

The Struggle for a Second Independence

Sociopolitical Construction of Space in Africa

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The twentieth century in Africa, more than elsewhere in the world, has been an era of startling and unprecedented changes. These changes have been most dramatic with respect to the sociopolitical organization of the continent. While at the beginning of the century, most of Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, had hardly emerged from prefeudal or feudal social formations, the advent of European colonialists, whose avarice for conquest and colonial territories was fueled by the blossoming technological capabilities of the Industrial Revolution and the expansionist market demand of a new and burgeoning capitalist economy in Europe, transformed the face of Africa forever.

By the end of the twentieth century, these adventurers have, as it were, come and gone. But their stay, relatively brief compared to the situation elsewhere, witnessed some remarkable changes to the spaces and the spatial organization on the African continent, concepts that need to be fully elucidated if they are to give direction to the major arguments in this paper. Space, as used here, is not just a portion of the earth's surface, a landscape, a region or a locality; it is a social product whose production or construction is the result of the operation of social processes. As a portion of the earth's surface, space may appear to be neutral or indifferent with regard to its contents, and may thus seem purely formal, the epitome of rational abstraction. If it does, it is only so when the traces of the past are not evident in the landscape. Indeed, space can be regarded as a phenomenon shaped and molded from historical and natural elements through essentially political processes. It is

this fact that led Lefebvre to assert that “[s]pace is political and ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies.”¹

The examination of the sociopolitical construction of space in Africa during the twentieth century and at the threshold of the twenty-first century fosters numerous questions. Among them: if space is the product of political processes, what have been the dominant political processes that have shaped the construction of African spaces over the last century? What are the prospects that these processes will continue into the new millennium? Are new voices already being heard which might change the direction of these processes in the new millennium? What form is the consequential construction of new spaces likely to take in Africa of the twenty-first century?

This paper is divided into four parts. The first examines the present situation on the continent and the nature of the sociopolitical spaces that were constructed largely during the colonial period. The second considers the political economy that underpinned and still supports these sociopolitical spaces and the internal demographic changes that it promoted. The third reviews the highly centralized sociopolitical spatial reconstruction that emerged in different African countries in the postcolonial era and the resultant political, economic, and social crises which were fostered everywhere. The fourth assesses the demand and struggle for greater democracy and the construction of new, more decentralized sociopolitical spaces that have now been initiated in many parts of the continent. A concluding section then examines the prospects of these new voices which are likely to become more strident as Africa crosses the threshold into the twenty-first century.

The Colonial Consolidation of Multi-ethnic Spaces

The closing decades of the twentieth century are marked by the struggle between two spatial constructions of the past: the ethnic and the colonial-state. Until the beginning of the century, most of Africa was peopled by a myriad of ethnic groups in kaleidoscopic political relations that were always changing in response to the fortunes of wars and environmental disasters. Tribes and remnants of

tribes were conquered or driven by the rigors of natural hazards into subordinate relations with other ethnic groups until the latter in turn were conquered or forced into subdominant positions by other superior groups. The vigor of the resultant ethnic domains was undermined and weakened everywhere by three centuries of insecurity and political instability arising from both the trans-Atlantic and the Arab slave trading of the East African coast.² Thus, although one spoke of "states, kingdoms, and empires" in different parts of the continent, these were all in different stages of disorganization and disablement.

Thus, by the third quarter of the nineteenth century, it was relatively easy for European traders to decide that on behalf of their growing trading interests it was necessary to subjugate the different ethnic groups with which they had been trading. A scramble for African spaces then began in earnest with representatives of different European countries striving to bring ethnic groups within their trading areas under some form of dependency or other. The Berlin Conference of 1884 was called to regularize the competition for these trading "spheres of influence." A major conclusion of the Conference was the agreement that the rights of any European nation to such territorial sphere would be honored by the others if there is a clear evidence of "effective occupation." The most concrete manner of showing such effective occupation was through the establishment of the then-prevailing major mode of land transportation, notably the railway. The closing years of the nineteenth century thus saw feverish activities by different European nations to use the railways to project their coastal trading ports into an indeterminate area of the interior.³

