4

Revolutionary Revisionism and the Merging of Nationalism and Socialism

As we saw in the last two chapters, democratic revisionism emerged in response to the inability of orthodox Marxism to explain or deal with many of the challenges of Western Europe's fin-de-siècle. Yet this was not the only revisionist challenge to emerge in response to orthodox Marxism's perceived problems during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, the most famous revisionist of this time was a figure who came not from Western Europe, but from its periphery – V. I. Lenin. Operating in a country in the early rather than later stages of capitalist development, Lenin found a doctrine that preached that socialism would develop only when economic conditions were ripe as unattractive as Eduard Bernstein and other West European socialists found it unbelievable. Having little faith in or patience with the inexorable unfolding of history, Lenin therefore also developed a strategy that was based on the primacy of politics rather than economics in the transition to socialism. Recognizing, in other words, that socialism would not come about simply because it was inevitable (or unwilling to wait around for such an eventuality to occur), Lenin concluded that it would have to be achieved as the result of human action. This realization Lenin shared with other revisionists; where he differed is in the conclusions he drew from this. Where democratic revisionists put their faith in the ability of an inspired majority to effect fundamental change through democratic means, in Lenin's revisionism historical materialism was replaced by the view that socialism could be imposed through the politico-military efforts of a revolutionary elite. Lenin believed that if left to themselves the masses would develop neither the will nor the ability to fight successfully for socialism; instead, acquiring the necessary "revolutionary consciousness" and organization was the task of a revolutionary party, and in particular of its leadership.[1]

[1] For example, in *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin argued that "the history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness. . . . The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by

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In short, in the Leninist revision of Marxism historical materialism and class struggle were replaced by the primacy of politics and revolutionary vanguards.[2] Indeed it was precisely Lenin's revisionism – his rejection of the economic determinism of orthodox Marxism and his emphasis on the possibilities of informed and determined political action – that inspired generations of socialists to come.[3] From the Chinese insistence that "armed with the great thought of Mao Tse-tung" a minoritarian revolutionary party could become the motive force of historical change, to Che Guevara's claim that "it is not always necessary to wait for all the conditions for a revolution to exist; the insurrectional focal point can create them,"[4] to Georg Lukács' proclamation that "Lenin succeeded in refuting the 'laws' of capitalist development and injected a sense of urgent political action in Marxism,"[5] twentieth century activists found in Lenin's revisionism justification for their belief that communism could be brought to any country, regardless of economic circumstance.[6]

Although its most important impact was not in Western Europe but in parts of the world that like Russia were struggling to speed up their transition to modernity, Lenin and the movement he inspired exerted a profound influence on West European politics and will therefore reappear in later parts of this story. However, alongside the democratic revisionism of Bernstein and the communism of Lenin, a third strand of revisionism appeared at this time, one that would indeed form the basis of a movement that would come to power in Western Europe in the decades to come.

intellectuals." Therefore, the revolution will require a "strong and centralized organization of revolutionaries" who can provide the "conscious element" necessary to direct the "spontaneous element." Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?* Reprinted in Robert Tucker, ed., *The Lenin Anthology* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 24.

[2] Perry Anderson, *In the Tracks of Historical Materialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Alfred G. Meyer, *Leninism* (New York: Prager, 1972); Joseph M. Schwartz. *The Permanence of the Political: A Democratic Critique of the Radical Impulse to Transcend Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ellen Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6ff.

[3] That Lenin insisted on his fidelty to Marx and Engels does not in any way detract from his status as a revisionist: According to the criteria laid out in this book, both his theory and praxis place him in this category. See footnotes 4 and 5 as well as Eric Hobsbawm, "Preface," in Georges Haupt, *Aspects of International Socialism, 1871–1914* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), xvi, and Chantal Mouffe, *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 176. For another interesting view of how Lenin fits into the larger scheme of Marxist theorizing (and indirectly to the categories laid out in this book), see Stephen Hanson, *Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

[4] A. James Gregor, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies* (New York: Random House, 1968), 99–100.

[5] Quoted in Carl Boggs, *The Socialist Tradition: From Crisis to Decline* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 45.

[6] See also famously Antonio Gramsci, "The Revolution Against Das Kapital," in Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1987), xxxi–xxxii, and more recently François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 31–2.

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Western Europe's fin-de-siècle was a period of rapid and disorienting change. A wave of globalization was sweeping the world, transforming European societies and generating immense social dislocation, fragmentation, and conflict. Between 1870 and 1900, Europe's population grew more than 30 percent, life expectancy and literacy rose dramatically, and the industrial and service sectors boomed while agriculture continued its steady decline.[7] These changes contributed to unprecedented migration, both internally (thanks to massive urbanization) and externally (as staggering numbers abandoned the "old" world for the "new").[8] Rapid social change weakened old elites and long-standing social and economic relationships and created an "extraordinary number of *deracines*.... that is, persons uprooted from ancestral soil and local allegiances,"[9] who had trouble adjusting to the dynamics of modern society. Amid the turmoil, not just workers, but artisans, farmers, and other marginal groups struggled to adjust to the ruthless competitive pressures of the capitalist system and the anomie and atomization of modern society. The result was a backlash, of which the new nationalist movements were a prime example and major beneficiary.[10]

Nationalists argued that only a revival of national communities could provide the sense of solidarity, belonging, and collective purpose that Europe's divided and disoriented societies so desperately needed. Many of them came to see socialism as a necessary component of their larger political program, but this was a socialism divorced from Marxism – based on a deep suspicion of capitalism and liberalism and a firm belief that something had to be done for those most discomfited by the new modern world order, but vehemently rejecting historical materialism and class struggle. At the same time that some on the right were calling for a non-Marxian socialism, dissident socialists on the left were gaining an appreciation for the revolutionary potential of nationalism. They saw it as an opportunity – a way to forge the motivated cadres and troops that workers and existing socialist parties seemed unable to deliver. These revisionist socialists were also influenced by the larger anti-Enlightenment backlash of the fin-de-siècle; unlike their democratic revisionist counterparts, they had nothing but disdain for liberalism and all it represented. They therefore rejected the democratic path of Bernstein and believed that socialism would emerge only

[7] B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics 1750–1970* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

[8] For example, during the first decade of the twentieth century, approximately 5.5 million Italians left their homeland while in Sweden an astounding 20 percent of the population emigrated between 1860 and 1910. Maurice Neufeld, *Italy: School for Awakening Countries* (Ithaca, NY: Cayuga Press, 1961), 521, and Franklin Scott, *Sweden: The Nation's History* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 369–70.

[9] J. H. Carlton Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), 254.

[10] These movements were considered "new" because the nationalism of the late nineteenth century was very different from earlier nationalism, which had been associated with liberalism, democracy, and humanism. See the discussion in this chapter.

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from "active combat which would destroy the existing state of things."[11] This strand of revisionism has thus been called "revolutionary," and during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, figures in this group came to believe that they might share a true community of interest with the growing nationalist movements on the right.[12] For these and other reasons, the fin-de-siècle witnessed the birth of a "national" socialism, a trend both midwifed and epitomized by Georges Sorel.

Sorel and Revolutionary Revisionism

Although largely forgotten today, Sorel was once considered by many to be "the greatest revolutionary in twentieth century political philosophy."[13] According to one popular (but possibly apocryphal) story, in the same week in the 1920s the director of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris was approached by the ambassadors of both Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy with offers to repair Sorel's tombstone. During the turmoil of the first third of the twentieth century, many would have agreed with Wyndham Lewis's characterization of Sorel as "the key to all contemporary political thinking."[14]

Sorel's path to prominence was a complicated one. Born in provincial France in 1847 and employed for many years as an engineer, it was not until he was in his forties that he moved to Paris and devoted himself full-time to intellectual pursuits. He soon established himself as "one of the leading theoreticians of Marxism in France"[15] and developed an association with the mainstream, orthodox wing of the movement. By the turn of the century, however, he was already questioning some of orthodoxy's basic premises.

As with Bernstein and other revisionists, Sorel's doubts were rooted in a realization of the gap between orthodox Marxism and the demands of contemporary politics. At first he hoped to be able to update Marxism for his own time, and focused his criticism on supposed distortions of Marx's work propagated by figures such as Engels, Lafargue, and Guesde. As time went on, however, he decided that many of orthodoxy's problems originated with Marx himself.

As did many of his contemporaries, he came to recognize that many of Marx's predictions about capitalism were simply not coming to pass. "Marx had written *Capital*," Sorel observed, "on the basis of observations made in England. But in the thirty years following its publication many great changes

[11] Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1950), 50.

[12] Zeev Sternhell, *Neither Right Nor Left* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1986), and idem with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[13] Hans Barth, *Masse und Mythos* (Hamburg: Rowolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1959), 10.

[14] J. L. Talmon, "The Legacy of Georges Sorel," *Encounter*, 34, February 1970.

[15] J. R. Jennings, ed., *Georges Sorel: The Character and Development of His Thought* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 38.

