Silva) (São Paulo: Nacional, 1961), esp. chaps. 1–2; and Rocha, *Annaes*, 1855, vol. 1, 26 May. The Brazilian case often contradicts generalizations in Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), esp. p. 44 and chap. 4. Anderson views the press as a key to nationalism and state formation in Latin America. Yet in Brazil, state formation preceded journalism, and journalism helped to maintain the state’s geographical integrity rather than undercutting the old colonial political unit and promoting regionalism and disaggregation.

went along with the prominent moderado leaders who had broken with the reforms of 1834 and the moderado regent. These moderado renegades secured their majority by gaining the support of other deputies who had until 1834 been associated with an ultra-reactionary minority (the *caramurus*) calling for the restoration of the first emperor.¹⁴

In this transition to a reactionary majority in the *Câmara*, the keys to partisan organization were the personal prestige and ideological appeal of a handful of deputies among their colleagues. Part of their personal prestige doubtless derived from their private circumstances. All the key reactionary leaders were linked to locally powerful and wealthy interests by occupation, blood, marriage, or all three. Without these private connections, they would not have been voted into the *Câmara* by an electorate organized and socialized to defer to the established socioeconomic hierarchy. The few radicals who rose to the *Câmara* by force of their ideas and their ability to articulate their views were the exceptions to this rule.¹⁵

Private circumstances make it easy to understand the bonds and the confidence of the local electoral colleges in such men. Once they had established a political reputation for leadership as speakers of talent and ideologues with attractive issues, they could become sources of power and confer prestige and appeal on ideas and on newer or less-known deputies. The electoral colleges were supplied with a list of names designated by such leaders, and because of the confidence in them, the list would receive the majority of college votes. In effect, the party leaders in Rio provided electoral direction to those who looked to them for national and provincial guidance through reading their speeches or the propaganda of party publicists in

14. On “*verdadeira liberdade*,” see Rodrigues Torres in *Annaes*, 1837, vol. 1, 9 May. For a detailed analysis of this transition, see Needell, “Party Formation,” pt. 2. This emphasis on a leadership organically part of socioeconomic elites and leading them through ideological appeal challenges the assumptions and arguments of Graham, Pang, and Flory.

15. Among reactionaries, Vasconcelos, a mineiro, was the son of a Portuguese magistrate associated with mineiro commerce to Rio and a well-known apologist for the slave trade. Honório, also a mineiro, was nephew, son-in-law, and heir to a Rio merchant with mineiro connections. Honório was also a fluminense planter. Fluminense Rodrigues Torres, a lowland planter, was the son of a Portuguese merchant and brother to a fluminense merchant and had married into an extensive clan of planters. Paulino married into the same family. José Clemente Pereira married the widow and heiress of a Portuguese merchant-planter of Rio de Janeiro. Calmon was the scion of one of Bahia’s oldest planter clans. Eusébio, son-in-law of José Clemente Pereira, was an Angolan-born Portuguese, the son of a supreme court judge, nephew of slave merchants turned fluminense planters, and cousin to their heirs. Among the liberals, Evaristo, preeminent publicist and deputy, was a journalist and bookseller; Diogo Antônio Feijó, the liberal regent of 1835–1837, was a priest and small-scale planter; and Teófilo Otoni, perhaps the most important radical deputy and publicist, was an urban professional. For details, see Needell, “Party Formation,” pt. 2. On local elections and political socialization, see Bieber, *Power, Patronage, and Political Violence*, esp. chap. 3; and Graham, *Patronage and Politics*, chap. 4. The local electoral control of the planters was recognized early by Evaristo in *Aurora Fluminense*, 29 Mar. 1833, p. 3199, and 1 Apr. 1833, p. 3206.

national periodicals and often because of personal ties through extensive family networks.¹⁶

This method of partisan organization created the *partido de ordem* between 1834 and 1837. The opposition to it called the party *regressista* (reactionary) in an attempt to taint it, given the prestige of liberal ideology at the time. The party actually had no name for itself. Members referred to the party as “a maioria” or “o partido ministerial” because the party was the majority supporting the cabinet ministers who took power on 19 September 1837. References to the “partido de ordem” appeared only in the early 1840s, after the party had successfully identified itself with the ideal of order to distinguish itself from its opposition. This success derived from the ongoing debates from 1835 to 1841 that led to the recentralizing legislation of 1840–1842, debates and laws fundamental to their ideology. This legislation gutted the 1834 reforms and carried state intervention to new depths in Brazil. Most important, the legislation of 3 December 1841 (which reformed the *Código do Processo Criminal*) enabled unprecedented state penetration and patronage at the local level, with clear implications for electoral influence. This legislative triumph was bound up with the return of key reactionaries to power in the cabinet of 23 March 1841. The reactionaries’ opposition responded with a desperate liberal revolt in 1842 that failed. The reactionaries subsequently exploited this revolt to label their opposition as “anarchists” willing to use violence against the constitutional order, despite clear risks to society. The liberals’ association with “anarchy” deepened in the 1840s because they seemed incapable of restoring national order when in power and became notorious for partisan violence in the elections of 1840, 1844, and 1847. The violence of those elections and the local violence visited on the reactionaries when the opposition was in power further strengthened partisan identity through the bitter experience of being vulnerable to state abuse and losing access to state patronage, particularly in the “liberal quinquennium” of 1844–1848.¹⁷

The general process described here during 1834–1848 refers more accurately to the experience of the province of Rio de Janeiro and southern

