

granting that those who refused to confess or who planned to recant were executed when they failed their "rehearsals," it does not explain the behavior of those who remained steadfast in their self-denunciation and, what is worse, in their glorification of their executioners. It was as if all the defendants were carrying out a posthypnotic suggestion. Assume that a promise was made that in exchange for their degradation, the lives of their loved ones would be spared. How could they believe that these promises would be kept, especially after the first Moscow Trial? Loebel dismisses with impatience Koestler's inspired guess that men like Bukharin and others immolated themselves as a last act of piety toward the party. His interrogators, Loebel protests, were no Gletkins, but "simple-minded, uneducated and unsophisticated people who could not convince anyone of anything." But his own account of Kohoutek, his chief hateful interrogator, shows him to be anything but simple-minded. On the contrary, psychologically he seems very shrewd. In the same breath as he abuses Loebel as a spy and traitor, he pleads with him, according to Loebel, "Your duty [*sic*] to the party is to prove your guilt by giving us the facts." What kind of duty does a spy and traitor owe to his party? But surely this perverse loyalty could hardly have operated in the case of *all* the defendants. Some of them must have felt that a party capable of such monstrous crimes was unworthy of any further allegiance, that it was no longer *their* party. Why, then, did none of them speak the words that would have exposed the whole business as an unbelievable farce? One wonders whether every defendant was promised a remission of his formal punishment. The interrogators could promise anything, even ultimate rehabilitation. The final decision, after the trials, was not theirs. But here, too, it is difficult to believe, as strong as the desire for life might be, that all these men would be taken in by the assurances of their inquisitors, especially in the light of what had occurred in the early trials. Some day, if the record of all the interrogations is made public, we may find the answer to this puzzling phenomenon.

That Loebel could have survived his ordeal is a tribute to the resiliency of the human spirit. But there is more than enough in his account to give pause to anyone who is too hopeful about the human prospect. For some reason I found the most disheartening detail in this grim book Loebel's report of what happened after he had been sentenced to imprisonment until the end of his life. "In the Ministry of Foreign Trade [where Loebel had served with distinction] there had been a protest meeting against the leniency of my sentence. A resolution demanding that I should be executed with the others was passed."

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By *William V. Wallace*. Nations of the Modern World series. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976. xvi, 374 pp. Illus. Maps. \$24.00.

After reading Professor Wallace's book on Czechoslovakia, my reaction was somewhat mixed: I had the highest admiration for his synthetic ability and power, for the factual wealth and his apparent fairness. His grasp of the political, socioeconomic, and cultural developments in the historic crown lands of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as in the "upper Hungarian province" of Slovakia since 1848—their common history since 1918, their short-lived separate status between 1938 and 1945, and, again, their mutual experiences under Communist domination up to 1968–69—is most impressive. Yet, in my judgment, the book lacks a certain quality: in spite of all its objectivity it does not catch the "spirit" of the events covered. Especially in the chapters about Slovakia, approximately one-third of the book, one gets the impression that the moving forces behind the history and aspirations of this small nation were not really understood or "digested." And, perhaps more important, the symbiosis of Czechs and Ger-

mans from the thirteenth century to 1945 is hardly mentioned—therefore, one of the significant factors in Czech and Czechoslovak history remains unexplained.

The year in which the emergence of two distinct nations in Bohemia—a Czech nation and a German nation—was revealed, 1848, is a convincing starting point. Here, as in the other two major sections leading up to the tragic developments of 1938, 1948, and 1968, Professor Wallace explains the evolution and the main political issues of the social classes, traces the important trends in the economy and in cultural affairs, and even manages to cover the major diplomatic currents relevant for Czechoslovakia. Because of a popular approach, footnotes do not verify the factual information, and one regrets the omission of a scholarly apparatus, even though quite a few errors were easily traced. Yet the pleasant, uncomplicated style makes the book easy reading; thus it should attract not only students of history, but anyone interested in a compact survey of modern historical development in Czechoslovakia.

Another shortcoming of the volume has to be mentioned: the reading list covers mostly books in English as well as a few titles in Czech and Slovak. German historiography, which recently has contributed so much to our understanding of the interwar period and the developments during World War II, is completely omitted. And one gains the impression that the author is not too familiar with this body of work which attempts to explain why the centuries-old symbiosis of Czechs and Germans came to such a dramatic end and why the German trauma was so influential on Beneš's judgment and policy making after 1938. On the other hand, Professor Wallace's objectivity and fairness to everyone concerned enables him to make sound judgments concerning most personalities involved. One could, of course, question some of his statements about Beneš's actions, at Munich or in 1948, or his statements on the motives and options of Dubček and the Czechoslovak reform politicians in 1968, but his open presentation of conflicting arguments and evaluations is a major asset and makes his book an informed and helpful guide for those who wish to learn.

The discussion of the driving forces behind the reform movement of the 1960s and the interpretation of the reform and the reaction in 1968–69 is very convincing. I have my doubts here—as in the chapter about Munich and the “treachery” of the Western allies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—about his judgment on the absence of military resistance, yet I know of no other description which is so to the point, so clear, and so sympathetic. One can only hope that his credo, formulated in his last sentence, will prove to be true: “1968 was not the end, and what is following is only an interlude.”

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CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE: WEIMAR GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By *F. Gregory Campbell*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1975. xvi, 383 pp. \$15.00.

This original contribution to scholarship is the first comprehensive and analytical study of Czechoslovak-German relations from 1918 to 1933. It complements and in some respects supersedes other works which deal not only with the same subject matter but with the First Czechoslovak Republic and interwar European diplomacy as well. Czechoslovak domestic politics are surveyed largely on the basis of newspaper and published accounts and to the extent necessary to explain certain developments in foreign policy. The author stresses almost exclusively the diplomatic aspects of the Czechoslovak-Weimar German relationship, discussing economic aspects occasionally and cultural and scientific developments hardly at all. He neatly places that relationship in the context of European foreign relations and reveals how it was affected by every