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took place in English industry, politics and in English life generally."[16] Indeed, Sorel noted, "experience shows us that the capitalist system is changing rather rapidly before our eyes. Orthodox [Marxists] make extraordinary efforts of imagination in order to not see what is clear to everyone; they have abandoned the terrain of social science to pass into utopia."[17] If capitalism had become more complex and differentiated since Marx's time, Sorel argued, then it was unlikely to collapse soon. He was in fact impressed by capitalism's immense productive powers and came to believe that the "primacy of production was essential to the operation of socialism."[18] Instead of calling for the socialization of private property and other measures that would hinder economic development, Sorel limited his opposition to capitalism "to the political, intellectual, and moral aspects of the liberal and bourgeois system; he [did not question] the foundations, principles and competitive mechanisms of the capitalist economy."[19]

Like the democratic revisionists, Sorel came to believe that historical materialism was not only wrong, but that it was also robbing the socialist movement of its vitality. As he noted, "belief in inevitable progress means paralysis of the will to power and creation":[20]

> Orthodox Marxists had such confidence in their theories that they end in quietism. Among Marxists there is a widespread opinion that social evolution is like a natural process which fulfills itself independently of every human effort, and before which individuals can do nothing but fold their arms and wait until the fruit is ripe enough to harvest. . . . The words which Marx used to express the analogy between the economy and nature have contributed in large measure to developing the fatalist illusion, above all through the use of the term "necessary."[21]

Any movement that described history in terms of rigid laws thus doomed itself to failure: "It is impossible to speak of determinism for nothing is determined."[22]

Many Marxist theoreticians were, to Sorel's chagrin, unwilling to confront the problems he identified and to admit that socialist doctrine needed to change with the times. "Time after time," he lamented, "the theorists of socialism have been embarrassed by contemporary history. They had constructed magnificent formulas, clear cut and symmetrical, but they could not make them fit the facts.

[16] Sorel, "The Decomposition of Marxism," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., *Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1901), 215.

[17] Sorel, "Is there a Utopia in Marxism?" in John L. Stanely, ed., *From Georges Sorel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1987), 135.

[18] Jack J. Roth, *The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 58.

[19] Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, 90.

[20] Quoted in Roger Henry Soltau, *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1959), 447–8.

[21] Georges Sorel, "Necessity and Fatalism in Marxism," reprinted in Stanley, ed., *From Georges Sorel*, 111, 124.

[22] Ibid., 57, and Soltau, *French Political Thought*, 461.

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Rather than abandon their theories, they preferred to declare that the most important facts were anomalies, which science must ignore if it is to obtain a real understanding of the whole."[23]

In the revisionist controversy discussed earlier, Sorel firmly supported Bernstein, noting that his efforts had "produced an effect analogous to that of a Protestant sermon amidst a Catholic population."[24] "When Bernstein, perceiving the enormous contradiction between the language of [socialism] and the true nature of its activity," Sorel wrote, "urged his German comrades to have the courage to appear what they were in reality, and to revise a doctrine that had become mendacious, there was a universal outburst of indignation at his audacity."[25] This was unfortunate, Sorel felt, since what Bernstein wanted was for "socialists to throw their doctrines overboard in order to observe, understand and, above all, play a truly efficacious role in the world."[26] Bernstein's revisionism was thus a sign of hope for the socialist movement:

> With Bernstein, one likes to think that Marxism constitutes a . . . doctrine still full of the future, that it suffices to free it from badly made commentaries and to develop it, while taking recent occurrences into account. With admirable good faith and great ability, [Bernstein] pursues the task of rejuvenating Marxism: from superannuated formulas or false impressions, he calls it back to the very spirit of Marx; we are talking about a *return to the spirit of Marxism*. With Kautsky, it is the complete opposite; Marxism appears as a very old thing, a compilation of disparate theses that the disciples keep from exposing too much. For them it is above all a matter of defending words, appearances and petrified formulas. . . . If [the socialist movement] were compromised of men sufficiently *emancipated from superstition*, undoubtedly Bernstein would have the great majority grouped around him. His book would be received as a deliverance. . . . *The triumph of Kautsky would signify the definitive ruination of Marxism*.[27]

Sorel agreed with Bernstein's conclusion that what was needed was an activist and voluntarist alternative to orthodoxy's economic determinism and political passivity. He too realized that if socialism was not, in fact, inevitable, then it would have to emerge as the result of directed human action. Indeed, perhaps even more than his democratic revisionist counterparts, Sorel was possessed by the idea of man as "creator," "fulfilled only when he creates, and not when he passively receives or drifts with the current."[28] For Sorel, history was as an act of creation that could be "forced" forward by "heroic acts of will."[29] If they

[23] Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 63. See also idem, "The Decomposition of Marxism."

[24] Idem, "Polemics on the Interpretation of Marxism: Bernstein and Kautsky," in Stanley, ed., *From Georges Sorel,* 150.

[25] Idem, *Reflections on Violence*, 64.

[26] Idem, "Polemics on the Interpretation of Marxism: Bernstein and Kautsky," in Stanley, ed., *From Georges Sorel*, 150. See also idem, "The Decomposition of Marxism."

[27] Idem, "Polemics on the Interpretation of Marxism," 174–5. Emphasis in the original.

[28] Isaiah Berlin, "Georges Sorel," *Times Literary Supplement*, 3644, December 31, 1971, 1617.

[29] John Stanley, introduction to Georges Sorel, *The Illusions of Progress* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), xxxv.

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wanted to motivate great collective efforts, he concluded, socialists "must be convinced that the work to which they are devoting themselves is a serious, formidable, and sublime work; it is only on this condition that they will be able to bear the innumerable sacrifices."[30] And so, like Bernstein, Sorel too called for a rediscovery of the moral content of Marxism:

> We know that [socialists] generally have a great disdain for ethical considerations. They treat morality with as much contempt as the Voltarians treated religion (which is no worse for wear because of it). When Bernstein writes: "The degree of development attained now gives to ideological factors and more particularly to ethical factors a freer field than ever before," Kautsky responds, "There is no place in historical materialism for a morality that is independent of economic forces and superior to them." It is like dreaming to read such an audacious declaration![31]

Yet despite similar criticisms of orthodoxy and comparable emphases on the primacy of politics, Sorel and Bernstein came up with very different suggested courses of action as a result of their very different readings of the fin-de-siècle world. When he surveyed Western Europe, Bernstein saw many reasons for optimism. He believed the reigning bourgeois liberal order was flawed but such was his respect for its genuine achievements that he believed socialism's task was not to destroy the order it created but rather to improve it. He once wrote, for example: "It is indeed true that the great liberal movement of recent times has in the first instance, benefited the capitalist bourgeoisie, and that the parties which took the name of Liberal, were, or became in time, nothing but straightforward defenders of capitalism.... But with respect to liberalism as a historical movement, socialism is its legitimate heir, not only chronologically, but also intellectually."[32] He thus believed socialists could and should work within the reigning liberal order to effect change, and viewed democracy as the most logical instrument for this task.

Sorel, on the other hand, was convinced of the utter decay, decadence and corruption of the contemporary world, and, like many other intellectuals of the day, he wanted not to reform it but to destroy it. (He once argued that Bernstein might have too, had he lived in France rather than Germany and thus been more directly exposed to a revolutionary tradition.[33]) For him, nineteenth bourgeois liberalism was itself the source of Europe's contemporary malaise and societal disorder,[34] and he had nothing but disdain for democracy,

[30] Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 139.

[31] Idem, "Polemics on the Interpretation of Marxism," 157–8.

[32] Eduard Bernstein, *The Preconditions of Socialism*, Henry Tudor, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 147. On Bernstein's relationship to liberalism, see Roger Fletcher, *Revisionism and Empire* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984); Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952); Manfred Steger, *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[33] Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 141, 214.

[34] Horowitz, *Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason*; Jennings, *Georges Sorel*; Roth, *The Cult of Violence*; Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*; idem, *Neither Right nor Left*.

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which he believed inevitably robbed socialists of their revolutionary fervor.[35] "Experience has quickly shown," Sorel claimed, "that . . . in entering into middle class institutions, revolutionaries have been transformed. . . . All . . . agree that there is very little difference between a middle class representative and a representative of the proletariat."[36] Socialism, accordingly, should stand as "an irreconcilable adversary" of the contemporary order, "threatening it with moral catastrophe."[37]

Sorel believed that bringing this catastrophe about would require a constant and probably "violent" struggle.[38] At first, he thought the revolutionary ardor necessary for such a struggle could come from a reemphasis on Marxism's moral roots. As time passed, however, and he became increasingly disillusioned with Marxism, he began to look elsewhere for something capable of motivating radical action; he eventually settled on the motivating power of myths. For Sorel, myths were "not descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act . . . [they] lead men to prepare themselves for a combat which will destroy the existing state of things [rather than directing] men's minds towards reforms which can be brought about by patching up the existing system."[39] By galvanizing the masses, myths would "permit the social and economic reality of the beginning of the century to be surmounted."[40] And while myths could inspire, to maintain revolutionary ardor it would also be necessary to keep the proletariat separate from bourgeois society. "All our efforts," Sorel wrote, "should aim at preventing bourgeois ideas from poisoning the class which is arising; that is why we can never do enough to break every link between the people and [all forms] of bourgeois deceit and decadence."[41] He saw conflict as a way to "restore the separation of the classes, just when they seemed on the point of intermingling in the democratic marsh."[42]

However, by the first decade of the twentieth century, Sorel had begun to lose faith in the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. To begin with, the economic and social developments that Marx had predicted would create a powerful, revolutionary working class and inevitable class conflict were not coming to pass: The proletariat was not growing ever larger, other classes were not disappearing, and societies were in general becoming more socially differentiated

[35] Jacob L. Talmon, *Myth of the Nation and Vision of Revolution* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1981), esp. 456ff.

