

*Wörterbuch der Soziologie*

Edited by WILHELM BERNSDORF and FRIEDRICH BÜLOW,  
with the co-operation of 84 prominent sociologists  
(Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1956.) Pp. 640.

*Soziologie: Ein Lehr- und Handbuch zur  
modernen Gesellschaftskunde*

Edited by ARNOLD GEHLEN and HELMUT SCHELSKY  
(Düsseldorf-Köln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1955.) Pp. 352.

*Einführung in die Sozialpsychologie*

By PETER R. HOFSTÄTTER  
(Stuttgart-Wien: Humboldt Verlag, Collection "Die Universität,"  
Vol. XL, 1954.) Pp. 536.

In the Foreword to the *Wörterbuch der Soziologie* it is expressly stated that this volume is not a reworking of the well-known pocket dictionary which was published by Alfred Vierkandt in 1931 and has long been out of print and was limited to a relatively small number of longer treatises on special subjects. The dictionary character of the new work is at the same time strongly emphasized: the fact that it serves more than merely the purely scientific purposes of the field. If, on the other hand, one's attention is called to the fact that no unified point of view is to be ex-

pected of the many collaborators, it is, however, at the same time conceded that the material treated is not to be considered as the depository of consolidated opinions or as a fund of sociological knowledge limited to the generally accepted concepts. Differences in point of view are naturally unavoidable, insofar as they reflect the present-day stage of development in sociology. One must, therefore, question whether this lack of homogeneity is not to be regarded at least partly as the result of a "cultural lag" in German sociology. There seems to be the tendency in this

dictionary to treat even those subjects for which there are at best only the barest beginnings in sociological investigation. One can, thus, scarcely assert that they are dictionary material. To these belong, for example, the articles "Handwriting," "Music," "Opera," "Theater," and even "The Super-State" (a forerunner of the "Total State," according to M. T. Vaerting), "Defense Sociology" (in addition to another article, "War and Peace," which would have sufficed for the needs of a dictionary), the "Physician," and many more. The same can also be said of a series of articles the subject matter of which appears indeed to be important in the framework of sociological thought up to the present day but which have hardly been the object of sociological research, such as "Co-determinism," "Conversation," etc.

Since no index for the articles is offered, one is forced to the assumption that the selection of the key words is supposed to be adequate for any reference needs. This is actually the case with the majority of the entries. But one may ask what the highly personal terminology of Hans L. Stoltenberg is doing here, for either one knows the work of this social psychologist, and needs no lexicon, or one does not, in which case it is scarcely necessary to become acquainted with this particular terminology. The following selection of key words taken at random may suffice as illustrations:

*Angefühl*—empathy with the feeling of another, either in sympathy (joy for his joy or sorrow for his sorrow) or the reverse, experiencing sorrow over his joy and joy over his sorrow.

*Gruppseelewissenschaft*—science of the group soul, sociopsychology; the soul seen, not individually, but in relation to the group and society, to its social determinism.

*Fürhaltung*—positive attitude toward another.

*Widerhaltung*—negative attitude toward another.

*Zuwillung*—conscious concession or sanction (willingness to concede) or making the other willing to accept the demand.

*Beihaltung*—an independent attitude (to be sharply distinguished from the determined attitude of *Mithaltung*; cf. below), which is conscious of its likeness to the attitudes of others concerning their opinions, dealings, and wants.

*Entgegenhaltung*—an independent, conscious attitude (sharply distinguished from an unconscious negative attitude) concerning the attitude of others in wanting to act against, to want against, to feel against something or somebody.

*Mithaltung*—feeling with or for another unconsciously.

*Fühligen*—to arouse feelings in another—to "emotionalize" him, through words, gestures, tones, colors; to arouse, calm, or make him happy or sad.

*Schaft*—a suffix used to designate a group of persons somehow or other related.

*Tum*—a suffix used to designate a spiritual-intellectual movement.

