

that many important thinkers believed to be Plutarch's, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau (p. 386n.39). Kingston follows the life of the reception of this essay because "pseudo-Plutarch" is, for this scrupulous scholar, "no less important to understanding the tradition of reception" than the genuine works (p. 209).

In part I, Kingston reviews what is known of Plutarch's life and offers accounts of his writings (including an overview of Lycurgus, Numa, Alexander, Caesar, Antony, and Phocion from the *Lives*); examines the differences between the thought of Plutarch and Cicero, whose writings had a greater and earlier impact on the education of European elites; and provides accounts of the history of the pseudo-Plutarch, the recovery of Plutarch's writings in Western Europe, and their reception in Renaissance Italy. Parts II and III examine the reception of Plutarch in France and England during the Renaissance and then in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. A far from exhaustive list of the works that Kingston examines highlights the richness of the book: Cicero, Desiderius Erasmus, Thomas More, Jean Bodin, Michel de Montaigne, Thomas Hobbes, Shakespeare, Pierre Corneille, Jean Racine, Jonathan Swift, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

In the process of relaying this vast and complicated story of reception, Kingston identifies a tradition that she terms "public humanism," which she sees as a salutary and enduring possibility for those who participate in and think about political life. Struck by the contemporary currents of thinking that disdain politics, which she sees arising from both the Right and the Left, Kingston aspires to foster renewed appreciation for the political realm, in which individuals engage their talents and their virtues to serve the public good. Plutarch, read in the right spirit, provides the prism through which one can come not only to a healthier regard for public service but also a deeper concern with practical politics, as well as with the effect of politics on the virtues themselves. She describes this approach as distinctive in its pragmatism about the compromises that political life sometimes demands; a participant in the tradition offers "moralism with a realist edge" (p. 112).

On Kingston's account, this tradition is particularly well defined through translation of and reflection on Plutarch's writings in sixteenth-century France where they "offer[ed] a conversation on the unique role and specific ethos of public life in reference to either kings in high office or those working within a monarchical administration" (pp. 98–99). She traces the development of this approach to politics through an examination of the writings of Geoffroy Tory, Guillaume Budé, Erasmus, and Claude de Seyssel. By contrast, on her depiction, England's general reception of Plutarch in the sixteenth century is not as conducive to such thinking. There Plutarch's *Moralia* tended to capture commentators' attention, thus fostering moral thinking frequently removed from considerations of the public realm

(p. 204). Even in France public humanism was overshadowed later in the century by concerns deriving from the religious conflict, and by the eighteenth century, public humanism was in full retreat at the hands of Abbé de Saint-Pierre, the Abbé Mably, and Rousseau.

Because the "major thrust" of her "argument is that Plutarch served as a source through which early modern political thinkers could reflect on very practical questions of virtue politics" (p. 9), Kingston is in conversation with James Hankins's important book *Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy* (2019). Hankins presents the Italian humanists as fundamentally concerned with the teaching of virtue to rulers and citizens of any regime—whether ruled by one, the few, or the many. Thus, both scholars examine the effect of the classical tradition on the thought of the Renaissance and look beyond the focus on republican liberty that has dominated generations of scholarship on the Renaissance and its legacy. Kingston herself recognizes these shared concerns but sees the development of French public humanism as an important variant of virtue politics—one that diverges from the "largely individualistic ideals of virtue politics" (p. 98; emphasis in original).

At times, a focused account of the development of public humanism is sacrificed for the exhaustiveness that Kingston conscientiously provides of the range of reception of Plutarch's works. But that very exhaustiveness holds treasures. A reader of this book cannot help but come away with a deeper appreciation for how exceptionally important Plutarch was for the development of modern thought in France and England. In the process Kingston brings to light hitherto unrecognized facets of the writings of some of its central figures. Surprises abound. For instance, one learns that Hobbes's famous encapsulation of the state of nature in *Leviathan* as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" found its origin in the language of the translation by Philemon Holland of an essay by Plutarch that also treats the transition of human beings from a wild state to a civilized one (pp. 302–3; emphasis in original). Some of the most memorable formulations in English drama and philosophy are modifications of Plutarch in the vernacular. Such discoveries are just a few among the many treasures this book unearths.

Foundations and American Political Science: The Transformation of a Discipline, 1945–1970. By

Emily Hauptmann. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2022.

