

- 28–9; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk II, Chapter 54, points 6, 8 and 10. The structure is, more precisely, threefold, including individual, essence and being: *Ibid*, Ch. 3, pp. 15–18 and Aertsen, *Nature and Creature*, p. 138.
- 45 Przywara, *Analogia*, p. 94.
- 46 *Ibid*, pp. 75 and 156–8.
- 47 *Ibid*, p. 32.
- 48 *Ibid*, pp. 31 and 163.
- 49 *Ibid*, pp. 87 and 114–15; Schrijver, *Merveilleux Accord*, p. 284; von Balthasar, *La Dramatique Divine: II. Les Personnes du drama: 2. les Personnes dans le Christ*, translated by Robert Givord (Lethielleux, Paris, 1988), p. 176.
- 50 Schrijver, *Merveilleux Accord*, p. 284.
- 51 Przywara, *Analogia*, pp. 116.
- 52 *Ibid*, p. 106.
- 53 *Ibid*, pp. 144 and 163.

## Reviews

**AQUINAS ON MIND**, by Anthony Kenny. *Routledge*, London and New York, 1993. Pp.viii + 182. £30.00 (Hb).

Thomist books on Thomas often walk you round Aquinas' house with hardly a glance through the windows at the outside world, a world which has changed somewhat since the house was built. Sir Anthony Kenny's decisive virtue is that in touring Aquinas' house he remains strongly aware of our modern world. His book is an extremely clear, well-conducted, detailed commenting of Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* questions on human mind; and it incorporates lengthy passages of Aquinas in translation, with Latin text in the end-notes. I read it with great pleasure and will keep it handy on my shelves; but it falls short of the book I would have liked it to be, for it never quite takes us into Aquinas' house. It examines it from over the fence, and occasionally makes bids for whatever pieces of Aquinas' furniture might not look out of place in Wittgenstein and Ryle's more modern establishment: "those parts of Aquinas' system which are of enduring value", as the blurb puts it. But I would like an account not of how the house looks from an outside world or how the furniture will fit some other house, but of how the world looks now from the house, whether the house - or parts of it - are still livable in, and how it compares in this respect to other more modern constructions.

I think Kenny believes such an account impossible. On p.57 he rejects Aquinas' view that philosophy develops out of a fundamental

defining vision of some subject: "The relation between even the best established hypothesis and the evidence which confirms it is quite different from that between theorem and axiom in a formal abstract system." He is arguing, I think with justice, that coming to understand the world is a complex fitting in of pieces, not a flowing deductive exercise; nevertheless he misses that what we are fitting together is a way of seeing the world. In 1901 Bergson gave a talk in Bologna on understanding a philosopher (later printed in *La Pensée et le Mouvant*). He argued that our first acquaintance with a philosopher throws up a multitude of odd positions, which, as we read on, begin to group into a few prominent obscurely-related theses. Further study reveals more and more the relationship between the theses, but they resist reduction to one principal proposition; rather they multiply reflect one primitive image which the philosopher strove all his life long to express. What I want to understand is Thomas's "image" through his conclusions; what Kenny gives us is painstaking criticism of Aquinas' conclusions, without revealing that the criticisms rely on another modern "image".

An example: pp.25–27 present very clearly and well the Aristotelian view of soul as 'forming', out of matter, a particular organization of body: "a human being is a human body", says Kenny felicitously. Then *passim* we are reminded that, for Aquinas, soul is only part of a human being: not me but part of me, as a comment on St Paul puts it. (Kenny makes much of the fact that the text says "the soul is a part of the human body", but the text is not a critical text, and the phrase quite unusual in Aquinas.) On pp.123-125 an interpretation creeps in that Thomas would deny and which is derived from a Wittgenstein and Rylean vision: the potentialities of a form cannot express themselves except in the enabling of bodily functions, certainly soul cannot "ennoble" a body to cooperate in 'immaterial' operations. Consequently on p.135 Kenny is ready to judge Aquinas' distinction of forms into material and immaterial forms incoherent, but the incoherency must rather be traced to how Kenny interpreted the earlier texts. On p.151 the whole concept of "ennobling" is written out of Aquinas because it "is difficult to restate in a way which will strike a chord among twentieth-century philosophers of any school. The problem with forms free of matter is not a question of value, but a question of logic". Well, now we know we've permanently moved house! Kenny is rejecting, as he does throughout, any teleological assessment of existence: "This part of Aquinas' system is something which must be discarded if we are to make any use of his philosophy at the present time . . . He is perfectly right to insist that teleological activities can take place in the absence of consciousness: [e.g. in plants]. He is also right that inanimate objects have tendencies . . . Where Aquinas goes wrong is in thinking that . . . every natural action is the exercise of a tendency to produce some good . . . The operation of the laws of inertia and gravity and the natural activities of sulphur or uranium are not teleological activities at all . . . In a hierarchy of different kinds of tendencies towards good . . . we must put at the bottom level of the hierarchy not the natural

agency of inanimate matter, but the nonconscious teleological activities to be found in the plant world" (p.61). But these levels are levels of an analogy, and light must be allowed to flow along the analogy from one level to another, illuminating each to each without confusing them. What is a tendency if it is not a seeking (let's say of equilibrium), and how can we think seeking without thinking good sought? Are we, as good scientists, to imagine pushes that suffer no pull? Or are we rather to think of tendencies as simple facts unilluminable by analogy? Then we must go and live in the house of positivism. I think this is also what obscures for Kenny Aquinas' notion of external human action as interiorly commanded: the interiority is the mind and will's joint loving (pulling) of an action into existence, not just, as Kenny thinks of it, an interior linguistic planning of the form of some action that we then just push out.

So this is a good book and recommended, but there is room for another.

Some textual mistakes and typographical errors: on p.37 for "general judgements" read "particular judgements"; on p.66 (in the quotation) for "intrinsic cause" read "extrinsic cause"; on p.138 for "Avicenna" read "Averroes". The references on p.32, and again on pp.66-7, omit the number of the article. On pp.63,86 and 87 we have the words "narrow", "onself" and "propostion"; on p.101 (in the quotation) for "of the side of" read "on the side of".

TIMOTHY MCDERMOTT

**THE QUEST FOR THE ORIGIN OF JOHN'S GOSPEL A SOURCE ORIENTATED APPROACH** by John Brodie. *Oxford University Press, OUP/USA, 1993. £30.*

John Brodie is a Dominican Friar and Professor of N.T.Studies at the Aquinas Institute of Theology St.Louis. Professor Brodie's contribution to Johannine studies in this book is described as "a source orientated approach" and may very well cause eyebrows to be raised among his professional colleagues.He seems to make very large claims indeed and his book may be regarded either as a study ahead of its time or as a somewhat laboured exercise in eisegesis.

Brodie begins with a certain impatience on the controverted issue of oral tradition for which he sees no evidence and argues that such traditions together with theories of a multiple redactor only cloud the issues of source criticism leaving the real problem of how the gospels were formulated more problematic than ever. So for the origin of John's gospel, then, we must turn to literary sources because, argues Professor Brodie, there is no Johannine independent tradition:no special Johannine Community, just a gospel written "for the world and for the wider Church". This contention alone is courageous because it puts him in danger of dismissing decades of study on the origins of the Johannine Community.

But if oral tradition cannot be taken into account in the composition