*Leball*—unit of life on the earth, with human life at the apex.

*Vorstelligen*—to arouse a conception or an idea in another—to "intellectualize" him.

*Willigen*—to arouse wants in another, to "volitionalize" him, to make him willing (either consciously or unconsciously).

This is also a good example of the

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fact that the space given over to private terminology is done at the expense of social psychology, to which only a very few articles are devoted, among them the good, short, and informative article by K. S. Sodhi under this title ("Social Psychology"). There is no article on "Prejudice" (*Vorurteil*), not even as a reference word; and social psychology of perception, so important today, is included in the article "Conviction" (*Überzeugung*) by Alfred Vierkandt, in and of itself an excellent article but surely not the place where one would look for social psychology of perception. The no less important topic of social psychology of learning is missing as a reference word by itself, whereas its rationale is at least hinted at in the detailed contribution of W. Bernsdorf on pedagogical sociology.

In the case of numerous other articles there is scarcely a need for dictionary references. Who, for example, would want to orient himself on "Love" in a sociological dictionary or on the hypothesis of hordes ("Hordenhypothese," to use E. Mayo's term for the erroneous concept of the nature of man, which is discussed in Ricardo's economic theory), or on "Time and Space" as the categorical condition of human existence, and so on?

The attempt, gratifying in itself, has been made to define briefly a number of English sociological terms under the key words themselves, a task assumed by Renate Pflaum. The peculiar situation occurs, however, whereby the English term is given as the reference word but not the German term modeled after it, which in some instances has already established itself in the German

vocabulary. Thus, there is an article on "Socialization" but no definition of "Sozialisierung" in its corresponding meaning. There is, to be sure, an article "Social Control," but under "Kontrolle" there are only references to "Ordnung," "Organization," and "Social Control." More serious is the fact that, of the two basic concepts of English sociology, namely, "status" and "role," only the first is briefly cited under "Social Status"; the other is given neither in the German nor in the English form. Also one would not, in my opinion, have had to shy away from treating the concept of "Soziale Mobilität" extensively under that heading. Instead, however, it hides discreetly in this dictionary under the reference "Social Mobility."

On these and other grounds one can scarcely say that the work in question fulfils its function as a dictionary to the degree that one would like to expect.

It might be tempting to assume that such a dictionary reflects the present-day status of German sociology in its whole width and breadth—less so in its depth—for the very reason that it does not limit itself to classifying the composite knowledge of sociology into the most important concepts, which would satisfy the need of a general reference work. Of course, such an assumption is not unconditionally justifiable, but we shall nevertheless follow it up a little further.

In reading through the dictionary, it is first of all obvious that a very large number of articles by a wide variety of authors is based mainly on two German sociologists, Leopold von Wiese and Alfred Vierkandt, whereas Max Weber

is taken as a point of departure only in the case of specialized, concrete questions.

In addition, Theodor Geiger is also cited relatively often and is himself represented by an excellent article on social stratification, which treats also of the concept of class. Nevertheless, it is precisely this article which deviates from the conceptual framework which is posited for a large number of significant analyses. Geiger criticizes among other things the customary distinction made between a class society and a caste society based on rank or political position, a distinction according to which many of the articles are specifically oriented. In relation to Geiger's conception, one is drawn to the conclusion that a more or less preponderant preference for an ideal structural caste society, based on political position and rank and projected into history, still influences the thinking of many German sociologists. This makes itself apparent, to be sure, usually in hidden form and without distortion of the essential facts as far as they are known to us today. Quite openly, the romantic idea of a state based on position and rank comes to the fore in articles such as "Stand und Ständewesen," "Berufsständische Ordnung," "Korporati(vi)smus," etc., by O. v. Nell-Breuning. This is noteworthy, since the articles (written for the most part by F. Bülow) concerning ideologies (a term which, moreover, is treated only through cross-references) strive for a neutrality based on a history of ideas, as, for example, "Individualism," "Socialism," "Collectivism," "Solidarity," etc.