16. For examples in the 1830s, see the correspondence cited in note 13. Also a draft of Visconde do Uruguai, “Circular aos Srs. Eleitores,” Rio, 7 Nov. 1856, IHGB, VU, pacote 23, 130; Visconde do Uruguai to Paulino José Soares de Sousa (*filho*), Rio, 13 Nov. 1856, IHGB, VU, lata 4, 1/53; and José Antônio Soares de Souza, *A vida do Visconde do Uruguai* (São Paulo: Nacional, 1944), 45, 46–47. For an example of the use of periodicals in elections, see *Sete d’Abril*, 8 Nov., 11 Nov., and 18 Nov. 1834. Elections were indirect. Voters, who qualified by owning a minimum of property, elected electors who formed colleges at the municipal level. Graham estimated voters at half of the free males by the 1870s. See *Patronage and Politics*, 107–9. He stressed that this relatively large number does not demonstrate an inclusive democracy so much as a broad-based electoral drama recognizing local hierarchy and current political pre-eminence (chap. 4).

17. Early attacks on Vasconcelos as a reactionary by his erstwhile ally Evaristo can be found in *Aurora Fluminense*, 22 June 1835; see also the issues for 3, 5, 17, and 19 June and 4 Sept. 1835.

and western Minas Gerais. In this region, most of the prestigious families supported the Party of Order by accepting the leadership of local sons and sons-in-law who had made names for themselves in Rio. The party enjoyed support in other provinces, particularly Bahia and Pernambuco, but their electoral colleges were disputed by celebrated local political chiefs who had thrown in with the opposition or initially hesitated to accept the newly successful leaders of Rio de Janeiro or Minas. Apparently, in some provinces (or provincial regions), no partisan organization took place at all in the 1840s. Even in Bahia, neither the dominant party nor its liberal opposition commanded widespread local partisan support until the late 1840s, when a liberal cabinet tried to impose electoral control and effectively forced hitherto independent political chiefs into the arms of the Party of Order. In Pernambuco, local partisan organization was complicated by the provincial power of a congeries of related families, the Cavalcantis, who were themselves split between the two national parties but jointly opposed by a third more radical party. In São Paulo (like parts of Minas, a stronghold of local liberal chieftains), the reactionaries lacked any partisan effectiveness.¹⁸

To date, no scholarship has illuminated local political organization in the other provinces of Brazil. The historiography and archival correspondence merely suggest that the local oligarchies, perpetually at war with one another, used party affiliation to further their private feuds at the local level when their particular national party came to power. Partisan organization

The reactionaries' early self-labeling is clear in *Annaes*, 1838, vol. 1, May; 1839, vol. 1, May; and Honório, *Jornal do Comércio*, 15 May 1844, p. 2. The key legislation can be found in Barão de Javari, *Organizações e programas ministeriais*, 3a. ed (1889; reprint, Brasília: Instituto Nacional do Livro, 1979), 86–87. See also Flory, *Judge and Jury*, 172–79. Aside from the reform of the Código do Processo Criminal and its enabling regulations in early 1842, the legislation included the November 1841 restoration of the Conselho do Estado (central to the monarch's constitutional oversight power). Vitiating of the reformist Additional Act of 1834 had already been completed on 12 May 1840. See Javari, *Organizações*, 70. The interplay between order and "anarchy" is manifest in Vasconcelos in *Jornal do Comércio*, 14 Jan. 1843, suplemento, p. 1; and 15 Jan. 1843; Honório, *Jornal do Comércio*, 15 Jan. 1843, p. 1, and 7 Mar. 1843, pp. 2–3; and *O Brasil*, 23 May 1844, pp. 1–2; 25 May 1844, pp. 2–3; 30 May 1844, pp. 1–2; 28 Sept. 1844, p. 1; 30 Oct. 1847, pp. 1–2; 9 Nov. 1847, pp. 1–2; and 23 Nov. 1847, pp. 2–3, 4–5. The rebellion of 1842 was perceived privately as it was defined publicly, as is clear in Honório to [Paulino], s.l., 18 June 1842, IHGB, VU, lata 310, pacote 10, 82. On the events of 1842, see R. Barman, *Brazil*, 209–16.

18. Reactionary strength in Rio de Janeiro was such that only unusual electoral violence (e.g., the infamous "eleições do cacete" in 1840) allowed an opposition victory. The 1840 election began the tradition of close cabinet intervention in the local electoral process. See the 1843 and 1844 citations in note 17 and R. Barman, *Brazil*, 210–11. On Bahia, see José Wanderley Pinho, *Cotegipe e seu tempo: Primeiro phase, 1815–1867* (São Paulo: Nacional, 1937), 45–56, 66–72, 79–80, 89–95, 103, 125–27, 157, 167–72, 175–81; and Honório to Anselmo Franco, Pereti, Bahia, 27 June 1849, Arquivo Histórico do Museu Imperial (hereafter AHMI), Arquivo Paranagua, I DPP 27, 6, 849 Leoc, P.P. Pe. On Pernambuco, see Mosher, "Pernambuco," 99–101, 109–13, and 115–22. On Minas, see Bieber, *Power, Patronage, and Political Violence*, chap. 3; and

throughout the empire was thus knit to local hierarchies dominated by extended families of local elites. The difference between these families in Rio de Janeiro and its hinterland and those elsewhere was that the fluminense leadership was clearly more successful in conflating their provincial and local interests with a vision of the national state so that in defending the state, they defended their provincial and local interests.

