

Introduction

The 19th century collision of nationalism and imperialism is one of the defining processes of modern world history, the consequences of which endure even today.¹ While much has been written on this subject it is nonetheless instructive to reexamine it from the perspective of Japan's modern history. Because Japan was the only country to have been both imperialized and imperializer, its experience provides a unique perspective on the tensions between the emergence of nationalism as a defense against perceived foreign threats, and imperialism, which was a more aggressive way to solve the same problem. This tension expressed itself in many ways but two in particular stand out in the case of Japan. The first was pan-Asianism grounded in the assumption that common cultural experiences would form the basis of political unity. Japanese pan-Asianists dreamed of such unity under Japan's leadership to protect against imperialist incursions while also providing the necessary resources to modernize Asia's economies and societies. The second was expansionism, pan-Asianism's more predatory cousin. It aimed to secure territory beyond Japan's borders, to provide access to raw materials and markets, to enhance Japan's status as a great power, and to protect its borders with a buffer zone. Linking these two strategies were the concepts of blood and race that arose in Europe at the very moment of Japan's forced emergence on the world stage. Both pan-Asianism and expansionism offered new ways of thinking about national and pan-national unity, justifying inclusion or exclusion in these new visions according to Japanese dictates.

The common thread running through both of these was the seemingly irresistible force of the West, which simultaneously represented a model for Japan's nationalist and imperialist goals and a clear and present danger to those very same ambitions. Despite the many competing visions of Japan's national and imperial future from mid-19th century onward, the West remained a constant: a model from which to borrow ideas, practices, and institutions selectively; an example of what great power was; a goad to ever greater imperialist endeavours; a threat to Japan's ambitions; and a constant reminder of Japan's backwardness under a Western gaze. As Japan proceeded to revolutionize itself and then project its power outward under such slogans as rich nation/strong military (*fûkoku kyôhei*), it became, in turn, a threat to the nations of the West as well as a model for others to follow from China and the Philippines to India and the Ottoman Empire.² These responses then fuelled even grander Japanese visions of pan-Asianism, both benevolent and predatory.

¹ Readers are encouraged to understand this collision as a process because it was the product of many intersecting forces and, most importantly, because it unfolded over time.

² One example of this was Japan's influence on pan-Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 20th century. For a good discussion on this topic, see Renée Worringer, "Japan's Progress Reified: Modernity and Arab Dissent in the Ottoman Empire," *Japan Focus*, September 2008, ID: 2896, <http://japanfocus.org/data/Japan%20Reified%20Worringer.pdf>.

In the short century between Commodore Perry's "black ships" of 1853 and Japan's defeat in 1945, a variety of groups and individuals constructed their own visions of Japan's pan-Asianist future.³ Despite the lack of official sanction until the 1930s, and the absence of clear strategies and objectives, these activists all shared a profound antipathy toward the West.⁴ Japan's pan-Asianists believed that without some form of overarching unity, the peoples of Asia – Japan included – would succumb to the rapacious greed of the Western nations. In this, the Japanese were not alone. Others in Asia also shared this image of a materially obsessed, spiritually barren West. In China, for example, organizations such as the Red Swastika Society (*Hongwanzihui*) and the Fellowship of Goodness (*Tonshanshe*) emerged from the early 20th century stirrings of Chinese nationalism claiming that humanity could only be saved from a hedonistic West by the spiritual and moral redemption of the East.⁵ Other Asian writers went even further in their analysis, identifying nationalism itself as the principal cause of human suffering. In a series of lectures delivered in the United States and published as a book in 1917, Bengali intellectual and Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore argued that nationalism was "one of the most powerful anesthetics that man had invented."⁶ For Tagore, nationalism was a product of Western commerce and science that turned out "neatly compressed bales of humanity" in its insatiable quest for power.⁷ He called this the "Nation of the West," a mechanistic monster of "organized self-interest" driven to seek power for its own sake through conflict and conquest. In both book and lectures Tagore devoted a chapter to Japan, which he commended for its inner strength and deep sense of human obligation. But he worried that the Japanese were in the process of voluntarily submitting to the "trimming of their minds and of their freedom[s]" through "their nervous desire to turn themselves into a machine of power called the nation, and emulate other machines in their collective worldliness."⁸ However, Japan still had a chance to carve a different path, one that would bring East and West together in a spirit of cooperation, not competition. "Of all the countries in Asia," Tagore declared, Japan had the freedom to use what it had gathered from the West. But with this came great responsibility, "for in your [Japan's] voice Asia shall answer

³ The term "black ships" is the English translation of the Japanese original *kurobune*. It refers to the black smoke pouring from the funnels of Perry's coal-fired steamships. There is some evidence, however, that the term originated in the 16th century, referring to the colour of the hulls of Portuguese ships that were covered in black pitch.