The first half of the twentieth century saw the consolidation of these trading areas into real colonial territories. Instead of over 3000 ethnic areas, the continent, or more correctly the sub-Saharan portion of it, was now organized into some forty-nine colonial territories. Not only the railways but networks of roads and port systems were developed to integrate the territories into new space-economies. The overriding consideration in all of these efforts was to enhance the export capacity of these territories so as to justify the European investment made in transportation facilities. Besides investments, the colonial authorities found themselves engaged in

the pacification of the different protesting ethnic groups in their new territories and the establishment of frameworks of governance.⁴ The British resorted to what they called “indirect rule,” which conceded some recognition to the ethnic differentiation within the territory. The French and the Portuguese colonial administrations pursued policies of “assimilation” whereby, upon meeting certain conditions, natives of colonial territories could aspire to full citizenship in the metropolitan country.

Whether with respect to British, French, or Portuguese colonies, however, the Second World War provoked serious transformation in the attitude toward colonial subjugation. Agitation for political independence of these multi-ethnic colonial territories became the order of the day. By the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, it was clear that colonial domination could not be sustained indefinitely on the continent. Starting with Ghana in 1957, Africa witnessed the granting of political independence to one country after the next, up until 1991 when even South Africa, which had experienced a highly brutal form of colonial subjugation under the system of “apartheid,” became independent.⁵ Early in this period of transformation and upon the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, it was agreed among the new African political elite to respect the colonial boundaries as defining new national entities on the continent.⁶

Very soon, however, it became obvious that securing political independence from erstwhile colonial masters was a relatively easier challenge than building a nation out of the myriad of ethnic entities that found themselves locked together in a new nation-state. The task of nation-building was seen as largely entailing the coercive acquiescence of the population in decisions of the government party. Theories of the “African-ness” of one-party states were widely propounded and acted out in many African countries.⁷ The legacy of tremendous coercive power from the colonial authorities enabled the central government to try to ram unacceptable policies down the throats of their population. Power in many countries became personalized and directed at favoring some ethnic groups while penalizing many others. With the increasing corruption and the pervasive lack of transparency and accountability of most regimes, not only did the economic circum-

stances become precarious but the prospect of open rebellions became a fact of life in many African countries.

Political Economy and Internal Demographic Changes

In the meantime, the economy of virtually all African countries had been forced onto a path of capitalist transformation. Before the colonial era, most of these economies can best be described as pre-capitalist. Although some market activities of buying and selling took place, these were essentially the vending of surpluses. They were not the products of a self-regulating market economy in which all factors of production – land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship – have become commodified and made available for free-exchange purposes in the market. Kinship relations still dominated the access to all of these factors of production. The result was that the mobility of the population was highly constrained since non-indigenes could not hope to own land outside of their ethnic areas.

The colonial era changed all this as it sought to integrate the economies of different African countries into the global capitalist economy. As such it pushed to commodify the different factors of production, starting with labor in particular. Through the control of the monetary system and the imposition of various types of taxes, colonial administrations forced most of the self-employed peasant farmers and artisans into wage-labor work either on the new transport routes or on the plantations, in the new mining centers or the emergent towns and cities. A European-style formal educational system for the young consolidated this transformation of African peasants into a wage-earning labor reserve. Land ownership was also being systematically transformed, although at a much slower pace. The need to provide accommodation for labor migration into areas away from their ethnic homelands required that land be freed of its kinship encumbrances and made available for acquisition on a fee-simple basis. This was particularly crucial for urban development where the idea of land division and sales quickly developed. Although no formal title registration was established, legal conveyancing soon emerged to

affirm these transactions. Nonetheless, by the end of the colonial era in 1960, the level of urbanization in Africa remained at 20 percent, the lowest in the world.

The position in the rural areas was more difficult except where the administration used the legal instrument of eminent domain to appropriate large tracts of land for plantations and other public purposes. Very soon, however, the rural areas in most colonial territories came to be differentiated between those where some exportable agricultural or mineral commodities could be produced and those where little or no exportable commodities were available. The former areas became the scene of much export crop improvement and relative economic vitality. Personal incomes could be more easily made here as wage labor. Such enclaves of relative agricultural or mining prosperity became the destinations of massive streams of migrations from the other rural areas of African countries.

