

The Sound of the *Analogia Entis*

Part I

Francesca Murphy

The Context

Urs von Balthasar's theology is attuned to a realism which becomes more attractive as Rahner's engagement with Kantianism seems less pertinent. This realism 'turns the rudder hard over', as von Balthasar said of Barth; but how did he acquire it? Rowan Williams has suggested that von Balthasar's seamanship originates partly with Heidegger.¹ This article will place him within the German Catholic revival of the 1920s and 1930s. At this time, German Catholics delved into phenomenology, and into Newman's theology. They appraised Aquinas's thought differently than did English or French neo-Thomists.

The *Memoirs* of the Hungarian philosopher Aurel Kolnai (1900–1973) supply some sidelights on von Balthasar's writings. Both men attended the University of Vienna between 1922 and 1926. There von Balthasar is said to have "... heard the Plotinus lectures of Hans Eibl: there being was ... interpreted as ... the self-communicating good."² He will later say that the affinity between Thomas and Heidegger derives not from Aristotle, but from "... that Plotinus for whom being remains a supraconceptual mystery ..."³ Kolnai places Eibl in his time and place:

"... Hans Eibl, [was] a Sudeten German and violent nationalist, yet a Catholic with ... a prodigious erudition concerning St. Augustine and Patristic thought ... During the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, Eibl was editor of a crypto-Nazi rag ... Yet this man, essentially a ... rightminded Catholic Conservative, had little resemblance to the Nazi and none to the current ... 'Reich German' ... type."⁴

Erich Przywara (1889–1972) edited the journal *Stimmen der Zeit* from 1921 until its proscription by the Nazis in 1941. In 1932, he suggested to Edith Stein that she compose an autobiography, *Life in a Jewish Family*, as an antidote to German anti-Semitism. He also persuaded her to make German translations of Newman's *Diaries* and

of Aquinas's *Questiones Disputatae*. Until her conversion, Edith Stein was Husserl's assistant at Göttingen. She came to share Przywara's ambition to create a synthesis of Thomism and realistic phenomenology. Przywara was the director of the Jesuit seminary at Pullach: he taught von Balthasar there, after he entered the novitiate in 1931. Pullach is near Munich, where, between 1906 and 1910, Max Scheler first developed a phenomenological philosophy.

In the 1921 preface to his *Commentary on Romans*, Karl Barth sets against warnings to members of the Dutch Reformed Church not to read the book, support from this quarter:

"Erich Przywara, S.J., contrasts our 'school' [!] with that of Otto and Heiler, judging it to be a 'genuine rebirth of Protestantism', a reappearance of the 'passionate fervour of the old Reformers.'"⁵

The *Commentary on Romans* swung a demolition ball against a neo-Kantian theological establishment. Its deconstructive assertion is that, far from evolving alongside human beings, God's action ". . . hangs in the air: it is a pure, absolute, vertical miracle."⁶ Von Balthasar considered that Barth had rediscovered the Biblical 'glory': that is, the irreducible demarcation between God and creatures.⁷

Max Scheler (1874–1928) tended to place truths and values in numbered ranks. According to Francis Dunlop,

". . . Scheler's third philosophical truth [is] that every being has both *Sosein* (is just 'so', has certain characteristics) and *Dasein* (. . . it 'is there', it exists). This distinction constitutes one of the foundations of his metaphysics."⁸

For von Balthasar, the 'ontological difference', the fact that a thing's being *such*, being a shoe or a star, differs from its being at all, is the basis of Christian philosophy.⁹ He says,

"If the Ontological Difference must already be referred back to a *unicum* (as Plotinus saw), then it will be secured as the authentic 'site of glory' . . . under the condition that the 'gloriousness' of its floating in the air, its oscillation, . . . remains the event of an absolute freedom. . . . Being arrives at itself as subsistence only within the entity and the entity arrives at its actuality . . . only within its participation in being. . . . Nothing is . . . fuller than being . . . and yet this fullness can unfold absolutely only once: in God."¹⁰

'Common being' brings about the essence of each fact. Each shoe and star is made real by a being which is not its own: created things and

their being are interdependent. Thomas Aquinas says in the *De Ente et Essentia* that it is in and “by virtue of” the “essence” that “being has existence.”¹¹ Those things of which we can know *what* they are without knowing *that* they are, are not one in themselves: the break between nature and being is a sign of contingency. Each nature has to *participate* in “*ens commune*”, common being.¹² For Thomas, the kinds and genera of created natures are multi-form: only in God are being and nature one undivided act. As von Balthasar says,

“. . . it is the not-being-one which separates beings and human existence, that . . . points beyond itself to identity. This . . . [is] the fundamental existential experience of everything that lives.”¹³

The key word stressed here is experience.

