

THE CUBAN COMMUNISTS IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: Revolutionaries or Reformists?*

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INTRODUCTION

Although the first Communist¹ state in the Western Hemisphere was established in Cuba, scholars have paid relatively little attention to the old Cuban Communist party, which for many years was the only significant political organization on the island that claimed to speak in the name of Marxism. An analysis of the old Cuban Communist program, strategy, and tactics is significant for understanding social and political processes not only in Cuba, but elsewhere in the world. The growth of so-called Eurocommunism and the questioning of the revolutionary credentials of traditional Communist parties by others within the Left have led to voluminous polemics, but have failed to clarify the nature and role of traditional Communist parties throughout the world.²

The Popular Socialist Party (PSP), the name adopted by the Cuban Communists in 1944, displayed political behavior as conservative and accommodating as any traditional Communist party in the last twenty years. In the mid-forties, the PSP was one of the few Communist parties that were criticized by the Soviet Union for exemplifying the "right-wing" line of U.S. Communist leader Earl Browder.³ Yet, as will be shown, during the course of the Cuban Revolution, no important PSP figure showed any commitment to preserving the capitalist status quo nor did any break with Castro as a result of his move toward establishing Communism.⁴ The behavior of PSP members contrasts markedly with that of the numerous reformist figures of various political shades who supported Castro in the early stages of the Cuban Revolution. As a rule, these reformists eventually broke with Castro and went into exile

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primarily because of their commitment to preserving the capitalist system, with major or minor modifications.⁵

In contrast to the reformers, the Cuban Communists responded positively and effectively to the greatly altered conditions of 1959–60 that offered the possibility of social revolution. This behavior suggests that the criticisms of traditional Communist parties as reformist rather than revolutionary may have confused behavior with character, militance with social radicalism, and tactical opportunism with support for the existing capitalist order.

The Cuban Communists at the Time of Batista's Fall

The Cuban Communists found themselves with reduced, but still significant, strength at the time of Batista's fall on 1 January 1959. The party once had exercised real influence through its control of the Cuban trade unions, but its influence on the Cuban working class and Cuban politics had sharply declined since the onset of the cold war in the late forties. Estimates of its size at the beginning of the Revolution range from seven to twenty thousand members. The party's prestige at this time was rather low. The Communists had supported Batista during his first period in office, which ended in 1944. Although the Communists (by then known as the PSP) did not support him in his second period, beginning with the coup in March 1952, they did not militantly oppose him. For a while, they advocated a loyal, electoralist opposition to the regime, and only in mid-1958 did they join the guerrilla struggle.⁶

The PSP's ambiguous, tardy role contributed to its marginality at the beginning of 1959. The party lacked legitimacy among people who under different circumstances would have been its natural constituents. Much of the populist Left perceived the PSP as a conservative force because of the Communists' electoral horse-trading and unprincipled politicking that dated back to at least the early forties. The PSP thus was associated with the traditional political forces that the populist parties, such as the *Auténticos* and then the *Ortodoxos*, had been expected to eliminate from the political arena. The conflict between the Communists and the various populist forces splintered leftist political culture in Cuba during the forties and fifties. Furthermore, the PSP was an unadulterated Stalinist party that took Stalin's Russia as its model of postrevolutionary social organization.⁷ While this approach may have attracted some, it hardly enhanced the image of the PSP for most Cubans.

The cold war also had a conservatizing impact on the non-Communist Cuban Left. The popular moderate-Left magazine *Bohemia* expressed pro-U.S. views, as did most of the leadership of the *Ortodoxo* party founded by Eduardo Chibás, which in the early fifties counted Fidel Castro among its second-rank leaders. These groups helped create

a pro-West political climate in Cuba during the fifties with such success that an official pamphlet of the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement published in 1957 disowned the term *imperialism*:

In good political terminology, the term "imperialism" is already inappropriate to the American continent; but there still exist forms of economic penetration generally accompanied by political influence that are very similar to it and that cause irreparable harm to the moral and material welfare of the country that suffers them.

Fortunately, such a situation can be overcome without any legitimate interests being hurt. Through a new treatment of *constructive friendship*, Cuba could truly be, as is advisable for many geographical, economic, and even political reasons, a loyal ally of the great country of the North, and at the same time safely preserve the capacity to determine its own destiny. Through new and just agreements, it can, without unnecessary sacrifices or humiliating sellouts, multiply the advantages that derive from neighborliness.⁸

This pro-West climate had originally developed in the anti-Nazi days of World War II with considerable help from the Cuban Communists and was furthered by the postwar economic boom on the island. The Cuban Communists were to become victims of the very ideology that they had helped to create. As party leader Carlos Rafael Rodríguez later wrote on the first postrevolutionary anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks on 26 July 1953:

Anti-imperialism was then a proscribed word, a set of ideas that the majority of our *compañeros* considered to be deadly. For saying that anti-imperialism was the present Cuban form of patriotism, those who thought in that fashion were considered to be agents of a foreign power. I am not referring here to the professional servants of imperialism, or to the anti-revolutionaries who have always existed. . . . Young people whom we knew to be honest, stung as we were by the suffering of our Fatherland, lived convinced that Cuba's independence was a Yankee gift and that our denunciations of national oppression were simply ways of serving an idea that they considered to be "anti-Cuban."⁹

The PSP often reacted to this political climate in an intensely sectarian manner that widened the gulf between the Communists and the populist Left.

The Strengths of the PSP

Ironically, although at the beginning of 1959 the PSP was neither popular nor prestigious and Fidel Castro and his Twenty-sixth-of-July movement were monopolizing mass support, the results of the revolutionary process would prove to be much closer to the PSP program than to any other Cuban political group or party. This can be partly explained by realizing that the skills necessary for successful political insurrection are not identical with those required for a successful social revolution. As the period of insurrection ended and one of social revolution began, the

latent strengths of the PSP began to emerge. It was an organization led by experienced and skilled politicians who had worked together for a long time and were considerably older than the generation of Fidel Castro and his associates. The PSP also had a cadre-type membership and a coherent political theory and program, which, although often shallow and superficial, were superior to the occasional, unsystematic, and programmatic pronouncements of all other political groups. Also, leftist intellectuals outside of the PSP had played little part in the struggle against Batista.¹⁰ The organizational endurance of the PSP was remarkable in a society that had failed to develop any other lasting political parties. By the time Batista fell, the traditional political groups had been completely discredited.¹¹ The few significant revolutionary organizations that had emerged during the anti-Batista movement, such as the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement and the small, student-based *Directorio Revolucionario*, remained amorphous. The PSP supported Fidel Castro, but in contrast with the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement, retained its organizational independence from him. PSP members were also strategically placed in extra-party organizations, where they were greatly outnumbered, but influential nonetheless. In the trade unions, for example, the PSP had important comparative advantages over the more numerous members of the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement. The unions were consistently the PSP's central priority. Its trade-union cadres were typically older and far more experienced than workers who belonged to other parties or were unaffiliated. PSP unionists were well organized in party committees in many shops and industries, and the PSP's daily *Hoy* covered union affairs more extensively than all of the other Cuban newspapers.