[36] Ibid., 55.

[37] Quoted in Jeremy Jennings, *Syndicalism in France* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 57. See also Talmon, "The Legacy of Georges Sorel."

[38] There is some confusion about precisely what Sorel was calling for here. Sometimes the term "violence" in his work does not necessarily seem to refer to action that results in bloodshed, but rather simply to direct, intense effort.

[39] Sorel, "Letter to Daniel Halevy," in idem, *Reflections on Violence*, 50.

[40] Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, 59. See also Michael Tager, "Myths and Politics in the Works of Sorel and Barthes," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 47, 4, October–December 1986.

[41] Talmon, *Myth of the Nation and Vision of Revolution*, 458, 462.

[42] Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 92.

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and complex.[43] In fact, he believed that the reigning bourgeois, liberal order had managed to "domesticate" the proletariat and deradicalize workers' movements. The result of these observations was that Sorel, like his democratic revisionist counterparts, abandoned his exclusive focus on the working class. But whereas the abandonment of a workers-only strategy led democratic revisionists to emphasize possibilities of cross-class cooperation and compromise, it led Sorel to embrace the revolutionary possibilities of a revitalized mass nationalism and to encourage the fusion of antidemocratic forces of the left with those of the right. Over the first decades of the new century, such ideas would spark the beginnings of something new and very dangerous.

Italy

Although Sorel was French, his ideas had their greatest impact in Italy. Some of his most important writings originally appeared in Italian, and he was widely read and discussed in Italian society. As one observer notes, "Every publication of his was widely commented upon by writers of the most diverse views. Every newspaper and weekly in Italy, whatever its political orientation, went to great lengths to secure an interview with the celebrated author of *Reflections on Violence* [Sorel's 1908 manifesto]."[44] Indeed, the Italian translation of *Reflections* was introduced by Benedetto Croce, the country's most well-known and influential intellectual. Sorel's greatest influence, however, was on the extremes of the Italian political spectrum, where he helped the syndicalist and nationalist movements realize how much they had in common – thus laying the intellectual foundations for what would become known as fascism.

Until 1908, syndicalism had been a significant faction within the Italian labor movement in general and the PSI in particular. Like democratic revisionists, syndicalists rejected orthodox Marxism's determinism and passivity, but they disdained political organizations and advocated direct revolutionary attacks on the existing order rather than a peaceful and evolutionary strategy of democratic transformation. At first, they assigned this revolutionary role to the proletariat. As time passed, however, many of them decided that the proletariat had become, as one observer noted, "saturated with 'democratic prejudices' and 'petit bourgeois in spirit,'" and thus unable to "develop the type of superior morality which creates the hero – the man who considers himself a warrior with a vow of sacrifice."[45] Such views brought many syndicalists into conflict with the leadership of the PSI, and in the aftermath of a massive strike wave in 1907–8, PSI leaders declared revolutionary syndicalism with its rejection of

[43] Jennings, *Georges Sorel*, 86; Larry Portis, *Georges Sorel* (London: Pluto Press, 1980), 55ff; John Stanley, *The Sociology of Virtue: The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), esp. 114ff.

[44] Talmon, *Myth of the Nation and Vision of Revolution*, 475.

[45] Thomas R. Sykes, "The Practice of Revolutionary Syndicalism in Italy" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University Press, 1974), 132.

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political organization and emphasis on violence and direct action incompatible with the party's doctrines and expelled all its adherents.

The expulsion of revolutionary syndicalists did not, however, put an end to the party's internal debates. As noted in Chapter 3, the PSI's 1908 and 1910 congresses were victories for its moderate democratic revisionist wing, but when this led Giovanni Giolitti to proclaim that "Marx had finally been relegated to the attic," the party's internal battles reignited. The invasion of Libya soon afterward stopped the PSI's drift toward revisionism and accommodation in its tracks.

At the party's 1911 congress, opponents of democratic revisionism played the war card. Giolitti's Libya policy, they argued, showed what could be expected from cooperation with the bourgeois order – a charge which divided the democratic revisionists themselves. Some argued that it was possible, and indeed desirable, to continue supporting the government's reform program while making clear the party's opposition to the war. But others came to feel that the war might actually benefit the nation and its workers, and so rejected a move back into opposition and the political wilderness. One prominent proponent of this latter position was Ivanoe Bonomi, one of the party's leading revisionists, who had for years mounted spirited attacks on orthodox Marxism's rigidity, sterility, and determinism. Bonomi championed the active participation of socialists in the parliamentary and electoral systems, which he believed implied support for ministerialism, and he favored loyalty to the government on the war issue for both substantive and political reasons. By supporting Giolitti, Bonomi argued, the PSI would show that "there is a national solidarity that is not opposed to, but rather complements, class solidarity."[46] Bissolati felt the same way, arguing that socialists should support Giolitti's Libyan policies in order to "keep the nation from being strangled in the Mediterranean and to prevent, as well, the dangerous nationalist movement from exercising a monopoly on Italian patriotism."[47] With the party's factions split both among and within themselves, the outcome of the congress was inconclusive.[48]

Then, on March 14, 1912, an anarchist made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the King. In response, a group from the Chamber of Deputies went to the Palace to congratulate the monarch on his survival. Three socialists – Bissolati, Bonomi, and Angiolo Cabrini – were part of the delegation, a final affront that gave the anti-accommodationists the ammunition they needed. When the party assembled that July for its congress at Reggio Emilia, they were ready to attack. A young and previously little-known activist named Benito

[46] Maurice Neufeld, *Italy: School for Awakening Countries. The Italian Labor Movement in Its Political, Social, and Economic Setting from 1800 to 1960* (Ithaca, NY: Cayuga Press, 1961), 240.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Alexander De Grand, *The Italian Left in the Twentieth Century* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), 24; James Edward Miller, *From Elite to Mass Politics* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990), 151; Charles Yarrow, "The Ideological Origins of Italian Fascism" (Ph.D. Thesis: Yale University, 1938), 117.

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Mussolini gave an impassioned speech, electrifying the assembled delegates with his calls for the expulsion of the deputies who had visited the King. Bonomi responded by reminding the gathering that

> The case you are asked to judge is not a question of the crisis of a few individual consciences, but rather the crisis of two conceptions: Revolutionary and Reformist . . . Expulsion is not . . . a disciplinary action against a few dissidents, but . . . the separation of two methods, two conceptions, two modes of interpreting socialism. . . . While we Reformists of the right have an open view of society and of the party, you men of the left are the champions of dogma. . . . We believe that the rising force of the proletariat makes this the period to reform; you hold after Libya, no reform is possible. In a few words, you restrict yourself to opposition, we enlarge ourselves in action.[49]

But attempts to broker a compromise failed, and the result was the expulsion of Bonomi and the others, who immediately left the congress and founded a new party, the Italian Socialist Reformist Party (Partito Socialista Riformista Italiano, or PSRI).[50]

Mussolini emerged from the congress as "hero of Reggio"[51] and, more importantly, as the champion of a new type of socialism; his followers, including such future stars as Antonio Gramsci, dubbed themselves "Mussoliniani." Opposed to the passivity and sterility of orthodox traditionalists, but also repulsed by the gradualism and accommodationism of democratic revisionism, Mussolini called for a new type of socialism, one that was active and truly revolutionary – and he found in Sorel and his syndicalist supporters the basic elements of the new ideology that he was groping toward.

The patriotic frenzy unleashed by the invasion of Libya had convinced many syndicalists that "national sentiment was capable of generating the selfless enthusiasm and sacrificial disposition among sectors of the population that syndicalists had expected exclusively among proletarians."[52] Many also saw the material benefits of conquest as too attractive for a poor nation like Italy (and its workers) to pass up.[53] And many valued the war's "moral" and "pedagogical" impact, as training for the sort of grand activist endeavor that revolution would necessarily involve. Many syndicalists were thus increasingly impressed by Sorel and his sophisticated theoretical treatement of revolutionary revisionism, which struck similar notes.

Mussolini felt the same way. Reading and corresponding with many of the leading syndicalists and revolutionary revisionists of the day, he adopted their ideas as his own and identified Sorel as one of his key inspirations. ("It is to

[49] Miller, *From Elite to Mass Politics*, 160.

[50] The new party took with it some deputies and led the confederation of labor to declare itself autonomous. It fell apart, however, during the war.

[51] Mirella Mingardo, *Mussolini Turati e Fortchiari. La Formazione della Sinistra Socialista a Milano 1912–1918* (Genova: Graphos, 1992), 44.

[52] A. James Gregor, *Phoenix: Fascism in Our Time* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999), 42.

