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THE CONTRIBUTORS

MICHAEL A. BAILEY is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. Beginning in the fall of 1997 he will be Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. His research interests include development and testing of formal models of representation.

JUDITH GOLDSTEIN is Associate Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. Her current research centers on domestic support for international institutions and, in particular, the World Trade Organization.

BARRY R. WEINGAST is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the political foundations of democracy and economic development in modern and historical contexts.

EDWARD L. GIBSON is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. He is the author of *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective* (1996).

ANDREW KYDD is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside. His interests include state perceptions, reassurance, and the security dilemma.

SHERI BERMAN is Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University and the author of *Ideas and Politics: Social Democracy in Interwar Europe* (forthcoming).

DAVID COLLIER is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is coauthor of *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (1991), and he has published extensively on concept analysis and comparative method. He is the incoming president of the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association.

STEVEN LEVITSKY is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is currently conducting research on the transformation of Peronism in the contemporary neoliberal era in Argentina.

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ABSTRACTS

THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY POLITICS, COALITIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

By MICHAEL A. BAILEY, JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, and BARRY R. WEINGAST

The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) changed the structure of the making of U.S. trade policy and made possible a dramatic reduction in tariffs. The authors demonstrate that the key institutional innovation in the RTAA was its mandate to lower tariffs through reciprocal agreements with foreign nations. The expansion of exports under the RTAA enhanced political support for increasingly lower U.S. tariffs. Evidence that export interests were positively associated with congressional votes for free trade supports this view.

THE POPULIST ROAD TO MARKET REFORM POLICY AND ELECTORAL COALITIONS IN MEXICO AND ARGENTINA

By EDWARD L. GIBSON

Governing parties face two fundamental tasks: they must pursue policies effectively, and they must win elections. Their national coalitions, therefore, generally include two types of constituencies—those that are important for policy-making and those that make it possible to win elections. In effect, governing parties must bring together a policy coalition and an electoral coalition. This distinction sheds light on how the transitional costs of major economic policy shifts can be made sustainable in electoral terms. It also provides a starting point for analysis of how two of Latin America's most important labor-based parties, the Peronist party in Argentina and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, maintained electoral dominance while pursuing free-market reforms that adversely affected key social constituencies. Peronism and the PRI are conceived of as having encompassed historically two distinctive and regionally based subcoalitions: a metropolitan coalition that gave support to the parties' development strategies and a peripheral coalition that carried the burden of generating electoral majorities. This framework permits a reconceptualization of the historic coalitional dynamics of Peronism and the PRI and sheds light on the current process of coalitional change and economic reform.

GAME THEORY AND THE SPIRAL MODEL

By ANDREW KYDD

When one state engages in a military buildup, other states sometimes take this as a sign that it is more aggressive or expansionist than they previously thought. Some argue that such increases in mutual suspicion can drive arms races and even lead to war. Psychological bias is often invoked to explain this pattern of growing suspicions leading to hostility. This article presents an incomplete information model of an arms race and investigates when escalations should rationally generate increased fears and when, in order to reduce such fears, security seekers can refrain from building. It shows that escalations rationally provoke fear even in the absence of bias and that weak states and states facing high costs of arms racing and war will be especially likely to refrain from building as a way of signaling benign intentions.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

By SHERI BERMAN

Practically everywhere one looks these days the concept of "civil society" is in vogue. Neo-Tocquevillean scholars argue that civil society plays a role in driving political, social, and even economic outcomes. This new conventional wisdom, however, is flawed. It is simply not true that democratic government is always strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society. This essay shows how a robust civil society helped scuttle the twentieth century's most critical democratic experiment, Weimar Germany. An important implication of this analysis is that under certain circumstances associationism and the prospects for democratic stability can actu-

ally be inversely related. To know when civil society activity will take on oppositional or even antidemocratic tendencies, one needs to ground one's analyses in concrete examinations of political reality. Political scientists should remember that Tocqueville considered Americans' political associations to be as important as their nonpolitical ones, and they should therefore examine more closely the connections between the two under various conditions.

DEMOCRACY WITH ADJECTIVES

CONCEPTUAL INNOVATION IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

By DAVID COLLIER and STEVEN LEVITSKY

The recent trend toward democratization in countries across the globe has challenged scholars to pursue two potentially contradictory goals. On the one hand, they seek to increase analytic differentiation in order to capture the diverse forms of democracy that have emerged. On the other hand, they are concerned with conceptual validity. Specifically, they seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate. This article argues that the pursuit of these two goals has led to a proliferation of conceptual innovations, including numerous subtypes of democracy—that is to say, democracy “with adjectives.” The article explores the strengths and weaknesses of alternative strategies of conceptual innovation that have emerged: descending and climbing Sartori’s ladder of generality, generating “diminished” subtypes of democracy, “precising” the definition of democracy by adding defining attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy is associated. The goal of the analysis is to make more comprehensible the complex structure of these strategies, as well as to explore trade-offs among the strategies. Even when scholars proceed intuitively, rather than self-consciously, they tend to operate within this structure. Yet it is far more desirable for them to do so self-consciously, with a full awareness of these trade-offs.