⁴ For arguments about the lack of unity among Japanese pan-Asianists and a lack of support from official circles, see the articles in this reader by Cemil Aydin, and Saaler and Szpilman.

⁵ For a good discussion of these associations in China, see Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945," *The American Historical Review*, 102:4 (Oct., 1997), 1030-1051. Duara used the term transnational rather than pan-Asian because many of these Chinese associations preached a redemptive message that was founded on a combination of Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian moral principles, but one that spoke to all humans, not just Asians.

⁶ Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism*, (1917), Kessinger Publishing, 1998, 57.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

the questions that Europe has submitted to the conference of man."⁹ When Tagore uttered these words in 1916 Japan had already begun to "emulate" the West with its own colonial empire. Yet, he still believed Japan could avoid the temptations to which Europe had succumbed.

Like his Japanese and Chinese counterparts, Tagore believed that pursuing wealth and power as ends in themselves threatened the future of humanity. The West had lost its way, he said. Tempted by Indra, Lord of the Immortals, it sought immortality through wealth and power rather than through penance and humility. Yet there was still hope in what Tagore called "the spirit of the West," especially its universal ideals of justice and, above all, human freedom. In contrast, Japan's pan-Asianists and China's transnationalists argued that only the moral East could overcome the commercial and mechanistic West.¹⁰ Herein lay the origins of Japanese spirit/Western learning (*wakon yōsai*).¹¹ Many Japanese, pan-Asianists among them, believed that a skillful and selective grafting of Western knowledge onto a foundational and unchanging Japanese essence would result in a powerful modern nation, one that would become the light of Asia and an example to the world. Western science and philosophy (*yōsai*) could therefore be separated from the moral turpitude of the Western nations and be successfully transplanted into the fertile environment of Japan's own moral traditions (*wakon*). As a metaphor for modernity, *wakon yōsai* was both a solution to Japan's quest for great power status and a problem to be overcome. The difficulty was twofold: how to import foreign ideas without changing Japan's essential nature and, at the same time, how to import those ideas free of the predatory impulses and moral depravity inherent in the West. In this sense, Japanese pan-Asianism was at its core anti-Western or, at the very least, fearful that without some form of overarching unity, the peoples of Asia, Japan included, would weaken themselves and succumb to the rapacious greed of the Western nations. That insecurity, ironically but understandably, also fueled Japanese nationalist dreams of imperial dominion over Asia, if only in the name of national security.

Often unnoticed in this story is the fact that the West itself was a relatively new concept, a product of the mid-19th century when Euro-American global domination truly began in earnest. From this time on, the West came to embody, in the eyes of both insider and outsider, the epitome of progress, civilization, modernity, and, above all, power. This claim may seem audacious to those raised in a tradition that understands the West and Western civilization as timeless concepts dating back hundreds or even thousands of years. Yet, when we examine the etymology of the West, at least in the English language, we find its origins in the mid-19th century.¹²

⁹ Ibid., 74-5.

¹⁰ Ibid., 110.

¹¹ The Chinese had their own version of this phrase, *Zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong* (Chinese learning as the principle, Western learning for the application), as did a little later the Koreans, *Dongdo seogi* (Eastern way, Western tools).