[53] Charles Lloyd Betrand, "Revolutionary Syndicalism in Italy, 1912–22" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1969), 53, and Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, 166.

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Sorel that I owe the most," he was later to claim.[54]) As he explained, "socialism, committed as it was to economic determinism, subjected man to inscrutable and little understood laws, to which he was required to submit. Syndicalism restores to history the effective will of man, who is both passive and active in turn – man who can leave the imprint of his influence on the things and institutions which surround him."[55] Although it would be wrong to ignore Mussolini's (intellectual and political) opportunism, it is fair to say, along with one of his leading biographers, that "The most important influence upon Mussolini's development, all the relationships and influences of the successive years notwithstanding, was that exercised by revolutionary syndicalism."[56]

Mussolini's new status after the congress at Reggio Emilia was reflected in his appointment as editor of the PSI's paper *Avanti!* It soon became clear, however, that his goals were too radical to be contained within the framework of party institutions. So, in November 1913, he decided to found a journal of his own, *Utopia*. It would enable him, he said, to "present my own opinion, my vision of the world, without worrying about whether it conforms to the predominant opinion of the party."[57] And reveal his evolving vision it did. Mussolini intended to use the journal to effect a "revolutionary revision of socialism" and believed that this would require an appeal to those outside the traditional left. Revolutionary revisionists and syndicalists were prominent contributors to *Utopia*'s pages, but so were other figures with little or no previous connection to the socialist movement. He appealed to "Young People" in general, and referred to not "the proletariat" but "the people" and "the nation."[58]

At the same time that Mussolini and other socialist dissidents were undergoing an ideological and political reorientation, Italian nationalists were also undergoing an evolution of their own. As was the case in other parts of Europe, Italian nationalists had been energized by fin-de-siècle conditions. Their ranks swelled with those disappointed not only by Giolitti's reformist policies but also by the perceived inadequacies of the Risorgimento – namely, Italy's continued status as the weakest of Europe's great powers and the inability of the reigning order to deal with many of the country's most pressing problems.[59]

[54] In an interview in 1926. See Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 224, and Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1964), 32.

[55] Quoted A. James Gregor, *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979), 51.

[56] Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini il Rivuluzionario* (Turin: Einaudi, 1965), 40, and Gregor, *Young Mussolini*, 29. However, Mussolini later became disillusioned when Sorel turned toward monarchism. See, for example, Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 136ff.

[57] Quoted in Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology*, 209.

[58] Ibid., 207–8.

[59] Ronald Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1990); Alexander De Grand, *The Italian Nationalist Association and the Rise of Fascism in Italy* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1978); Armand Patrucco, *The Critics of the Italian Parliamentary System, 1860–1915* (Dusseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1973); John A. Thayer, *Italy and the*

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One of the first places that the nationalist movement's ideology was elaborated was in a small journal called *Il Regno* (the Kingdom), founded in 1903 by Enrico Corradini. *Il Regno* was concerned with national integration and rejuvenation, and "with passion and little bombast its program called for the end of democracy, a reassertion of the principle of authority, and the fulfillment of Italy's imperialist destiny."[60] In its opening number, Corradini proclaimed that its "voice will be lifted to re-erect the statues of the higher human and national values before the very eyes of those who are awakening to a new life."[61] *Il Regno* proved to be short-lived, but as a "first indication of a right wing interest in Sorel,"[62] it created a stir nonetheless, and attracted a wide range of contributors, including a number of revolutionary revisionists and syndicalists.

In the following years, Corradini's exposure to Sorel combined with his concern with national integration led him to advocate an accommodation between nationalism and some form of socialism. Corradini characterized nationalism and socialism as the "two great facts of the modern world," which although "commonly held to be contradictory, were instead very similar."[63] Both, he argued, "were manifestations of a rebirth of stern moral values" and had heroic and activist spirits.[64] He was particularly interested in syndicalism, which he argued was, like nationalism, a "school . . . for mass organization, mass mobilization, and mass heroism"[65] and argued that both also had "a common love of conquest."[66] Nationalist enthusiasm for war, he claimed, paralleled, and had similar goals to, syndicalism's emphasis on the general strike. As one observer noted, Corradini "breathed the spirit of the *Réflections*. Sorel wrote to Croce that the 'remarkably intelligent' Corradini understood 'exceedingly well the value of my ideas.'"[67]

As part of his effort to bring nationalists and syndicalists together, Corradini reinterpreted the class struggle, substituting conflict between capitalists and the proletariat with the struggle between rich and poor nations. All domestic groups, and especially workers, thus had a stake in Italy's success, since in a poor country such as Italy, "the proletariat could significantly improve its lot not through domestic class struggle against the bourgeoisie, but through collaboration with other classes." If Italy as a whole were to remain poor, the workers would remain poor too; only increased production and international expansion would allow the country to take proper care of all its sons and

Great War: Politics and Culture, 1870–1915 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964).

[60] Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 92.

[61] Article reprinted in Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism*, 212–13.

[62] Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 92.

[63] Corradini, "Nazionalismo e socialismo" (1914), quoted in Norberto Bobbio, *An Ideological Profile of Twentieth Century Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 53.

[64] Betrand, "Revolutionary Syndicalism," 117, and Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology,* 164.

[65] Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism*, 104.

[66] Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 92.

[67] Ibid., 92.

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daughters.[68] Corradini thus transformed Italy into a "proletarian nation" – one engaged in a desperate struggle against the old and plutocratic powers for its fair share of international wealth and glory.

Others too were bringing together Sorelian, socialist, and nationalist themes for Italian audiences. Giuseppe Prezzolini, one of *Il Regno*'s chief contributors, founded the review *La Voce* in 1908. With contributions from a diverse group of intellectuals interested in the theme of "national renewal," many of whom were influenced by Sorel, it became a major cultural force. The *Pagine Libere*, meanwhile, founded in 1906 by the syndicalist Angelo O. Olivetti, "propagated a proletarian nationalism and 'national syndicalism.'" It was a strong advocate of the war in Libya, which it characterized as the "'revolt' of proletarian Italy against her bourgeois oppressors,"[69] and attracted contributions from both syndicalists and nationalists, including such (future) luminaries as Mussolini, Luigi Federzoni, and Edmondo Rossoni. And the journal *Lupa*, founded in 1910 by the revolutionary syndicalist Paolo Orano, championed Sorel's revolutionary revisionism.

Corradini's own growing popularity and a continuing upsurge in nationalist sentiment led him to decide that the time was ripe for a formal nationalist organization, and in December 1910 the opening congress of the Italian Nationalist Association (Associazione Nazionalista Italiana) was held. The assembled delegates included syndicalists, socialists, republicans, and conservative liberals. In the keynote address, Corradini expanded on the themes of populist nationalism, national syndicalism, and Italy as a proletarian nation. To begin dealing with Italy's problems, he argued, Italians had to recognize that their interests lay not in competition against each other but in a struggle against others outside their borders. "For years and years," Corradini declared, "the socialists ... have been preaching to the workers that it was in their interest to show solidarity with the workers of Cochin-China or Paraguay and to dissociate themselves completely from their employers and the Italian nation. We must drum it into the workers' heads that it is in their best interests to maintain solidarity with their employers and, above all, with their own country and to hell with solidarity with their comrades in Paraguay or Cochin-China." He continued: "Just as socialism taught the proletariat the value of the class struggle, we must teach Italy the value of the international struggle." And by so doing, the nationalists would become a force for national unity and rejuvenation – "our national socialism."[70]

[68] David Roberts, *The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 118.

[69] Ibid., 73, 133.

[70] Enrico Corridini, "The Principles of Nationalism" (Report to the First National Congress in Florence on December 3, 1910). Reprinted in Adrian Lyttelton, ed., *Italian Fascisms* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 146–8. Also Eugen Weber, "Introduction," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965), 7.

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In the years after its founding, the Nationalist Association continued to refine its ideology and goals. Its third congress, held in May 1914, brought Alfredo Rocco to the forefront of the movement. In his youth briefly a socialist sympathizer, Rocco was a well-respected professor of commercial law who had become the nationalists' chief economics spokesperson. He berated socialists for not recognizing that Italy was a "poor country in a constant struggle against the richer nations of Europe. Distribution of poverty would gain the worker little."[71] Nationalism was superior to socialism, he argued, because it recognized the overarching need to promote both national production and unity; it aimed "to achieve . . . a strengthening of society from within through the creation of national awareness and strong national discipline; it wishes in addition an increase in internal wealth by intensifying economic production; it wants improved economic and moral status for the working classes because this higher status is necessary to strengthen social cohesion, to increase the wealth of the nation and ensure that the nation is properly prepared for war."[72] Rocco attacked socialists for their lack of social solidarity and their neglect of Italy's developmental needs, and he also fervently opposed economic and political liberalism. He objected that the "materialism and fatalism"[73] of the former was a luxury that a poor nation like Italy could not afford; the latter he believed served merely to weaken and divide the nation. (One result of these attacks was to push many liberals out of the nationalist movement.) His vision of nationalism, in contrast, advocated a "mixed syndicalism" – which, by bringing together workers and industrialists, would help "achieve [the] political stability, spiritual oneness, economic unity and social harmony"[74] that Italy so desperately needed.