This perspective is clearly evident in the massive local support raised by the reactionaries in Rio de Janeiro and southern Minas against the 1842 rebellion in Minas. One reactionary chieftain, Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão (1801–1856), was crucial to this mobilization. As president of the province and a fluminense planter, Honório successfully marshaled fellow planters against the rebels in Minas. His views are clear in a letter he wrote to his reactionary colleague, Paulino José Soares de Sousa (1807–1866), then Minister of Justice: “If your Excellency . . . hesitates, we are lost, because the Government will not be able to conquer and topple the vast conspiracy. One is not dealing with a mineiro affair but the cause of the monarchy, and this one debates with sword in hand.”¹⁹

In other provinces, even comparable oligarchies of slaveholding planters were hard put not to perceive some contradiction between their local interests and the state. For the fluminenses, the strengthening of the state meant the strengthening of a political institution and port to which their private interests were directly articulated through crown appointments,

Honório to Paulino and Vasconcelos, Aguas Virtuosas, 5 Sept. 1847, IHGB, VU, lata 3, pacote 10, 113/30; and Honório to Paulino, s.l., 5 Sept. 1847, IHGB, VI, lata 3, pacote 10, 114/31; and Mascarenhas, *Um jornalista*, esp. chaps. 1–2. On São Paulo, see J. M. Pera. da Sa to Eusébio, São Paulo, 28 Dec. 1848, Arquivo do Museu Histórico (hereafter AMH), Coleção Eusébio de Queirós (hereafter EQ), cr. 15/1.

19. The quotation is from Honório to [Paulino], s.l., 18 June 1842, IHGB, VU, lata 310, pacote 10, 82. See the citations to Pinho, Bieber, and Mosher in note 18. Compare with Graham, *Patronage and Politics*, 158–60, 177–81. Flory has argued that the Liberal party’s local adherents emerged in response to the need of weaker oligarchies or marginalized groups to find partisan national articulation in their struggle against stronger and more established groups or regions allying with the reactionaries. See Flory, *Judge and Jury*, 182–83. In the correspondence, the early differences between the partisan perspectives, loyalties, and assumptions in the provinces and those of the Court in Rio and its hinterland were striking enough to be noted. See José Joaquim Cunha to Vitor de Oliveira, Natal, 14 Dec. 1851, AN, Arquivo Particular 26, Vitor de Oliveira (hereafter AP26), caixa 70, pacote 29, 22, p. 1; Honório to [Eusébio], Recife, 30 July 1849, IHGB, Coleção Leão Teixeira, lata 748, pacote 26; J. M. Wanderley to [Eusébio], Bahia, 19 Nov. 1848, AN, Arquivo Particular 07, Eusébio de Queirós (hereafter AP07), caixa 1, pacote 2, PM129; J. M. Wanderley to [Eusébio], Bahia, 20 July [1849], AN, AP07, caixa 2, pacote 2, PM585. The fluminense planters who rallied to defend the state with money and men were carefully listed in the correspondence, in which the conflation of state, reactionary party, and planters is often explicit. For examples, see Visconde de Baependy to Franco, Peixoto de Lacerda Verneck, Valença, 3 July 1842, AN, FW, caixa 379, pacote 1, doc. 221; and Visconde de Baependy to Franco, Peixoto de Lacerda Verneck, Paraiso, 1 July 1842, AN, FW, caixa 379, pacote 1, doc. 233.

local expenditures, access to favors, and local security. More distant provincial oligarchies who affiliated with the Party of Order seem to have done so because they needed the prestige and repressive potential of a strong state to secure their local positions and feared the destabilizing potential of a weak state.²⁰

Indicative of the initially local character of the Party of Order is that its members, particularly the most prestigious political chieftains, were called "Saquaremas." The name derived from the fluminense municipality of Saquarema, an established reactionary bailiwick associated with one of the party's most prestigious founders, Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres (1802–1871). In 1844, when the party's opposition was in power, his political control was defended against flagrant liberal electoral abuse. That stalwart reactionary defense of the status quo against violent liberal intervention became so strongly associated with the local fluminense place-name that it became the sobriquet of the reactionary leaders and their party. Saquaremas, both chieftains and followers, made up a party that claimed the national mission of securing a threatened established order.²¹

The Party of Order and Provincial Partisan Organization, 1848–1853

In 1848, after five years of liberal control of the cabinet and the Câmara, Pedro II decided that Brazil required the stability, unity, and prestige that the Party of Order seemed more likely to provide. The emperor

20. Here I extrapolate from the conclusions made by Mosher in "Pernambuco," 61–65, 197–99, 112, 114–22, 252–53. Pernambuco is useful in this regard because of its history of provincial antagonism toward the centralizing rule from Rio. The fact that a dominant sector of an oligarchy profoundly opposed to imperial intervention in their bailiwick embraced the reaction of 1837 and the *partido de ordem* speaks precisely to the general point made.

21. See *O Brasil*, 23 Nov. 1847. Saquarema was the town closest to the plantation of Rodrigues Torres. See also J. M. Pereira da Silva, *Memórias do meu tempo*, 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro: Garnier, 1895), 1:126–27. Rohloff de Mattos has associated the term *Saquarema* with his conflation of the state and the seigniorial class, informed by a statist ideology. This usage is problematic, not least in terms of the actual political history. For example, to discuss the policies of the Saquaremas' archenemy, Aureliano de Sousa e Oliveira Coutinho, as exemplifying Saquarema ideas is misleading. So is the notion that the Conciliação (1853–1857)—when the emperor and cabinet overcame Saquarema resistance and aggrandized the executive, diminished the Câmara, and undercut political parties—represented a Saquarema triumph. See Mattos, *O tempo saquarema*, 171, 258, 260, 275. On Aureliano and the Saquaremas, compare R. Barman, *Brazil*, 221, 222; Honório, *Jornal do Comércio*, 15 May 1844, p. 2, and 19 May 1844, suplemento, p. 1; and Pereira da Silva, *Memórias* 1:116–19. On the Conciliação, see Visconde do Uruguay to [Eusébio], Rio, 10 Dec. 1854, AMH, EQ cr84/2; Visconde do Uruguay to Eusébio, Paris, 27 Nov. 1855, AMH, EQ 84/5, p. 3; Visconde do Uruguay to [Bernardo Belisário Soares de Sousa], Paris, 4 Nov. 1855, AHMI, I-DST, 12.3.855, Sou c1–20,2–3; Mascarenhas, *Um jornalista*, 220–22; Pereira da Silva, *Memórias*, 1:243–49; Nabuco, *Um estadista*, 1:177–85; Ferraz and Silveira da Mota, *Jornal do Comércio*, 30 June 1854, p. 2, and suplemento no. 179, p. 1; Eusébio, *Jornal do Comércio*, 7 Aug. 1855, p. 1; Sayão Lobato, *Annaes*, 1855, vol. 1, 18 May and