Aurel Kolnai

Kolnai was born within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He believed that the Habsburg Lands were the natural birth-place of the phenomenological movement. Phenomenology begins with Franz Brentano (1838–1917). Kolnai comments that, although Brentano was a Catholic from the Rhineland, he

“. . . taught and flourished in Austria . . . his most important . . . pupil, Alexius von Meinong . . . was a pure Austrian, and so were his disciples (Hofler . . . and in Prague, the more original Baron Ehrenfels). Husserl . . . was a Moravian Jew and was decisively influenced by Bernard Bolzano, a priest of Prague (1781–1848), founder of . . . objectivist logic . . . that Brentanoism had an Austrian connotation is indubitable. . . phenomenology and ‘object theory’ fit better into the mental climate of a bureaucratic Empire than of a National State.”¹⁴

Kolnai met ‘Brentanoism’ in Vienna. His professor in philosophy there—and perhaps von Balthasar’s also—was Karl Bühler. Bühler belonged to the Würzburg school, which practised descriptive psychology with a philosophical thrust. An earlier, associationist psychology contended that each of our sensations is disparate. One would perceive soup tins whose labels depict glamorous versions of their contents, bins of vegetables, and the smell of bread, but not, in a single, immediate apprehension, Sainsbury’s. The ‘Brentanoist’ counter-argument originates with Karl Stümpf (1848–1936). Stümpf studied under Brentano at Würzburg, and later became Professor of Philosophy there.¹⁵ He considered that experiences are *given* as wholes, and are not

only ordered as such in memory; nor do the senses operate in isolation. In the *Psychological Origin of the Presentation of Space* (1873), Stümpf argued that extension and colour must be co-presented in consciousness. Stümpf designates as ‘fusion’ the attention in which we perceive *at once* an orchestra (not seventy people sitting on a platform clutching various instruments), the sound of the fugue, and the smell of our neighbours.

Stümpf’s *magnum opus*, in the service of which he acquired a laboratory equipped with tuning forks, was his *Tonpsychologie*. He was an amateur composer, who played six musical instruments. Many of those who took up his thesis of the unity of experience, including Ehrenfels and von Balthasar, were ardent musicians. Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932) was the first to argue for *gestalt* unities in experience. He did so in order to describe how we hear a melody. Ernst Mach had analysed the experience of melody as the association of “sensations of time-form” with the extended perception of each tone. Ehrenfels argued that both ‘time-form’ and tones are heard together, as one “quality”. He wrote three papers on “Gestalt Qualities”, in 1890, 1922, and 1932. He saw that a melody cannot be reduced to its phonic matter because it is perceived as the same melody when transposed into another key.¹⁶ The 1922 article claims that,

“. . . someone remembering a melody is remembering not a complex of separate tone presentations, but . . . a tonal gestalt.”¹⁷

A melody is not heard as an amorphous barrage of sounds: it opens out within a *single* netted enclosure. As one young aesthete, the twenty-year-old von Balthasar, wrote in 1925 in his first published article, “On the Unfolding of the Musical Idea”:

“Melody . . . contains a certain aura which binds the notes together into a unity, lending them an entirely new character. For if one or more new notes are added to a melody, the aura of a melody is entirely disrupted, it flows into the new part and relocates itself. In it the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. These structures are called *Gestalten*. They cannot be logically comprehended, but are directly evident and meaningful.”¹⁸

Ehrenfels noted that objects flaunt diverse degrees of *gestalt* intricacy: that of a rose is higher than that of a heap of sand. “What we call beauty”, he concludes, is “level of *gestalt*.”¹⁹

Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (1900) are dedicated to Stümpf: the book discovers as realities the forms which the Würzburg psychologists found in experience. Edith Stein recalls that, as a student in Breslau,

“... in the winter of 1912–1913, we had studied the problems of the psychology of thought, particularly associated with . . . the ‘Würzburg School’ (Külpe, Bühler, Messer, etc.). . . I kept coming across references to Edmund Husserl. . . One day Dr. Moskiewicz found me thus occupied. . . ‘Leave all that stuff aside’, he said, ‘and just read this; after all, its where all the others get their ideas’. He handed me . . . the second volume of Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen*.”²⁰

Moskiewicz’s gesture propelled her to Göttingen, to study under the “Master”. She took part in the “short flowering time” of the Göttingen circle, from 1905 to 1914. For the philosophers whom Husserl attracted to Göttingen, the *Logical Investigations*

“... were considered a ‘new scholasticism’ because it turned attention away from the ‘subject’ and toward ‘things’ themselves. Perception again appeared as reception, drawing its laws from objects. All the young phenomenologists were confirmed realists.”²¹

Edith Stein’s first summer seminar at Göttingen was devoted to Scheler’s *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*. Ten years later in Vienna, Kolnai was an avid reader of the works of Husserl and Scheler. He regarded their “neo-objectivism” as a revitalisation, not of scholasticism as a de-frosted system, but of “. . . the inner attitude underlying the thought of the Middle Ages.”²² Its two main tenets were the reality of essences and that these can be perceived in intuition²³. Kolnai noticed that most of the philosophers he liked were Catholics. Scheler’s *On the Nature of Sympathy*, “probably his best book, written some three years before his apostasy”,²⁴ persuaded Kolnai that the Christian philosophers were preferable to the non-believers.

This book analyses the immersion in another person’s emotions which occurs in sympathy. It discusses *intentional feelings*, feelings which are related to other beings. Scheler claims that the understanding of some kinds of object can only derive from feeling. We know that another is pleased or irritated when we sympathise with their state. Sympathy is a direct line to the other’s emotion. It does not reconstruct hypothetically what someone who appeared in such a way might be feeling; nor is it an inference by analogy with what, for example, ‘I would be feeling if . . .’ someone stole my bicycle. Sympathy is a direct *seeing* of another’s field of expression: it recognises the *gestalt* of another person’s physiognomy, as it dissolves in grief, or erupts into rage.²⁵

Scheler speaks of sympathy as a spontaneous ‘seeing’. This does

not mean it is a detached inspection of the other's emotion. As Aquinas notes, an intentional state is a nonmaterial *becoming*.²⁶ Sympathy participates in the other's emotion. The primary type of sympathy is "*Einsfühlung*": 'feeling one with'. An instinctive *Einsfühlung* is present in those wasps which know precisely where and how forcibly to sting their prey; mothers are said by Scheler to have an innate *Einsfühlung* for their children.²⁷ "*Einsfühlung*" is a twofold amplification of *gestalt* theory. First, to understand in "*Einsfühlung*" is to grasp an object as an affective *gestalt*. Second, the idea enlarges the notion of *fusion*, as the "co-adunative" power of sense and imagination to apprehend the sequence of slides in one cinematic experience. Leaping at one bound beyond the Würzburg school's descriptive psychology, Scheler contends that we experience nature as a cosmic *gestalt* before we know its individual parts. It follows, he says, that self-knowledge derives from a more primitive 'feeling-one-with' the world as a whole. A person's

“. . . act of internal perception embraces not only his own mental processes, but. . . take[s] in the whole existing realm of minds. . . And just as we start by apprehending our present self against the background of our *whole* experience, and do not manufacture it by a *synthesis* of our present self with earlier remembered states of mind, so too do we always apprehend our own self against the background of an ever-vaguer, all-embracing consciousness in which our own existence and the experiences of everyone else are presented, in principle, as included together.”²⁸

Einsfühlung, the pre-theoretical inwardness between self and objects, occurs before more delimited acts of understanding. The clear realism of the Munich and Göttingen circles became overcast. Scheler became from 1925 a proponent of the neo-vitalism and pantheism for which he once had no stomach. Kolnai suggests that these things happened because, where scholasticism over-emphasises the cosmos, phenomenology over-stresses mental acts. The degeneration also