¹² According to the complete Oxford English Dictionary, the earliest usages of the West in the sense we are familiar with today go back only to the mid-19th century. For an

Like all concepts, of course, the West had its antecedents, Christendom, the Occident, and Europe among them. It is also true that many Europeans saw themselves as superior to other peoples long before European global domination was manifest. It was only in the 19th century however, during what some historians have called the second industrial revolution, that the will to dominate was finally and fully matched by ability. The mass productive forces of industrial capitalism and the infrastructural power of nation-states, together with rapid advances in science and technology, coalesced into an irresistible force that made European, and later American, global domination possible on a scale unprecedented in human history. Ideologies that justified domination quickly gained force too. As the epitome of civilization, modernity, and progress, the West was the senior partner to the subordinate East in one of the most powerful binary constructions in human history. In this sense, it is no exaggeration to say that the West and the East (Asia) not only grew up together but also emerged from the same geopolitical milieu at the same time. Earlier, people thought of themselves as Gauls or Swedes, on the one hand, or as Chinese or Khmer, on the other, but not as members of two fundamentally different civilizations, or even as Europeans and Asians. Just as there were few self-conscious Asians in Asia until about 150 years ago, neither were there many Westerners in the West. The melding of the will to power with the ability to wield that power over immense space not only created the West but also the entire modern world as we know them today.

Here, again, Japan is a most instructive case. Japan's modern history often begins with Commodore Perry's arrival in Uraga Bay in 1853. This is a convenient, albeit incomplete, beginning for Japan's modern transformation and one that is certainly flattering to Americans and other Westerners: There but for the grace of the West went modern Japan.¹³ However, as much as this was a beginning, Perry's mission was also the end of a succession of British, Russian, and American attempts to engage Japan dating back to the late 18th century. All these earlier efforts failed – as did the McCartney mission to China in 1792 – for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was inability or lack of motivation on the part of the Europeans and Americans to impose their will on the Chinese and Japanese. Fifty years later all that had changed with the gunboat diplomacy of the first Opium War and Perry's arrival in Japan 12 years after that. These were the beginnings of the West as an unstoppable force in East Asia. The Japanese understanding of this change is aptly captured by the speed with which they moved from a position of absolute opposition (*sonnō jōi*: revere the Emperor/expel the barbarian) to one of resigned

argument that the West as a political idea shorn of its racial edge began even later in the 20th century, see Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics, and History*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

¹³ This phrase is an intentional play on the original "There but for grace of God goes John Bradford," attributed to the English reformer and martyr of the same name. It highlights one of the major narratives in Japanese and Western writing about Japan until the last 20 years or so that characterized Japan as a follower, a latecomer, and an imitator. In this story the West was Japan's opposite: a leader, a pioneer, and a creator.

accommodation (*wakon yōsai*: Japanese spirit/Western learning) with the Westerners.

One of the most important developments that gave rise to the West was the rapidly expanding power of science, both in terms of its rhetorical authority and its practical value. Professionalization, too, assisted this process as new infrastructural power (the research institute, the academy, and the state) gave scientific inquiry in all its forms a legitimacy to weigh in on all aspects of human life. From the family kitchen and the firm to government bureaucracies and the marketplace, scientific thinking reigned supreme and quickly became central to the definition of Westernness. To think or act scientifically was not simply to be modern and progressive. It was, in a word, to be Western. While it conflicted at times with the received truths of Christianity, science just as frequently meshed with religion into a progressive story of salvation by promising to lift the pagans of the world out of their self-imposed ignorance. This is particularly evident in the 19th century missionary legacy. There is considerable evidence that the peoples of Asia were more interested in science than in Christianity and, in fact, were able to comfortably separate the two. As a result, Christian missionaries in Asia were far more successful in building schools, orphanages, and hospitals based on the progressive scientific theories then emanating from Europe and America than they were in winning converts.

In practical terms, rapid advances in scientific discovery and technological innovation, coupled with machine-driven mass production techniques, more than matched the rhetorical power of scientific discourse. It was in these fields that the ability to project power finally matched the will to do so. This was particularly true in military affairs where the screw-driven ironclad steamship, the breech loading gun, and the exploding shell gave tremendous advantages to any who could build or buy them. All of these were developed in the 19th century but constructed on many incremental improvements from earlier times. Here, again, Perry's "black ships" are a useful measure of the speed with which industrial capitalism and scientific discovery were transformed into tools of power. When James Biddle and James Glyn sailed to Japan in 1846 and 1849 respectively, they did so aboard sail-driven wooden warships armed with smoothbore cannon. Matthew Perry arrived in Uraga Bay in 1853 on the USS *Mississippi*, a wooden paddle-driven steam frigate brandishing ten French-made Paixhans guns that fired exploding shells. The *Mississippi* represented a dramatic improvement in naval warfare, yet it too was rendered obsolete within a decade by screw-driven ironclad steamships. Mao Zedong is usually credited with the phrase, "political power flows from the barrel of a gun." However, mid-19th century Japanese didn't need Mao to interpret what they experienced directly from Perry onward. This was the world into which the Japanese were thrown, a decidedly dangerous world in which progress, indeed survival, was measured in terms of the ability to project power on whatever object a nation's gaze was fixed.