The evacuation of these flourishing export commodities from different African colonial territories led to the emergence of port cities that also became the focal point of importation of manufactured goods from the metropolitan countries. In many cases, such centers became the political capitals of their colonial territories. Other nodal centers emerged on the various road and rail transportation routes leading to the ports. All these became thriving urban centers attracting more and more of the population migrating from the rural areas of the country.⁸

Widespread pacification of recalcitrant groups protesting their colonial subjugation had preceded much of this development of the local economy. But peaceful consolidation required the establishment of some administrative framework and the installation of at least rudimentary social infrastructures and utilities. Various forms of taxation were imposed on the population to allow the provision of schools, hospitals, electricity, and water supply at least in the major urban centers. These facilities, in addition to the generally more peaceful situation, began to impact on the demographic situation resulting in greatly reduced levels of infant mortality and a rapid growth of the population everywhere.

The closing years of the colonial era in most African countries also witnessed a program of import-substituting industrialization.

Since, in the African case, this program mainly entailed the substitution of imported finished consumer products with the importation of the machinery, equipment, semi-processed raw materials, and capital needed to make the same products locally, port locations became the preferred sites for concentrating these industries. The result was that such centers became major attraction poles for massive internal migrations in the different African countries. African port cities were thus set onto a path of rapid population growth, a good number becoming major cities accommodating a high proportion of the total urban population in these countries. Thus, in the closing decades of the twentieth century, Africa became the continent with the fastest rate of urbanization with the prognosis that by the year 2010 more than half of its population would be in urban centers, with at least four of its cities having attained the status of megalopolis or cities with over ten million people.

The situation was further reinforced by the massive programs of social development embarked upon by the emergent postcolonial governments. As the new postcolonial governments came to power promising to eradicate the scourge of ignorance, disease, and poverty among their populations, it was not unexpected that they would heavily invest in education and health care. The result was a rapid rise in the growth rate and life expectancy of African population. Indeed, all African countries began to experience real demographic transition, which combined with high fertility rates, produced increasingly significant additions to the population every year.

The galloping growth in the African population everywhere was, however, not matched by a steady and sustained growth in economic productivity. Very soon, African governments found themselves in serious economic crisis.⁹ Most of them had to use international borrowings to invest in projects or balance their budgets. With declining international prices for most of their exports and an unimpressive rate of growth of their economies, it became increasingly difficult for most of these countries to either pay back or even service these international debts. A debilitating debt overhang has stymied African economic progress since the 1980s and deepened the scourge of poverty in virtually all African countries.

Constructing the Postcolonial Political Spaces of Africa

The deepening poverty of most African countries has brought to the forefront the challenge of trying to understand how countries that started out with so much promise of achieving significant progress in social, political, and economic development could all virtually end up in such dire straits. Increasingly, such ruminations have compelled an agonizing reappraisal of power distribution and power use in the postcolonial administration of most of these countries. These are all countries where political leadership in the pre-independence period had tried to mobilize different segments of their population – peasants, women, youths, but particularly trade unions – in the struggle against colonial rule. The prevailing ideology of the struggle was the need to install some form of socialist equity in a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and sometimes multi-religious colonial state. The political instrument often designed for achieving such an objective was a one-party political system. Such a system, it was strongly argued in those days, was also a most efficient way for fostering national unity and national cohesion.¹⁰

Not unexpectedly, the postcolonial successor governments in most African countries spent much time trying to concentrate political power in the central administration. To achieve this entailed doing one of two things to other existing centers of power in the country: co-optation or extermination. Such organized centers of power as the trade unions, women's associations, youth movements, and local colonial governments were all systematically co-opted and effectively neutralized in this process of power concentration. More difficult to deal with were the traditional centers of power built up over the centuries by the different ethnic groups in the country. Where such groups were substantial in size, political conflict with varying degrees of disruptive consequences became the order of the day.

In spite of their multi-ethnic composition, most African countries did refuse to consider the viability of a federal structure, with its more decentralized structure of power distribution allowing constituent units of the state some substantial degree of autonomy

in the management of their affairs. More seriously, postcolonial African governments had difficulty even conceding a modicum of power to local communities to look after matters of concern only to them. Laws, of course, were passed to ascribe some powers to local governments, but on the very critical issue of the power to raise their own resources for their own use, central governments everywhere on the continent dragged their feet. The usual response was to set up central parastatals and agencies to carry out functions that were best left to local governments, such as the responsibility for collecting and disposing of their own refuse.