“. . . had to do with the German political decision, traceable to the Youth Movement . . . [which] ripen[ed] under the deceptively calm surface of the mid-twenties, against civilisation and for a neo-pagan adventure. . . Perhaps, again, a direct link can be found in the phenomenological—that is, especially, Schelerian overestimation of 'affective intuition' in the wake of St. Augustine and Pascal; bearing, also, a faint reflex of the 'voluntarism' of Duns Scotus. . . Here the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas might have acted as a safeguard against the worst aberrations.”²⁹

Kolnai became a Catholic in 1927. He had little sympathy with Thomas's ethics, taking them to be unduly naturalistic. He spent the '30s in Vienna, poring over the compositions of the Nazis, and of their literary standard-bearers, such as the Stefan George Circle. The result was *The War Against the West* [Gollancz, 1938]. For Kolnai, the essence of the Nazi philosophy is its glorification of the body, and thus of race. His book lambasts the aesthetic and 'scientific' vitalists who proposed that the human spirit is generated by its body. His insistence on the non-materiality of the human soul, of ethical values, and of God, had at its inception an urgent political import.

Kolnai was not lured to faith by the 'Thomistic' 'proofs'. He says that the quest for a 'causal explanation of the world' need not lead to monotheism, and that he is not overwhelmed by the impossibility of an 'infinite regress' in causes.³⁰ He considered that all proofs of God's existence depend on the ontological argument: they presuppose a perfect being who transcends the process of contingent causality. He states that,

"... St. Anselm's . . . much-derided 'proof' of the existence of God—existence being a necessary attribute of perfection, and thus implied in His very concept . . . contains . . . the gist of all other arguments for theism; not the concept as such . . . but the fact that mankind has this concept testifies to the existence of God. For although our imagination can create all kinds of figments within a given framework of sense experience, the assumption that it were able to create a fictitious concept of an altogether different and superior *order of Being* strikes us as preposterous . . . in the Thomist strain of thought . . . the implied postulate of obeying the drift of our mind toward the concept of an *ultimate* plenitude of Being, . . . is [not] . . . dispensed with, for the alleged absurdity of 'infinite regress' means nothing else."³¹

Kolnai was concerned about social realities. It was important to him that the 'idea' of a most perfect being is common to all humanity. The convert, he writes,

"... neither bows to an incontrovertible 'proof' nor coins a belief of his own, but rather *joins* an historically existing belief . . ."³²

He respected a claim to make explicit the tendencies of the human mind more than a claim to expose the tendencies of natural facts. Many of Husserl's theistic followers were attracted by Anselm's argument. The *Logical Investigations* decry the relativism in which J.S. Mill's empiricism results. As an avowed successor to Bolzano, Husserl founded his work in a general theory of logic.³³ He contends that Mill's

psychologism turns such logical axioms as the principle of non-contradiction into the empirical fact of a single mind not being able to hold contradictory beliefs. His book opposes the “mere” empirical generalisation and the universal, necessary truth. Philosophers reared on such oppositions would not be drawn to arguments from change, design, or causation amongst empirical facts.

Max Scheler: ‘On the Eternal In Man’ [1921]

Thomas’s ‘Third Way’ argues from “. . . what need not be and what must be. . . .” It touches on the gulf between contingent and necessary being. For Scheler, it still ranks lower than the ontological argument. Phenomenology analyses the concordance between a specific type of human act and a specific object. As Scheler would have it, the object to which the ‘Third Way’ relates is the contingent world. As such, it is part of what he calls “metaphysics”. It is concerned with the metaphysical question: why is there something rather than nothing? It is not founded in the *religious* act. For the essence of this is the subject’s direction to *God*. Phenomenology is, so Scheler claims, like negative theology: by cutting away the unessential, it intensively restricts our horizon to a particular, mysterious region of being.³⁴ In the Husserlian terminology, a mental act is ‘fulfilled’ when it is intentionally at one with its object. Only such a ‘fulfilled’ act can know the essence of its object. In Scheler’s “eidology” of *religious* acts, these acts cannot be fulfilled by any contingent object. Nor are they *mediated* by such objects: his exemplar is *direct seeing*, as opposed to inference by analogy. The ontological argument is thus not a deduction from the concept of God to His real existence. It is about the immediate apprehension of supernatural perfection.