chose the Viscount of Olinda, the reactionary regent of 1837–1840, to head the cabinet, which was actually led by the most prestigious of the Saquaremas. Two of the founding party chieftains were not included, apparently personae non gratae to the emperor. Yet both played significant roles elsewhere in the Senado, diplomacy, and provincial rule, thus furthering the project associated with the Saquaremas and their cabinet.²²

This cabinet, even after being reshuffled in 1852, comprised one of the two most successful and long-lived administrations of the Segundo Reinado, lasting from September 1848 to September 1853. Many of its achievements have been noted. The cabinet ended the trade in African slaves, re-founded the Banco do Brasil, and reformed judicial legislation, land legislation, and various ministries. It also overthrew Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas and increased imperial prestige in the Río de la Plata, opened up the Amazon, and completed a commercial code. Yet the Saquaremas' success in strengthening the Party of Order as a national party has gone unremarked.²³

In terms of partisan patronage and violence, no portfolio was as important as that of the Ministro da Justiça since at least the early liberal years of the Regency. But the ministry's political role was dramatically enhanced with the reactionary legislation of 1840–1842. The Ministro da Justiça ap-

²² May; Sayão Lobato, Carlos Carneiro de Campos, and J. J. da Rocha, *Annaes*, 1855, vol. 1, 19 May; Ferraz, *Annaes*, 1855, vol. 1, 22 May; and J. J. da Rocha, *Annaes*, 1855, vol. 1, 25 May and 26 May. Compare Roderick J. Barman, *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825–91* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 164–66.

²³ On the liberal quinquennium and the Saquarema cabinet of 1848, see Ottoni, *Circular*, 118–28, 132–39, 143; and Timandro (pseudonym of Francisco de Sales Torres Homem), “Libelo do Povo,” 4th ed., in *Três panfletários do Segundo Reinado*, edited by R. Magalhães Júnior (1849, 1868, 1870; reprint, São Paulo: Nacional, 1956), esp. 97, 116; [Justiniano José da Rocha], “Ação, reação, transição,” in *Três panfletários*, [1855], 199–206; Mascarenhas, *Um jornalista*, 111–56; Pereira da Silva, *Memórias* 1, chaps. 8–10; *Jornal do Comércio*, 9 Sept. 1848, p. 2; 10 Sept. 1848, pp. 1–2, and 29 Sept. 1848, p. 1; and Mosher, “Pernambuco,” 204–12. R. Barman has analyzed the impact of foreign policy pressures on the liberals' disarray. See Barman, *Brazil*, 229–31. Vasconcelos and Honório may well have been in bad odor with Dom Pedro, Vasconcelos for resistance to the emperor's unconstitutional empowerment in 1840, Honório for his failed 1843 attempt as a minister to overawe the emperor. Nonetheless, Vasconcelos led the reactionaries in the Conselho de Estado and the Senado until his death in early 1850, and Honório was a key player in the Senado, and the Conselho do Estado, as president of Pernambuco, and in the victorious diplomacy over the Río de la Plata region in 1850–1852.

²³ See the portfolios and legislation in Javari, *Organizações*, 104–12. Despite the reshuffle in 1852, the cabinet remained dominated by two of the original cabinet's Saquarema founders, Rodrigues Torres and Paulino. The administration's consolidation of the state and its other triumphs are summarized in Pereira da Silva, *Memórias*, 1, chaps. 11–13; Nabuco, *Um estadista*, 1:113–18; and R. Barman, *Brazil*, 231–35. Its foreign policy is carefully reconstructed in Soares de Souza, *A vida*, chaps. 7–15 and pp. 425–42. Abolition is analyzed in Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question, 1807–1869* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1970), chaps. 11–12. Material improvements are noted in Richard Graham, *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1972), chap. 2; and Caldeira, *Mauá*, 191–279.

pointed the magistrates and police agents at the local level throughout the Brazilian Empire, thus controlling prestigious patronage and the local use or abuse of state power. The minister also oversaw the electoral activities of the cabinet-appointed provincial presidents traditionally charged with securing party victory at elections. Thus the *Ministro da Justiça* defined an administration for most Brazilians of that era.

