

must impose *upon themselves* social rules, social institutions. Economics and economists cannot evade their responsibility in the continuing discourse over such rules and institutions by shifting attention to trivialities. To the extent that they do so, their functional roles can only be filled by the charlatans and the fools, whose presence around us requires no demonstration.

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TO THE EDITOR:

As a person who once wrote a dissertation on Locke, I was intrigued to read Robert H. Horwitz's review of the Clarendon edition of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (*APSR* 72:651-52). I was especially struck by the account of the difficulties Locke had with printers. Given Horwitz's statement that "the Clarendon edition has been suspiciously inaugurated" it seems that the spirit of the seventeenth century lives on in printing as well as in philosophy.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The following articles have tentatively been scheduled to appear in the June, 1979, issue:

- David O. Sears, Carl P. Hensler and Leslie K. Speer, University of California, Los Angeles, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?"
- Michael Johnston, University of Pittsburgh, "Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage"
- Richard L. Cole, George Washington University, and David A. Caputo, Purdue University, "Presidential Control of the Senior Civil Service: Assessing the Strategies of the Nixon Years"
- Edward T. Jennings, Jr., State University of New York, Buffalo, "Competition, Constituencies, and Welfare Policies in American States"

David John Gow, Rice University, "Scale Fitting in the Psychometric Model of Judicial Decision Making"

Arend Lijphart, University of California, San Diego, "Religious vs. Linguistic Class Voting: The 'Crucial Experiment' of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland"

David M. Lampton, Ohio State University, "The Roots of Interprovincial Inequality in Education and Health Services in China since 1949"

William Pang-yu Ting, University of Michigan, "Coalitional Behavior among the Chinese Military Elite: A Nonrecursive, Simultaneous-Equations, and Multiplicative Causal Model"

- James M. McCormick and Young W. Kihl, Iowa State University, "Foreign Policy-IGO Linkages: Some Empirical Findings"
- Timothy A. Tilton, Indiana University, "A Swedish Road to Socialism: Ernst Wigforss and the Ideological Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy"
- Alan Gilbert, University of Denver, "Social Theory and Revolutionary Activity in Marx"

An unfortunate combination of errant typesetting and proofreading resulted in misplacing sections of Professor J. Patrick Dobel's article, "The Corruption of a State" (September, 1978, pp. 958-73). We are most apologetic, understanding how upsetting this type of error is to authors. We reprint below the whole section of Professor Dobel's article in which the offending misplacement appeared (ref. pp. 970-71).

Education:

Formal, Family, Religion and Militia

Inequality dominates the causes of systematic corruption, but human nature must also be addressed. Education and socialization must inculcate disciplined commitment to other citizens and loyalty to the commonweal.⁴⁹ Customs, habits and mores can sometimes be strong enough to sustain institutional integrity and loyalty among citizens even after great inequality exists. Education and socialization, however, fight a rear-guard action. Neither equality without education nor education without equality can sustain a just, stable and equal state. Corruption spreads beyond the political realm and cripples the structures which generate reasonably disinterested loyalty and civic virtue. As relations become instrumentalized under the pressure of inequality, citizens lose the capacity for piety, dutifulness and affectionate loyalty. Four vital areas of political socialization are undermined: formal education, the family, organized religion and mutual self-defense.

The society's civic educational system is corrupted by several onslaughts. As the corruption of values in government and the wider society becomes more apparent, it becomes

harder to find teachers who can seriously teach these values. Teaching, itself, becomes an undervalued occupation in a world of great economic and social disparities, and fewer talented people enter it. Additionally the teachers and schools come under constant attack from various factions for teaching a set of values which might lead a student to question a particular faction's place in society or damage a faction's future recruitment. The schools also confront students and parents who see that the "older" concern with rational and humane mores and loyalty are counterproductive in a world of atomized selfishness and factional competition. The schools are slowly transformed into nothing more than occupational training for the factions and become devoid of any independent values linked to loyalty to the common good and other citizens.

The incapacity for loyalty also wrecks the social stability of the family. The loyalty of husband and wife lasts only as long as it is convenient; adultery and divorce become normal and justifiable whenever duties of fidelity interfere with immediate pleasures. As the parents liberate themselves, the children are neglected or shunted off because they seem unrewarding.

The lack of loyalty and care in the family destroys the family as a socializing agent. In families citizens acquire basic moral beliefs and learn rudimentary forms of justice, cooperation and affirmation of authority.⁵⁰ As parents betray one another and lose confidence in their authority, children learn to ignore parental authority and pursue their own interests. Individuals learn to perceive all law and morality as oppression.⁵¹ If children have no respect for rules given by parents, they will never accept laws which impinge upon them for the benefit of others.

The corruption of organized religion destroys another voluntary organization which sustains moral commitments to others.⁵² The change is not so much one of religiosity as of piety. The moral claims of religion to limit avarice or encourage charity lose their force. Fear of God wanes and the self-sacrifice of piety is outweighed by love of gain.

⁵⁰Machiavelli (1965, *Discourses*, Bk. 1, Chs. 11-15; Bk. 2, Ch. 2; Bk. 3, Ch. 33); Rousseau (1964, *Discours sur l'economie*, pp. 261-62).