It follows, for Scheler, that Anselm did not offer a ‘proof’. The ontological ‘argument’ describes the experience of revelation. For God is a *Person*, a free being. He can, therefore, only be known in so far as he chooses to turn His face towards us. Scheler says that the religious act is the only type of act which is wholly “receptive”, engineered by a personal Object, Who reaches in to, and moulds the subject. He writes,

“. . . the personality of God is withheld from . . . rational cognition in finite beings . . . because it belongs to the nature of a purely spiritual person . . . that its existence . . . can only be known by means of a self-communication . . .”³⁵

The metaphysical arguments from causation depend upon this divine self-giving, known in the religious act. For, to know the world as *creation*, rather than as a process of reactions set in motion by an

anonymous cause, is to know it as the free 'work' of a divine *Person*. Where does that leave the movement *from nature to God*? In speaking of "*Einsföhlung*", Scheler claimed that we vaguely apprehend the cosmic whole before we recognise its parts. He argues here that it is our unthematized knowledge of God, as the illuminating horizon of experience, which conditions our grasp of the world as meaningful. The experience of the "essence called divine", as a "primordial datum of . . . human consciousness" enables us to perceive nature as created.³⁶ The 'religious sense' guides our other faculties. It knows God 'in' His own light. And, Scheler notes, disparagingly,

"It was Aquinas who first thought it permissible to read this *in lumine* as no more than *per lumine* in an objectively causal sense. . . he paved the way for the proof of God now typical of natural theology."³⁷

For Bonaventure, whose path Scheler is taking, one understands the imperfect in the terms imposed by the more perfect; one sees what the mini-market is working at by reference to Sainsbury's. Our grasp of finite facts is based in an insight into the infinite and perfect being of God.³⁸ For Scheler, the religious act is the whole within which other acts take shape.

Eric Przywara

Przywara completed his *Analogia Entis* in 1932. He mentions in its Preface the two impulses which led to its composition. He was immersed between 1912–1913 in Thomas's *De Ente et Essentia* and the *Questiones Disputatae*; then he studied Scheler's works, especially *On the Eternal in Man*. This book brought him "face to face" with the philosopher. He restates Scheler's distinction between the philosophical and the religious act in the formula: in philosophy, creatures 'measure' God, in theology, God is the 'measure' of creatures. The two are bound together by one 'measure': 'measure' is for Przywara the meaning of analogy.³⁹ The *Analogia Entis* has, in common with other works of German philosophy of the 1930s, the author's enjoyment of neologisms; and with Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius a preference for circular *gestalten*. As to the first, the work begins by asking where to begin: in the "metanoetic", with human thinking, or in the "metaontic", in being. The answer comes from the principle of analogy: because reality is contextual, the "metanoetic" is not its own standpoint, or measure. Thought is intentional: it is placed within the relational complex of reality. As to the second, "metaontic" and "metanoetic" infiltrate one another, as thought glides into its 'beyond' of an open world of objects,

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coming back to itself in re-flection, and returning thence to its object. That metanoetic is rooted to reality is an implication of “creaturely metaphysics”.⁴⁰

Przywara had been a seminarian at Valkenburg. This was a seat of Suarezian theology. His training in Suarezian conceptualism is held by some to be responsible for Przywara’s too rigid demarcation of God and creatures: this results, it is said, from the clear cutting model of logic.⁴¹ But what underlies Przywara’s system is as much an aural symbol as a notional model. He grew up singing classical polyphony and Bach, in a mixed choir; as a young Jesuit, he was given charge of music in the College of Stella Matutina, in Austria. He says that

“... ‘music as form’ is the birthplace of that which I later placed as ‘polarity’, and then ‘unity in tension’, and finally as ‘analogy’ at the centre of my work.”⁴²