Noteworthy to the contrary is the

absence of the terms "Fascism," "National Socialism," although, on the other hand, the contribution of O. K. Flechtheim on communism is by no means limited to a presentation of communistic ideology. The political actuality of totalitarianism, and indeed not only in its communistic form, finds extensive treatment nevertheless by Otto Stammer in the field of political sociology; his articles are especially clear in conception and are related to one another in subject matter.

As far as the residual amount of foreign sociology in this dictionary is concerned, the influence of a few American sociologists (if we disregard the references to historical dogmas) is strikingly apparent. These are notably W. F. Ogburn and H. E. Barnes, whose concept "cultural lag" appears again and again. On the other hand, contrary to many expectations, the works of T. Parsons, R. K. Merton, and Georges Gurvitch have found but little reception. It is interesting to find as well many an echo of the industrial sociological works of E. Mayo and E. J. Roethlisberger.

It is regrettable to note in this connection that in the bibliographies belonging to the most important articles foreign literature is cited very unevenly and often according to criteria difficult to fathom. The articles by O. Stammer once again constitute a thoroughly gratifying exception, as do also the contributions of R. König on "The Family and Family Sociology," "Marriage and Divorce," "Interview," and "Sample," which merit special attention, and the contributions of W. E. Mühlmann on "Anthropology and Sociology," "War and Peace," etc.

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The dictionary exhibits, in my opinion, three considerable deficiencies, if one starts from the assumption that such a lexicon should not omit the explanation of purely technical expressions within its special field. In the first place, statistical, empirical sociology is represented only in the cross-references: "Interview," "Sample," and "Public Opinion." In the second place, we have already referred to the somewhat unfortunate treatment of social psychology, which is becoming less and less sharply delineated from sociology. Third, the direct and indirect influence of psychoanalysis upon sociology, a thing which cannot be overestimated, is given only little attention in the article by Emil J. Walter, "Depth Psychology, Ethnology and Sociology," as well as in other places.

On the other hand, one can say that, of the social sciences related to sociology, ethnology is extraordinarily well represented through Richard Thurnwald, who signs almost all the articles on the subject. Many of the articles which treat of the relationship between sociology and other sciences have been particularly successful, such as that on "Anthropology and Sociology" by W. E. Mühlmann and that of St. Münke on the sociological bases of social politics.

One can say in summary that German sociology, insofar as it is reflected in this dictionary, has until now only partially cemented contact with sociology abroad. This fact is above all apparent in the choice of article headings, in the bibliographies, and in its almost exclusive orientation toward German sociologists. As an over-all impression

the fact remains that an approach to sociology is reached for many German sociologists via the concept of an intellectual community in Tönnies' specific use of the term, in which case romantic philosophy still represents one of the more important points of departure. The turn toward empiricism is made by many, in any event, with reluctance.

On the other hand, one must not overlook the fact that this dictionary offers an astonishing number of excellent miniatures which would do honor to many a reference work, even if they are not precisely what one might expect to find in a dictionary.

The collected works edited by A. Gehlen and H. Schelsky present important branch areas of sociology in the form of separate essays which are directed especially toward the student. It is not a real manual of sociology, as one might conclude from the subtitle. Above all, those related fields were selected for which "recent claims are present on the basis of the prevailing status of West-German society, whenever the theory warrants it. . . . Importance was placed only upon those individual contributions which indicated a progression toward more comprehensive principles or criteria, wherever the material warrants this." The attempt to offer a general theory which would encroach on the territory of others was purposely abandoned. That is certainly justifiable in view of the present status of sociology. Nevertheless, this in itself does not necessarily mean that one must also forego a confrontation of the individual essays with one another or forego reference to the problems which are a

result of this particular status of sociology. In this work the demarcations within sociology are to some extent taken for granted from the beginning, more so, at any rate, than is the case with the dictionary, which makes use of a carefully worked-out system of cross-references. In the following discussion we shall, try, thus, to follow these internal lines of demarcation as closely as possible in order to obtain a point of reference from which we can evaluate the work as a whole.