The *Ministro da Justiça* from September 1848 to May 1852 was Eusébio de Queirós Coutinho Mattoso da Camara (1812–1868), traditionally called “o papa dos saquaremas.” The cardinals were Rodrigues Torres, *Ministro da Fazenda*, and Paulino José Soares de Sousa, who served after October 1849 as *Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros*. A legal prodigy in his early twenties, Eusébio held the key position of police chief of Rio in the 1830s and early 1840s and went on to become a fluminense deputy in 1838 and a deputy for Rio de Janeiro by 1847. This Angolan-born son of a Portuguese-born Brazilian supreme court justice was also the nephew of a slave trader, the cousin of fluminense coffee planters, and the son-in-law of a Portuguese-born planter and prestigious minister in both the *Primeiro* and *Segundo Reinados*. Eusébio’s wife stood to inherit the fortune of a Rio merchant.²⁴

Eusébio thus represented the first and third fluminense oligarchies already discussed in his private life and the Party of Order in his public career and achievements. By 1848 he was one of the party’s preminent spokesmen in the *Câmara*. Years of networking, his distinguished record as police chief, and his role in the *Câmara* made his appointment as *Ministro da Justiça* a natural culmination. He now sat atop the partisan pyramid—smooth, cool, enormously prestigious, and the evident master of men. Although Pedro II made it clear that he wanted a more bipartisan approach to appointments, Eusébio used his position to strengthen the party in provinces where it was weak and implant it in provinces where it did not exist. He apparently saw no contradiction between his efforts on behalf of the party and on behalf of the state, a common view among party chieftains

24. The cabinets had no council president until 1847. Javari listed the ministers beginning with *Império*, not *Justiça*, possibly because of the greater antiquity of its antecedents in Portuguese law. Indeed, the *Ministério do Império* oversaw both elections and provincial presidents. Nonetheless, the police powers and appointments, control over the *Guarda Nacional*, and judicial appointments and case reviews in the hands of *Justiça* apparently provided that minister with the more effective local intervention. See Javari, *Organizações*, 1–249; José Antônio Pimenta Bueno, *Direito público brasileiro e análise da Constituição do Império* (1857; reprint, Brasília: Senado Federal, 1978), 269–71, 273–75. On Eusébio, see S. A. Sisson, *Galeria dos brasileiros ilustres (os contemporâneos)*, 2d ed., 2 vols. (1859; reprint, São Paulo: Martins, 1948), 1:19–22; Tavares de Lyra, *Instituições políticas do Império* (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1979), 252; Thomas H. Holloway, *Policing Rio de Janeiro: Repression and Resistance in a 19th-Century City* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, 1993), 103–5, 123–42. Eusébio’s father-in-law was José Clemente Pereira, the noted minister in the *Primeiro Reinado*. See AN, AP07, PM1907. Eusébio’s paternal aunt married into the Teixeira de Macedo family. See Sisson, *Galeria*, 1:281; and Garcia Florentino, *Em costas negras*, 283.

and their ideological stalwarts. Eusébio's ministerial correspondence reveals that they viewed the Party of Order as the party of representative constitutional monarchy, the very definition of the state that the party founders had established and defended in law and in practice. When as *Ministro da Justiça*, Eusébio directed the party's maintenance and increase, he thought he was strengthening the state itself. In response to a candidate's acceptance of a provincial presidency, Eusébio spelled out the Saquarema position:

I organized these instructions according to the ideas that we agreed on in the cabinet. Our opinion is that a President ought not to accept a position as a party chief enslaved to his [political] passions; the [previous] administration accustomed both parties [in your province] to view the President in an inappropriate light; it will thus be difficult for the [new] President to govern in his own way without displeasing the demanding friends of the Government [the cabinet]. But if the President must not be weak with these people, it is in no way suitable that he surround himself with men who disguise their opposition and even their radical reform sentiments; that he demonstrate more esteem for such people than for [our] friends. Whatever the defects of these friends might be, they sustain order, while the others disturb it; they sustain the Constitution, while the others preach a constituent assembly; they defend union against the others, who preach the secession of the North, and this very recently. . . . In view of the circumstances in which you find the Province, I judge that you ought, first of all, to reassure friends of the Government. . . .²⁵

Eusébio pursued his goals in several ways. He appointed local magistrates whose service to the party and the state could be confirmed by party stalwarts in his confidence. He urged the publication of provincial periodicals sustaining the party's ideology and local political chiefs. Eusébio made it clear that he expected provincial presidents to influence the elections on behalf of the Party of Order and against "the party of anarchy." He maintained a network of confidants in provinces to investigate local political struggles, indicate sources of partisan conflict or weakness, and point to potential local party leaders. He intervened on behalf of party members and against the opposition in making provincial appointments. The stakes were obvious to Eusébio and to other party chieftains. The Party of Order was in power, but one could not know for how long. Correspondence demonstrates that they believed themselves opposed by a party of "anarchists" and opportunists willing to reform away constitutional order and mobilize the masses. The Saquaremas' letters and actions demonstrated their assumption that state power had to be used to preserve the nation against such men and such forces.²⁶

25. The quotation comes from Eusébio to Ribeiro, Rio, 15 Mar. 1852, AN, AP07, caixa 5, pacote 2, PM1281.

26. See for example J. M. Wanderley to Eusébio, [Bahia], 16 Dec. 1848, AN, AP07, caixa 1, pacote 1, PM131; João Evangelista de Negros. Sayao Lobato to Eusébio, Porto Alegre, 11 Apr. 1849, AN, AP07, caixa 2, pacote 2, PM567; J. M. Wanderley to Eusébio, Bahia, 19 Jan. [1849], AN, AP07, PM578; Eusébio [minute] to M. C. Jeronimo Guedes Alcoforado, [Rio], 6 Apr. [1849],

The End of an Era

By 1851 the Saquarema ministers had achieved much of what they had dreamt of in the 1830s. They had created a majority party in the Câmara and in the nation that sustained a parliamentary, constitutional monarchy. They had passed legislation sustaining national order by strengthening the the state's power to intervene in local judicial and electoral affairs. They had ensured the legitimacy of the state and its charismatic quality by reaffirming the monarch's role as constitutional overseer. The state they had designed and governed had successfully weathered provincial revolts, attempts at secession, and foreign intervention and had promoted Brazilian interests abroad. Yet by that same year, the ministers were desperate to leave office.