The application of scientific thinking to the world of human affairs led to new justifications for using such power. The physical sciences provided insight and

understanding into the laws that governed the inanimate world. Similarly, the newly emerging human sciences seemed to many people to offer comparable insights into relationships among people as well as those between states. As with the physical sciences, these ideas about human behaviour, class, and race did not emerge fully formed but coalesced in the mid-19th century into a powerful discourse about linear progress buttressed by scientific authority. Among the many questions addressed by Europeans and Americans at that time were those concerning human origins, the age of the world, and the mechanisms by which progress occurred.

Of the new ideas circulating at the time none was more powerful than Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory.¹⁴ As compelling as it was controversial, evolution offered an evidence-based explanation for how some species survived, reproduced, and thrived and others did not. According to Darwin, any slight change or variation in a species, if useful to it in the endless struggle for existence, would be preserved and passed on to its offspring.¹⁵ This was the principle of natural selection at work. Thus, not only did organisms change over time – a controversial enough idea in itself – they did so through the invisible hand of nature, which, by privileging useful variations, gave reproductive success to some and not others. As with all ideas, the power of concepts like evolution and natural selection lay not only in elegant explanation grounded in evidence but also in the ease with which others were able to adapt them to new circumstances. Natural selection proved particularly malleable. Among its many interpretations perhaps the most famous is Herbert Spencer's "survival of the fittest," which is often mistakenly attributed to Darwin himself.¹⁶ However, whereas Darwin originally defined fitness in terms of reproductive success in the natural world, Spencer and the many who followed this thread defined it as mental and physical productive success in the human world.

¹⁴ Although we credit Charles Darwin as the father of modern evolutionary theory, we should not forget that Alfred Russel Wallace independently derived the same idea from his work in the Amazon and Southeast Asia. In fact, knowledge of Wallace's theory was the final push that drove Darwin to publish *On the Origin of Species* in 1859. A year earlier, the now-famous Darwin-Wallace paper was read at the Linnean Society of London by Charles Lyell and Joseph Hooker. The full text of this is available at <http://wallacefund.info/the-1858-darwin-wallace-paper>. Readers should also note that both men were deeply influenced by Thomas Malthus' *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, J. Johnson, 1798, available online at <http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPop.html>.

¹⁵ Charles Darwin, *On the Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*, 2nd ed. John Murray, 1860, 61-62, available online at <http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=F376&viewtype=text&pageseq=1>.

¹⁶ While Darwin did not use this term in the first four editions of his famous work, he did cite Spencer's phrase approvingly in the fifth edition, saying it was "more accurate [than natural selection] and [was] sometimes equally convenient." *On the Origin of Species*, 5th edition, John Murray, 1869, 72. Available online at <http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&itemID=F387&viewtype=text>.

This move toward analyzing human society through evolution and natural selection marked the beginning of what we now call Social Darwinism, particularly when linked from the 1880s onward with definitions of race that were specifically based on skin colour.¹⁷ Ultimately, these ideas provided new ways of understanding power and why the West should wield it as it did. It was a moral tale in which individuals, races, and nations engaged in endless struggle for survival, a zero-sum world with only winner and losers where the fittest prevailed to write and re-write the story of progress. This was the West in full bloom, an existing concept now grounded in new scientific theories about racial purity and fitness. Long before the advent of National Socialism in Germany, Europeans and Americans generally accepted the link between race and nation, and the idea that imperialism was an expression of a nation's fitness. So too did the Japanese.

