

TRENDS AND ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICAN URBAN RESEARCH, 1965-1970

(Part II)*

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IV. ABSORPTION OF MIGRANTS

A. *Tertiarization*

It has for years been accepted that as Latin American countries urbanize and industrialize, the proportion of people employed in tertiary ("services") categories relative to those in secondary (manufacturing, construction) increases more swiftly than in the nineteenth-century industrial countries. This is usually taken to mean that urbanization here "outruns" industrialization, that people are released from precarious rural occupations faster than stable secondary-sector jobs are created for them. The situation is aggravated by the introduction of advanced technology that allows high worker-output ratios and by the lack of possibilities for migration abroad such as relieved Europe of 55 million "excess" persons in the period 1750-1939. Table 5 shows that although the per cent of Latin Americans working in factories more than doubled in the period 1925-60, thus increasing much more sharply than the per cent of city dwellers, the total share employed in manufacturing barely increased at all—and in fact shaded off in the 1950s—because of a relative drop in artisans.

For the important but not necessarily typical case of Mexico, Unikel-Torres (1970) place in doubt the tertiarization thesis for the period 1940-60. Limiting

TABLE 5

Latin America: Urbanization and Employment in Manufacturing, 1925-1960

year	% of total population in cities over 2000	% of active population in manufacturing	% of active population in artisan sector	% of active population in factory sector
1925	29.5	13.7	10.2	3.5
1950	39.3	14.4	7.5	6.9
1960	46.1	14.3	6.8	7.5

Source: Slawinski, 1965: 164, 167.

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TABLE 6
*Mexico: Annual Rates of Industrialization and Tertiari-
 zation of Urban and Non-Urban Economically Active Population (EAP), 1940-60*

	1940-50	1950-60
Industrialization of:		
total EAP	2.9	0.9
urban EAP	1.4	0.3
non-urban EAP	2.4	-0.8
Tertiari- zation of:		
total EAP	1.5	1.0
urban EAP	-0.5	-0.1
non-urban EAP	1.6	0.5

"urban" = cities of 50,000 or more in 1960
 Source: Unikel-Torres, 1970: 11.

their "urban" figures to cities which had 50,000 or more inhabitants in 1960, they show that: (1) in the 1940s industrialization for the nation proceeded faster than tertiarization (despite inclusion in the industrial sector of the shrinking proportion of artisans); (2) in the 1950s the national industrialization rate plunged and began lagging the tertiarization rate; and (3) *in both periods there occurred de-tertiarization of the economically active population in the cities* (Table 6). Furthermore,

TABLE 7
*Correlations Between Urbanization and Sectoral Transformation
 in Latin America (1950-65)*

sector or subsector	employment	income
1. Agriculture	—	—
2. Mining	—	—
3. Construction	0	0
4. Manufacturing	+	+
5. Total commodities (1, 2, 3, 4)	—	—
6. Transport	+	+
7. Electricity	+	+
8. Trade and banking	+	+
9. Government	0	0
10. Personal services	+	—
11. Total services (8, 9, 10)	+	0

+ = positive or generally positive correlation between urbanization and employment or income in the designated activity
 — = negative or generally negative correlation
 0 = variable correlation

Source: Adapted and tabulated from Mamalakis, 1970.

the fact that Mexico's urbanization rate slackened in the 1950s while tertiarization gained ground (relative to industrialization) shows service-sector expansion to be somewhat independent of city growth.

For Latin America as a whole, however, Mamalakis (1970) gives country-by-country tabulations for 1950–60 and 1960–65 which boost the tertiarization thesis and, in particular, its “marginalization” corollary—namely, that tertiary “inflation” affects principally the “personal services” subsector, where it creates *descamisados* and not gray flannel suits. Mamalakis' figures do not make the critical Unikel-Torres distinction between big-city and rural-semiurban location of the “inflated” tertiary. On the other hand they yield sharper correlations than usual between urbanization and employment in specific subsectors, and they supply the often neglected correlations with subsectoral income. Table 7 interprets his broad conclusions. Of special interest are the findings that: (1) relative agricultural income as well as employment tends to fall as urbanization proceeds, reaching a critical and stable minimum at a level of 7% to 15% of gross domestic product (GDP); (2) construction remains a small and surprisingly stable sector in the face of accelerated urbanization; (3) industrial income, though tending to rise, fell in at least four countries; two-way feedbacks between industrial income and urbanization are weak and subtle; (4) industrial employment was negative in at least one of the two periods in 11 of 17 countries reported; (5) there exists “a massive, clear-cut and general inverse relationship between urbanization and overall commodity production and employment;” thus, declines in agriculture and mining are not compensated by a relative rise in industry and construction; (6) income for total services (S-sector) tends to accompany urbanization in early phases; thereupon S-sector income stabilizes at 45% to 55% of GDP, losing ground while urbanization seemingly “proceeds on its own;” (7) unlike S-sector income, S-sector employment shows a consistently positive relationship to urbanization. Once S-sector employment reaches the 45% to 55% range, Mamalakis speculates, it may shift to the sector's income pattern. (In 1965, only in Argentina and Venezuela was service employment slightly over the 45% margin.) (8) The high-income, low-employment shares of trade and banking reflect “quasi-rents due to artificial or monopoly power”; (9) employment in government services shows stability or even relative decline; it could be increased substantially before its subsectoral productivity fell to the economy-wide average; (10) in the personal services subsector, employment advances steadily and briskly with urbanization while income tends to decline (although in Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru income gains equaled or exceeded subsectoral employment gains).