In the years leading up to the First World War, nationalism thus wreaked havoc on the Italian socialist movement and the Italian political scene more generally. A growing number of figures on both the revolutionary left and the nationalist right recognized that their movements had important similarities. The former, disillusioned with orthodox Marxism and its institutions and constituencies, appreciated the mobilizing and revolutionary potential of nationalism. The latter, disillusioned with the failures of the post-Risorgimento order and the inability of traditional bourgeois political parties to do anything about them, appreciated syndicalism's and revolutionary revisionism's voluntarist and revolutionary spirit and its potential to broaden nationalism's appeal to Italy's workers. Sorel's ideas facilitated this embryonic rapprochement by offering a doctrine through which these groups could find common ground. The result was that in the years before the First World War, "Sorelianism" began to lose

[71] De Grand, *The Italian Nationalist Association*, 50.

[72] Alfredo Rocco, "The Critical Objections to Nationalism," reprinted in Lyttelton, *Italian Fascisms*, quote on 245.

[73] Yarro, "The Ideological Origins of Italian Fascism," 55.

[74] Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism*, 113.

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its clear association with left or right in Italy and instead became associated with a "national" version of socialism that attracted adherents from across the political spectrum. Thus in the years leading up to the First World War, the intellectual, if not yet the organizational, lines between nationalism and socialism had begun to break down in Italy.[75]

France

In France, as in Italy and much of the rest of Europe, a tentative accommodation between nationalism and socialism began to emerge during the fin-de-siècle. As noted in the last chapter, Jaurès (and other democratic revisionists) had long defended the French nation and the principle of nationality, but a growing interest in the nation could also be found among French syndicalist intellectuals as well – many of whom "looked to Sorel as their maître."[76] Among this group, Hubert Lagardelle and Édouard Berth[77] were probably the most influential. The former edited a review called *Le Mouvement Socialiste,* which became a critical organ for revolutionary revisionism and exerted considerable influence over the development of French and European syndicalism. Sorel published much of his own work in the review, for example, including, in 1905–6, the series of articles that would become *Reflections on Violence*. The latter, meanwhile, was Sorel's "closest and staunchest friend."[78] Berth had been an early critic of Guesde and orthodoxy more generally,[79] and was particularly dismissive of the passivity and fatalism associated with much of the contemporary socialist movement.[80] Berth also diverged from the mainstream left in his views of capitalism, which he criticized trenchantly but primarily on ethical rather than material grounds. He objected, for example, to the "egoism, conflict, brutality and ugliness"[81] generated by capitalism and believed that socialism was best understood as a "revolt of the spirit against a world in which man had been reduced to the status of an automaton, a world in which man was threatened by 'a monstrous moral and metaphysical materialism.'"[82]

[75] Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 128. Also Roberts, *The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism*, esp. chapter 5, and Yarrow, "The Ideological Origins of Italian Fascism."

[76] Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 34. In fact, nationalism proved to be less of a problem for French socialists than it did for others. The French Revolution's association with democracy and liberation had given rise to a republican patriotism, and so nationalism in France retained a long-term association with the left. French socialists thus generally did not see a stark trade-off between internationalism and love of country the way many other socialists did.

[77] Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, 71. On Langardelle and Berth, see also Jules Levey, "The Sorelian Syndicalists: Édouard Berth, Georges Valois, and Hubert Lagardelle" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1967); Roth, *The Cult of Violence*; Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left*.

[78] According to Pierre Andreu. See Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, 72.

[79] Ibid., 77, 80.

[80] Ibid., 77.

[81] Ibid., 73.

[82] Ibid., 74, 195.

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However, unlike the case in Italy, most French syndicalists mellowed with time; indeed, especially after the failure of a general strike in 1906, most (including Lagardelle) moved toward an accommodation with parliamentarism and gradualism. Others (including Berth) refused, however, to make their peace with the existing order and began to see in France's growing nationalist movement a potential alternative outlet for their revolutionary aspirations. This development was facilitated by changes that had been brewing there, in particular the growing interest expressed by nationalists in traditionally socialist and Sorelian themes.

The "new" nationalism in France began with the Boulangist movement of the late 1880s and early 1890s. Although the movement is normally considered to be of the right (because of its nationalism and authoritarianism), many Boulangists referred to themselves as socialists and championed policies traditionally associated with the left. They supported an extensive program of social reforms and cooperated with socialists in parliament; indeed, notes one observer, "the only issue which . . . distinguish[ed] the Boulangist from the socialists was nationalism."[83] In addition to championing many policies and themes most often associated with socialism, Boulangists also went after some of the left's natural constituencies. Boulangists' calls for national unity and class collaboration and their insistence that they were the true champions of France's "disinherited" and "little people"[84] found support across the political spectrum.

The Boulangist episode proved relatively brief, but it had a lasting impact. It marked the birth of a new type of right-wing movement in France, one that appropriated themes, appeals, and policies traditionally associated with the left. Indeed, after its collapse, many of its members drifted back to the socialist camp.[85] Unlike traditional conservative and rightist groups, moreover, Boulangism was committed to attracting a cross-class, mass constituency, and was thus "a forerunner of all future mass political movements"[86] on the right that aimed at capturing the support of broad swathes of society in order to destroy the foundations of French democracy.[87] It also brought to the fore a man who would play a critical role in later events: Maurice Barrès.

Barrès was a leading member of a cohort of fin-de-siècle European intellectuals antagonistic to the Enlightenment, and his influence was profound.

[83] Ibid., 94.

[84] Michael Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès and Maurras* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), esp. chapter 2; Patrick H. Hutton, "Popular Boulangism and the Advent of Mass Politics in France, 1866–90," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11, 1976; René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France: From 1815 to de Gaulle* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), esp. chapter 6.

[85] C. Stewart Doty, *From Cultural Rebellion to Counterrevolution* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1976), and George Mosse, "The French Right and the Working Classes," *The Journal of Contemporary History*, 7, 3–4, July–October, 1972.

[86] Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic*, 33.

[87] See also Zeev Sternhell, "Paul Deroulede and the Origins of Modern French Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 6, 4, 1971, 68.

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His great passion was nationalism: The most important task facing the country, he felt, was restoring France to greatness. Like many intellectuals of the day, Barrès viewed modernity, and capitalism in particular, as a hindrance to this goal. By dividing the nation into "winners" and "losers," by placing self-interest above communal interest, and by giving the market and private interests control over France's destiny, capitalism threatened the national unity and social cohesion that France so desperately needed. To succeed, Barrès believed, nationalism needed to find some way to reintegrate the "casualties of modern society" back into the national community. This would require a forthright commitment to solving the "social question" and support for some type of socialism.[88]

Through the 1890s, accordingly, Barrès claimed to be a socialist (he even ran on a worker's platform in 1893 and 1896) while rejecting the materialist orthodoxy of Guesde. He supported almost all the same social programs and reforms as the socialists did and claimed to recognize the desirability of "social revolution." In 1890, he wrote that "Boulangism is a Socialist program, a general movement against the omnipotence of capital, in favor of national reconciliation and love of the disinherited."[89] Barrès' success in pushing Boulangism to coopt many of the left's traditional themes was widely recognized. As one contemporary newspaper put it, "today the National party is composed only of socialists."[90] But, of course, as a nationalist, Barrès did not accept the entire socialist agenda; he objected in particular to its insistence on class conflict and doctrinaire internationalism. What was needed instead was a new type of socialism, one shorn of its class conflict and antinational stances. He called this new doctrine "socialist nationalism" and himself a "national socialist."[91]

The Dreyfus Affair picked up where Boulangism left off. As one observer remarked, "Boulangism drew up nationalism's birth certificate, the Dreyfus Affair its baptismal record."[92] By highlighting and sharpening the divisions in French society and increasing the number of those who saw the Dreyfusards as a threat to "traditional" French values and institutions, the affair helped create a potential mass constituency for an antidemocratic nationalist movement. And noting the outcome of the case, many nationalists recognized that achieving their goals would require more determined proselytizing, organizing,

[88] Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic*, and George F. Putnam, "The Meaning of Barrèsisme," *Western Political Quarterly*, June 1954.

[89] Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic*, 49–50.

[90] Doty, *From Cultural Rebellion to Counterrevolution*, 76–7.

[91] The term "socialist nationalism" was apparently first used when Barrès stood as the nationalist candidate for Nancy in 1898. R. D. Anderson, *France 1870–1914: Politics and Society* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 107; Zeev Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology," in Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 326; "Nationalism, Socialism, and National Socialism," *French Historical Studies*, 2, 3, Spring 1982, 276; idem, *Varieties of Fascism*, 12.

[92] Rémond, *The Right Wing in France*, 60.

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and political activity. Out of this recognition emerged a man and an organization that would play critical roles in subsequent French political life: Charles Maurras and the Action Français.