Last but not least, the PSP was the only significant political force in Cuba that claimed to be socialist or Marxist and therefore stressed the importance of a systematic ideology and program as the basis for the development of strategy and tactics.¹² Its ideology and program were tools used to win ideological support from radicalized Cubans seeking a systematic explanation of the country's situation. This aspect of the PSP is even more noticeable when contrasted with the antitheoretical and antiprogrammatic stance of the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement.¹³

The Programs and Analyses of the PSP

Less than a month before the triumph of the Revolution, the PSP rather defensively had advocated the nationalization of foreign utilities and the "revision of colonialist concessions." The party also proposed an unspecified program of agrarian reform without any mention of the requirement in the 1940 Constitution for "previous payment" to dispos-

sessed owners, a proviso the Communists had criticized during the 1940 Constitutional Convention. This relatively cautious social program was nonetheless more anticapitalist than Castro's positions in the period 1956–58. During this period, Castro had sought to appeal to Cuban moderates and conservatives by setting aside the radical proposals of "History Will Absolve Me" that were little known to the great majority of Cubans before 1959. At this time, Castro even repudiated nationalization as a tool of public policy. The PSP also proposed that Batista's regime be replaced by a "democratic coalition" that would include "moderate elements," which in this context was meant to avoid excluding leaders of traditional political organizations and former officeholders such as ex-President Carlos Prío Socarrás.¹⁴ This position had already been abandoned by Fidel Castro, who by then had adopted a more radical political perspective rejecting corrupt pre-Batista politicians while still welcoming nonparty notables such as José Miró Cardona and reputable Ortodoxos like Roberto Agramonte, who had never held public office.

The programs and analyses of the PSP in the early months following the Cuban Revolution demonstrated a great deal of flexibility and resilience. On the whole, the PSP kept pace with Fidel Castro in the radicalization of the Revolution. From a programmatic point of view, the PSP continued to be significantly more anticapitalist than Castro in the first few months of 1959. With the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law in May of 1959, Castro began to catch up with the PSP and by the fall of 1959, the gap had been closed and Castro would soon surpass the PSP in his anticapitalism. But even when the PSP was tactically more cautious than Castro, it always managed to support his measures.

The positions staked out by the PSP in early January 1959 indicate the proximate goals of a party trying to end its political isolation and marginality. The PSP was also trying to advocate changes that would affect the social, economic, and class structure of the society, promoting social content in what had thus far been a purely political revolution. At this point, the PSP had established a minimally radical program, while trying to allay fears by insisting that "socialism" was not on the agenda.¹⁵ Although the PSP had adopted a stance very friendly towards Castro, it identified a Right, Center, and Left in the revolutionary camp, which, it argued, existed at the top as well as among the rank and file. The PSP defined most of the early revolutionary cabinet in office before Castro became Prime Minister in mid-February 1959 as being on the Right and criticized them for not acting in a revolutionary manner.¹⁶

Thus, on 6 January 1959, the PSP was advocating that the Rebel Army be the new permanent army, in opposition to those who favored a professional "nonpolitical" army, a modest agrarian reform, the devel-

opment of new markets in the “socialist countries,” and the restoration of the 1940 Constitution to prepare for democratic elections.¹⁷ But only a few days later, the PSP also was calling for changes in the Constitution that revealed its intention to “clear the road” for future radical measures. The PSP now decided to argue for the repeal of the above-mentioned section of the Constitution that provided for repayment for any property seized by the state. In addition, the PSP proposed to lower the voting age and extend the franchise to the army (assuming that it would remain the Rebel Army).¹⁸ The PSP also upbraided the cabinet for failing to address agrarian reform, racial discrimination, and utility rates.¹⁹ The general slogan of this period was “defend the Revolution and make it advance,” or as top PSP leader Blas Roca said, “the Revolution, to defend itself, must become more revolutionary.”²⁰ It is worth noting that in this earliest of stages, the PSP advocated measures that have not been established even today, such as the return of the naval base at Guantánamo,²¹ or the establishment of what North Americans call “affirmative action” to deal with racial discrimination.²² It should be pointed out that a good number of PSP’s prominent figures were black, including Blas Roca, Lázaro Peña, Salvador García Aguero, and Nicolás Guillén, in contrast with the much smaller number of black leaders in the fused Cuban Communist party led by Fidel Castro.

With this approach, the PSP expected to end its isolation by having its relatively small membership recruit new participants. Although at this earliest stage the PSP was perceived as being to the left of Castro,²³ its position did not imply that the PSP in any way wished to confront Castro’s control of the revolutionary process. The PSP essentially had developed the stance of a friendly “Left” pressure group toward Fidel and the revolutionary leadership. Thus, in February 1959, when the revolutionary government passed Law 87 decreeing that anyone who engaged in illegal, spontaneous land-seizures would automatically forfeit all benefits from the pending Agrarian Reform Law, the PSP merely complained that this law was unnecessary and dangerous and that the peasants should be allowed to prevent illegal spontaneous land-seizures.²⁴ This response was a rare instance of the PSP advocating peasant (or worker) initiatives. Neither the PSP nor Castro did much to encourage independent rank-and-file action, a crucial affinity that would facilitate their future alliance, despite their political differences. A few spontaneous land-seizures did occur, but they were exceptional.²⁵ As James O’Connor has pointed out, it was the ruling group that everywhere initiated the liquidation of Cuba’s private-property system. In comparing the Cuban Revolution to the Russian, Mexican, Chinese, and Bolivian revolutions, O’Connor concludes that the Cuban case was unique: in all these other revolutions, spontaneous mass-action impeded the revolutionary leaders from keeping control of land and in-

dustry, but in the Cuban Revolution, the absence of such spontaneous action facilitated state collectivization of the economy.²⁶

Defining the Nature of the Revolution

While insisting that neither socialism nor Communism was on the agenda, the PSP initially defined the Revolution as a "patriotic and democratic national liberation and agrarian revolution" necessitated by the semifeudal nature of Cuban society.²⁷ The PSP's analysis of the revolutionary process was the most radical offered by any major leftist group in Cuba at this time. Moreover, as the Revolution became radicalized in fact long before it did so in theory, the PSP was not to be left behind Fidel Castro's radical anticapitalist push. The PSP's analysis of the nature of the Revolution proved to be very elastic. At the important October 1959 Plenum of the party's national committee, Blas Roca reported that many of the national liberation tasks of the Revolution had already been accomplished. He continued, "There are stages in the revolutionary process but they are not separated by Chinese walls. . . . It is a process where one can advance from one stage to another." Roca further explained that the new PSP program would state the possibility "that the most advanced elements of the radical sector of the petty bourgeoisie, which today maintains revolutionary hegemony, evolve toward the proletariat, adopt its socialist point of view and continue to lead in the process of transition to socialism." Roca hedged his bets by cautioning that the absence of pure stages in a revolution did not mean that one could "in Cuba pass willy-nilly to the socialist stage of the Revolution, or even that this step is near." He nonetheless went on to make a statement that was surprising coming from such a veteran enemy of Trotskyism: "Marxism-Leninism teaches us as much that revolutions have stages as that they must develop uninterruptedly and pass from one stage to another."²⁸ By mid-March of 1960, Roca continued his discourse on the nature of revolutionary stages, but this time unambiguously concluded that socialism "was the aspiration and next goal of the revolutionary forces."²⁹ Four weeks later, another prominent PSP leader, Aníbal Escalante, compared the Egyptian and Cuban revolutions and concluded that the main difference between them was that Cuba had pursued the road of "uninterrupted" revolution.³⁰ At the Eighth National Congress of the PSP in August 1960, Blas Roca continued to characterize the Cuban Revolution as "national, emancipatory, agrarian, patriotic, and democratic," but added that "the Cuban Revolution is radical, it uses radical methods, is developing in a rapid rhythm, and is advancing *without interruption*."³¹ Significantly, the PSP's notion of stages of development did not indicate the objective and subjective social factors that specifically accelerated or delayed the Revolution's

movement from one stage to the next.³² As a result, the PSP's theory was in fact essentially descriptive and exclusively political. Because it was not based on a deeper analysis of underlying social realities, it lent itself more easily to ad hoc opportunistic uses determined by which way the political winds were blowing. In this kind of analysis, such factors as the extent of working-class consciousness and initiative and the nature of economic development played marginal roles at best.