Therapists for the real or imagined tertiarization malady divide into those absorbed in policy concerns (subdivided into hand-wringers and positive thinkers) and those more interested in identifying the enduring configurations of society than in devising panaceas for realigning the Latin American case with Western experience. Among the policy advisers (hand-wringers) Mattelart-Garretón (1965), Dorselaer (1965), and Lambert (1965) decry tertiarization as a transfer of poverty to cities that creates a parasitic, inefficient, marginally employed, hard-to-modernize

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sector in the urban setting. Lambert holds that the rural exodus does little to advance modernization of agriculture and that migrants become socially and economically more onerous after relocation. The policy implication of such analysis is to keep 'em down on the farm until agriculture is rationalized and urban industry, decentralized in smaller cities, affords a proper labor market.

Positive thinkers accept migration as a tidal, revolutionary force, are philosophic about temporary disequilibriums, and look to the cities, even primate cities, as engines of salvation. With classic faith in man's economic rationality, Rottenberg (1958) assumes that migrations reallocate workers to maximize their earnings and that once in cities people have more job mobility, are freer to seek the most productive employment, and encounter more porous class stratification. Urban slum conditions, he believes, simply reflect the low per capita output of Latin American economies and would be alleviated by a dose of classical economics. Government price-fixing, for example, aggravates bad housing by distorting the allocation of resources and inhibiting their use for residential construction.

Other positive thinkers are more interventionist. Currie (1965) despairs of curbing the rural exodus with land reform and rural services. He welcomes migration as relieving the urban sector of expenditures for rural welfare. However, one cannot rely on the market mechanism for accommodating new urbanites. Not only must fresh jobs be created but the physical planner is challenged to plot the number, size, and distribution of urban centers; to control congestion by regulating residential patterns and the use of automobiles; and to regroup urban populations into self-contained work-residence neighborhoods—a large order in view of the fact that city plans in Latin America are still limited, with rare exceptions, to the old-fashioned *plan-regulador* (Hardoy-Basaldúa-Moreno, 1968: 34). From the Chilean case, Friedmann-Lackington (1967) argue that "hyperurbanization" positively assists the larger society to pass from a "traditional" to a "transitional" stage by replacing old elites with middle- and working-class groups and creating a "pluralistic interest-bartering system." Political development and urban services, however, have been won at the cost of economic retardation, inflation, and a marginalized popular class. The country faces a "crisis of inclusion." Now that hyperurbanization has brought Chile to the threshold of modernity, economic development must catch up.

Such analyses are riddled with vocabulary (parasitism, marginality, distortion, imbalance, hyper-, exclusion) which implies that urbanization in Latin America has somehow gone wrong or gotten out of phase. Public-spirited economists and physical planners must therefore take "corrective" measures. There may be quarrels over whether the rural or the urban sector is to enjoy such ministrations, but policy advisers are agreed on the self-evident principle that economic rationalization, full employment, and higher per capita income will solve the crisis of inclusion. "Historically," say Friedmann-Lackington (1967: 29), "the re-entry point appears to be at around \$1,200 per person."

The view that large numbers are "excluded" from the socioeconomic system challenges the engineering mind to devise technical strategies which, given a favor-

able political climate, will extend the system's coverage until national welfare indices reach acceptable minima. In 1967, Friedmann-Lackington detected such a climate in Chile, as well as a "new sense of realism" reflected in "the rise of a new class of technicians."²³ It seemed a propitious moment for the spirit of rationalization to engage with the spirit of traditionalism, as if two Maya calendar stones were meshing to compose a portentous date.