The Dreyfus Affair catapulted Maurras to the top of the French nationalist movement. An ardent nationalist, Maurras was propelled by a hatred for the Third Republic and an obsession with restoring France to its natural glory. He claimed not to be able to find a single "example in history of a positive and creative action initiated by a majority"[93] and firmly believed that political order required dedicated leadership. As he bluntly put it, "The mob always follows determined minorities."[94] These views led him to support a restoration of the monarchy. Yet despite his authoritarian and monarchist convictions, Maurras was not merely an old-fashioned conservative. Like Barrès, he expressed sympathy for a particular type of socialism, one that would bring back national unity. And again like Barrès, Maurras held modernity and capitalism to blame for the breakdown of social cohesion and believed that counteracting contemporary ills required a determined effort to bring workers and other marginal groups back into the national community. He thus supported explicit outreach to workers and an extensive program of social reforms. Socialism, he noted, "delivered of its democratic and cosmopolitan elements can fit nationalism like a well made glove fits a beautiful hand."[95]

Over the following years, Maurras continued to develop his vision for the nationalist movement as the chief ideologue of an organization called the Action Français. Under the leadership of Maurras and Léon Daudet, the Action Français attacked democracy and the Republic, called for a return of the monarchy, and advocated an "integral nationalism" that would strengthen France and purify it of "foreign elements." Although clearly a movement of the right, the Action Français continued the Boulangist tendency to voice both socialist and nationalist themes. As one of its most prominent observers noted, "it combined and reconciled the popular radicalism of nationalism with the reactionary elitism of the royalists."[96] It held laissez-faire capitalism to blame for the social divisions plaguing contemporary society and took an active interest in the "social question," championing an extensive program of social reforms designed to reintegrate workers into the national community.

Some members of Action Français became attracted to the ideas of Georges Sorel – an attraction that was reciprocated as the years went by. In 1908, the Action Français published an interview with Sorel that introduced him as "'the brilliant and profound theoretician of antidemocratic socialism' who, though he believed a monarchist restoration improbable, had 'no serious objection to

[93] Ibid., 73.

[94] Roland Stromberg, *European Intellectual History Since 1789* (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966), 236.

[95] Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology," 326; Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, 131.

[96] Eugen Weber, *Action Français: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), 52. Also Stephen Wilson, "History and Traditionalism: Maurras and the Action Français," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 29, 3, July–September 1968.

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it.'"[97] Sorel returned the compliment, evincing a growing interest in Maurras' integral nationalism and the potential for a rapprochement between left- and right-wing antidemocrats; by 1910, he was openly collaborating with the group's members.

One consequence was the founding in 1911 of the Cercle Proudhon, an organization that looked to both Sorel and Maurras for guidance. (It referred to them as the "two masters of French and European regeneration."[98]) The Cercle was characterized by its denunciations of democracy as well as its merging of socialist and nationalist themes. The first issue of the Cercle's publication *Les Cahiers du Cercle Proudhon* declared, "Democracy is the greatest mistake of the last century,' . . . in economics and politics [it] permitted the establishment of the capitalist system which destroys in the state that which democratic ideas dissolve in the spirit namely the nation, the family, morals, by substituting the law of gold for the laws of blood."[99] Sorel's friend Berth was one of the Cercle's most prominent promoters, as was Georges Valois from the Action Français.[100]

Valois would emerge in the years to come as a critical figure on the new "national and social" right. He had begun his career on the left and was heavily influenced by Sorel. But by the early 1900s, his disillusionment with the moderation and parliamentary inclinations of the workers' movement had led him to abandon it for the Action Français. He became one of the organization's foremost experts on labor and economic matters and a fervent advocate of a rapprochement between left- and right-wing antidemocrats.[101] Valois was committed to increasing the "social" component of nationalism and to bringing the working class into the movement. Nationalism, he once declared, "when reduced to its essentials, demanded that the nation be placed ahead of all other considerations. Socialism was nothing more than the demand for social justice."[102] Both nationalism and socialism were determined critics of capitalism, Valois argued, although (like a growing number of his revolutionary revisionist and nationalist colleagues) he focused more on capitalism's "excesses" and negative social consequences than on the inherent nature of the system itself. As he once wrote:

> It can be conceived that the capitalist principles . . . are pernicious to any human group when applied outside of the [economic] domain, considering that they have been established solely in order to insure the highest possible yield on capital, the heads of the firms are led, as much because of the force of these principles as because of their natural egoism (happy in other conditions), to destroy all the institutions that limit, in view of a superior interest – the national interest – the immediate possibilities of the yield of

97 Roth, *The Cult of Violence*, 90–1.

98 Ibid., 123.

99 Ernst Nolte, *The Three Faces of Fascism: Action Français, Italian Fascism, National Socialism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), 71; Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology," 333.

100 Georges Valois was actually the pen name that A. G. Gressent took when he turned away from the left.

101 Levey, "The Sorelian Syndicalists," 98ff.

102 Quoted in ibid., 210.

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capital and of the exploitation of the soil. Thus religious life is diminished, the working life degraded, the family destroyed, the foreign worker brought in, the natural resources are exploited without restraint, the political institutions are transformed into organs of coercion in order to increase the excessive output of capital. In everything the national interest is gravely compromised.[103]

Through his efforts in the Cercle Proudhon and after, Valois helped further the idea that nationalism and socialism complemented and reinforced one another – an idea that would find increasing resonance in France after the war.

Germany

As in Italy and France, during the fin-de-siècle a growing number of nationalists in Germany began calling for a new type of socialism – one opposed to Marxism but harshly critical of capitalism and focused on overcoming the conflicts and divisions that plagued modern societies. Also as in France and Italy, at the same time that figures on the right were working towards a synthesis of nationalism and socialism, some figures on the left were moving in the same direction.

As the standard-bearer of orthodox Marxism and the Socialist International's most important party, the SPD had long opposed German nationalism, and the party's initial estrangement from the Wilhelmine political system and demonization by conservatives solidified its antipathy. But during the early twentieth century, this hostility began to soften. Especially after the party's setback in the 1907 election, the SPD was buffeted by calls for a reassessment of its stance. Neither Sorel nor syndicalism was a force to reckon with in Germany as in Italy and France, but otherwise the debates about nationalism within the German socialist movement had much in common with those taking place in other parts of Western Europe. It was revisionists who led the charge, and once again they fell more or less into two broad categories. As noted in the previous chapter, democratic revisionists, typified by Bernstein, insisted that the working class had national as well as international commitments and worried that the movement was ignoring the powerful appeal of nationalism at its peril. But even more influential in this regard was another faction of the party centered on Joseph Bloch's *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. Although not explicitly Sorelian, this group bore a distinct resemblance to revolutionary revisionists in other parts of Western Europe.

Under Bloch's leadership, the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* became the party's most popular and influential journal and the main forum for German revisionism. The full panoply of revisionist critiques were aired in its pages, with the determinism and passivity of the party's orthodox Marxism coming in for particular disapproval and calls for the SPD to break out of its "proletarian ghetto" a regular theme (especially after 1907). Because most contributors to the *Monatshefte* shared so many revisionist positions – a rejection of orthodox

[103] Quoted in Mazgaj, "The Social Revolution or the King," 438.

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Marxism, a dedication to expanding the SPD's appeal, a commitment to active reform work, an embrace of German culture and patriotism – they are misleadingly placed in the general "revisionist" category. But while Bernstein adamantly rejected the ethnic or primordial nationalism of the day and retained a strong commitment to liberal ideals and policies, Bloch and many other members of the *Monatshefte* group agitated for reconciliation between socialism and *Deutschtum* (German-ness) and denounced the liberal "canker."[104]

Antiliberalism in particular was a central feature of Bloch's thinking. He had "no time for Enlightenment progressivism, disdained 'humanitarian chimeras,'" and denounced liberal economic policies.[105] He argued that free trade was bad for Germany and its workers, and he was a vociferous advocate of protectionism – which carried as an added benefit, he felt, the ability to bind together different socioeconomic groups. Bloch's support for protectionism was part of his broader backing for almost all aspects of German *Weltpolitik*, including imperialism. (Indeed, Bloch took positions that would have made many conservatives and nationalists proud, such as support for a "continental Europe under German domination."[106]) He favored a strong German state and a unified national community, seeing no contradiction between such positions and socialism, since he defined the latter as merely seeking "the highest attainment of all" and as having at its essence "service to the common weal."[107] And he also believed that the *Volksgemeinschaft* (or what he often referred to as "the solidarity of classes") would be "at least as important as its complement, the class struggle" to the construction of socialism.[108] For Bloch:

> ...the national idea was more than the sum total of the collective economic interests of the nation. It also had cultural and spiritual dimensions, which transcended class and fostered a sense of national community among all classes. If the *Volkskraft*, or vitality of a people, was as potent of that of the Germans, socialists would be dogmatic fools to pretend that only the class struggle mattered to the worker.[109]

The group's most influential spokesperson, meanwhile, was Karl Leuthner. Like Bloch, Leuthner disdained Enlightenment progressivism and liberalism, commenting on the latter that "there [had] possibly never existed an intellectual current that [was] so bereft of healthy political insight as the Manchester liberal world view." He believed that there was little hope for either socialist or German progress until "liberal economic and political doctrines had been eradicated"[110] and advocated the virtues of *Deutschtum*. Leuthner too was a

[104] This is how Roger Fletcher describes Bloch's views of liberalism. See Fletcher, *Revisionism and Empire*, 55, 93.
[105] Fletcher, *Revisionism and Empire*, 52 and chapter 2 in general.
[106] Ibid., 61. Not surprisingly, Bloch was a dedicated Anglophobe – yet another way in which he differed from the Anglophilic Bernstein.
[107] Fletcher, *Revolution and Empire*, 48, 52.
[108] Ibid., 58.
[109] Quoted in ibid., 58.
[110] Ibid., 83.