The result of such power concentration was the construction of a sociopolitical space with principally one actor – the Central Government. All other subdivisions found themselves in various degrees of political helplessness, deprivation, and impoverishment. Such concentration of power not surprisingly encouraged acute internal strife. In some countries, notably Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the situation eventually led to civil wars. In some of the countries such as Angola and Sudan, civil war has been all that has happened since political independence. In other countries notably Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria, the pervasive political instability created ideal conditions for a military take-over of power. Still in others such as Togo, Cameroon, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, the one-party rule translated into a one-person rule with political leaders unwilling to leave the seat of power. Thus, whether under a military dictatorship or one-party personal rule, the absence of a strong opposition or public watchdog led to a lack of accountability and transparency in government and fostered the burgeoning of corruption at the very highest level of governance in most African countries.¹¹

Disempowerment of a large proportion of their citizens, corruption, and the consequential high costs of doing business with the government as well as a high international debt overhang all conjoined to stultify development impulses in most African countries and deepen the poverty of the majority of their population. Lack of legitimacy of most postcolonial African governments have served to immobilize the administration of these countries and to impair the growth potential of their economies.¹² Not surprisingly, therefore, the closing years of the twentieth century have been marked

by the cry for greater decentralization of political power, greater democracy in governance, greater privatization in the delivery of social and infrastructural services, and greater emphasis on reforms of fiscal and macroeconomic management. Such demands, of course, represent a call for a reconstruction of the sociopolitical spaces in all of these countries along lines that recognize the human and citizens' rights of the people of these countries to not only choose their own leaders on the basis of their promotion of the common good, but also to allow them more power to manage their own affairs, especially at the local level.

The Struggle for a Second Independence

Demand for a new dispensation in most African countries is coming at a time of significant global changes, which are drawing all nations of the world into an increasingly integrated economic and financial system with major implications for the political and social conditions in individual countries. These global changes are being driven by three revolutions: economic organization, information technology, and democratization. The first has led to the spawning of transnational corporations, the assets of a good number of which are greater than those of most countries in the developing world. The second revolution, in information technology, has impacted effectively on both the global economy and global society. With respect to the former, it has encouraged increasing economic liberalization and a growing level of foreign private investment in the economies of many countries; in the case of the latter, it is fostering the rise of civil society and a greater concern for human rights. The third revolution, the increasing global orientation towards democracy, is promoting widespread global concern with real popular participation in governance.

For most African countries, all three revolutions constitute a major challenge to the manner in which their sociopolitical spaces have been structured to date. The rise of transnational organizations with their incredible financial and technological capabilities has undermined the capacity of national governments to take charge of the commanding heights of their economies. Privatiza-

tion especially of public utilities and infrastructural facilities represents a contestation of what used to be the domain of central governments in service delivery to their citizens. Economic liberalization with its emphasis on competition and efficiency has meant that the days of parastatal organizations with their monopolistic controls and inefficiencies are numbered. The rise of civil society and the orientation towards democracy are promoting increasing demand for the decentralization of political powers, especially on the local level.

It is this demand for a greater decentralization of political power that is bound to become a veritable struggle toward a second independence and a major factor in the reconstruction of sociopolitical space in most countries of the African continent in the early decades of the twenty-first century. Everywhere on the continent, centralization, whether arising as a result of a single-party political system, a military dictatorship, or a centralizing bureaucracy, has had much the same result: stifling productive and creative vitality, producing a certain degree of alienation among citizens and provoking a crisis situation in all aspects of national life.

Of course, it is possible to assume that decentralization is already taking place in many African countries today. Nonetheless, in a country like Nigeria that boasts of a federal constitution, the long years of military rule with its unified command structure has emasculated and eroded away the benefits and advantages of a decentralized system of government. Furthermore, in a case study review carried out by Olowu in the late 1980s, it was noted that what passes for decentralization in many African countries was often no more than the deconcentration of government activities.¹³ In Zambia, for instance, President Kaunda in initiating the process of so-called decentralization in 1969, indicated that the program was "to decentralize most of the party and government activities while retaining effective control of the party and government machinery at the center in the interest of unity." In the Sudan, decentralization involved the transfer of responsibilities from the center to an intermediate level of provincial or regional authorities, with key fiscal powers still tenaciously held at the center. In Tanzania, decentralization entailed the creation of development

authorities at regional, district, and village levels to coordinate central government activities, planning, and local initiatives at their respective levels. In Kenya, decentralization also involved the setting up of provincial development committees to review proposals from district development committees and coordinate provincial plans and implementation with respect to rural development. In Nigeria, decentralization took the form of the creation of large local governments (for populations varying from 150,000 to one million) with broad responsibilities and very limited power for raising local resources. In most of francophone Africa, decentralization took the form of the prefect as well as central controls as given, and concentrated rather on structural reorganization and democratization, usually within a single-party framework.