In the European story of progress, which meshed so well with Social Darwinist ideas of struggle and survival, the Japanese found themselves at a distinct disadvantage as one of the "inferior races." However, much like Marx and Engels' argument that class struggle was the motive force in historical change, the story of progress and Darwin's story of evolution driven by natural selection could provide both an explanation for Japan's current position in the world and a blueprint for improving that condition. To that end, Japan's Meiji leaders dedicated themselves to forging a strong national polity united by race and culture, powered by industrial capitalism, and protected by military might. Initially these objectives aimed to eliminate the unequal treaties Japan's shogunal government was forced to sign in the wake of Perry's "black ships." Diplomatic parity and international respect from the great powers would lift Japan from its subordinate position in the European story of progress and demonstrate to the world that being modern, civilized, and powerful was not exclusive to the West. By the beginning of the 20th century these goals had been achieved. Japan had diplomatic parity, economic and military power, and a strong national polity. Most importantly Japan's victories in its wars with China (1894-5) and Russia (1904-5) and the territories that came with the victor's justice of the time demonstrated its ability to project power outward, an absolute prerequisite for great power status. This was truly a remarkable achievement. In only 40 years Japan had transformed itself into an industrial hub – about the same length of time it had taken England to complete the first phase of its own industrial revolution.

As with the English, the costs of this achievement for many Japanese were considerable. Abuses of labour in the factories, thread mills and mines were widespread, as was growing poverty and tenancy in the countryside. Another cost, this one very much tied to race, nation and struggle, was that Japan's success in the international arena had made it a threat to the very powers from which it wished to gain parity and respect. In the world of all against all, a binary world of grow or perish, Japan's ascendancy to near-great power status altered the balance of power

¹⁷ For a good discussion of these ideas and particularly Darwin's place in the 19th century European intellectual world, see Gregory Claeys, "The 'Survival of the Fittest' and the Origins of Social Darwinism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 61:2 (Apr. 2000), 223-240.

in Asia and, in the eyes of Westerners, turned Theodore Roosevelt's "plucky little Jap" into a yellow menace whose buck-toothed, squint-eyed gaze struck fear into the hearts of "good white folk" until well after the Pacific War. This was, of course, the "yellow peril," a phrase attributed to Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany but one that resonated powerfully in all the nations of the West and found popular expression in laws, legislation, education, and the media. At the heart of yellow peril fears lay visions of teeming Asian hordes overrunning the civilized white world. These visions lent truth to the idea that race as a biological category mattered. They also revealed the centrality of skin colour in the definition of race. Finally, yellow peril rhetoric also blurred the lines between Darwinist and Social Darwinist conceptions of evolution and selection. The yellow peril preoccupation with reproduction actually brought it closer to the original Darwinian idea rather than the Social Darwinist emphasis on productive fitness. The fluid movement between one kind of fitness and the other, however, illustrates the many ways these concepts could be adapted to different situations, all seemingly grounded in scientific authority.

Western images of Japan and China revealed this tendency clearly. China was the object of Western yellow peril fears primarily due to the "fecundity of its loins," to use Jack London's phrase.¹⁸ Japan, on the other hand, represented a double threat. As a formidable military power and the only non-Western participant in the great power game, Japan had demonstrated both the will to power and the ability to wield it in the international arena. But a modern, militarized Japan also represented a special danger because of its potential to awaken the Chinese "sleeping dragon" and unleash its teeming masses. Thus, for many in the West, Japan was the spearhead of yellow peril fears precisely because of its pan-Asian rhetoric. This was evident in Euro-American writings as early as the 1880s, particularly in future war fiction.¹⁹ As part of the emerging East/West binary, yellow peril and white peril fed on each other, creating a self-sustaining discourse of fear and loathing. Yellow peril anxieties were articulated through literature, scientific study, and anti-Oriental legislation, all of which provided compelling evidence to Japanese and other Asians that the West was a threat to their own existence. As Singhalese Buddhist Anagarika Dharmapala wrote in 1913, "[i]t is a political trick of the Europeans to keep harping about the yellow peril... It is the white peril that Asiatic races have to guard against."²⁰ In this

¹⁸ Jack London, "The Unparalleled Invasion," in *The Strength of the Strong*, MacMillan, 1910, 60-80. In this chilling tale, set some 70 years in London's future, he recounts how the nations of the world, led by a brilliant American scientist, exterminate the entire Chinese race through biological warfare due to fears of China overbreeding. It is the earliest form of fiction I have found that treats both germ warfare and genocide.