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proponent of a strong state, which, once infused with the power of popular sovereignty, would "bring state and nation into harmony on the basis of the *Volksgemeinschaft*."[111] To help this process along, he believed that the SPD needed to expand its appeal and pursue cross-class alliances, which would be facilitated by the adoption of "national" rhetoric and policies. As he argued, to be "politically effective the German labor movement could not do otherwise than transform itself into a mass or people's party and place the national or general interest above class interests."[112] Finally, Leuthner was a proponent of military expansion, imperialism, and protectionism.

With this "national" reorientation of socialism, Bloch, Leuthner, and other contributors to the *Monatshefte* hoped to achieve a number of goals. They aimed at strengthening the German state and the country's international position. They hoped to broaden the appeal of the SPD. And they hoped that a national reorientation on the part of the SPD would bridge the gap between the workers and the rest of the nation. As one observer noted, Bloch and the *Monatshefte* group's ultimate goal was the "integration of the German working class into the existing social order with the aid of a *Sammlung* or common front founded on an illiberal and anti-Marxist nationalism [that aimed at] the pursuit of a German superpower position of truly global and epoch-making dimensions."[113]

It is difficult to judge the precise impact of the *Monatshefte* group. Although the SPD never suffered the kind of high-profile defections or explicit flirting with the nationalist movement by its members as did the Italian and the French socialist movements, there does seem to have been an increasing willingness within the SPD during these years to consider the kind of "national" socialist positions advocated by Bloch, Leuthner, and others. As some observers have noted:

> ...at the various post-1907 party conferences, nationalist revisionists staged impassioned hymns to the "virtues of fatherland," receiving louder applause from the delegates than Karl Liebknecht's plea to renew the party's efforts toward providing the working class with a "proper education in the tradition of proletarian internationalism." It would take years for Kautsky to admit that his cherished theoretical mission of imparting "correct Marxist principles" to the party had been severely jeopardized by nationalist-revisionist forces and the SPD was actually going backwards.[114]

[111] Ibid., 84.

[112] Ibid., 86.

[113] Ibid., 183. In addition, these socialists hoped that by actively supporting Germany's international aspirations, and its military endeavors in particular, the party would be able to gain benefits for its supporters. As Wolfgang Heine had put it: "We give military credits to the government; the government thereupon grants us new liberties.... The policy of 'compensation' has worked...for the Catholic Centre, why not for" us? Quoted in John Snell, *The Democratic Movement in Germany 1789–1914* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 297.

[114] Steger, *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism*, 194. Also Stanley Pierson, *Marxist Intellectuals and the Working-Class Mentality in Germany, 1887–1912* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 234.

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Many have seen the party's decision to support the German war effort in 1914 as evidence that nationalist and revisionist forces had influenced the SPD to a much greater degree than Kautsky and other prewar SPD leaders had been willing to admit.

Turning to the other half of the political spectrum, because of the rapidity of Germany's economic transformation (it industrialized much more quickly and completely than either France or Italy during the late nineteenth century) and the social strains emanating from this process as well as national unification, critiques of modern liberal capitalist society and calls for national unity found even more fertile ground in Germany than in Italy or France. As one observer notes, the degree to which German intellectuals "attacked the progress of modernity" in general and liberalism and capitalism in particular was unprecedented and turned what was elsewhere a troubling but still contained current into a "decisive intellectual and political force."[115] Germanic nationalism also was far more prone than its counterparts to define national identity in racial rather than linguistic, cultural, or historical terms, and to paint Jews as a central threat. Anti-Semitism thus came to play a more central role in German and Austrian nationalism than it did in many of its European counterparts.[116]

The intellectual backlash against modernity and the embrace of radical nationalism in fin-de-siècle Germany was widespread, but there were two figures whose contributions were particularly important and representative: Paul de Lagarde and Julius Langbehn. As one observer notes, "If the *Volkish* movement can be said to have had a founder, it was a cranky scholar [named] Paul de Lagarde; if the founder, in turn, had a prophet, that role was filled by Julius Langbehn."[117]

Obsessed by a belief that even after Bismarck's successes Germany was a weak and divided nation, Lagarde became one of the most prolific and popular critics of the Wilhelmine Reich.[118] According to Lagarde, there was little right about the country: Its culture and educational systems were in disarray, its morality was in decline, and its people were disunited and discontented. He saw it as his mission to correct these problems, a task that required "bringing to his people [a] vision of a Germany reborn." This meant reuniting a society

[115] Friz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1961), xi, xxiii.

[116] There is debate on this issue, however. Anti-Semitism was certainly widespread and strongly attached to nationalism in France. However, the forces defending the reigning order were more powerful and the nationalist movement weaker in France than in Germany, thus diminishing the political force of anti-Semitism in the former. For comparative studies of anti-Semitism, see Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (London: Peter Halban, 1988); Meyer Weinberg, *Because They Were Jews* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Robert Wistrich, *Anti-Semitism: The Longest Hatred* (New York: New York University Press, 1990).

[117] George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 31.

[118] Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, 16.

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torn apart by modernity and capitalism, evils whose "parasitic carriers" (that is, liberals and Jews), Lagarde asserted, "should be extirpated." In addition to purging German society of its "foreign" and "destructive" elements, his plan for the country's regeneration included the cultivation of a "new religion" capable of uniting and mobilizing disparate interests and the replacement of *Parlamentarismus* by a new type of political order centered on a *Führer* who would represent all Germans and spur them to pursue their country's national destiny.[119]

Lagarde's obsession with national unity and the degenerative effects of modernity were further developed and popularized by Langbehn, particularly in his extremely influential 1890 book *Rembrandt als Erzieher*.[120] Langbehn claimed that the "ultimate cause of German decay was modernity itself, that complex of new and violent forces that had destroyed the traditional society and the traditional faith. But the immediate cause was the Jews."[121] Like Lagarde, Langbehn favored removing Jews from positions of public authority and influence. He also believed that national unity required paying special attention to those groups marginalized by the reigning liberal, capitalist order, such as workers. In order to lure them back into the national community, he advocated "nationalizing" the SPD – "that is, transforming it into a nationalistic-socialistic movement" – and creating a pseudocorporatist system that would help regulate and harmonize relations among different social groups.[122] And he also believed that national unity required replacing *Parlamentarismus* and democracy with a new type of political system centered on a strong national *Führer* who could represent and mobilize the German *Volk*.

The ideas developed and disseminated by men such as Lagarde and Langbehn grew in popularity during the early twentieth century. One particularly important advocate of them was Werner Sombart, one of the "most renowned social scientists of his day."[123] Sombart's contemporary fame came largely from his influential analyses of modern capitalism (in fact, the term "capitalism" was taken from his 1902 book *Der Moderne Kapitalismus*), a subject that became something of an obsession in Germany in the years preceding the First World War. (As Friedrich Naumann, whose own calls for a national socialist movement reflected concerns similar to those of Sombart, noted in 1911: "Just as the French have their theme, namely 'What was the great Revolution?' so our national destiny has given us our theme for a long time to come, namely 'What

[119] Ibid., 3.

[120] In the book's first year, sixty thousand copies were printed and more than forty printings of the book appeared in the first two years after its publication. By the end of the Second World War, at least 150,000 copies had been sold. Even after Langbehn's death, new editions of the book continued to appear. Ibid., 155.

[121] Ibid., 139–40. Langbehn identified assimilated Jews in particular as the problem. Orthodox Jews, who retained their own separate identity and religion, he saw as less of a threat.

[122] Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, 146.

[123] Jerry Z. Muller, *The Mind and the Market: Capitalism in Modern European Thought* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2002), 253.

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is capitalism?'"[124]) Even more than Lagarde or Langbehn, Sombart blamed his country's current misfortune on the baneful effects of capitalism. Social conflict, materialism, the destruction of national cultures, the undermining of national unity – all of these problems could be laid at capitalism's door. And Jews, he felt, were not only largely responsible for capitalism's rise, but also embodied its most offensive features – egoism, self-interest, and abstraction.[125] As a result, as one scholar notes, in Sombart's work the triumph of capitalism was portrayed as the "replacement of a concrete, particularist, Christian *Gemeinschaft* by an abstract universalistic, judaized *Gesellschaft*"[126] – giving all those discontented with and alienated from the reigning order someone to blame.