This apparent contradiction between unprecedented partisan and ideological triumph on the one hand and personal disgust and desperation on the other points to significantly changed political realities. What the Saquarema ministers had not anticipated in the 1830s were the pressures that compelled their exhaustion, disgust, and increasing despair in the 1850s. Some of the pressures derived from the local partisan and patronage mobilization that followed the reactionary legislation of 1840–1842, which allowed the party in power the exclusive right to make crown appointments. Others were new pressures for state patronage born of a surfeit of qualified candidates for various positions. Still other pressures derived from the unlooked-for intervention of the monarch himself.

Despite a Conservative majority, the cabinet found themselves beset in the parliament not by their old ideological foes but by individuals and factions of their own party. The parliament became insufferable to the cabinet members because of debates designed to obstruct and embarrass them as well as private demands all driving toward the same goal—patronage. The newly elected deputies and established senators had ambitions and local clientele to satisfy, and they demanded patronage in exchange for political support. After years of exclusive liberal control of state patronage, Conservative deputies were desperate to protect their careers by obtaining access to patronage in order to strengthen their own local positions, help their electors, and undercut the careers and clientele of their enemies. In the

AN, AP07, PM746; J. M. Wanderley to Eusébio, Bahia, 29 Nov. 1851, AN, AP07, caixa 4, pacote único, PM1115; [Eusébio] to [Vitor de Oliveira], [Rio], 18 Nov. 1851, AN, AP26, caixa 70, pacote 29, 2, p. 1; Eusébio to Dr. Figueira de Melo, s.l., 21 Jan. 1849, AN, AP07, PM2085; Eusébio, draft of circular apparently directed to all provincial presidents, AN, AP07, PM2082; Eusébio to anonymous, s.l., 7 Jan., AN, AP07, PM1881; Eusébio to anonymous, Rio, 12 Nov. 1851, AN, AP07, caixa 5, pacote 2, PM1298; J. M. Pera. da Sa. to Eusébio, São Paulo, 28 Dec. 1848, AMH, EQcr15/1; Francisco José Teixeira Leite, Joaquim José Teixeira Leite to Eusébio, Vassouras, 10 Nov. 1852, AMH, EQcr 78.1; and Firmino Rodrigues Silva to Eusébio, Ouro Preto, 30 Jan. 1852, AMH, EQcr7/2.

cabinet's attempted resignation of 1851, the prime minister expressed the issue well:

When Your Imperial Majesty . . . called to his Councils the present Ministers, it had been five years that the party known as Santa Luzia occupied all of the official positions from which it had expelled its adversaries. Those known as Saquaremas, upon whom alone the Ministry could depend, hailed the day 29 September 1848 with great expectations, some because of the natural desire for vengeance, others because they saw the hegemony of their ideas consolidated, others because they wished to regain the positions that they had occupied.²⁷

The minister's comments expressed the perspective of Saquarema stalwarts, but that of younger Conservatives should also be taken into account. During this cabinet administration, a new generation of Conservatives was elected to the Câmara, one that had not been shaped by the partisan ideological struggle of the late 1830s and early 1840s, when the dangers of liberal reform and national disaggregation seemed evident to party founders. The younger deputies too may have been affected by the liberal control of state patronage and positions from 1844 to 1848, and perhaps disproportionately so. As Roderick and Jean Barman have pointed out, although the legislation of the early 1840s dramatically augmented the number of state positions, by the early 1850s, more trained jurists were graduating from the imperial law schools than there were positions available. Moreover, as Murilo de Carvalho suggested, such men increasingly lacked an independent source of income and required state employment for a career.²⁸

27. Visconde de Montealegre et al. to Senhor [Dom Pedro II], Rio, 15 Nov. 1851, quoted in full in Hélio Vianna, *Vultos do Império* (São Paulo: Nacional, 1968), 150. (Montealegre had replaced Olinda early on in the cabinet.) This joint letter is frank about the political history and electoral realities of the regime as well as the specific difficulties of the cabinet's relations with the parliament. "Santa Luzia" (a reference to the battlefield of the last Liberal defeat in the revolt of 1842) was a common sobriquet for the Liberals, as was "Luzia." The date 29 Sept. 1848 refers to the date of the cabinet's appointment.

28. On the new generation and the parliament, see Nabuco, *Um estadista*, 1:144–45, 148–60; and Roderick James Barman, "Brazil at Mid-Empire: Political Accommodation and the Pursuit of Progress under the Conciliação Ministry, 1853–1857," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1970, 1–3, 4. On the surfeit of jurists, see Roderick Barman and Jean Barman, "The Role of the Law Graduate in the Political Fate of Imperial Brazil," *Journal of International Studies and World Affairs* 18, no. 4 (Nov. 1976):429, 432–47. On the new career dependency on the state, see Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem*, 79, 84. Both the Barmans and Murilo de Carvalho point to the early 1850s on the rise of these phenomena. As I have shown, archival correspondence indicates an earlier emergence. The patronage increase and partisan mobilization after the laws of 1840–1842 are also noted in Flory, *Judge and Jury*, 176–78; and its local impact is exemplified in Bieber, *Power, Patronage, and Political Violence*, 150–54, 161–75. Graham's model of patronage and politics is devoid of ideology or change over time. It stands in contrast to Barman, Murilo de Carvalho, Flory, the local studies by Bieber and Mosher and by Wanderley in *Cotegipe*. Graham's interpretation may have this character partly because his copious evidence was generally drawn from the era after the 1850s, when party organization and ideology became increasingly incoherent. See R. Barman's comments