Other analysts ascribe broader reach and more stubborn historical logic to Latin American social systems. They insist that planning and "rationalization" cannot take hold in quarantine from the preindustrial matrix, which Newton (1970: 9) defines as:

. . . the juridical principles involved, the ascription of individual and corporate status and roles, the devices of corporate self-government, the legitimation of political intervention in the larger system and frequently the mechanisms through which such intervention is exercised.

Soares (1967) resists application of unilinear stage theory to Latin America, even when it allows for dislocations and alternate phasing, and points to a radically different "structural configuration of development." Ratinoff (1968–69: 214–17) finds that Latin American developmentalism has been oriented to results, not to institutionalization. The "rational" use of human resources has been highly selective, with "irrational" use of the majority "an integral part of this process, which gradually tended to lose its dynamism." True development must occur "from within," as a process of "socio-political building and creation." Frank (1966) and Cotler (1970) consider it a gross misjudgment of the structure and resilience of the socioeconomic system to say that the urban poor are marginal to it; rather, they are integrated to it in a way that prejudices their most vital interests.

Cardoso (1969) finds the notion of "dual" societies responsible for much of the confusion, for the dynamic-modern versus stagnant-traditional dichotomy correlates awkwardly to such observable polarities as urban-rural, rich-poor, elite-popular. In this view, preindustrial elites have flexibly accommodated new urban-industrial groups into a "policlassist center" by a system of alliances—perhaps along the lines of Mamalakis' sectoral-clash paradigms (1969). Although this center may transmit growth stimuli to the periphery, it continues to impose its order on the whole society, fragmenting the peripheral popular classes by absorbing elements into middle groups or into an industrial proletariat. Cardoso considers it to be premature to assume "a complete rupture between the relatively more integrated core of the social system and the periphery, which many assume to be anomic and 'available'." Whatever its ambiguities, the system is not dual or polar but an amalgam of considerable coherence. One should not underestimate its absorptive capability, its "many resources to expand the channels of social control," or its effective if somewhat mythic "patterns of deferred social upward mobility."

In this situation, according to Soares (1967: 41), a new alignment replaces the legendary polarization into a class owning the means of production and a property-

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less proletariat, buffered by a middle class or petty bourgeoisie. For the Brazilian case he pictures a critical tension between a new professional and salaried middle class and the underemployed floating population. Here the buffer role falls to the securely employed proletariat, which is not large enough fully to assume the function. If, then, the slow increase of stable urban jobs has systemic causes and is not remediable by enlightened technocracy, the political dynamic has semipermanent features—with all that this implies for the behavior and expectancies of urban groups.

These last generalizations are not reproduced as models or summary descriptions of something so diverse and complex as urban social change in contemporary Latin America.²⁴ They serve merely to suggest that this process, in its many regional versions, may have its own logic and “legitimacy.” They also yield a basis for preliminary contrasts with urbanization in other world areas, of the sort that Armstrong-McGee (1968) propose with their “Indonesian” and “Cuban” models. In the balance of this section two such contrasts are explored: (1) the limited applicability to Latin American urban society of the notion of “anomie” as it has developed in the Rest of the West; (2) differences between internal migrations in Latin America and in the rest of the Third World.

B. *Anomie*

The term “anomie” often figures in analyses of “marginal” urban groups in Latin America. The Caplow-Stryker-Wallace study (1964) of San Juan, Puerto Rico, employs the term repeatedly and inconsistently, as I have elsewhere observed (1965a: 53). Larson-Bergman (1969: 220) detect anomic behavior in migrant slum-dwellers in Lima who fail to become upwardly mobile and lead a “trapped” life, unsupported by group solidarity or traditional identities. Cornelius (1969: 835) incompletely summarizes the Latin American “anomic gap” literature as focused on “the time lag between the abandonment of the traditional value system and the acceptance of a replacement system.” Fernandes (1969: 56, 128) refers to anomic social disorganization created for Brazilian Negroes by slavery and aggravated for freedmen in the city, where they remained in caste-like subordination; the defensive adjustment for urban blacks was apathy rather than aggression. Margulis (1968: 18, 132) believes that anomie is experienced by rural folk who confront urban norms and expectancies; he therefore applies the term both to migrants in Buenos Aires and to prospective migrants who are exposed to urban ways by mass media in communities of origin. In Colombia, Cardona (1968: 85–87) ascribes *individual* anomie to the rural poor and recent urban migrants, who do not perceive their problems as shared, and *collective* anomie to migrants who have adopted urban values, identified channels of mobility, experienced group solidarity as squatters, and who have not yet acquired a stake and acquiesced in the system. Here, collective anomie has positive implications for social action and is said to reach a peak three to six years after migration.