The PSP's Class Analysis of the Revolution

During the early stages of the Revolution, the PSP insisted that as long as Cuba was capitalist, the existence of classes and class struggle in Cuba could not be ignored.³³ The PSP took this position at a time when conservative opposition to Castro maintained that the existence of classes and the class struggle was a Communist myth. Furthermore, many populist supporters of Castro claimed that a popular, honest government could avoid eliminating social classes as such and make classes and the class struggle irrelevant.³⁴

The PSP developed a Cuban equivalent of Mao's "four-class" model. In the view of the PSP, there were four progressive classes in Cuba: the working class, peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie, particularly its industrial sector.³⁵ Given this analysis, the PSP leaders sometimes tried to reconcile conflicting goals such as maintaining an appeal to the working class while arguing that there was room for the industrial national bourgeoisie in the revolutionary ranks. For example, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez said that the industrialists were entitled to profits, but he simultaneously proposed to limit them through an excess-profits tax to be used for the government's industrialization drive.³⁶ Previously Rodríguez had insisted that the economic class struggle between workers and employers should not prevent them from working together to accomplish the political tasks of the Revolution.³⁷

As the anticapitalist direction of the Revolution became more evident, neither the so-called national industrial bourgeoisie nor most of the petty bourgeoisie supported Castro's government. The PSP's repeated assurances that in China, unlike Russia, many supportive bourgeois elements had been welcomed by the Chinese Communists in the transition to socialism did not carry much weight with the increasing number who chose the road to exile in Miami and elsewhere.³⁸

Once again the PSP did not allow its early caution to prevent its keeping up, in theory and practice, with the forward rush led by Fidel Castro. Already in early July 1959, while Blas Roca was still denying the anticapitalist character of the Cuban Revolution and was asserting that

the Cuban bourgeoisie could benefit from the anti-imperialist and anti-landlord character of the Revolution, he was also suggesting that the bourgeoisie could not be allowed to become the dominant class in the revolutionary process. For Roca, such a situation would mean the betrayal of the Revolution because of the bourgeoisie's inclination toward moderation and reformism, and its tendency to take advantage of the working class and the peasantry. Roca exhorted the national bourgeoisie to support the Revolution and defeat the imperialistic tendencies within the bourgeoisie. He made it very clear, however, that his appeal for bourgeois support did not mean that the PSP would abandon its socialist program.³⁹ Even this kind of qualified appeal became less frequent in the PSP's pronouncements. By April 1960, the PSP's analysis and exhortations had undergone a noticeable change. In characterizing the class character of the Revolution, the PSP now emphasized the "worker-peasant alliance."⁴⁰ This shift was consistent with the PSP's new belief that in the "uninterrupted" development of the Revolution, "socialism" had now become the next stage.

The Unions and the State

The PSP's tactical agility in the face of the rapidly changing situation in Cuba (due to increasing U.S. hostility to the regime and Castro's own developing anticapitalism) is best exemplified by the party's changing attitude about the relationship between the unions and the revolutionary government. Despite its small membership and weak links to the revolutionary center, the PSP nonetheless possessed in the early months of 1959 significant comparative advantages in the trade-union movement because its cadres were politically experienced. The party naturally emphasized that trade unions needed to be completely independent from the revolutionary government.⁴¹ Conveniently ignoring its past role as the most important political force responsible for the Cuban union-movement's dependence on the state,⁴² the PSP even argued against Law 22 in which the government officially recognized the newly established trade-union leadership, then dominated by the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement.⁴³ In the same spirit, the PSP strongly objected to various plans to establish the withholding of dues in Cuban unions. The PSP defended its opposition to withholding dues by arguing logically that such a practice would encourage both the bureaucratization of the unions and their dependence on the state.⁴⁴ The PSP's daily *Hoy* reported approvingly the decision by the PSP-influenced Havana local of the tobacco-workers union that future dues would be collected personally by union representatives on the shop floor.⁴⁵ It should also be noted that the PSP's currently stronger organization of its labor cadres

made the withholding of dues far less useful for the PSP than for the amorphous, but more numerous, Twenty-sixth-of-July-movement union members.

For similar reasons, the PSP voluntarily avoided calling for or encouraging strikes even in the earliest days of the Revolution.⁴⁶ However, the PSP did not wish the Cuban government to prohibit it from calling strikes. The party took the position that “we do not encourage or approve of unnecessary or unjust strikes. But strikes, when they are necessary and just, help rather than harm the Revolution.”⁴⁷ All these positions were consistent with its policies of not alienating Castro, not promoting workers’ independent initiatives, yet preserving autonomy and the right to strike. As the PSP’s fortunes in the labor movement improved when Castro turned against the anti-PSP, Twenty-sixth-of-July-movement labor leadership, the PSP, consistent with its long-range plan of having the unions controlled by a state amenable to or run by the party, radically changed its stance. In early November 1959, PSP veteran labor leader Carlos Fernández R. published an article entitled “Independence from What?” that attacked those labor leaders who had objected to the new Minister of Labor’s postponement of union elections.⁴⁸ (It should be added that the new minister, Major Augusto Martínez Sánchez, was a close associate of Raúl Castro and was friendly to the PSP.) By late 1959, the PSP was actively opposing strikes in many situations⁴⁹ and had begun to advocate working-class sacrifices such as abolition of the traditional end-of-the-year bonus in the sugar industry, arguing that counterrevolutionaries were demanding its retention.⁵⁰ By April 1960, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was also advocating a wage freeze to be accompanied by a limit on capitalist profits.⁵¹

A Partial Exception: Foreign Policy

The PSP adopted its most radical anticapitalist stance in the area of foreign policy. From the beginning, the PSP supported and identified with the Eastern European countries and China. It was the only group that dared take such a public stance in 1959. *Hoy* even-handedly devoted equal space to praising the Chinese and the Russians, strongly denying that a split was developing between these two countries.⁵² *Hoy* also strongly supported China’s intervention in Tibet⁵³ and retrospectively defended the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary.⁵⁴ Of course, the PSP did not initially advocate that Cuba join the “socialist” camp outright, but it was much more critical of the United States and the Western camp than of Cuba’s national bourgeoisie. *Hoy* praised the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement’s newspaper *Revolución* when it came out in support of Cuba having diplomatic and commercial relations with the whole world, including the Soviet camp.⁵⁵ This view and the advocacy of a neutralist

stance for Cuba were major components of the PSP's earliest foreign policy program for the Revolution. At the time, this position may have been the most radical one adopted by the PSP in opposition to such well-known pro-Western Cubans as Herminio Portell Vilá.⁵⁶ Notably, while in this earliest stage the PSP frequently courted the national industrial bourgeoisie, only very reluctantly did it admit that under certain limited conditions capitalist foreign investment in Cuba might be justifiable.⁵⁷

The PSP's divergent attitude on foreign policy matters was to be expected because its historic association with the Soviet camp made the party less flexible on this issue. After all, the PSP leadership had the double task of supporting Soviet foreign policy and winning over Cuba's domestic audience. The PSP also correctly sensed that the unfolding revolution might develop an anti-United States dynamic that would effectively destroy the pro-West consensus of the fifties. Furthermore, Cuba's geographical and psychological distance from Eastern European and Asian countries, plus its heavy reliance on Western news agencies for reports of events in those parts of the world, fostered one of the PSP's favorite successful tactics—its rationalization that if U.S. press agencies lie about Cuba, why should Cubans believe what they say happened in Hungary and Tibet?⁵⁸

In sum, the PSP began the first year of the Revolution with relatively cautious analyses and programs that were nevertheless significantly more anticapitalist than Fidel Castro's policies at the time. By the end of the year, Fidel Castro's initiatives and choices, developed in the context of increasing U.S. hostility and the evolution of his own political views, clearly had become more anticapitalist and tactically bolder than the PSP's initial or subsequent programs. The PSP responded fairly quickly to this change in the situation because its leadership was skillful in adapting and taking advantage of a very favorable, albeit unexpected, social and political climate.