From all of these examples, it is clear that what was being "decentralized" was really governmental activities, a process which is more correctly referred to as "deconcentration." The people involved in the decentralization process were invariably lower-level bureaucrats. Where an elected council was involved, it was usually made responsible to a higher authority and not to the people who elected it. Consequently, the failure or success of such bureaucrats or assembly, cannot be anything different from the performance of the national government itself. In the case of the elected council, election was assumed to have satisfied the requirement of "democratization" for validating the process. In most countries of Africa, although the period of the 1970s and 1980s was said to have witnessed significant decentralization, everywhere, almost without exception, the effort came to grief. According to the World Bank, the reasons for this failure included a lack of clear objectives, ambiguous legislation, poor planning of the decentralization process, inadequate resources, shortage of skilled personnel to service the reform, as well as poor overall management.¹⁴

Yet, when correctly used, decentralization is about the transfer of the responsibilities of governance from a central government to lower levels of government, particularly the local government level. It involves granting autonomy of decision making and the power to raise tax resources to people at the local level so that they can feel a strong sense of ownership of their own development process. It thus entails actualizing or operationalizing the

precept of "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Consequently, for decentralization to be effective it must go hand in hand with democratization. According to Gitonga, democratization is about people ruling themselves, ordering, organizing, and managing their own affairs in freedom. From a structuralist perspective, Gitonga suggests that democracy can be experienced at three levels or in three dimensions of social existence, which are: the material (or infrastructural) level, the institutional (or techno-structural) level, and the human-relations (or superstructural) level.¹⁵

At its infrastructural level, democratization is about the economy, the system of production, distribution, and consumption of material goods and services in a free market that facilitates meeting the basic needs of the people. Five of such needs are emphasized: the *sustenance* needs for food, clothing, and shelter, the *security* needs for freedom from danger, fear, and anxiety, the *identity* needs for social belonging, acceptance, and affection, the *recognition* needs for respect, social esteem, and status, and the *self-actualization* need for accomplishments.

At its techno-structural level, democratization relates to the system of institutions, organizations, and mechanisms for ensuring that democracy functions well in a given society. Three principles are critical for ensuring that any governance system meets the democratic ideal. First, it must be open in the sense that it allows to citizens freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of choice to whomever they choose to represent them. Second, it must be simple to operate or manage so as to make it easily understood by the citizenry and thus less vulnerable to fraudulent manipulation. Third, the role of each of its institutions or organs must be clear as to their authority, power, and influence since it is this that helps to establish the necessary "checks and balances" in the operation of the system.

At its superstructural level, democratization relates to values, beliefs, and attitudes of individuals. Much of this is regarded as acquired behavior. Or as Gitonga puts it, democratic behavior is not a genetically conditioned, inborn, or inherited faculty – it is learned. Citizens must be made to appreciate the profound implications of the gospel of equality, freedom, and human dignity as well

as of fairness and justice in their day-to-day interactions with others. Indeed, for democracy to exist, survive, and prosper, it requires that the people be bathed and drenched in the democratic ethos.

In governance terms, therefore, democracy is not just about how representatives are chosen. More importantly, it is about how the citizens are regarded in the decision-making process – whether they are believed to be individually the equal of those making decisions and have the freedom to accept or reject any decisions made on their behalf or whether, as in feudal and precapitalist social formations, they are considered inferior beings upon whom decisions can be imposed. Accountability of elected representatives to those who elected them at each level of government and not to any other body however highly placed is thus central to the operations of a democratic system.