In addition to deepening the link between anticapitalism and anti-Semitism, Sombart played an important role in developing the idea of a particularly "German" or "national" form of socialism. Sombart's socialism had little in common with its Marxist brethren; indeed, Sombart was a vehement critic of Marxism, finding particularly offensive its emphasis on the primacy of economics. He argued instead that economics had to be subordinated to political and social factors, with the economy serving the needs of the *Gemeinschaft*, and public interests trumping private ones. As time passed, he and others began to believe that this goal could be achieved without destroying capitalism, by simply controlling it and purging it of its extreme and "Jewish" elements.

These sorts of ideas had a profound effect on German political life during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An immense number of civil society organizations developed around this time in response to the perceived failures of the Wilhelmine system and disillusionment with aspects of modern life.[127] On one end of the spectrum were explicitly apolitical organizations such as the Wandervogel, whose goal it was to counter "the sense of frustration, alienation, and loneliness which mass industrial society induced" in German youth by creating a sense of solidarity and nationalist commitment among them.[128] Endless hiking trips through the countryside would expose the young Wandervogel to the virtues of the "real" Germany (that is, rural areas viewed as untainted by capitalism and modernity) and the simple *Volk* (most often peasants who were viewed as still enjoying the benefits of a pre-industrial *Volksgemeinschaft*). The movement embodied the combination of romantic anticapitalism and nationalist longing for community so typical of the era.

[124] Ibid., 229.
[125] Ibid., 253–4.
[126] Muller, *The Mind and the Market*, 254. Also Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chapter 6.
[127] On the proliferation of such organizations and their implications for German political development, see Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics,* 49, 3, April 1997.
[128] Peter Stachura, *The German Youth Movement 1900–1945: An Interpretive and Documentary History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 17.

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On the other end of the spectrum were nationalist associations best known for their insistence that German expansionism was necessary for the survival and health of the German *Volk*. Eager to expand the appeal of nationalism to all social groups, nationalist associations often referred to themselves as *Volksvereine* (people's organizations), explicitly attacking many of the Reich's reigning political institutions for dividing the *Volk* and alienating key groups from the national community. The constitution of the Pan German League, for example, stated, "The League strives to quicken the Germanic-national . . . sentiment of all Germans in particular to awaken and foster the sense of racial and cultural kinship of all sections of the German people."[129]

For the nationalists, of course, "the German people" did not include Jews, and the growing power of anti-Semitism was reflected in the appearance of a number of explicitly anti-Semitic groups and parties preaching an extreme form of racialist nationalism and an extreme hostility to liberalism and capitalism, both blamed on the Jews. In fact, as one observer notes, "such was the enmity towards capitalism that we find in anti-Semitic programs proposals which look very much like pure Socialism – for instance, the nationalization of railways, insurance, banking, or advertising. Indeed a great many anti-Semites proclaimed themselves Socialists." One of the anti-Semitic movement's founders, Wilhelm Marr, proclaimed that "anti-Semitism is a Socialist movement, only in nobler and purer forms than" the SPD.[130] (Or, as August Bebel once put it, "Anti-Semitism is the socialism of fools.") In order to highlight their commitment to social reform, many anti-Semitic groups put the word "social" in their name (for example, Christian Social, German Social Reform, and National-Social). Over time, however, the anti-Semites developed a subtler picture of capitalism and the market, differentiating, for example, between *raffendes* (grasping) and *schaffendes* (creative) capital, the former associated with Jews and the latter with "true Germans."[131]

These groups generally adopted explicitly populist stances, appealing directly to the "people" or the "masses" and opening their leadership ranks to talent and effort. They were also often very good at making use of modern methods of political organizing and propaganda to expand their appeal and support base. As a result, their ideas spread throughout civil society associations and the German right during the decades ahead, even if many explicitly anti-Semitic organizations went into decline around the turn of the century. As one scholar of the movement notes "the decline of the overtly anti-Semitic organizations after 1900 is deceptive. In Germany the various parties quarreled and vegetated; at the same time anti-Semitism was more openly accepted than before by several other parties, an increasing number of political and economic interest

[129] Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, 169. On the nationalist associations in general, see Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
[130] Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism*, 44–5.
[131] Ibid., 42–3.

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groups, and many nonpolitical bodies, such as students' corps or athletic or mountaineering clubs."[132]

Across the border in Austria, meanwhile, a political party that placed anti-Semitism at the center of its appeal and program was becoming an extremely powerful political force, and would seize the imagination of a wandering young aspiring artist who was drifting through Vienna at the time. The modern anti-Semitic movement in Austria owes much to Georg Ritter von Schönerer, an ardent German nationalist who brought together anti-Semitism, anticapitalism, and populism in a potent (and by now familiar) mix. Schönerer's 1882 Linz program, in addition to advocating closer to ties between Austria and Germany, called for the defense of civil liberties, the installation of a progressive income tax, improved and expanded social policies, protection of the peasants and "honest labor," and nationalization of the railways and insurance industries. As one observer notes, the program contained a "mixture of nationalism with semi-socialism" and racial anti-Semitism. Its economic proposals contained a "well-developed statement of the antithesis between 'honest' and 'harmful' capital and a denunciation of the professions notably associated with Jews."[133] In 1885, the program added a plank advocating "the removal of Jewish influence from all sections of public life." Although Schönerer ultimately failed to create a mass movement, he succeeded in expanding the appeal of anti-Semitism and "almost single-handedly created a German national rightist movement and [gave] it the fundamental character and ideology it would have for at least a generation after his death. He was the first representative of the radical Right in Austrian political life."[134]

Many pieces of Schönerer's ideology were picked up by Karl Lueger. Although he began as a democrat and even a sympathizer of the left, Lueger, always careful to see the way the winds were blowing, by the end of the 1880s recognized that anti-Semitism was increasingly a force to be reckoned with in Austrian political life. He thus skillfully integrated it and Catholicism (another rising force) into a larger political package, and in 1889 the Christian Social Party was born – the type of dynamic, modern mass movement that had previously eluded anti-Semites and the right more generally.[135] Lueger persuasively argued that his was a party of the "people," but for Lueger that really meant the middle class. Particularly important for Lueger were those lower-middle-class and artisan groups suffering under capitalism. As in other parts of Europe, these groups proved particularly vulnerable to anti-Semitism, and they were ripe for the picking because they had essentially been abandoned by the two

[132] Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, 185.

[133] Ibid., 145.

[134] Ernst Nolte, "Austria," in Rogger and Weber, eds., *The European Right*, 321.

[135] The analysis of the Christian Socials draws most heavily on John Boyer's classic studies of the movement, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement 1848–1897* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) and *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897–1918* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

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other main forces in Austrian political life, the liberals and the socialists. The Christian Socials thus exploited the discontent and alienation of these groups to integrate them into a "single, multi-interest coalition by forcing ... traditional intra-Bürger tensions into subordinate roles. Given the hostility of the [Austrian Socialists] to the master artisans and the property owners, the success of the anti-Semites' tactic was insured, at least in the short term."[136]

Since the Christian Socials wanted to create a mass constituency, they strongly supported universal suffrage – a reform that once finally enacted in 1906 pushed the party to accelerate its own modernization and professionalization. They also developed "a new style of high-tension, issue politics in which dramatic social and economic problems were used as mobilization devices both to manipulate public sentiment and, if necessary, to create it."[137] From early in his political career, Lueger had recognized the mobilizing effect of economic grievances, and so the party stressed that it was committed to improving people's lives. Once in power, moreover, the Christian Socials actively pursued a reform program, known as "municipal socialism," which included improved public services; the building of parks and recreation areas; municipal control of gas works, street railways, and electrical works; and the founding of a city mortgage bank.[138] In general, these programs were well run and gave the party "an immediate, large-scale object on which to focus public attention as proof of the party's 'revolution' in municipal government, and its propaganda value was therefore enormous."[139]

Although the Christian Socials often touted their policies as "anticapitalist," they never threatened the property or livelihoods of their bourgeois constituents; what they did instead was try to protect them from the harshest winds of the market and economic change. They reserved their most fervent condemnation not for the owners of private property per se or even capitalists more generally, but rather for those who could be portrayed as unfairly exploiting the system and living off the labor of others – in their view, the Jews. In the end, this proved to be a powerful political formula. The party came in first in every political contest it entered from 1895 until Leuger's death in 1910, and after 1895 Lueger himself became the undisputed master of Vienna. When he died, the main Socialist newspaper remarked that "he had managed to achieve in Vienna what had proven almost impossible elsewhere in Central Europe: 'to organize the *Kleinbürgertum* politically and to constitute them as an independent party.' Lueger was perhaps the first bourgeois politician to 'take the masses into account, who moved the masses who sank the roots of his power deep in the ground.'"[140]

[136] Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna*, 402–3.
[137] Ibid., 415.
[138] Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna*, 7ff.
[139] Ibid., 8.
[140] Ibid., 237–8.

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That the Christian Socials' success made a deep impression on the young Adolf Hitler is indisputable. But Lueger differered from Hitler in critical ways: He maintained a general respect for the rule of law, and his "Jew baiting" was "primarily a political act" rather than a reflection of insane racialist thinking. Nonetheless, Lueger's mixture of nationalism, socialism, and populism provided a model that a future generation built upon with the most horrific of results. This is "a burden that Austrian Christian Socialism shall forever have to bear."[141]

[141] Ibid., 26.

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