THE STRATEGY OF THE PSP

Organizational Independence and Growth

In response to the marked antiparty sentiment encouraged by the *fidelista* movement, the PSP defended the existence of an independent Communist party on the grounds that the society the Revolution was building, while advanced, would not be socialist or communist. This new society would still have inequalities and problems and, therefore, would need Communists and a Communist party.⁵⁹

Students of the Cuban Revolution, including this writer, have failed to note previously that in the earliest stages of the Revolution, the PSP made a significant, although not wholly successful, effort to enlarge

its ranks. Early in 1959, probably recalling the "Lenin's levy" under Stalin, the PSP announced the "rebel levy" (*la promoción rebelde*). Specifically, the party relaxed its requirements for membership in the youth section known as the Socialist Youth (JS)⁶⁰ in order to recruit fifty thousand young people.⁶¹ By the middle of April 1959, the party claimed to have recruited five thousand young people,⁶² although it later contradicted itself by claiming that in the period from 1 January to 20 May 1959, it had recruited three thousand youths and four thousand adult party members. At this time, the party also claimed to have established two hundred party cells and an equal number of youth cells.⁶³ Yet at the October 1959 Plenum, the PSP organizational leader Manuel Luzardo, without publicly providing any figures, complained that the PSP had not grown at the same rate as the Revolution.⁶⁴ In the context of the PSP's optimistic reports at this Plenum, Luzardo's statement suggests that growth indeed must have been well below expectations. After this time, the party may have discontinued its recruitment campaign because *Hoy* had virtually nothing to say on the subject in subsequent months. The PSP's developing alliance with the revolutionary leadership may have made the recruitment campaign superfluous. This growing alliance with Castro and the overall growth of the party's political influence can explain why, for example, in April 1960, the PSP's youth leader called for the dissolution of the Young Socialists into a single organization that would include all revolutionary youth.⁶⁵ Undoubtedly the leadership of the Socialist Youth would have been extremely influential, if not the controlling force, in any such united organization.

Again, PSP recruitment figures do not suggest dramatic organizational success, but it must be remembered that these results were achieved despite the fact that the PSP was not Fidel Castro's party. In any case, PSP organizational progress had also become evident in areas other than recruitment. In early May 1959, the party daily newspaper began publishing larger issues in the party's newly acquired printing plant.⁶⁶ In late August 1959, the party's youth magazine *Mella* had also acquired its own printing shop.⁶⁷ By mid-April of 1960, the leader of the Socialist Youth claimed a circulation of thirty thousand for *Mella* and listed several other party publications for such special audiences as young people and peasants, plus a theoretical journal directed toward university students.⁶⁸ In early May 1959, the party's weekly radio hour became a daily occurrence,⁶⁹ and in succeeding months, both adult and youth sections of the party acquired new meeting premises in the city of Havana.⁷⁰

The "Unity" Line

While the PSP organization had grown, its greater political influence resulted mainly from the strategic line first put forward by the party and later supported by Fidel Castro. This line consisted in repeatedly stressing the need for "revolutionary unity." The specific programmatic bases for this "unity" were rather vague, but its organizational meaning clearly endorsed collaboration with those wings of the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement and lesser revolutionary organizations who, although not necessarily admirers of the PSP, were willing to refrain from opposing the party's politics. The PSP skillfully pursued this particular strategy in numerous arenas such as the unions and the Rebel Army. In the beginning, the PSP placed less emphasis on obtaining positions than on creating a favorable political milieu in each arena. Here the PSP partly was making a virtue out of necessity because Castro and the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement had insisted on not formally sharing office with other groups, be they the PSP or the Directorio Revolucionario. Moreover, in the early stages of the Revolution, any explicit PSP participation in governmental bodies would have created political difficulties for the government because at this time, Castro was still disassociating himself from Communism. Consequently, the PSP took an apparently patient and reasonable attitude toward not participating in the central government,⁷¹ or even in union executives.⁷² Later on, when the Communists became less and less marginal, the PSP aggressively developed large organizational ambitions that eventually provoked the ire of Fidel Castro himself.⁷³

The PSP had some distinct advantages in politically winning over many of the radicalized fidelistas, particularly those who had been influenced by the more radical pronouncements of Raúl Castro and Ernesto (Ché) Guevara. Although both of these leaders enjoyed a great deal of prestige, surpassed only by Fidel Castro and perhaps Major Camilo Cienfuegos, they were greatly limited by their dependence on Fidel Castro in a way that did not apply to the PSP. In other words, Ché and Raúl had to modify their pronouncements as representatives of the government. The PSP had much more freedom to propound its world view and thus could provide the only systematic explanation of events to its own members and to radicalized fidelistas. The PSP fully exploited its ideological monopoly as the one significant political force with a systematic political methodology and the only Cuban voice speaking in the name of Marxism and socialism.⁷⁴

Although it cannot be proved conclusively, the PSP possibly may have exerted some political influence over the revolutionary leadership. For a short while, internal differences of opinion occurred within the PSP over the existence of "Cuban exceptionalism."⁷⁵ One consequence

of an "exceptionalist" approach would have been a more aggressive role by the party, including an attempt to recruit leading revolutionaries into the PSP, but this course would have been dangerous. The fact that this approach did not prevail made it easier for PSP leaders such as Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who were already more sympathetic to Fidel Castro, to work closely later on with the revolutionary leadership without becoming threatening. The party apparently was able also to take advantage of the beginnings of "polycentrism" in the Communist world and to pressure Moscow to commit itself eventually to total support of Castro's revolution.⁷⁶ By early 1961, after all, Castro was not asking merely for economic and other kinds of assistance in the manner of nationalist leaders such as Nasser and Sekou Touré. Castro was in fact making an unprecedented request: that Cuba be recognized as a member of the "socialist" camp, with all the consequences of such recognition. This request was all the more striking from a country ninety miles from U.S. shores that was clearly within the United States' geopolitical "sphere of influence," and for a revolution that had not been led by a traditional Communist party.

All these events could only have augmented the PSP's importance in the eyes of the revolutionary leadership, thus increasing its political leverage. The PSP had on its side not only the monopoly of Marxism and a cadre-type organization, but also contacts with the Soviet Union as a potential source of support for Cuba's "socialist" course. Additionally, Cuban political thought had always dwelt on the dangers involved in alienating the United States. The PSP and the USSR likely were perceived as defenders who could provide a way out of this quandary. A number of objective factors also facilitated the work of the PSP including a definite, although diffuse, leftward movement among the great majority of the population, which was partly provoked by U.S. hostility to the Revolution and partly induced by the redistributive programs carried out during the unrationed, prosperous first two years of the Revolution.⁷⁷

The Organizational Results of the "Unity" Approach

The "unity" approach of the PSP clearly had borne some fruit long before Fidel Castro officially declared the socialist character of the Revolution in the spring of 1961. An important example of this success occurred in the trade unions. While the trade-union strength of the PSP itself was not numerically impressive, the PSP-influenced "unity" union executive-slates did better.⁷⁸ The "unity" forces dominated a few of the thirty-three "industrial federations," including those of textile, restaurant, and transport workers. In addition, they controlled a number of locals in other federations such as those of sugar, tobacco, and maritime

workers.⁷⁹ Fidel Castro's intervention at the Tenth Congress of the Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC) in November 1959 paved the way for the CTC to be controlled by the minority of "unity" unionists. This takeover was soon followed by wholesale purges and neutralization of the anti-PSP majority. After that, the PSP unionists themselves soon took over the top leadership positions of the CTC, although Fidel Castro's ultimate control was never in question.⁸⁰

The "unity" approach scored some successes in other arenas as well. For example, the student section of the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement in Havana, over the opposition of the national student section, joined with the PSP and other groups in forming the United Civic Youth of Havana.⁸¹ Similarly, "united" revolutionary organizations also were formed in such cities as Santiago de Cuba,⁸² Sancti Spiritus,⁸³ and Marianao.⁸⁴ But perhaps the most important accomplishment was the conversion of a significant number of Rebel Army majors who became closely identified with the "unity" line. In addition to Ché Guevara and Raúl Castro, this group included Majors Augusto Martínez Sánchez, William Gálvez, Demetrio Montseny (Villa), Manuel Piñeiro, and Faure Chomón from the Directorio Revolucionario.⁸⁵ Thus the PSP created a political milieu that was not decisive enough to challenge successfully Fidel Castro's power and prestige, but could facilitate and help legitimate the existence and political message of the PSP. It is possible to speculate that at least part of the PSP's "unity" milieu might have become a source of opposition to Fidel Castro, had the latter chosen to go a political direction different from Communism.