The essay by Arnold Gehlen deals with the social structures of primitive societies. Here the general direction of recent American research in ethnological sociology or cultural anthropology is presented in a felicitous and original manner, though in a somewhat pre-tentive form. His discussion is primarily concerned with the problem of the stabilization of primitive societies, lacking a nationality, on the basis of their social structure. Thereby, the results of a systematic comparison of the largest possible number of primitive societies (the most extensive to date, for which we must thank George Murdock) are cited. The guiding principle of this statistical analysis is, we have said, the degree of stability. Stated in extremely simplified terms, the basic pattern or criterion employed indicates that, between the family living under the taboo of incest (practically universal) and the society in which this family is rooted, there is no dichotomy. The coherence of the group can be assured in such societies only by means of reciprocal relationships. Such reciprocal relationships are exhibited in a network of kinship relationships, which grant a

status and encompass the entire society. That is to say, these reciprocal relationships are found in the fundamental social structure. They can only take on permanent form, in that "natural" bilateral attribution is replaced by a system of "artificial" unilateral attribution within the framework of the exogamous group. As a result of the very widespread practice of levirate and sororate, marriage between parallel cousins is generally avoided, whereas marriage between "cross-cousins" (mother-brother-daughter, or father-sister-daughter) often becomes even obligatory. Gehlen points out also with convincing arguments that totemism has the function in this connection of making the identification of the individual with his kindred group possible.

Such a functional methodology naturally does not replace casual analysis, a thing which Gehlen does not indeed assert, either implicitly or explicitly, as many do. However, the possibility is not excluded that the same phenomenon can be analyzed from different functional points of view. It is, for example, possible to see the incest taboo from the point of view that it tends to drive the children out of the family and thereby forces them to establish their own family group. Such a point of view can be significant for the problem concerning the conditions necessary for a successful socializing of the growing personality, something which the function of marriage regulations in the stability of society, as pointed out by Gehlen, need not exclude. This example shows that different functional methods can be employed concomitantly to the same object of study, with the result

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that in some instances the understanding of certain social phenomena is tremendously increased.

The late Kiel sociologist Gerhard Mackenroth contributed the article on "Population Theory." Although brief, it is an extraordinarily clear and simple introduction to this science, which attempts, in exemplary fashion, to transplant the various factors in population growth into a sociological framework. The preindustrial society, for example, has as its variable (which takes into account the margin of the food supply) the smaller number of marriages and the higher marriage age, whereas the industrial society succeeds in making adaptations specifically in accordance with the social classes by means of fertility curtailments within marriage, as, for example, when the urban middle classes try to curtail the relatively high level of social expenditure through birth control.

In an analogous sense the essay by Carl Jantke on "Preindustrial Society and the State," a subject taken from the field of social history, belongs also to a peripheral area. One might perhaps expect here a contribution to, or a summary of, the research done on capitalism, but the author's intention is to present preindustrial society from the late sixteenth to the close of the eighteenth century, above all as not being the forerunner of high capitalism. Let us elaborate on this with one example: Jantke explains how, out of the confrontation between the absolutistic state and the inherited legal order, the institution of the commissar arises—who is no longer an official in the old sense but rather a functionary, whose contract, based on