This voracious new demand for patronage affected even the diplomatic corps and the temper of the famously correct *Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros*. Just after the cabinet requested its resignation from the emperor in vain, Paulino responded testily to criticism from his old friend, Honório, who was on a diplomatic mission in Uruguay:

Yes, sir, I did make some nominations . . . to the Diplomatic Corps. I have to take responsibility for them in public and defend them as best I can. But I never thought I would have to defend myself with Your Lordship, who is not among those who lick the shopwindow from outside, who knows how our affairs are going, who was a Minister, and who will be one yet again. . . . I can affirm to Your Lordship that if you had been in my position, you would have done the same. . . . Finally, these are matters that I, silent and burdened with all blame, can only explain to you here. This is what vexes me. And when Your Lordship, who is familiar with affairs, says what I read in your letter . . . , what can I expect from others? Is there anyone who can suffer all this with resignation? It is because of these things and others that I want to leave this hell.

I fear certain friends who do what children often do when they have some little bird. They torment it, they torture it, but they don't want it to die. . . .²⁹

While the ministers groaned under the increased weight of patronage demands, they had also to face the new impact of the emperor. While the parliament was demanding patronage, the monarch was fighting against it. Pedro II pressed for not granting partisan spoils or making partisan appointments. Perhaps more important, the emperor's increasing intervention in ministerial politics was something the ministers could not have anticipated. Thus at the same time that their party colleagues were demanding

on the 1860s in *Citizen*, 165. As the present study demonstrates, party organization and ideology were not always so. Graham's analysis implicitly suggested as much. Perhaps because the earlier period did not jibe with his conclusions, Graham rarely treated it or treated it as something apart rather than the first part of a process. See Graham, *Patronage and Politics*, 50–55; 148–49, and chaps. 6 and 9. In the future, I hope to demonstrate still further the connection between the forces that came into play by 1850 and the later party and ensuing ideological decline of the era after 1853.

29. The quotation comes from Paulino to Honório, Rio, 13 Dec. 1851, Biblioteca Nacional, Seção de Manuscritos (hereafter BNSM), Coleção Tobias Monteiro (hereafter TM), armário 32, pasta 22, pp. 2–3. The Saquarema ministers' frank correspondence reveals disgust with parliamentary opportunism and patronage. See [Eusébio] to Honório, s.l., 30 June 1850, AN, AP07, caixa 5, pacote 2, PM1284; Paulino to Honório, 27 Sept. 1851, IHGB, VU, lata 5, pacote 18, no. 7; Paulino to [Nabuco de Araújo], Rio, 27 Sept. 1851, IHGB, VU, lata 367, livro 1, nos. 100–101; [Paulino] to [Honório], Rio, 12 Jan. 1852, BNSM, TM, armário 32, pasta 24, pp. 2–3; Paulino to Paranhos, Rio, 12 June 1852, IHGB, VU, lata 5, pacote 18, no. 10, pp. 1–2; Paulino to Firmino Rodriqs. Silva, s.l., 27 Dec. 1852, IHGB, VU, lata 9, p. 1; Paulino to [Carvalho Moreira], Rio, 13 Nov. 1853, Arquivo Histórico de Itamarati, Arquivo Particular Penedo, 907, pp. 1–2; and Paulino to [Carvalho Moreira], Rio, 15 Mar. 1854, Arquivo Histórico de Itamarati, Arquivo Particular Penedo, 907, p. 2; Paulino to [José Maria da Silva Paranhos (*pai*)], Rio, 11 Sept. 1853, Arquivo Histórico de Itamarati, Arquivo Particular Visconde do Rio Branco, Correspondência Encardenada, vol. 1, lata 338, Maço 1, no. 2, pp. 1–2.

partisan patronage, their emperor demanded nonpartisan distribution of state appointments and largesse.³⁰

By November 1851, the Saquaremas were actually imploring the emperor to allow them to leave office. Eusébio, exhausted and ill, left first, forcing a temporary reshuffling of portfolios in 1852. The cabinet staggered on seventeen months before the monarch released them. They had made possible a political world that they found themselves incapable of ruling. In the years to come, hard choices would have to be made between the parliamentary ideology of their party and the new pragmatics of a state and political milieu that they and their party had helped to create. The increasing importance of state patronage, its associated political opportunism, and the emperor's steady intervention all combined to strengthen the state and the Crown and steadily encroached on the party's achievement in creating and sustaining the possibility of a representative parliamentary regime. The impact of these developments on the parliamentary role of the party and the socioeconomic and ideological interests that it articulated were felt increasingly over the Segundo Reinado, as the state's increasing independence from its provincial and partisan origins took its toll.³¹

30. See Montealegre et al. to Senhor, 15 Nov. 1851, in Vianna, *Vultos*, 151; and Pereira da Silva, *Memórias*, 1:231–38.

31. I am currently conducting research on this process. Something of its nature is clear in Murilo de Carvalho, *Teatro de sombras*, chaps. 2, 5, and conclusion; and in R. Barman, *Citizen*, 159–79. Rohloff de Mattos views this process as the Saquaremas' project because he conflates their support for a strong state with the embrace of statism. He neglects the Saquaremas' explicit balancing emphasis on a parliamentary, representative, and constitutional regime.