Przywara bases his interpretation of the analogy of being in Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction—the same axiom which Husserl utilises in his critique of psychologism, in the *Logical Investigations*.⁴³ It states that a thing cannot be and not be, at the same time and in the same way. Przywara sets the principle of non-contradiction to music. He imagines the being of each thing as retaining its self-identity through perpetual motion. Aristotle had to contend both with Parmenides’ univocalist conception of being as the immobile One, and with Heraclitus’ idea of reality as fluent Manyness, never twice the same, and always equivocal with itself. Aristotle’s idea of analogy is intended, Przywara claims, as an ‘acrobatic balancing act’. It is a set of ‘tensions’ which maintain a mid-position between identity and equivocality.

The ontological difference is just such a “dynamic”, or mobile tension. According to Thomas, created contingent beings are marked by a twofold movement, as between act and potentiality. In the first, a potentiality to become one type of object is actualised as that form; the second is that in which this form’s being ‘so’ is made to be ‘there’.⁴⁴ The buddleia blossom exercises its potential to become this flower form; this form depends on the existential act which makes it to be. There is, for Przywara, a ‘double negativity’ in contingent material things: each is pervaded by the possibility of not becoming actual, and of not being at all.⁴⁵ The double movement from potential to actual nature, and from potential to actual being is an entelechy. Its inner becoming travels towards a final end. The “oscillation” between nature and being, between “*essentia*” and “*ens*”, is ‘open’: its motion is striving to realize

a pure act of being. The inner nothingness of each contingent fact, the absence of a pure, self-contained act of being within shoes, stars, and buddleia trees, is the place where God is present to them. The fact that creatures are ever taking on their essence and being while God simply 'is, is *both* where they diverge *and* why they meet.⁴⁶ Aristotle noted that a thing cannot simultaneously be and not be: Przywara imagines reality as dynamically moving out of possible non-being toward being. He understands the transitions in which forms grow into actuality as the rhythmic interplay of melodic themes. Bach's "Art of Fugue" was the model for his interpretation of the analogy of being.

In the *Analogia Entis*, two movements revolve around each other. Przywara terms them, alas, the "ana" and the "ano". The "ana" is the horizontal transition of *essentia* towards *ens*, and the involution of *ens* within essence. This is the ascendant movement towards God. The "ano" is the vertical descent towards created things: this is the foundation of the music of being. The analogy of being is the rhythmic movement from the "ano" to the "ana".⁴⁷ Aristotle's notion of theology requires an Unmoved Mover; movement presupposes stillness. For Przywara, the "sonorous analogy" culminates in an "analogy of silence".⁴⁸

Has the logic of non-contradiction led him to envisage the analogy of being as a measure of reciprocal "alterities"?⁴⁹ Przywara says that created and uncreated being meet only in their "rupture", for the metanarratives of the Idealists reflect a human desire for univocal harmonisation with God, of which we must be divested; God's descent is a stripping away of self.⁵⁰ Przywara's preferred dogmatic formula was provided by Lateran IV: "No matter how great the similarity of God to creatures, the dissimilarity is always greater." He read that as "the greater the similarity, the greater the dissimilarity". Von Balthasar will say that he imports into the "*maior dissimilitudo*" an "exaggerated" sense, which mutes the value of created form. But he concurs with his teacher's adherence to Anselm's statement: '*Si comprehendis. . . non est Deus*'. Przywara's positive intention is this: the difference between created beings and God allows each contingent thing a breathing space, in which it can be just this thing. He disavows Barth's "Theopanism", or an insistence on the sovereignty of God to the point of nullifying the independence of nature. The particular limitations of created beings enable them to occupy the free space of creaturehood.⁵¹

The analogy of being is thus not only a rhythm of causes and effects: it also has to do with the unpredictable. For God is transcendent. The movements of "ana" and "ano" are not of the same "genre". Creaturely movement toward actuality is marked by "necessary

dependence' and "receptivity". God's creating has the sign of "independent, freely giving movement".⁵²

Przywara does not altogether 'suppress the figure' within God. The analogy of being is for contingent natures a process of transition: created being is relational through its movement towards the beyond. This need not entail that God is non-relational, because Unmoved. Przywara writes,