THE TACTICS OF THE PSP

Attacking Enemies

An implicit system can be discerned by analyzing the lists of those attacked by the PSP in the early stages of the Revolution. The PSP ignored political figures who may not have liked the party, but who kept silent about its growing influence. The PSP distinguished between what it called antirevolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries, preferring the antirevolutionary who might not favor the Revolution, but would not actively oppose it.⁸⁶ In contrast, those who actively opposed Communism or the PSP elicited a negative response from the party, which would be strongest and even vituperative toward critics who were in some way weak or vulnerable. Accordingly, when the PSP argued with the powerful Twenty-sixth-of-July-movement newspaper *Revolución*, PSP spokesmen were very civil and polite, particularly during the spring of 1959, when Fidel Castro had recently criticized the PSP. But by September 1959, when the political winds had begun to blow favorably in

the direction of the PSP, a clearly threatening tone could be detected in the PSP's polemic against Euclides Vázquez Candela, the principal *Revolución* editorialist whose political fortunes (along with those of the anti-PSP "Humanist" faction with which he was linked) had begun to decline.⁸⁷ Consider also the case of Huber Matos. When still a respected officer, Matos was taken to task by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez for an anti-Communist pronouncement, but only after he had been given considerable credit for his anti-imperialism and exploits as a guerrilla fighter.⁸⁸ Only four months later, all of Matos's presumed virtues were conveniently forgotten, and the PSP supported Fidel's denouncement and twenty-year sentencing of Matos after the latter (and his staff) dared to resign. A close reading of the attacks on Matos reveals that as much or more space was spent by *Hoy* and *Revolución* in discrediting Matos as a person via character assassination than in attacking Matos's brand of anti-Communist politics.⁸⁹ In this manner, Cuban Communists combined a social approach to politics with much skill in the art of "witch-hunting." This approach appealed to Manichean and conspiratorial views of the world, personality cults, and the use of innuendo and guilt by association. These tactics were no less important than program and theory as part of the political weaponry of the PSP. Rather than being a matter of excessive zeal in the heat of revolutionary passion, "witch-hunting" was an essential technique for creating malleable followers rather than self-governing working classes. The Matos case illuminates one of the features of the early stages of the Cuban Revolution, which was that as Castro clashed with many of his erstwhile associates, often the PSP had already attacked those very same people at a time when they were regarded as safe, untouchable figures of the revolutionary government. The most notable example was President Manuel Urrutia.⁹⁰ Consequently, the PSP could claim a good "track-record" in unmasking the false friends of the Revolution. In this limited tactical sense, the PSP was often ahead of Fidel Castro even when the latter had caught up with them fairly well in the areas of social and economic policy. The reason for the PSP's "vanguard" role was simple: at a time when Castro was trying systematically to avoid rather than confront the Communist issue, the PSP as an established Communist party was carefully monitoring anti-Communist pronouncements from all quarters. The PSP's organizational independence allowed it to name names at a time when doing so would have been difficult for Fidel, or even for Ché Guevara and Raúl Castro.⁹¹

The Question of Anti-Communism

The theme of anti-Communism was extensively employed by right-wing opposition to Castro at a very primitive level of know-nothing preju-

dices that had been greatly encouraged by the Cold War and the impact of McCarthyism on Cuban society in the 1950s. First the hard-right-wing, pro-Franco *Diario de la Marina*, and subsequently various liberal and populist organs such as the daily *Prensa Libre*, as well as many writers for the weekly *Bohemia* all resorted to this ideological approach to justify their die-hard or reformist adherence to capitalism. In the latter case, eloquent defenses of civil liberties and democracy typically lacked any understanding, let alone indictment, of Cuban or U.S. capitalism as a system. In combating these forces, the PSP was joined by *Revolución* and several other publications in defending the revolutionary government. But the PSP, and later Fidel Castro, used the charge of anti-Communism to pressure supporters of the revolutionary camp to avoid criticizing existing Communist states or the PSP's political line. This accomplishment was notable because the PSP, as previously indicated, could propagandize freely on all of these issues. Consequently, the PSP could propagate Communist politics, but those who opposed the party, whether moderate, radical, or conservative, found themselves characterized as part of an officially defined right-wing "anti-Communist" amalgam.

The use of this tactic in combination with other factors such as the absence of a non-Communist Marxist or socialist tradition prevented any substantive discussion within the Left of the pros and cons of Communism as an economic, social, and political system. Perhaps the most important political casualties of this process were the persons associated with the Twenty-sixth-of-July-movement newspaper *Revolución*, edited by the former-PSP-member Carlos Franqui (who was allowed eventually to resign and later go to Italy in 1968). It is significant that Euclides Vázquez Candela, the non-Marxist, radical chief theoretician of *Revolución*, closed the debate with the PSP in September 1959 by accusing the PSP of trying to portray the Twenty-sixth-of-July movement as a merely provisional formation in order to prevent it from becoming a permanent organization. Vázquez Candela again reiterated the need for such an organization and went on to specify the nature of his objections to the PSP's politics:

. . . to be a communist plain and simple is a way of confronting reality like many others and as such not at all shameful in itself. . . . To be a communist of a party of the Cominform is already, without doubt, to adopt a type of Marxism compromised with the interests and demands of a metropolis in which one blindly trusts in . . . the universal establishment of socialism. The open belligerence against these two forms of conduct and living is not at the center of our struggle. We have our own position and we will defend it with the same right that all revolutions have defended their way of facing the restructuring of the society in which they must act.⁹²

CONCLUSION

This essay has contended that in the earliest stages of the Revolution, the PSP was ahead of Fidel Castro in attempting to push the political revolution in a social direction. Later on, as Fidel Castro surpassed the PSP's anticapitalism, the PSP managed to keep up with Fidel, even though it was usually more cautious than he.⁹³ It has also been argued that the PSP's analyses, programs, and plans of action, although not at all comparable to the decisive role played by Fidel Castro, significantly contributed to the creation of a political climate that facilitated and may even have influenced Castro's choice of Communism. This assertion was particularly true of the "unity" approach pioneered by the PSP, which after the summer of 1959 helped eliminate from consideration other possible roads for the Cuban Revolution. In carrying out the "unity" approach, the PSP was tactically ahead of Fidel Castro in unmasking anti-Communists even after Castro had caught up with the PSP's anticapitalism.

One must still wonder, however, whether the new system would have been established if Fidel Castro had been less bold and had followed instead the PSP's strategic and tactically conservative approaches. It is possible that the strategy and tactics of the PSP would not have brought Cuban Communism into existence regardless of the wishes of its leadership. These conservative methods may be explained as follows: while the PSP had no commitment whatsoever to the preservation of capitalism, at the same time it did not want to engage in political actions that would risk unduly its existing political power. Hence, its first goal in the earliest stage of the Revolution was to influence the long-range political climate in a direction favorable to its interests. Later on the party readily altered its political posture in an even more radical direction in order to take advantage of unusual opportunities created mainly by others, such as the drastic actions of Fidel Castro and the other revolutionary leaders. Even while doing so, however, the PSP seems to have feared that these bold actions might recklessly endanger the gains already achieved by the PSP-Castro alliance.

