**PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA, 2 Vols. by Arthur Shopenhauer, translated by E.F.J. Payne.** *Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press.* **1974. Pp. 497, 703. Vol. 1 £9.50; Vol. 2 £12.50.**

With the publication of these volumes the complete text of Schopenhauer's *Parerga and Paralipomena* (1851) is for the first time made available in English. Although excellent, the translation is not of course a contribution to specialist scholarship. Rather, its most important service is to awaken widespread reflection on a major text by a major thinker. Indeed, Schopenhauer would be disappointed with any other reaction. One of the underlying tensions of these essays is that they constantly point away from themselves; offered in a heuristic spirit (I, p. 201), they call the reader's attention to his own experience, and attempt, by example and exhortation, to stimulate him into independent thinking. This constitutes the keynote of the whole book. From the opening essays of Volume One, where Schopenhauer places himself in a critical relation to his predecessors, he is concerned to indicate even in difficult areas such as the experience of fate and spirit--seeing the explanatory power of his metaphysics (I, p. 68), as well as its general enlightening nature as wisdom of life. But these writings are not offered as answers in any straightforward sense. Conscious of the highly problematic nature of all metaphysical reflection (II pp. 3,96), he fully recognises those limits of philosophical discourse which Wittgenstein was later to raise to a principle. Schopenhauer, however, is not prepared to fall silent. Instead, he installs at the very centre of philosophical discourse the method of ostensive reflection. The metaphysical impasse is penetrated, albeit uncertainly, by the cumulative movement of a text which self-consciously approaches its problems from a great variety of perspectives, and generates its themes within a multiplicity of different contexts; the constant re-emergence of an idea, an image, or a quotation builds up, so to speak, a pressure of insight. Thus the whole text constitutes an experience of otherwise inaccessible truths; its very structure attains the status of argument. Thus, too, the value of a complete translation.

Of course, the importance that this perspectival procedure was later to have for Nietzsche needs no emphasis. But its close relation to imaginative literature is what should be stressed in the present English context, where philosophy has largely ignored an extremely fruitful literary critical tradition. Nor is this simply a matter of the use which Schopenhauer makes of poetry and drama. For although fully conscious of the crucial differences between philosophy and literature (II p.5), he recognises at the same time that real philosophical reflection *involves* a lot more than argument. And equally relevant in the contemporary Anglo-Saxon context is the immense range and variety of subjects with which he deals precisely as a philosopher; his writings both enact and insist upon the social role and responsibility of philosophical reflection (II, p. 349).

Indeed, the relation of philosophy to human experience is a central motif of the work. Not only is this relation held to be fundamental to philosohpical method (II p. 8)–whereby method becomes a substantive and not merely a formal concern–but for Schopenhauer it further underlies the concept of philosophical vocation, with its motto of *Vitam impendere vero.* Throughout these essays its debasement in the academic and culture industries (and the theology of the day), all of which he places, in contrast to philosophy, under the motto *primum vivere, deinde philosophari.* Here, he succeeds in providing the first major analysis and critique of modern cultural organisation. He fully recognises the consequences for the humanities of the so-called knowledge explosion, with its substitution of information for insight (II p.479) and commentary for source (II p. 558); nor has his insistence on "the art of *not* reading" (II p.557) lost any of its force or relevance. Of equal influence and value is his examination of the conditions of language, about the cultural and social importance of which he is emphatic (II p. 569).

One cannot, then afford to ignore the importance of the problems which Schopenhauer both recognised and described–not least, his masterly outline of the contemporary religious situation



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(II p. 392), which Nietzsche was to take up. But, above all, Schopenhauer's work leaves us (as Nietzsche recognised) with immense problem on our hands. His central theory of the non-intellectual nature of the will (I pp. 20, 81) has since been powerfully elaborated. The genesis of reason, it seems, does not take place within the bounds of rationality. Nor have the traditional defences proved adequate. As a result, the rational principle is in jeopardy. Here, as Schopenhauer would insist, we have to think (and act) for ourselves.

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**WITTGENSTEIN AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF, by W. Donald Hudson, *Macmillan,* London, 1975, 206 pp. £6.95.**

W. Donald Hudson has written before in this area but this volume is the most comprehensive of his studies. It is a clear and useful exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophical development, and particularly of the way his thought on religious belief is related to his general philosophical concern with language. There is, however, one fundamental problem which Hudson evades by too ready an acceptance of Wittgenstein's position.

Wittgenstein's account of language undergoes a radical change, but there remains a certain continuity in his account of religious belief. Just as there is no way of questioning that which in the *Tractatus* is referred to as "das Mystische" (6.45; 6. 522), so in the *Philosophical Investigations* we are not able to resolve the problem of the respective worth of different language-games because there is no higher logical order to which we can take such questions as "Does it make sense to talk in this way?". In the *Investigations* we are left with "What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life" (P.I. 226); "This is simply what I do" (P.I,217). The comparable position in his *Lectures on Religious Belief* is found in his characterisation of the difference between the believer and unbeliever: "I have different pictures" (p. 55); "I can't contradict that person" (p. 55). This aspect of Wittgenstein's thought presents both the religious believer and the philosopher with a problem. Is religious belief an attempt to describe what the world is like, in some way, or does it in some sense "create" a world? If the religious believer is trying to say something in terms of how things are, what the world is like, then one must ask whether it is permissible to have statements which place themselves beyond criticism. One can accept Wittgenstein's claim for immunity from criticism but only because he presents religious belief as in some sense ethical. This ethical account is not to be confused with that of R.B. Braithwaite's Eddington lecture. Wittgenstein has idealist tendencies, as Hudson points out: "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (P.I.373). Thus for Wittgenstein the ethical constitutes the kind of world we live in. But this is also to apply to theology, for after the above sentence from the *Investigations,* Wittgenstein adds in brackets: "Theology as grammar" (P.I. 373). For the Christian the dilemma is obvious. Hudson does not face up squarely to this problem. He does insist that language in any one language-game cannot be used in a completely isolated way, but with that proviso he finds no serious faults in Wittgenstein's approach.

This account of religious belief raises crucial questions for the religious believer, especially the Christian, but these questions are only part of a more general unease that arises directly from the way in which Wittgenstein "liberated" English philosophy. It is crucial to understand and accept that the meaning of a word is its use in a language. But without having recourse to some absolute logical order, it is also important to engage in some evaluation of different language-games. This can be done only if we reject the view that language-games are logically isolated, thus allowing scope for criticism whereby the worth of any particular language-game is constantly under scrutiny. Although this critical activity may never make conclusive claims, by it we are able to discriminate and put aside much that is of little value. Hudson takes Wittgenstein to be saying that criticism can only take place within an agreed language-game, and not between it and some other. Forms of life then become absolute and this could result in all sorts of nonsense which would have "to be accepted".

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