

in their relations to law. Special attention is paid to the mutual influence of the Puritans and the State Constitutions in North America, to the Utilitarians and the Industrial Revolution; all of this seen against the background of the Graeco-Roman Christian heritage of Western civilisation. Dr. Lindsay stresses, as does Mr. Drucker, the distinction between society and state, and in so doing is led to discuss the rise of nationalism and of the nation state. Here perhaps his treatment is less satisfactory, and the chapter bearing the latter title suffers from compression. As he wishes to distinguish nationality from nationalism his definition of nation is framed to suit this and many will find it insufficient, viz: 'a state becomes a nation when instead of its members being primarily divided between sovereign and subjects, government and citizenship becomes a common task, demanding not passive citizenship but active co-operation from all.'

The concluding chapters of the book, dealing with the spirit and the standard of the common life, discuss modern theories of political obligation, dismiss those which can only lead to claims of absolute sovereignty and end by stating the immensely complex problem of the control of the organisation of power by the ordinary person. Dr. Lindsay promises to take up this problem in his next volume along with a discussion of how a greater sense of community can be produced in the modern democracy. To this we look forward with all eagerness.

JOHN FITZSIMONS.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE. By Henry A. Mess. (Allen & Unwin; 6s.)

Practically all modern scholarship is scientific in its treatment and proceeds exclusively by induction. Definitions, therefore, are still being sought. It is difficult to know on inductive principles alone how or when we can define anything except as a working hypothesis. When such a method is in use in all branches of science, a certain confusion is inevitable. There is abundant need at the moment for people to compare notes about definitions. This introduction to sociology by Dr. Mess will be welcomed because he has tried to meet this need. He has given to his readers a useful series of definitions arranged so that no section is in verbal contradiction with the other. This explains certain innovations in definitions. "The book is therefore a stepping-stone to a synthesis of sociological knowledge.

But it is well to see that it is only the first step. A Catholic will find much of the atmosphere of the book dull and dreary. Scientific induction of this kind only skims the surface of reality. The impartiality of the treatment of religion and the churches in particular seems to evade the issue. However impartial a man may desire to be, the fact remains that he is bound by the laws of human nature to depend on one doctrinal system or another in order to affirm

anything. This approach to sociology basically accepts a philosophical and religious relativism as its basic dogma. If this assumption were true, the conclusions reached in the book could well be regarded as the latest contributions to human wisdom on social relations; but if the assumption be false, then maybe it is high time our sociologists supplemented their studies on the nature of society with a little leaven from elsewhere. Maybe there is no social or economic solution to social and economic problems.

DANIEL WOOLGAR, O.P.

THE FEAR OF FREEDOM. By Erich Fromm. (Kegan Paul; 15s.)

Dr. Fromm's book has a rather uncertain status: it sets out to be a frontier patrol on the borderlines of sociology and psychology, and thereby raises many important questions of method. Man is not for him as for Freud the sum of his biological drives; but neither is he a metaphysical animal, although he has an inherent trend to strive for justice and truth. If then we ask 'Why?' Dr. Fromm disallows the question. There is no why, it happens solely as the result of historical evolution that human nature has this justicewards and truthwards ordained dynamism which society brings to full realisation. Not only—as there is with Freud—is there no dichotomy between man and society, but man is primarily ~~for~~ society and not society for man. On this rather rickety foundation Dr. Fromm builds an imposing socio-psychological thesis.

The thesis roughly is this. In the process of evolution, Renaissance man broke away from the primary ties of family, manorial authority, occupation, Church authority, etc., of the pre-individualistic world and looked for freedom *to* express his individual self and at the same time found freedom *from* a setting that gave him reassurance and social security. His task in modern times is to recover that reassurance, not by returning to the old ties, but by orienting and rooting himself in the world in other ways than those characteristic of his pre-individualistic existence.

In mediaeval times 'a person was identical with his role in society; he was a peasant, an artisan, a knight, and not an individual who happened to have this or that occupation' (although we may interject that a doctor, e.g., nowadays is more than ever the doctor, not the human being, but the specialist). In modern capitalist society 'there ceased to be a fixed place in the economic order which could be considered a natural, an unquestionable one. The individual was left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of his traditional status' (p. 50). But man *needs* to be related to the external world, to belong; his aloneness drives him into neuroses, the characteristic disease of our civilisation. The individual's psychological and moral autarchy offers no principle of adjustment with society, because its true issue is anarchism.