I would like now to pose the larger question of whether the terms of the classic Marxist-socialist debate of reform versus revolution are appropriate to understanding the nature and actions of traditional Communist parties. Before that substantial question can be addressed, however, a semantic matter must be dealt with. The term *social revolution* can be used in either a descriptive or evaluative fashion, which is to say, in a neutral manner to describe the complete transformation of a society or in a judgemental way to evaluate approved or disapproved social transformations. Accordingly, one could argue without contradiction that Communist parties are revolutionary, yet nonrevolutionary in the classi-

cal Marxist sense that they do not promote the self-emancipation and self-determination of the working class. They are revolutionary not only in the descriptive sense that these parties have organized the destruction of the bourgeois state, particularly in its Third World stage of development, but also because victorious Communist parties afterward have created a new social order. They have precipitated out of their own organization new, hierarchical bureaucratic entities. These power centers have then directed the operation of nationalized means of production and radically altered the role of the market as the regulator of economic activity.

Once the distinction between the two meanings of revolution is understood, the traditional Communist parties' behavior no longer seems so anomalous with their characters, and the inappropriateness of the terms of the classic socialist debate over reform versus revolution becomes more obvious. European social democrats argued for moderate tactics because they were satisfied with the bourgeois welfare states and top-down trade-union bureaucracies that their leadership had helped create. Traditional Communist parties may often display moderation similar to social democratic parties, but as has been shown in the case of Cuba, they definitely work to create a new state. Because structure and function must correspond to aims, the organization, strategy, and tactics of traditional Communist parties understandably do not correspond to those outlined in classical Marxism. Criticism of these discrepancies, however, tends to be pointless unless it acknowledges that such changes also reflect a change in ultimate aim. Thus, while the struggle from below may be necessary to prepare the working class for socialist revolution and workers' power, a different, but still "revolutionary," aim may render the classical Marxist emphasis on mass insurrection, mass political self-education, and mass democratic institutions superfluous.

The classical debate of reform versus revolution does not promote understanding of the traditional Communist parties for another reason. Although all political organizations must be somewhat judicious in taking risks and in using their political assets, a revolutionary party by definition must be willing to take undue organizational risks, not for the sake of reckless adventure, but because it is willing to subordinate narrower organizational interests to a larger political cause. This description definitely does not fit the PSP, but neither did the PSP, like a true reform party, limit its actions by any unwillingness or inability to challenge the bases and legitimacy of the existing capitalist system.

Finally, the kinds of social transformation the Communist parties seek possibly can be attained by either reformist or revolutionary means or by both. Such a result would not differ from the triumph of capitalism, which replaced earlier modes of production sometimes through revolution, sometimes through reform, or through a combination of

these two.⁹⁴ In other words, while Communism has come about through revolution in China and Cuba, it conceivably also could be reached by a reformist road, for example in the context of a disintegrating capitalist system with a politically dormant working class, a weak right wing, and strong bureaucratic tendencies of corporatist, social democratic, and Communist origins.⁹⁵

None of this means that parties like the PSP are necessarily likely to succeed. Social and political conditions are often likely to be unfavorable to either a revolutionary or reformist victory by a PSP-type party. Or a different kind of development may take place. It is possible that social conditions and economic circumstances, for example, may help transform a Communist party into a traditional reform party. This process already may have started in some of the so-called Eurocommunist parties. Communist parties, like all other social institutions, are ultimately subject to the forces and pressures of social reality. Their form of organization and the nature of their politics provide them with a substantial degree of immunity from those pressures, but cannot totally isolate them from change.

NOTES

1. I use the term *Communist* for the sake of simplicity and convenience. However, as should be apparent from the following discussion, I do not link present-day Communism with the "classical" communism of Marx, Engels, and many other revolutionaries who predate the rise of Stalinism. Furthermore, I also use *Communism* in a generic sense to describe a socioeconomic system even though, of course, each Communist state has its own peculiarities and individual history. Marxists use the term *capitalism* similarly, despite the fact that capitalist states like the United States, Japan, and Sweden are not identical.
2. For an explicit characterization of Communist parties in various parts of the world as reformist, see the informative works by Ian Birchall, *Workers Against the Monolith: The Communist Parties since 1943* (London: Pluto Press, 1974), and James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru" in *Latin America. Reform or Revolution?*, edited by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (New York: Fawcett, 1968). The works of other authors such as André Gunder Frank and Régis Debray also tend to suggest that the traditional Communist parties are not revolutionary.
3. See the 1945 letter signed by French Communist leader Jacques Duclos, who acted as a spokesman for Stalin and conveyed to the world Communist movement the new Soviet cold-war policy. Under Browder's leadership during World War II, the CPUSA changed its name to the Communist Political Association and stressed its "Americanism." It should be noted in passing that, unlike the case of the CPUSA and the unfortunate Browder, the Cuban PSP leadership managed to reverse itself completely without any major purges.
4. Breaks, of course, occurred between PSP leaders such as Anibal Escalante and Fidel Castro; however, they were not due to these PSP members being opposed to Castro's moving Cuba towards Communism.
5. This statement does not mean to imply that all those who broke with Castro were reformists. The postrevolutionary exiles included many conservatives opposed to any significant social changes in Cuba, as well as a relatively small number of dissident leftists and socialists.

6. For a more extensive treatment of the history of the Cuban Communists, see my work, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Cuba, 1933–1960: A Political Sociology from Machado to Castro* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1976).
7. See, for example, the unsigned article “1879—J. V. Stalin—1959” in the Sunday supplement (*Hoy Domingo*) of the PSP’s daily, *Noticias de Hoy*, of 27 December 1959. While lamenting some of Stalin’s “mistakes” toward the end of his life, the article fully endorsed his social and political legacy. See also the article by Y. Zhilin entitled “Los comunistas” that attacks Yugoslav “revisionism” in *Noticias de Hoy* of 19 June 1959. (Henceforward *Noticias de Hoy* will be referred to as *Hoy*, according to common usage in Cuba.)
8. Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio, *Nuestra razón: manifiesto-programa del movimiento 26 de julio*. Reprinted in Enrique González Pedrero, *La Revolución cubana* (México: Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1959), p. 124. (Emphasis as in the original.)
9. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, “Reflexiones ante un aniversario,” *Hoy*, 29 July 1959, p. 1.
10. For analyses of the political role of intellectuals in prerevolutionary Cuba, see Roberto Fernández Retamar, “Hacia una intelectualidad revolucionaria en Cuba,” and Ambrosio Fornet, “Revaluaciones del movimiento cultural del 30,” in *Casa de las Américas* 7, no. 40 (Jan.-Feb. 1967).
11. For a fuller discussion of this matter, see my *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Cuba, 1933–1960*, chapters 7 and 8.
12. Traditional, union-oriented social democracy was never a significant force in Cuba. Anarchism had been important until the twenties, but sharply declined thereafter. Trotskyism had some influence in Cuba during the 1930s, but most of its adherents eventually merged and disappeared into the populist Auténticos in the late thirties. By the time of the 1959 Revolution, Cuban Trotskyism had been reduced to a little-known, tiny sect. See Robert Alexander, *Trotskyism in Latin America* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), pp. 215–35.
13. For a good rendition of this mood, see C. Wright Mills, *Listen, Yankee* (New York: Ballantine, 1960). See also the “Granma” column in *Revolución*, 16 May 1959, entitled “Hechos, no palabras,” and the article by César Leante entitled “Tiene la revolución cubana una ideología” in *Revolución* of 2 September 1959.
14. Partido Socialista Popular, *La solución que conviene a Cuba* (Havana?: n.p., 10 December 1958). This fifteen-page mimeographed pamphlet was produced clandestinely and may be seen in the New York Public Library.
15. Blas Roca, “¿Qué clase de revolución es ésta?,” *Hoy*, 11 April 1959, p. 1.
16. Blas Roca, continuation of report to PSP January Plenum, printed in *Hoy*, 28 January 1959, p. 1.
17. Cited by Andrés Suárez in *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 38.
18. “Tesis sobre la situación actual,” *Hoy*, 11 January 1959, p. 2.
19. *Hoy*, of 27 January 1959, quoted Blas Roca as saying at a PSP meeting, “La revolución, para defenderse, debe hacerse más revolucionaria,” p. 1.
20. *Ibid.*
21. “El programa del Partido Socialista Popular,” *Hoy*, 8 February 1959, p. 3.
22. Lázaro Peña, “Problemas del movimiento obrero. Debemos combatir prácticamente la discriminación racial desde los sindicatos,” *Hoy*, 29 March 1959, p. 1.
23. I am using the word “Left” here in the limited sense of anticapitalism and not in the broadest sense of opposition to exploitation and oppression whether under capitalism or any other socioeconomic system.
24. “Declaraciones del PSP. El PSP pide a los campesinos que impidan por sí mismos las ocupaciones de tierras. Considera innecesaria y peligrosa la Ley 87.” *Hoy*, 22 February 1959, p. 1.
25. In my book, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Cuba, 1933–1960*, I considered the possibility that the PSP may have encouraged squatting (pp. 230–31). After analyzing the PSP’s attitude towards the Castro government in 1959 in detail, I now think this stance was unlikely, although some individual PSP members may have encouraged squatting on their own.

