

moment: "Cease fire!" Now: "Show fury!" Then: "Hold your fury!" . . . If indeed it seems man's destiny that evil instincts be his master for yet many days to come—until that day when from on high there shall pour forth the longed-for spirit of purity—then let this evil in him at least express itself in a direct, natural way: at the desire and initiative of each individual in accordance with his own needs, and not through that contemptible and humiliating process which turns men into wild dogs who both dance and hate at their master's bidding.

Regarding the third theory, this evaluation surely contains much truth, both in its analysis of the causes of war and in its proposals for war's extirpation. For it is true that the principal warmongers are to be found among the ruling classes, who incite the masses in their armies to assault the masses in the armies of other countries. . . . Therefore is it necessary to limit the power of these rulers over the people so that the latter be not delivered into their hands, like clay into the hands of the potter, for any folly or perversion the leaders seek to pursue. By this the possibility of the evil of *actual* war would be greatly limited.

It is not written, "*man* shall not lift up sword against man," but rather "*nation* shall not lift up sword against nation." For it is this sword, the collective sword forcibly placed in the hands of the individual against his will, which presents the greatest danger to the world today; and it surpasses by far all private misdeeds.

Nevertheless, anyone who suggests that by extending changes in the ordering of society or by altering this or that objective condition even the possibility of war will be completely eliminated, he is surely mistaken. For it is utter naïveté to believe that it lies within the power of a small group of "rulers" to rally myriads of people to strange and savage deeds (such as war) unless the masses themselves harbor a propensity toward such acts. Were these mobs wholly rejecting of war in their hearts, a small group of leaders could never swim against such a mighty tide.

It is true that, often throughout history, individuals have swum against the tide. But these few were men of great and pure soul intent on furthering great and pure ideals, the strength of which sustained them in their efforts; they swam against the powerful current of "things as they are," propelled by the force of that most sublime of urges, "how things ought to be." In contrast petty and frightened individuals like the ruling groups engage in tasks which have no rational support. How then shall they be emboldened to swim against the tide?

We cannot, therefore, share the opinion of the naturalistic school which holds that war is, in its entirety, nothing but the manipulation of a plotting few, the rulers; and it would seem that we must—wearily—revert to that earlier theory of war rejected because of its apparent obsolescence, which regards war as a mysterious phenomenon.

I insist that such is indeed the case! If we are to understand the nature of war we must return to the theory which views war through the lens of mystery. We must return not to vague and popular theories of mystery which have no rational support or basis in reality, but rather to an intelligent and rational sense of mystery (and reality contains such mystery). Mystery is so designated, not because it hides in remote regions never seen by the eyes of any living creature, with fantastic sights bearing no resemblance to truth; but, rather, because it is concealed from senseless eyes to which are revealed only the external appearances of natural phenomena. However, to those eyes which are able to penetrate the inner essence of phenomena mysteriousness is a perceptible reality.

The correct theory of war is, therefore, a synthesis of the mysterious and naturalistic points of view.

correspondence

"JUDAISM AND CULTURE"

Southfield, Michigan
Dear Sir: Arthur Cohen's essay on "Judaism and Culture" in your issue of January 1963 represents one view and does not by any means reflect the views of most Jews. However, it is not to take issue with the theological premises upon which the essay is based that I wish to enter a demurrer at this time. Rather do I wish to take exception to one statement which does violence to the intensity and magnitude of Judaism's concern in the area of man's social life. Mr. Cohen writes "The transformation of the world is not demonstrated by the rightings of wrongs; the justification of injustice; it is only partially this, for the transformation of the world consists in more than that the wolf and the lamb shall lie down together or that war shall cease from the world. This is the social image of salvation which is true enough as far as it goes."

I seem to hear the word "mere" intruding here as it is sometimes used by theologians in speaking of "mere reason." "True enough as far as it goes" is an expression of theological condescension which borders on social callousness. The prophets believed that the actions resulting in the elimination of injustice, wrong and war could only spring from motives that have the capacity of transforming the world and they would never have spoken as lightly of these mighty social consummations as Mr. Cohen presumes to do. In a world in which injustice is mountainous and a war of annihilation a realistic possibility, the dismissal of such vast reforms as the elimination of injustice and war in a cavalier way would never have occurred to those who laid the foundations of Judaism.

Rabbi Morris Adler

The Author Replies:

New York, N. Y.

Dear Sir: Assuredly I had no desire to give offense to Rabbi Adler or to any Jews of similarly passionate sensibilities. I was stating a theological argument and that argument was founded upon theological premises. Although Rabbi Adler did not wish to enter the lists against these premises, he was exceedingly quick to locate a passage which, loosed from

its foundations, made me appear quite monstrously callous. I do wish to assure him and others of your readers that I should be more than delighted—indeed, I would consider it a consummation of the highest order—if the wolf and the lamb could lie down together. I would still continue to argue that this would represent an issue of natural transformation, possible without the presence or contrivance of Divine Providence. My argument is and remains directed to the ontological foundations of social ethics and my question to Rabbi Adler—a question I would not have had to address to Isaiah—would be: how shall the conduct of man be changed other than by the radical transformation of man's *being*? The *being* of man is existence before God; the reconciliation of man and God involves not only the work of man, but the work of God. To the extent that that work is confined to the sphere of justice—a concept which has become immensely more complex since the days of Prophetic Judaism—we are restricted to the arena of human possibility. To the extent, however, that that work is founded upon the Holy (a perfection which exceeds all other social and moral virtues), the transformation of history must await the Coming of the Messiah and the End of History.

Arthur A. Cohen

An Analysis of Modern Political Attitudes

The Two Faces of American Foreign Policy by Thomas Molnar. Bobbs-Merrill. \$5.00.

by William Pfaff

Mr. Molnar deserves to have this book dismissed, the intelligence and perception that it contains, the argument that it makes, dismissed together with the careless and violent nonsense with which he has loaded it. To the crimes of a liberal establishment in America, so many of which

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Mr. Molnar describes, may be added the charge that it provokes so many of its critics into self-destruction—into the posture of self-dramatization and tasteless provocation, to a contemptible willingness to accept any innuendo about their enemies and any alibi for their friends, to a sacrifice of intellectual standards that too often renders their work ineffectual when it is not repellent.

Mr. Molnar's argument is a familiar one, but it is stated with considerable power and eloquence, and the author, in his early chapters, makes an analysis, intelligent, and too often just, of American political attitudes which deserves greater attention than this book is going to get for it. In Mr. Molnar there is a serious

man struggling to get out; this review will do him a courtesy that he does not deserve and deal with this book as though it were the serious political work that it might have been.

The author understands and describes with force a number of delusions—and let us join him in calling them liberal delusions, although they are not confined to those who profess liberalism; they underlie very much of what is said on foreign policy by Americans of every persuasion, not least by those who profess a conservatism which, in its apocalyptic vision of politics, resembles nothing quite so much as the beliefs of Marxist ideologues. These delusions include a complacent messianism ambitious to remake the

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