⁵¹Plato (1957, 553a-553e; 562e-565e).

⁵²Machiavelli (1965, *Discourses*, Bk. 1, Chs. 11-15; Bk. 2, Ch. 2; Bk. 3, Ch. 33); Rousseau (1964, *Du contrat social*, Bk. 2, Ch. 7; Bk. 4, Ch. 8).

⁴⁹Plato (1957, 386a-416c; 423e-424c); Aristotle (1962, Bk. 2, Chs. 7, 8; Bks. 7, 8); Rousseau (1964, *Du contrat social*, Bk. 2, Chs. 6, 12; *Discours sur l'economie*, pp. 260-61).

The decay of religion occurs on two levels. First, citizens slowly leave the churches or transform them into purely social or private activities. Second, the church itself becomes a faction. To maintain its institutional power it might ally itself with the elite and then act as an agent of control rather than one of grace and worship. The constant vacillation of the Delphic oracle among the various Greek factions reflects such bankruptcy. The religion might also follow the strategy of the Roman Catholic Church of Machiavelli's or Rousseau's time and use its spiritual authority to gain riches, land and power for itself while sacrificing the moral integrity of its leaders and the spiritual welfare of its members.⁵³

Religion's inherently mysterious and evocative relation with people gives it the constant potential to renew the moral life of the community. Its clergy can be corrupted, its membership thinned, but the possibility of prophecy and regeneration remain. The resurrection of Florence under its unarmed prophet, Savonarola, and Geneva's transformation by its armed prophet, Calvin, were classic examples of religion's "restorative" powers.⁵⁴

The increasing dissolution of the citizens' bonds of loyalty ends the state's ability to generate its own militia. In a just and stable state a voluntary citizen army served three purposes. First, it was a counterweight to the rich and powerful. As long as the citizens controlled the main source of legitimate coercion and defense, the loyalty of the elites was reinforced by fear of arms. Second, loyal and committed citizens made better and less ambitious soldiers. Third, a participatory militia was a great equalizer. It pulled all classes of society together and made it more democratic in its values and reinforced the loyalty of citizens for

one another.⁵⁵

In an unequal and corrupted state the bulk of the citizenry have little reason to defend a state which gives them so little. The elites care too much for themselves and possess their own means of protection. They also fear to see the poorer citizens armed. The state is reduced to expedients for defense: payoffs to enemies, mercenary soldiers, wars by proxy and a professional army. The bribery scheme works in the short run, but it is too dangerous in the long run and often generates internal unrest because of the humiliation and cost involved.⁵⁶ Mercenaries, like Francisco Sforza, The Duke of Milan, are inefficient, expensive, often disloyal and liable to turn on the country and conquer it.⁵⁷ Proxy wars, as the Athenians discovered in trying to rule their empire indirectly, are extremely costly and they usually involve unreliable allies and pull the state into increasingly larger and costlier intervention.⁵⁸ The last solution, the professional army, is much more militarily efficacious, but it poses a great threat to internal freedom. The army is loyal to those who pay it and can easily become an adjunct to the ruling classes. The maintenance of a standing army involves larger budgets and creates many opportunities for corrupt alliances between the military and various economic factions which supply it. Finally, if the army should develop its own inner cohesion, the army can become the most powerful faction in the state. The state can either buy it off with great sums of money or the military faction may sell itself to a political entrepreneur or simply take over the government.⁵⁹

⁵⁵Machiavelli (1965, *Discourses*, Bk. 2, Ch. 10; *Art of War*, Preface; Bk. 1); Rousseau (1964, *Considérations sur le Pologne*, pp. 1012–20).

⁵⁶Machiavelli (1965, *Discourses*, Bk. 2, Chs. 10, 30).

⁵⁷Machiavelli (1965, *Prince*, Chs. 12, 13; *History of Florence*, Bks. 1–6, passim, esp. Bk. 1, Ch. 39; Bk. 4, Ch. 24; Bk. 5, Ch. 34; Bk. 6, Chs. 1, 20).

⁵⁸Thucydides (1934, Bks. 3–8, passim, esp. Bk. 3, Chs. 10, 11; Bk. 5, Ch. 16; Bk. 7, Ch. 21; Bk. 8, Chs. 24–25; Bk. 1, Ch. 4).

⁵⁹Machiavelli (1965, *Art of War*, pp. 566–76; *Prince*, Chs. 6, 12; *Discourses*, Bk. 2, Ch. 12); Rousseau (1964, *Discours sur l'économie*, p. 269).

⁵³Thucydides (1934, Bk. 1, Chs. 5, 6); Machiavelli (1965, *Discourses*, Bk. 1, Ch. 12; *History of Florence*, Bk. 8, Ch. 17; *Prince*, Chs. 7, 11, 12); Rousseau (1964, *Du contrat social*, Bk. 4, Ch. 8).

⁵⁴Rousseau (1964, *Du contrat social*, Bk. 2, Ch. 7); Machiavelli (1965, *Prince*, Ch. 6; *Discourses*, Bk. 2, Ch. 16; Bk. 3, Chs. 1, 24; Letter 3, Vol. 2, pp. 886–89).