¹⁹ Future war is also known as military science fiction or simply science fiction. However, it was a genre of adventure stories for boys in Japan in the early 20th century known as *mirai sensô* (future war). For more on this genre, see my article in this reader.

²⁰ Anagarika Dharmapala, "Japan's Duty to the World," quoted in Janaka Perera, "White peril vs. 'yellow peril' then and now," *Asian Tribune*, September 21, 2009, <http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/13340>. I have not yet found a copy of Dharmapala's original article.

way, yellow peril fears helped to drive pan-Asianist visions of the Japanese and other Asians.

The articles that follow offer a variety of perspectives on Japanese thinking about pan-Asianism from its earliest formations in the mid-19th century to its eventual official adoption as Japanese policy in the 1930s. While the approach and focus of each article differs, they share some understanding that the motive force behind all forms of Japanese pan-Asianism was a powerful antipathy to the West.

This is what I have called the “white peril” even though in my research thus far I have found no Japanese use of the term. Of course they did have many derogatory names for Westerners, from “long noses” and “butter stinkers” to the “evil British and Americans” (*aku O-bei*) common from the 1920s through the 1940s. The earliest references to the “white peril” may actually come from the West itself. The first was a novel by Anatole France entitled *The White Stone* (*Sur la pierre blanche*) published in 1905. In the shadow of the excavation of ancient Roman ruins a group of Frenchmen gathered each afternoon to discuss politics, philosophy and history. During dinner, conversation turned to the rise of Europe with one young man, Nicole Langelier, inverting history by remarking that “[t]he white kingdoms joined issue over the extermination of the red, yellow, and black races, and for the space of four centuries gave themselves up madly to the pillaging of the three great divisions of the world. This is what is styled modern civilization.”²¹ In an even more damning indictment, Langelier went on to say that “[i]t was not the yellow men who hunted up the whites... We created the White Peril. The White Peril engendered the Yellow Peril.”²² France’s inversion of civilized and barbaric was echoed later that same year by American journalist Sidney Gulick who argued that Japan’s victory over Russia marked the beginning of a new era, “a readjustment [in the balance of power] that promises to halt the territorial expansion of white races and to check their racial pride.”²³ In an almost exact reproduction of France’s fictional character, Gulick went on to say that “[s]ince the discovery of America, the dream of conquest, of empire and of unearned wealth has intoxicated the white people of the earth and made them the scourge of all the world... Surely the outstanding fact in the relations of the West to the East has been the peril to the yellow and brown races through the presence of the white man, whose assumption has been the theory that might makes right.”²⁴

These examples powerfully illustrate how the “Nation of the West,” in Tagore’s words, became the goad for Japanese pan-Asianism. In a short poem penned on the last day of the 19th century, nearly 20 years before his lectures on nationalism, Tagore portrayed the West as a monster whose “naked passion of self-

²¹ Anatole France, *The White Stone* (*Sur la pierre blanche*), trans. Charles E. Roche, The Bodley Head Limited, 1905, 152.

²² *Ibid.*, 162.

²³ Sidney Lewis Gulick, *The White Peril in the Far East: An Interpretation of the Significance of the Russo-Japanese War*, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1905, 5.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

love” and “drunken delirium of greed” had burst forth “in a violence of fury from its own shameless feeding. For it has made the world its food.”²⁵ Here, we see the self-criticism of Western hypocrisy (France and Gulick) converging with Eastern perceptions of Western greed and rapaciousness (Dharmapala and Tagore). This was the world historical context in which Japanese pan-Asianists operated, a world in which pan-Asian unity under Japanese leadership became for many the only protection against the West. However, just as Tagore saw the West consuming itself, Japanese pan-Asian visions also ran the risk, now all too clear in retrospect, of becoming just like the enemy they struggled to resist.

²⁵ Rabindranath Tagore, “The Sunset of the Century, 1899. The poem was written in Bengali on the last day of that year and translated and reprinted in English in 1917 in *Nationalism*.