26. James O'Connor, "On Cuban Political Economy," *Political Science Quarterly* 79(June 1964). Juan and Verena Martínez Alier have argued, on the basis of a study they conducted in the archives of the INRA (National Institute of Agrarian Reform), that the rural working class demanded land or work ("tierra o trabajo"), thus creating heavy class pressure on the revolutionary government and aiding in its radicalization. This study and its conclusions pose several problems. While it can be plausibly maintained that the rural workers demanded "land or work," it is impossible to determine how representative the cited cases are of the total rural labor force. Conceivably, these cases may not have been representative, especially if one reasonably assumes that only the most discontented and needy would write, petition, or complain to the INRA. Furthermore, these authors seem to underestimate peasant and rural working-class support for the revolutionary government in 1959–60. The government's overwhelming credibility and prestige at that time would have diminished the impact of any class or political pressures. However, the most serious objection is that the Aliers failed to refute O'Connor's claim that in any comparison with the Chinese, Mexican, Bolivian, or Russian revolutions, Cuba experienced remarkably little rural turmoil during 1959–60. I would bracket the frustrated Cuban revolution of 1933, which took place with considerably more popular upheaval than the 1959 revolution, with the four foreign revolutions mentioned.
27. Blas Roca, "¿Qué clase de revolución es ésta?," *Hoy*, 11 April 1959, p. 1.
28. "Informa Blas Roca ante el Pleno del Comité Nacional del Partido Socialista Popular sobre el programa del PSP," *Hoy*, 7 October 1959, p. 1. Whether Andrés Suárez's argument that Roca's report was partly a polemic against other views within the party is accurate or not in no way affects my thesis that the party was able to "keep up" with Fidel Castro. Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966*, pp. 73–74.
29. Blas Roca, "El programa del partido y la revolución cubana," *Hoy*, 13 March 1960, p. 1.
30. Aníbal Escalante, "El marxismo-leninismo y la revolución cubana," *Hoy Domingo* (Sunday supplement), 10 April 1959.
31. Quoted in Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966*, p. 101. (Emphasis mine.)
32. This observation is true of even the PSP's most elaborate theoretical documents. See, for example, Blas Roca on "Socialismo" in his *Fundamentos del socialismo en Cuba*, revised edition (Havana: Imprenta Nacional de Cuba, 1961).
33. See, for example, Raúl Valdés Vivó's class analysis in "En el frente de las ideas," *Hoy*, 19 April 1959, p. 1.
34. Columnist "Argos," in his essay entitled "Con cien ojos," criticized Minister of Labor Manuel Fernández for saying that the class struggle had been laid off ("cesante"). *Hoy*, 19 June 1959, p. 1. A couple of weeks later, "Argos" criticized Nasser for saying that classes could coexist even as nations could coexist. *Hoy*, 5 July 1959, p. 2.
35. Raúl Valdés Vivó, "En el frente de las ideas," *Hoy*, 19 April 1959, p. 1.
36. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "Los industriales, los obreros y la revolución," *Hoy*, 10 December 1959, p. 1.
37. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "Unidad revolucionaria, unidad popular y lucha de clases," *Hoy*, 24 May 1959, p. 1.
38. *Ibid.* See also Blas Roca, "Consideraciones sobre lo dicho por Aguilar León," *Hoy*, 8 July 1959, p. 1; and Blas Roca, "Informa Blas Roca ante el Pleno del Comité Nacional del Partido Socialista Popular sobre el programa del PSP," *Hoy*, 7 October 1959, p. 1.
39. Blas Roca, "Consideraciones sobre lo dicho por Aguilar León," *Hoy*, 8 July 1959, p. 1.
40. See, for example, "Llamamiento del Partido Socialista Popular al lero de mayo," *Hoy*, 28 April 1960, p. 1; and Blas Roca, "Bases y fundamentos de la Alianza Obrero-Campesina," *Hoy*, 26 June 1960, p. 1.
41. For example, Lázaro Peña, "Los sindicatos y las tareas de la Revolución," *Hoy*, 28 March 1959, p. 1.
42. For a discussion of this issue, see my *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Cuba, 1933–1960*, pp. 136–44.