Decentralization and democratization thus entail the construction of multiple and ample sociopolitical spaces in each African country. It involves the empowerment of civil society within limited and intimate spatial domains, within which the population can effectively direct their own affairs and impact more effectively on the social, political, and economic life of the country. Such spaces will be represented predominantly by the municipalization of local authorities so as to enable them take full advantage of the emergent economic liberalization and become active agents in the capital markets of their countries. More than this, through the increased involvement of citizens, the struggle for a second independence is bound to foster greater transparency and accountability in governance and provide a drastic check on the hold of corruption on public life.

Conclusion

Clearly, it would be naive to expect such a reconstruction of the sociopolitical spaces in African countries, with an emphasis on greater internal autonomy for lower levels of government and particularly the local governments, would be achieved without some massive and determined struggle by the citizens of most African countries. Such struggles for greater internal autonomy

within each African country are bound to be as decisive as those fought for political independence from foreign domination. They are also bound to be inevitable, especially as the overriding challenges faced by most of these countries in the closing years of the twentieth century remain the eradication of poverty from among the vast majority of their citizens.

One of the most instructive lessons of recent times is the fact that poverty is not simply about income but about lack of basic education and access to public and private resources; it has to do with the denial of choices and opportunities for living a tolerable life.¹⁶ Its eradication must thus focus directly on strategies of empowerment and other actions to enhance opportunities for everyone. Such strategies, to be effective, require multiple democratic spaces in which people can articulate their demands, act collectively, and fight for a more equitable distribution of power. They call into existence a strong civil society whose agencies, particularly the media, the non-governmental organizations, and social movements of various orientations become sufficiently active and committed to mobilizing the population so as to challenge the state in defense of their own interests. The state, for its part, will find it increasingly expedient to adopt a bottom-up approach in planning and programming its socioeconomic services, an approach which depends essentially on the active participation of the population in their own governance.

The prospects of success for these struggles are bound to be reinforced by global tendencies in which states are beginning to recognize that they are too big to directly execute programs such as poverty reduction and too small to carry out actions that are best performed by private sector organizations in partnership with transnational corporations. The voices from Africa in the early years of the twenty-first century are thus bound to be about the rights of people to secure the power to make a significant difference to the circumstances of their lives. The strident tenor of those voices are bound to be about how the people can collectively work to ensure that they lead long, healthy, and creative lives, and enjoy decent standards of living in conditions of freedom, dignity, and confident self-esteem.

ARTICLE SYNOPSIS IN YORUBA

Ìjìjàgbàrá fún òmìnira eìéèkèjì:
isatúnse òrò isèlú àwùjò nì ilẹ̀ Áfíríkà Àṣamò

Sàà egbèrun ọdún tuntun ní ilẹ̀ Áfíríkà yóò jẹ̀ èyí tí àwọn ènìyàn yóò dojúko pèlú akítìyan láti lówó gidì nínú isàkóso ara won. Orílẹ̀-èdè olóminira nílẹ̀ Áfíríkà tí te sí ihà gbígbé agbára isèjòba sí ojú kan soṣo. Èyí sì tí fi àyè sílẹ̀, kì í ẹ̀ fún agbára ipá nìkan, sùgbón fún àwon iwà ibàjẹ̀ aláilégbé àti àìsì àwẹ̀mó àti ijábòfénìkan nípa isèjòba pèlú. Ní pàtàkì, ó tí mú òsì àti iméhe idàgbàsókè ọ̀rọ̀-ajé gbílẹ̀ sí i. Láti kojù bí nìkan ẹ̀ rí yíí, ìjìjàgbàrà ọ̀tun láti ẹ̀ àtúntò ètò isèjòba kúrò ní ojú kan náà, ká sí fi òmìnira isèjòba tó gbé péjẹ̀ fún àwon ijoba ipínlẹ̀ àti tí ibílẹ̀ tí wà dí òótọ̀ tí a kò lẹ̀ yera fún ní bíi sàà egbèrún ọdún tí a sí wà nínú ẹ̀ yíí tí ní lẹ̀ sópín bayi. Nípa fífún àwon ipele ijoba yoóku wònyí ní agbára isèjòba ní ilẹ̀ Áfíríkà fí lẹ̀ jẹ̀ ànfààní àwon iyípadà mèta tí ní lẹ̀ lágbàáyẹ̀, bí àgbénde àwon ilé-ẹ̀ lájólájo tí ká rí ayé, imò-èrò afúnninímo àti ní pàtàkì ètò ijoba olósèlú.

Notes

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