REFERENCES

- ASSUNÇÃO, MATTHIAS RÖHRIG
1999 "Elite Politics and Popular Rebellion in the Construction of Post-Colonial Order: The Case of Maranhão, Brazil (1820–1841)." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, pt. 1 (Feb.):1–38.
- BEIGUELMAN, PAULA
1976 *Formação política do Brasil*. Second edition. São Paulo: Pioneira.
- BARMAN, RODERICK J.
1970 "Brazil at Mid-Empire: Political Accommodation and the Pursuit of Progress under the Conciliação Ministry, 1853–1857." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
1988 *Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798–1852*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
1999 *Citizen Emperor: Pedro II and the Making of Brazil, 1825–91*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- BARMAN, RODERICK J., AND JEAN BARMAN
1976 "The Role of the Law Graduate in the Political Fate of Imperial Brazil." *Journal of International Studies and World Affairs* 18, no. 4 (Nov.):429, 423–50.
- BETHELL, LESLIE
1970 *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave-Trade Question, 1807–1869*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BIEBER, JUDY
1999 *Power, Patronage, and Political Violence: State Building on a Brazilian Frontier, 1822–1889*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- BUARQUE DE HOLANDA, SERGIO
1967– *História geral da civilização brasileira*. Tomo 2, *O Brasil monárquica*, vols. 2–5. São Paulo: DIFEL.
- CALDEIRA, JORGE
1995 *Mauá, empresário do Império*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- CLEARY, DAVID
1998 "'Lost Altogether to the Civilised World': Race and the Cabanagem in Northern Brazil, 1750 to 1850." *Comparative Studies in History and Society* 40, no. 1 (Jan.):104–35.
- COSTA, EMILIA VIOTTI DA
1985 *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- DEAN, WARREN
1995 *With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- DIAS, MARIA ODILA LEITE DA SILVA
1972 "A interiorização da metrópole (1808–1853)." In *1822: Dimensões*, edited by Carlos Guilherme Mota, 160–84. São Paulo: Perspectiva.
- FAUSTO, BORIS
1997 *História do Brasil*. Fifth edition. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo (EDUSP) and Fundação do Desenvolvimento da Educação (FDE).
- FLORENTINO, MANOLO GARCIA
1995 *Em costas negras: Uma história do tráfico atlântico de escravos entre a África e o Rio de Janeiro (séculos XVIII e XIX)*. Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional.
- FLORY, THOMAS
1981 *Judge and Jury in Imperial Brazil, 1808–1871: Social Control and Political Stability in the New State*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- FRAGOSO, JOAQUIM RIBEIRO
1992 *Homens de grossa aventura: Acumulação e hierárchia na praça mercantil do Rio de Janeiro (1790–1830)*. Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional.
- GORENSTEIN, RIVA
1993 "Comércio e política." In Lenira Menezes Martinho and Riva Gorenstein, *Negociantes e caixeiros na sociedade da Independência*, 125–239. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Carioca.
- GRAHAM, RICHARD
1972 *Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil, 1850–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- 1990 *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Brazil*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- HOLLOWAY, THOMAS H.**
 1993 *Policing Rio de Janeiro: Repression and Resistance in a 19th-Century City*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- KRAAY, HENDRIK**
 1992 "'As Terrifying as Unexpected': The Bahian Sabinada, 1837–1838." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 72, no. 4 (Nov.):501–27.
- LENHARO, ALCIR**
 1991 *As tropas da moderação: O abastecimento da Corte na formação política do Brasil, 1808–1842*. Second edition. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca Carioca.
- LIBBY, DOUGLAS COLE**
 1988 *Transformação e trabalho em uma economia escravista: Minas Gerais no século XIX*. São Paulo: Brasiliense.
- MACIEL DE CARVALHO, MARCUS JOAQUIM**
 1989 "Hegemony and Rebellion in Pernambuco (Brazil), 1821–1835." Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois.
- MARTINS FILHO, AMILCAR, AND ROBERTO B. MARTINS**
 1987 "Slavery in a Nonexport Economy: Nineteenth-Century Minas Gerais Revisited." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 3 (Aug.):537–68.
- MATTOS, ILMAR ROHLOFF DE**
 1987 *O tempo saquarema*. São Paulo: Hucitec and Instituto Nacional do Livro.
- MOSHER, JEFFREY C.**
 1996 "Pernambuco and the Construction of the Brazilian Nation-State, 1831–1850." Ph.D. diss., University of Florida.
- MURILO DE CARVALHO, JOSE**
 1986 *A construção da ordem: A elite política imperial*. Rio de Janeiro: Campus.
 1988 *Teatro de sombras: A política imperial*. Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ and Vértice.
- NABUCO, JOAQUIM**
 1897– *Um estadista do império, Nabuco de Araujo: Sua vida, suas opiniões, sua época*. 3 volumes.
 1899 Rio de Janeiro: Garnier.
- NEEDELL, JEFFREY D.**
 1995 "Conservative Party," under "Brazil: Political Parties." *Encyclopedia of Latin American History*. 4 volumes. New York: Scribner's.
 n.d. "Party Formation and State-Making: The Conservative Party and the Reconstruction of the Brazilian State, 1831–1840." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81, no. 2 (May 2001), forthcoming.
- PANG, EUL-SOO**
 1988 *In Pursuit of Honor and Power: Noblemen of the Southern Cross in Nineteenth-Century Brazil*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- REIS, JOÃO JOSE**
 1993 *Slave Rebellion in Brazil: The Muslim Uprising of 1835 in Bahia*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- SODRE, NELSON WERNECK**
 1966 *A história da imprensa no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.
- STEIN, STANLEY J.**
 1957 *Vassouras, a Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900: The Roles of Planter and Slave in a Plantation Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- TAUNAY, AFFONSO DE E.**
 1943 *Pequena história do café no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Maranguape.