A study of working-class anomie in Buenos Aires by Yalour-Chirico (1967) offers contrasts with Cardona’s analysis. Starting from Leo Srole’s definition of “subjective” anomie as isolation, despair, and a sense of divorce from society, they de-

velop the hypotheses that anomie arises from insuperable obstacles to goal achievement; that it increases with the length of the migrant's urban residence; that the more anomic a person the more disposed he is to adopt socially unacceptable forms of action; that anomie correlates positively with a realistic perception of class structure and one's place in it; that anomie leads to withdrawal from urban culture. In other words, anomie is said to produce nonconformism with "the system" and values imposed from above; disillusionment with "education," "work," and "luck;" and a "realistic" appreciation of the benefits of syndicalism and political participation.

These versions of anomie depart from Durkheim's formulation as introduced in *Division of Labor* and developed in *Suicide*, for Durkheim's emphasis was on the inability of industrial society to curb unregulated ambition, not its failure to meet basic life-requirements of the common man. Anticipating the "culture of poverty" idea by more than half a century, he observed: "Poverty protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself" (1966: 254). His concern, as Gouldner (1962: 23) has said, was with "fine-tuning" the industrial regime, not reorganizing it. His proposal in the preface to the second edition of *Division of Labor* to recreate corporate guilds was not designed to mobilize the masses or integrate the marginalized, but to restore moral communities to industrial society. For Durkheim, personal "isolation" was traceable to the ethos of commercialism and industrialism; in urban Latin America it is caused by rigidities of the institutional order.²⁵

As Parsons (1964: 129) points out, anomie is not a fortuitous aberration in Western society but involves a dynamic of its own, closely related to the process of "rationalization" and thus to the application of science to technology, the conversion of human relationships to a contractual basis with orientation to specific and limited goals, and the patterning of roles by function rather than by diffuse status ties.²⁶ If Durkheimian anomie signals the ascendancy of "critical rationality," urban Latin America would seem an uncongenial breeding-ground for it.

While Durkheim associated anomie with an advanced stage of division of labor, or organic solidarity, Merton (1968: 185–248) translates it for specific application to the society of the United States. Paradoxically, it is this version which is often borrowed for Latin America. Mertonian anomie arises from the gap between means and goals in a competitive society rather than from "liberation of desires" in an industrial society.²⁷ It is therefore specific to a society "which places a high premium on economic affluence and social ascent for *all* its members." Here, that is, success-striving is a socially defined expectation, not a random individual proclivity, and the expectation applies to everyone, whatever his initial station in life (1968: 221). Because it features internalization of achievement motivation so prominently, Parsons (1951: 258) calls the Mertonian paradigm "culture-bound" and questions its applicability to societies such as the Latin American ones.

It is beyond the scope of this paper, even were it within the author's competence, to invent sociological vocabulary to fit the Latin American case. But if the relevance of anomie to Latin America is to be questioned, so too must Merton's forms of deviant response to anomic situations, utilized by Yalour-Chirico (1967), Critto

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(1969: 353), and Heintz (1969). When one casts about for Latin American counterparts to Merton's North American deviants (innovator, ritualist, retreatist, rebel), the "deviance" is in each case arguable. Is the Latin American *pícaro* a deviant? the fatalistic rag-picker? the urban *guerrillero*? The question is, of course, what such types are deviant *from*—whether from the historic Catholic ethic or from an imperfectly generalized achievement ethic—and in what manner social sanctions operate. For Merton (1964: 218) anomie is a "withdrawal of allegiance from one or another part of prevailing social standards." Yet how does one define deviance in a Catholic society which not only countenances but is premised on "sinful" behavior?²⁸ A cultural relativist might sidestep the sociological issue by taking cues from historic definitions and strategies for handling heresy in the Catholic and Protestant worlds. "Deviance" might then turn out to be the behaviorist translation of a term from Protestant theology.

Leads do exist for any who might wish to renovate sociological vocabulary for Latin American uses.²⁹ Parsons (1951: 259) supplies a paradigm for deviant orientation which subsumes Merton's as a special case. Or, one could return to Durkheim's seminal works, which recognize anomie as only one of three abnormal forms of division of labor, and only one of four conditions which predispose people to suicide.³⁰ Because tertiarization is a centuries-old phenomenon in the patrimonial Iberian world, however, so are the psychological resources for dealing with it. The occasional uncluttered, culturally sympathetic accounts of migrations make one wonder whether sociological neologisms are not a luxury.

Here, for example, is how Montoya (1967: 95–97) describes emigration to Lima from highland Pacaraos. The migrant arrives in a society where:

... dependence and subordination are his only means to fulfill the new aspirations imposed by the metropolis. He must therefore look for "independent work." To have one's own stall in the market or be proprietor of a jewelry workshop means "freedom to work when you want," "when you feel like it," "without anyone shouting at you or walking over you or annoying you."