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Political scientists rarely study the influence of wealthy elites on politics, much less their influence on the science of politics. The growing literature on the history of American political science is no exception. Although

disciplinary histories often place political science in the context of broader social and political forces, disciplinary historians rarely explore how philanthropic and government patronage shaped political science research and graduate education. Enter Emily Hauptmann. Her book breaks new ground in the study of political science history by illuminating the material basis of the discipline's intellectual development.

The book focuses on the two decades following World War II, when material conditions were ripe for philanthropic patrons to transform political science. Wartime federal support for social science research all but vanished at the war's end, making it possible for even relatively modest foundation grants to make a difference. The rapid clip of faculty hiring prompted by the explosion of undergraduate enrollments created a situation in which the intellectual disposition of political science departments was up for grabs. And the proliferation on university campuses of Organized Research Units (ORU) designed to attract external funding provided foundations with eager clients whose research agendas were easier to shape than those of the often resistant and fragmented faculty of disciplinary departments.

Based on meticulous research in the archives of the Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation, Hauptmann painstakingly reconstructs their captains' aspiration to remake the social sciences into attractive candidates for renewed government patronage. For Carnegie and Ford, this meant promoting a practical and technically sophisticated social science that Ford dubbed "behavioral science." Carnegie used the Social Science Research Council as a conduit for supporting major projects that "set the stage for the behavioral revolution in political science" (p. 48). The Carnegie-funded study of the 1952 presidential elections, for example, not only yielded classic works such as *The American Voter* (1960) but it also sowed the seeds for the creation of the tremendously influential American National Elections Studies data project. The Ford Foundation, for its part, spent \$24 million between 1950 and 1957 to steer the social sciences in a behavioral direction. Ford-sponsored grants and fellowships accelerated the careers of behaviorally inclined political scientists and offered them training in statistics. Its patronage also spurred university administrators—most notably at Stanford University—to push their political science departments in a behavioral direction against the faculty's wishes. Hauptmann concludes that "the unusually large and directive grants Ford made sparked and fueled the behavioral revolution" (p. 77). Importantly, she finds little evidence that the foundations' initiatives were inspired by demands from political scientists. Political scientists responded to the foundations' behavioral science agenda more than the other way around.

The Rockefeller Foundation took a more eclectic approach than its counterparts. It extended substantial support for

behavioral projects, including significant grants that were crucial to the survival of the University of Michigan's national election studies after the Carnegie Corporation discontinued its support. At the same time, Rockefeller invested heavily in political theory and international relations theory, motivated by its leaders' belief that these fields had an important role to play in the ideological Cold War and in advising US foreign policy makers. Rockefeller's emphasis on pressing social science in the service of the Cold War foreshadowed and converged with the Ford Foundation's reorientation of its program, after 1957, from behavioral science to international and area studies. From the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, Ford invested \$138 million in international and area studies programs, which fostered close ties between scholars and policy makers and shaped the contours of the field of comparative politics through the end of the Cold War.

A key strength of Hauptmann's book is her insistence that "the history of political science is ... the history of political science *in the university*" (p. 11; emphasis added). Whereas other disciplinary historians explicitly or implicitly locate the profession in political science departments, Hauptmann's account dovetails with a recent trend in the study of American higher education to emphasize the significance of nondepartmental spaces on university campuses, including, importantly, ORUs. As noted earlier, after World War II, many university leaders sought to transform their institutions into research powerhouses in part by setting up externally funded research centers and institutes that were administratively independent of disciplinary departments. Hauptmann effectively demonstrates the significance of such ORUs for the development of political science by zooming in on two major campuses: the University of Michigan and the University of California, Berkeley.

At Michigan, the bulk of the foundations' support for behavioral research was channeled to the Institute for Social Research (ISR) and its subsidiary, the Survey Research Center. Generous foundation support provided ISR-affiliated political scientists with substantial resources—research and travel funds, release from teaching duties, graduate student assistantships, and the like—that were scarcely available to other members of the political science department. Entrepreneurial scholars such as Warren Miller and Samuel Eldersveld shrewdly leveraged these resources to transform the political science graduate program and ultimately place the department's leadership in the hands of behavioralist-friendly scholars.

At UC-Berkeley, although the Rockefeller Foundation earmarked its grants in political theory and international studies to the political science department, the Ford Foundation directed its massive patronage to the Institute of International Studies and its affiliated area studies centers. These units provided some members of the political science department with second academic homes whose abundant resources helped these scholars curtail the power of the department's political theorists.