"... 'relation' penetrates . . . the intra-Trinitarian life, so relation is not itself a *modus imperfectus*. Relation is for St. Thomas the particular mode of the *imago Trinitatis* . . . The *analogia entis* . . . has its hypertranscendental expression in the intra-divine 'relations' which *are* the Father, the Son and the Spirit."⁵³

- 1 Rowan Williams, "Balthasar and Rahner", in John Riches, ed., *The Analogy of Beauty: The Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar* (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 11–34.
- 2 "Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Portrait", by Medard Kehl, in *The Hans Urs von Balthasar Reader*, edited by Medard Kehl and Robert J. Daly, translated Robert J. Daly and Fred Lawrence (Crossroads, New York, 1982), p. 15.
- 3 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics. V: The Realm of Metaphysics in the Modern Age*, edited by Brian McNeil and John Riches, translated by O. Davies, A. Louth, B. McNeil, J. Seward, and R. R. Williams (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1991), p. 435.
- 4 Aurel Kolnai, *Memoirs*, (Claridge Press, London, forthcoming 1993), p. 265. All page numbers refer to the manuscript.
- 5 Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, translated from the sixth edition by Edwyn C. Hoskins (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1933), preface to the Fourth Edition, p. 21.
- 6 Ibid, p. 60.
- 7 Von Balthasar, *Glory: V*, p. 15.
- 8 Francis Dunlop, *Scheler* (Claridge Press, London, 1991), p. 61.
- 9 Von Balthasar, *Glory: V*, p. 445.
- 10 Ibid, p. 625.
- 11 Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, translated by George G. Leckie as *Concerning Being and Essence* (Meredith, New York, 1967), Chapter 1, p. 5.
- 12 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. II, Chapter 53, point 4; Jan Aertsen, *Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought* (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1988), pp. 83–8 and 127.
- 13 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord. A Theological Aesthetics. I: Seeing the Form*, edited by Joseph Fessio and John Riches, translated by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1982), p. 448.
- 14 Kolnai, *Memoirs*, pp. 262–253.
- 15 Edwin G. Boring, *A History of Experimental Psychology* (Century, New York and London, 1929), pp. 351–59.
- 16 Christian von Ehrenfels, "On Gestalt Qualities" (1922), in *Foundations of Gestalt Theory*, edited by Barry Smith (Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1988), pp. 82–117 (pp. 90–3). All three essays are collected in this volume.
- 17 Ibid, pp. 92–3.
- 18 Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Die Entfaltung der Musikalischen Idee: Versuch Einer