no legal grounds, is unconditionally devoted to the prince. The commissar, thus, as many of the modern capitalists, stands outside the old social order; he points to the future of modern bureaucracy but, nevertheless, is to be understood only in the context cited. To the somewhat peripheral contributions belongs also the treatise by Carl Heinz Pfeffer on "The Social Systems of the World." When one considers that only the remaining five essays are properly part of the core of sociology, he can see in this essay the attempt to conceive of the field in the broadest possible terms and to emphasize the close connection with various sciences, which, methodologically and according to their traditional level of development, are peripheral to sociology: namely, cultural anthropology, population theory, and history. Mainly due to this latter attempt, the tradition of continental European sociology is being continued, and the possibility of a fruitful co-operation with these sciences is postulated, even if not explicitly. Nevertheless, in contrast to recent American developments, social psychology apparently does not yet fall within the scope of German sociology. In the peripheral contributions discussed up to this point there are doubtless sufficiently concrete results from the research, which can be of the greatest importance for sociology. In contrast, the contribution of Pfeffer has a clearly discernible journalistic tinge, which is not of a nature to confer a scientific character on sociology. If this essay is supposed to serve the purpose of examining the relation between the various societies—a relation that is becoming more and more a matter of

fact—then one would also be justified in expecting that the complicated problem of cultural confrontation would be articulated. This is, however, not the case, if one disregards the reference to the “Europeanizing” in non-European cultures. This emission has, therefore, an especially confusing effect, because the United States, on the one side, and the Soviet Union, on the other, are presented as world messianic systems. The sociologist, in particular, should not let himself be led to see the problem of societies, which are in the state of rapprochement, exclusively from a geopolitical point of view, any more than from the more idealistic one of messianic zeal. Occasionally, with Pfeffer, one finds a social concept which he really would like to see banned from sociology: the idea, for example, according to which social-political-cultural happenings are decided in the last analysis by the caprice of collective wills, which are limited either by the margin of the food supply or by other conditions of that sort. In reality, however, there are certain currents which do not always follow the path set by the temporary superiority of a society. The game of “Indians,” which has enjoyed such widespread popularity among children in our society, is to be understood no less as a result of a process of acculturation than is the misuse of whiskey by the Sioux Indians.

The remaining five essays—“Sociology of the Family” by Rene König, “Industrial and Commercial Sociology” by Helmut Schelsky, “Agrarian Sociology” by Herbert Kötter, “Sociology of the Metropolis” by Elisabeth Pfeil, and “Political Sociology” by

Otto Stammer—are concerned with some important contributory disciplines of sociology in the narrower sense. We cannot summarize all these excellent discussions. Rather, a few remarks will have to suffice, which perhaps can give us an indication of the present status of German sociology.

In the work at hand, the field which is often designated as “rural-urban sociology” in the United States is represented by two essays, in their inception very different from each other. Both have in common, fortunately, the tendency not to romanticize about country life in the manner of modern cultural criticism and not to condemn urban life. Elisabeth Pfeil, however, gives particular attention to the pattern of social contact, characteristic of the metropolis in its specifically formalized attitudes. She rightly emphasizes the fact that the role-plans (with reference to abstract social categories), on which modern sociology generally operates, are really of urban origin. In the treatment of agrarian sociology the emphasis for modern research plainly lies in the diverse reactions of the country communities toward the influence of urban ways of life.

From the standpoint of a well-thought-out treatment, for the purpose of a handbook, of those areas related to sociology, the three contributions on family sociology, industrial and commercial sociology, and political sociology are undoubtedly the best. This is due perhaps not only to the worth of the authors themselves but also to the fact that in postwar Germany a preponderance of theoretical and practical work was done mainly in two areas

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(and is being continued today)—in the fields of family sociology and more recently in industrial sociology—and to the fact that, as far as political sociology is concerned, there exists a still very vital point of departure for linking German sociology with the past, namely, the work of Max Weber, recognized equally by foreign sociologists.

As a matter of form, there still remains to be said that a few regrettable discrepancies occur due to limited space, for instance, those between Kötter and Jantke concerning the development of the agrarian society; between König, on the one hand, and Pfeil and Kötter, on the other, concerning the modern family; between Pfeil and Schelsky concerning the modern labor world; etc. Such discrepancies were, no doubt, not entirely avoidable.

