

worthy of a wider readership, because it sets out a general approach to vertebrate pest management that does not simply view 'pest' animals as 'vermin' to be killed indiscriminately. While they can cause significant damage and spread diseases to people, their welfare (and that of non-target species) during control operations should be given consideration.

*R J Quy*  
*Pest Management Group*  
*Central Science Laboratory (MAFF)*  
*York, UK*

***Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism***

R D Ryder (2000). Berg Publishers: Oxford. 284pp. Hardback and paperback. Obtainable from the publishers, 150 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 1JJ, UK (ISBN 1859733255 hardback or 1859733301). Price £42.99 hardback or £14.99.

*Animal Revolution* was first published in 1989, more than a decade ago. It has been substantially revised by the author, by the removal of outdated chapters, and by the addition of a new chapter. This discusses more recent developments in ethical theory and the science of animal welfare, and describes some of the political campaigns of the 1990s, particularly those in the UK.

It would be difficult to find a text that provides a more comprehensive history of man's changing use and relationship to non-human animals. However, it is important to remember that this text is written by an individual who is strongly against the use of animals. Richard Ryder has spent the better part of his working life campaigning against the 'exploitation' of animals – not only those animals used for research purposes, but also animals used as a source of food and for recreation/entertainment. As might be expected, the author's views strongly colour the interpretation of historical fact.

The historical range of the book encompasses the author's interpretation of man's attitudes to animals all the way from the Ancient World to the present day. What appears clear from the book is that the perception of man's similarity to animals and man's dissimilarity is an ongoing dichotomy. In addition, in each century, it would appear that humans go through a period of reminding one another that the dissimilarity is not so great.

The book focuses chiefly on the evolution of British history, not least of all because the author has been involved in the animal protection movement in the UK for many years. Richard Ryder was responsible for the development of the concept of speciesism during 1970, a concept which was revised and made more popular by Peter Singer. In 1977, the RSPCA organized an Animal Rights Conference at Trinity College, Cambridge. This concluded with a 'Declaration against speciesism' authored by Ryder, which essentially condemned the infliction of suffering on animals, unless it was necessary for the animals' own, individual benefit. Unfortunately, for those non-UK readers, some of the sections of the book, in particular Chapter 10, 'The revival of the movement after 1960' could be rather boring. The section describing the reform of the RSPCA, rakes unnecessarily through the financial mismanagement of the organization. This is likely to hold little interest for international readers, and de-emphasizes some of the important accomplishments.

The book is not overly dominated by anti-speciesist arguments, but in places it is difficult to agree with the author's position. The UK *Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986* (ASP), as well as other systems of oversight for animals used in research, teaching and testing, including the Canadian Council on Animal Care (CCAC) programme, are – as Ryder

states – ‘speciesist’. Internationally, almost all the systems of oversight are based on the principles of the 3Rs – replacement, reduction and refinement – and serve to protect animals used for scientific purposes, by ensuring that they are only used when necessary and that pain and distress is minimized. It is impossible to envision a system that could function otherwise. In this respect, we cannot agree with Ryder’s position that ‘Speciesism is always wrong (so try to act as though human and nonhuman suffering carry equal weight)’. It does not seem inappropriate to have a greater degree of concern for animals currently believed (on the basis of scientific evidence) to have a greater capacity for suffering. For example, both the Canadian and the UK systems include cephalopods in addition to all vertebrates within the definition of an ‘animal’ for oversight purposes, on the basis that cephalopods possess a more highly developed nervous system than other invertebrates.

Ryder is strongly opposed to the cost-benefit analysis which is at the basis of the UK ASPA, requiring that the potential benefit of an animal-based study (either to humans or other animals) must be weighed against the costs to the animal (in terms of anticipated pain and distress). He argues that the only time it is appropriate to use a cost-benefit analysis is when the benefit will be to the individual animal itself. Adoption of this approach would halt most current biomedical research, and would, therefore, benefit neither man nor animal in the end. However, his argument contains a germ of thought that deserves highlighting. As each individual animal has the capacity to experience pain and distress, then the amount of pain and distress must be considered on an animal by animal basis – it is not appropriate to aggregate the amount of pain and distress. In the CCAC system, the local animal care committees spend a great amount of time ensuring that procedures are in place to minimize pain and distress for each animal involved in a project, even if ultimately this involves the use of a larger number of animals.

Ryder is a psychologist. Therefore, much of the language of the book reflects the psychologist’s lexicon, in particular the ideas of power and dominance and the explicit comparisons to human relationships between adults and children and sexual exploitation. The link between violence to humans and violence to animals is clearly established; certainly veterinarians in Canada are now being encouraged to report instances of animal abuse to child protection officers. There should be greater recognition in the book that scientists are also concerned about the well-being of the animals that they use. To some extent Ryder lapses into the language of ‘them and us’. However, at one point he describes ongoing attacks on Colin Blakemore, Waynflete Professor of Physiology at Oxford University, as unfair and arbitrary; recognizing that while Blakemore carries out neurophysiological research on cats, he has also been a worker for reform, joining forces with animal protectionists to lobby the UK Home Office for more humane measures. The involvement of community representation has long been seen as one of the strengths of the CCAC system and encourages lay people and scientists to discuss the issues arising from animal-based studies, empowering informed decision-making by community representation on individual protocols. In addition, in Canada, provincial consortia of animal welfare organizations, scientists and the CCAC has led to the incorporation of CCAC standards in provincial legislations and regulations.

Chapter 12 focuses on the concept of speciesism that Ryder himself coined in 1970, but which has subsequently been more thoroughly explored by Peter Singer. Singer argues that sentience is the heart of the matter, and, therefore, that animals must be given due consideration because of their ability to suffer. Tom Regan, on the other hand, argues that animals have an inherent value, irrespective of any pain or pleasure that they might experience, and this has led to the concept of rights. Ryder postulates that there has been a

move from the nineteenth century concept of man's duties to animals, to the concept of rights and a shift in emphasis from the 'perpetrator to the victim'. He equates this to the concern for animals shifting from being solely a concern of the ruling classes, to being more a concern of the working class. This discussion is interesting, particularly in light of the shift to describe the inherent value of animals within various pieces of international legislation. Ryder himself appears to adopt a different stance, based solely on animal sentience. In the final analysis, although there may be disagreement on what matters to the individual animal in terms of pain and distress, one has to agree that minimizing pain and distress should be the focus of any regulatory system for animals used in research, teaching and testing.

*Clément Gauthier and Gilly Griffin*  
*Canadian Council on Animal Care*  
*Ottawa, Ontario*  
*Canada*