Philanthropic patronage thus “solidified the centrality” of Cold War-oriented international and area studies to political science at UC-Berkeley (p. 135).

An intriguing insight presented by the book is that the battle at the University of Michigan between the ISR-affiliated behavioralists and their older political science colleagues was not about research methods. Hauptmann shows persuasively that these tensions were instead rooted in a deep disagreement on the purpose of political science. For the older guard, the discipline’s main mission was to prepare students for public service, whereas the younger advocates of behavioral political science sought to orient graduate training and political scientists’ careers predominantly toward research. Similarly, the conflict that pitted the international and area studies faculty against the political theorists at UC-Berkeley in the 1960s was not about how to study politics. At its core, the conflict—which coincided with the emergence on campus of the free speech movement—reflected radically divergent visions of the university: Should it refashion itself as a community of scholars and students committed to knowledge for its own sake (the vision favored by the theorists and allied student activists), or should the university continue its transformation into a massive producer of research useful to government and corporate clients?

The book concludes with a thought-provoking observation. Hauptmann points out that the research-oriented culture of political science shaped by the foundations in the mid-twentieth century remains in place even as the favorable material conditions of that era—abundant philanthropic and (later) government research support, coupled with a rapid expansion of faculty ranks—no longer apply. Doctoral programs in political science continue to produce large cohorts of hyperspecialized researchers even though research patronage has become scarcer (the National Science Foundation, for example, has recently phased out its political science program) and even though higher education institutions have increasingly been hiring contingent instructors at the expense of full-time research-oriented faculty. I wonder if conditions are ripe for contemporary mainstream philanthropic leaders (Bill/Melinda Gates? Michael Bloomberg?) to transform political science once again by realigning it with current political-economic realities.

Creating Human Nature: The Political Challenges of Genetic Engineering. By Benjamin Gregg. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 250p. \$105.00 cloth, \$34.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592723001858

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Benjamin Gregg takes on important and timely issues in *Creating Human Nature: The Political Challenges of Genetic Engineering*. The rapidly developing biotechnologies of

gene editing, embryo selection, and the like raise challenging ethical predicaments and regulatory challenges for democratic societies to navigate. Gregg’s contribution to these debates is a welcome one that helps fill what is something of a lacuna in normative political theory: theorizing about the significance and challenges of scientific innovation and the regulation of new biotechnologies. Gregg tackles these issues with both ambition and careful attention to the science.

Creating Human Nature concerns itself with the question, “What kind of human nature should humans want to create for themselves?” Advances in human genetics, like the sequencing of the human genome, the rapid expansion of genetic tests and clinical trials for gene therapy, and genome editing, have ushered in a new era of medicine where the prospects of personalized medicine and genetic engineering have shifted from the realm of science fiction to reality. Genetic engineering “refers to the genetic editing of living things—to the specific addition, removal, or modification of DNA sequences, for example, to correct a particular gene’s defective functioning in a specific biological context” (p. 42). Many scholars in the humanities and social sciences may shy away from these issues, at least in part, because of the troubling history of eugenics. The suggestion that science should be harnessed to directly manipulate our biology raises the worry that we may repeat the injustices of the eugenics movement that started in the 1880s and lasted into the mid-twentieth century. These injustices included racism, the exclusion of those already marginalized in society, and violations of reproductive liberty and other human rights.

Gregg begins *Creating Human Nature* by noting the prevalence of racism in the political writings of Western Enlightenment philosophers, ranging from Kant and Diderot to Rousseau and Voltaire. He contends that today the Enlightenment inspires a Janus-faced response to the prospect of human genetic engineering: “One face regards nature as yielding to culture: culture as human will and imagination in its limitless plasticity, as the capacity to shape and endlessly reshape ideas, artifacts, and institutions. The opposite face regards nature as a limit to human belief and behaviour: the ‘natural’ as a standard by which to reject the ‘unnatural’” (p. 3).

These two dimensions of Enlightenment thinking, contends Gregg, raise different concerns for the prospects of genetic engineering. The skeptical side will raise concerns about respect for individual autonomy and our identity as members of the species *homo sapiens*. By contrast, the optimistic side sees the potential that genetic manipulation offers to promote freedom by helping humanity more effectively abate disease and disability. The goal of Gregg’s book is to navigate a path between the skeptical and optimist faces of European Enlightenment. He believes this can be done by highlighting the *political* dimensions of human genetic engineering.