We have had occasion in discussing the dictionary as well as the handbook to call attention to the fact that the narrower delimitations of the field of sociology have been often and basically trespassed. At the same time, no place has been given to social psychology—a place which should have been granted within the framework of sociology on the basis of research in other countries. This lacuna is to some extent filled by Peter R. Hofstätter's book. It is, however, characteristic of the actual status of sociology in the German-speaking field that this one exceptional work is oriented completely toward the vast amount of American literature in the field. Hofstätter masterfully introduces the most complex of problems and attempts to present the status of knowledge in this field in a selective and ar-

bitrary manner, to be sure, without attempting to avoid his own bias. He by no means evades even the most difficult methodological questions; indeed, he makes no secret of the fact, for example, that he—in accord with R. Cattell—considers the possibility of innumerable uses for statistical analysis to be very promising. And this he tries to demonstrate by practical examples, leading us, thus, into the most modern empirical research. It is gratifying to see how the facts of the most recent research in the field are included in a book which is, on the whole, simply a handbook. The handbook appears thus as something which must not necessarily lag behind the up-to-date research of the period in question.

It is not always easy for us, indeed, to agree with the theories developed by Hofstätter, taken individually. For example, one of his main theses for the explanation of social prejudice toward minority groups, expressed in extremely simplified form, sounds something like this: The group leader is a person who, as a matter of course, clearly distinguishes himself from the group members; but at the same time this must not hinder the identification of those being led with the leader. Now, since any minorities within a society clearly differentiate themselves from the majority, one must consider them as potential leaders. The class which is actually the leading one therefore feels its position threatened by the presence of the minority. The prejudices directed toward the minority are thus to be conceived of as an expression of defense against this danger. The counterargument against this premise is apparent: If

the minority were to vote, then these differences in the population between the leading classes and those being led could of necessity be determined, and indeed with the tendency that the intensity of the prejudice would, for example, decrease from top to bottom. In reality this is demonstrably the case in regard neither to anti-Semitism nor to the anti-Negro attitude in the United States.

In another passage Hofstätter expounds the idea that, instead of the hypothesis of the existence of a sexual drive or of a drive directed toward the rearing of offspring, one should posit the hypothesis of the existence of a family instinct. The other drives would then be absorbed as participative instincts within the family instinct. Thus, for example, for writers of the realistic school, the emphasis on the sexual is not responsible for the marriage crisis, but contrariwise, the marriage crisis has led to an autonomy of sex. It is questionable to me whether one gains anything by such a hypothesis. Is the situation not more likely to be that there could be no continuation of the existence of society without some sociocultural, definite, formalized concept of the family, which recurs again and again in every individual case? And, in addition, that the chances for the transmission of such formalized ideas are very high on the basis of those specifically socializing conditions placed on the maturing individual—conditions which tend to fur-

ther and foster these ideas. It may be true, too, as Hofstätter explains by means of a diagnostic example, that a person who is marked by an extraordinarily conspicuous sexual drive has suffered from disrupted family relationships; if we, however, consider at the same time what a larger role such disrupted family relationships also play in respect to non-sexual criminality, then the isolation of the sexual drive which acts only as a participative element within the totality of the family instinct (which Hofstätter raises as an explanatory hypothesis) appears to be a truly artificial construction, which certainly does not satisfy as an explanation for the general effect which interfamily aberrations produce.

These and other objections, however, do not seriously discount the worth of this stimulating book, which is based on so broad a knowledge of the literature of the field. It is Hofstätter who makes us conscious once again of how much sociologically relevant insight has been gleaned from modern American social psychology and that perhaps the most decisive stimulus in the modern day for further development in the field of the social sciences proceeds from this specific discipline. In its neglect of this field, therefore, to my mind, lies the greatest shortcoming of German sociology, and this neglect must be deduced from the consideration of the representative works which have been discussed here.