43. "Los trabajadores de todas las ideologías tienen que estar en desacuerdo con la Ley No. 22," 7 February 1959, p. 2.
44. See, for example, Ursinio Rojas, "Cuota sindical obligatoria, ¿Para qué?" *Hoy*, 6 June 1959, p. 1; Lázaro Peña, "Discutamos la cuota," *Hoy*, 9 June 1959, p. 1; and Lázaro Peña, "La cuota sindical obligatoria. Otros aspectos del mismo tema," *Hoy*, 11 June 1959, p. 1.
45. "Condenan el terrorismo los obreros tabacaleros. Rechazarán la cuota sindical obligatoria y acuerdan se cobre en las fabricas por los delegados del Sindicato," *Hoy*, 23 June 1959, p. 6.
46. Thus, the leader of the PSP sugar workers supported Castro's call for a temporary suspension of strikes in the sugar industry. Ursinio Rojas S., "Cómo defender las demandas de los obreros azucareros," *Hoy*, 28 February 1959, p. 1.
47. Blas Roca, "Huelgas o 'no huelgas,'" *Hoy*, 10 February 1959, p. 1.
48. Carlos Fernández R., "¿Independencia de qué?" in "Sindicales de Hoy," *Hoy*, 5 November 1959, p. 3.
49. See, for example, the speech by PSP trade-union leader Juan Taquechel in *Hoy*, 21 November 1959, p. 7.
50. Ursinio Rojas, "La asamblea plenaria de la FNTA," *Hoy*, 19 December 1959, p. 1.
51. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "Sobre el programa de 'La Marina'. Inflación, salarios y sacrificios," *Hoy*, 16 April 1960, p. 1.
52. E.g., "Argos" column entitled "Con cien ojos," *Hoy*, 12 May 1959, p. 2.
53. See, for example, Pelegrín Torras, "Panorama mundial. ¿Qué ocurre en el Tibet?" *Hoy*, 2 April 1959, p. 2; and the unsigned article entitled "La verdad de los sucesos del Tibet," *Hoy*, 4 April 1959, p. 1.
54. Ladislao G. Carbajal, "Desde Budapest. La contrarrevolución húngara," *Hoy*, 1 January 1960, p. 2.
55. *Hoy*, 31 January 1959, p. 1.
56. Pelegrín Torras, "Respuesta al Dr. Portell Vilá. La neutralidad posible y patriótica," *Hoy*, 14 and 15 April 1959, p. 1.
57. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "Industria y nación," *Hoy*, 8 March 1959, p. 1.
58. For example, Aníbal Escalante, "En Cuba o en el Tibet la propaganda imperialista tiene iguales perfiles," *Hoy*, 6 November 1959, p. 1.
59. "Comunistas . . . ¿Para qué?" Unsigned article, *Hoy*, 22 March 1959, p. 1.
60. "Informe de Ramón Calcines al IV Congreso Nacional de la JS," *Hoy*, 10 April 1960, p. 10.
61. "Reunión nacional de la JS. 50,000 nuevos militantes y 50,000 magazines *Mella* semanales en el año de la libertad," *Hoy*, 25 January 1959, p. 1.
62. "Realiza grandes actividades la Juventud Socialista," *Hoy*, 15 April 1959, p. 1.
63. "Cuatro mil nuevos miembros del PSP y tres mil jóvenes socialistas más," *Hoy*, 24 May 1959, p. 1.
64. "Manuel Luzardo sobre la organización del PSP," *Hoy*, 10 October 1959, p. 1.
65. Continuation of Ramón Calcines's report to the Fourth National Congress of the Socialist Youth, printed in *Hoy*, 12 April 1960, p. 6.
66. "Llama la Habana-Interior a vender 10 mil 'Hoy' el día 3," *Hoy*, 29 April 1959, p. 1.
67. "Inaugura el 'Mella' sus talleres el próximo viernes," *Hoy*, 27 August 1959, p. 1.
68. Continuation of Ramón Calcines's report to the Fourth National Congress of the Socialist Youth, printed in *Hoy*, 12 April 1960, p. 6.
69. *Hoy*, 6 May 1959, p. 1.
70. "Inauguran locales del PSP de la Habana en Carlos III," *Hoy*, 9 June 1959, p. 1. "Inaugurados los nuevos locales de la Juventud Socialista en emotivo acto," *Hoy*, 10 July 1959, p. 5.
71. See, for example, the report of a televised interview with Blas Roca, *Hoy*, 8 May 1959, p. 8.
72. See, for example, Lázaro Peña's comments on Ursinio Rojas's report on "La lucha por la unión obrera y la democracia sindical," at the May 1959 Plenum of the PSP in "Terminó la reunión del Comité Ejecutivo Nacional del PSP," *Hoy*, 27 May 1959, p. 1.
73. This ambitiousness was the context of the first major dispute between PSP leader

- Aníbal Escalante and Fidel Castro in 1962. See Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 149–59.
74. Interestingly, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez once revealed that Major Guillermo Jiménez of the Directorio Revolucionario used to consult him for political orientation and that Major Fauré Chomón, also from the Directorio, used to study Marxist texts with PSP leader Raúl Valdés Vivó. Cited in Maurice Halperin, *The Taming of Fidel Castro* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 53.
 75. The “exceptionalist thesis” was elaborated by Aníbal Escalante, who maintained that the Cuban Revolution had not taken the classical road, but had developed first in the countryside and ultimately surrounded the cities. Escalante claimed that the PSP had assisted this process and helped open the way for the “Chinese road.” He concluded that the party should recruit aggressively and even usher these recruits toward positions of leadership. Edward González, “The Cuban Revolution and the Soviet Union 1959–1960,” (Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1966), pp. 343–46.
 76. Edward González, “Castro’s Revolution, Cuban Communist Appeals and the Soviet Response,” *World Politics* 21 (Oct. 1968).
 77. See Felipe Pazos, “Comentarios a dos artículos sobre la revolución cubana,” *El Triestre Económico* 29 (Jan.–Mar. 1962). Mexico City.
 78. Estimates of the proportion of PSP delegates at the Tenth Congress of the Cuban Confederation of Workers in November of 1959 range from 5 to 10 percent. For the low estimate, see Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966*, p. 7. For the high estimate, see James O’Connor, *The Origins of Socialism in Cuba* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 192. It is generally estimated that at the time Batista fell, Cuban unions contained approximately half of the labor force of two million, or one-sixth of the entire population.
 79. For a listing of some of the unions under “unity” leadership, see the account of the labor rally at Parque Trillo in Havana during the summer of 1959 in “Denunció Jesús Soto el mujalismo que aún perdura en el movimiento obrero. Mitin en Parque Trillo,” *Hoy*, 16 July 1959, p. 1.
 80. For accounts of the labor movement under Castro written from different political perspectives, see Robert Alexander, *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 153–72; and Hobart A. Spalding, Jr., *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York: Harper, 1977), pp. 226–50.
 81. “Manifiesto de la Juventud Cívica Unida de la Habana a las juventudes cubanas,” *Hoy*, 9 May 1959, p. 1.
 82. “La juventud santiaguera unida en frente cívico,” *Hoy*, 14 April 1959, p. 1.
 83. “Unidad monolítica entre los sectores revolucionarios de Sancti Spiritus,” *Hoy*, 6 May 1959, p. 1.
 84. “Constituye en Marianao un comité de unidad, para defender la revolución,” *Hoy*, 20 November 1959, p. 6.
 85. See, for example, the report of May Day celebrations entitled “La unidad fue el centro de los discursos del Primero de Mayo” in *Hoy*, 3 May 1959. Majors Montseny and Gálvez gave “pro-unity” speeches in Santa Clara, and on the same day, Majors Raúl Castro and Ché Guevara gave pro-unity speeches in Havana and Santiago de Cuba.
 86. Thus, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez warned Auténtico leader Tony Varona that the latter was moving from an antirevolutionary to a counterrevolutionary position. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, “En pie la nación,” *Hoy*, 16 June 1959, p. 1.
 87. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, “Punto y aparte,” *Hoy*, 15 September 1959, p. 1.
 88. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, “En torno a un discurso de Huber Matos,” *Hoy*, 12 June 1959, p. 1.
 89. See *Hoy*, and the Twenty-sixth-of-July-movement’s newspaper *Revolución* for the periods of 24–30 October (immediately after Matos’s arrest) and 12–17 December (the trial of Matos). Citing this incident in no way implies agreement with or approval of Matos’s views, then or now.
 90. See the attack on President Urrutia by Aníbal Escalante in “Divagaciones sobre la justicia y defensa propia,” *Hoy*, 30 June 1959, p. 1. The Castro-Urrutia split became public on 17 July 1959.

91. Note, for example, the indirect and strange polemic between Raúl Castro and Ché Guevara with various Twenty-sixth-of-July-movement leaders in the days subsequent to 1 May 1959. After Raúl and Ché called for "unity" and attacked those opposed to "unity" at the May Day rallies, all of the Twenty-sixth-of-July provincial coordinators (except for Oriente's) published statements in *Revolución* arguing for "unity from below" and against "unity from above." Neither side identified those being criticized. See *Revolución's* coverage of 4, 6, 7, 8, and 12 May 1959.
92. Euclides Vázquez Candela, "Saldo de una polémica," *Revolución*, 14 September 1959.
93. For numerous examples of this cautiousness, see Andrés Suárez, *Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959–1966*.
94. For an important discussion of the various roads to capitalism, see Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Of course, the choice and implementation of Communist approach will be affected by such decisive factors as whether we are dealing with a mass Communist party or a sect, or with a party oriented to the working class, peasants, or intellectuals. Also, my analysis applies only to the leadership of these parties because under so-called democratic centralism, the leadership effectively governs while the rank and file may come and go. Finally, I am not necessarily questioning the sincerity of leaders who may think they are building socialism and sometimes engage in heroic acts in pursuit of this ideal, just as the capitalist Puritans sincerely thought of themselves as doing God's work on earth.
95. For a suggestive and penetrating analysis of some ideological corporatist tendencies within capitalism, see Hal Draper, "Neo-Corporatists and Neo-Reformers," *New Politics* 1(1961):87–106.