- Synthese der Musik", *Sammlung Bartels* 2 (1925), ['On the Unfolding of the Musical Idea'] 1–39, (16).
- 19 Cited in Barry Smith, "Gestalt Theory: An Essay in Philosophy", in *Foundations of Gestalt Theory*, pp. 11–80, (p. 67). See also Barry Smith, "Christian von Ehrenfels and the Theory of Gestalt Qualities" in Barry Smith, ed., *Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and her Successor States* (John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1981), pp. 145–159.
 - 20 Edith Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family 1891–1916: An Autobiography*, translated by Josephine Koepfel, O.C.D. (I.C.S. Publications, Washington, 1986), p. 217.
 - 21 *Ibid*, p. 250.
 - 22 Kolnai, *Memoirs*, p. 215.
 - 23 Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, Volume I (Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 2nd edition 1969), p. 236; Francis Dunlop, *Scheler*, p. 11. Husserl says "we are concerned with a phenomenological origin or— . . . we are concerned with the insight into the essence of the concept involved. We can achieve such an end only by intuitive representation of the essence in adequate Ideation . . .": Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations* [1st edition 1900; 2nd edition 1913], translated by J.N. Findlay from the 2nd German edition (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970), Volume I, p. 238.
 - 24 Dr. Dunlop explains the disparity in dates: The book was first published in 1913; Kolnai refers to Scheler's re-edition of *The Nature of Sympathy*, in the early twenties. Scheler now added the speculations about 'cosmic Einsföhlung' which are discussed below. Scheler's allegiance to Christianity was not deepened.
 - 25 Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, translated by Peter Heath (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954), pp. 10, 41, 122.
 - 26 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the First Part, Question 34, Articles 1 and 2.
 - 27 Francis Dunlop, *Scheler*, pp. 47–8.
 - 28 Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, p. 250.
 - 29 Kolnai, *Memoirs*, pp. 256–60.
 - 30 *Ibid*, pp. 182–4.
 - 31 *Ibid*, pp. 183–4.
 - 32 *Ibid*, pp. 184–5.
 - 33 Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol. I, pp. 60, 70–71, and on Bolzano, pp. 222–4. Setting the empirical singular against the universal: *Ibid*, pp. 101–110, 185 and 227–8.
 - 34 Max Scheler "Problems of Religion", in *On the Eternal in Man*, [1921], translated by Bernard Noble (S.C.M. Press, London, 1960), pp. 105–356 (pp. 170–1; 247–51; 254 and 282–83).
 - 35 *Ibid*, pp. 149–50.
 - 36 *Ibid*, p. 163 and 283.
 - 37 *Ibid*, p. 284.
 - 38 Aertsen, *Nature and Creature*, pp. 222–4.
 - 39 Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, translated by Philibert Secretan (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1990), pp. 65 (philosophy and theology); on analogy as measure, pp. 125–27.
 - 40 *Ibid*, p. 27–30.
 - 41 Georges de Schrijver, *Le Merveilleux Accord de L'Homme et De Dieu: Etude de l'Analogie de l'Etre Chez Hans Urs von Balthasar* (Leuven University Press, 1983), pp. 267–8, citing Przywara's student, J. Teran-Dutari.
 - 42 Przywara, *Analogia*, p. 10.
 - 43 Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol. I, e.g. pp. 111–13; Przywara, *Analogia*, 91–3.
 - 44 Thomas Aquinas, *Concerning Being and Essence*, Ch. 2, pp. 7–8 and Ch. 5, pp.

- 28–9; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk II, Chapter 54, points 6, 8 and 10. The structure is, more precisely, threefold, including individual, essence and being: *Ibid*, Ch. 3, pp. 15–18 and Aertsen, *Nature and Creature*, p. 138.
- 45 Przywara, *Analogia*, p. 94.
- 46 *Ibid*, pp. 75 and 156–8.
- 47 *Ibid*, p. 32.
- 48 *Ibid*, pp. 31 and 163.
- 49 *Ibid*, pp. 87 and 114–15; Schrijver, *Merveilleux Accord*, p. 284; von Balthasar, *La Dramatique Divine: II. Les Personnes du drama: 2. les Personnes dans le Christ*, translated by Robert Givord (Lethielleux, Paris, 1988), p. 176.
- 50 Schrijver, *Merveilleux Accord*, p. 284.
- 51 Przywara, *Analogia*, pp. 116.
- 52 *Ibid*, p. 106.
- 53 *Ibid*, pp. 144 and 163.

Reviews

AQUINAS ON MIND, by Anthony Kenny. *Routledge*, London and New York, 1993. Pp.viii + 182. £30.00 (Hb).

Thomist books on Thomas often walk you round Aquinas' house with hardly a glance through the windows at the outside world, a world which has changed somewhat since the house was built. Sir Anthony Kenny's decisive virtue is that in touring Aquinas' house he remains strongly aware of our modern world. His book is an extremely clear, well-conducted, detailed commenting of Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* questions on human mind; and it incorporates lengthy passages of Aquinas in translation, with Latin text in the end-notes. I read it with great pleasure and will keep it handy on my shelves; but it falls short of the book I would have liked it to be, for it never quite takes us into Aquinas' house. It examines it from over the fence, and occasionally makes bids for whatever pieces of Aquinas' furniture might not look out of place in Wittgenstein and Ryle's more modern establishment: "those parts of Aquinas' system which are of enduring value", as the blurb puts it. But I would like an account not of how the house looks from an outside world or how the furniture will fit some other house, but of how the world looks now from the house, whether the house - or parts of it - are still livable in, and how it compares in this respect to other more modern constructions.

I think Kenny believes such an account impossible. On p.57 he rejects Aquinas' view that philosophy develops out of a fundamental