This *prise de conscience* accentuates an individualism already kindled by the weakening solidarity of the home community. In Lima society, which offers few paths to self-fulfillment, "each one lives his life," "here one has to make one's own way," "no one helps anyone." That the realization is at first frustrating explains the importance of "stadiums where people yell and drink themselves into a rage." But eventually the migrant accepts the game of the big city.

He becomes a creole and learns to make out with the weapons of the *limeño*. He works for himself and the rest matters nothing. He becomes a creole in the new meaning the word has in Lima, that is, a *pícaro*, capable of doing what's socially prohibited, of "doing what he damn well feels like."

The "moral crisis" finally subsides as the migrant is absorbed into what Delgado (1969b) analyzes as the "culture of *arribismo*."

This account is redolent with ancient Hispanic types and attitudes: *pícaro*, *hacer lo que le da la gana*, *hacerse solo*. Such language emphasizes establishing personal dominance, not achieving impersonal "success;" pitting oneself against the larger society, not uniting with peers for "rational" ends. If historico-cultural conditions contribute to the tertiarization of Latin American societies, they also provide psychological antidotes. Levels of tolerance for what the rationalist would call social dysfunction seem higher here than in the Rest of the West.

Applied to Latin America, many sociological categories generate more caustical heat than intellectual light. The limitation of the post-Durkheimian anomie-deviance vocabulary is that it assumes societies in which life-chances depend upon the efficacy of internal police mechanisms, euphemistically called "personality organization." The hallmarks of good self-policing, and therefore success, are the sociologist's familiar indices of education, occupation, and income. Such a society is thought of as the sum of its members, not as something "external" to large numbers of them.³¹ The norms for individual success are those of the society, and therefore a person who is self-policed need not struggle—need not be *en la lucha*—but merely learns to "cope." Hence the critical importance for social engineering of scales of adjustment, motivation, and aptitude.

The logic of Latin American societies is different. True, industrialism and urbanization have forced minimal concessions here to organic solidarity. But this is not equivalent to rationalization of private and social life, a feature reserved in Latin America since long before industrialization for "Jesuitical" persons and groups. Some lineaments of a sociology for Latin America are fairly clear. Certain observers now recognize the primacy of power over income or occupational status as a goal for social striving (Rama, 1960: 23–32; Adams, 1967) as well as historical reasons for it (Guillén, 1963; 1968). Another finds that in Brazilian society the "basis for evaluation, judgment, and ranking is the manifest consumption or use of material goods and services—and not the means of their acquisition." Thus Brazilian standards legitimize many alternatives associated with acquisition while United States society offers none but the occupational ranking system. Conversely, United States values have institutionalized more options in the area of consumption or disposal (Greenfield, 1969).

A stress on power and acquisition rather than on capacitation and utilization causes persons to be perceived as "types" who employ characteristic strategies to achieve objectives rather than as bundles of discrete traits cultivable for individual and social fulfillment. As Newton (1970: 15) has said:

The North American observer, culturally conditioned to "open-mindedness" toward the infinity of human possibilities, is disturbed to find himself surrounded, in a Spanish American milieu, by highly disparate, sharply modeled, and reasonably predictable *types*.

In his aptly titled *Estrategias para sobrevivir en Buenos Aires*, Moffatt (1967) delineates three such types: the *cabecita negra*, the white collar worker, and the executive. He is concerned simply to adumbrate the personal style, anxieties, and psy-

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chological crutches from which each one fashions a strategy for survival. Because the types are “given,” and because the problem given is survival and not how to “make good,” the writer does not linger over identifying mechanisms or character patterns favorable to social mobility. No type is more “successful” than another. And one is led to speculate that in the Latin American setting the equivalent of calibrating urbanites along a personality-adjustment scale from anomie or deviance to “integration” might be to block out an array of character types premised on attitudes or accessibility to power (fatalism,³² control, omnipotence, etc.). In this vein, the Veblen-Mills tradition of United States sociology offers more for the study of Latin American societies than the Merton-Lazarsfeld tradition.

The question at issue is antecedent to both theorizing and policy making, for it has to do with perception of reality. This being the case, it might not be extravagant to suggest that we turn for a while from sociological categories to literary sources. Moffatt gives a cue by extracting elements of the *cultura del cabecita* from *Martín Fierro*. To review at this point the gallery of human types from *La Celestina*, *Lazarillo de Tormes*, *Quijote*, *El Periquillo Sarniento* down through recent novelists (lingering over the four volitional positions defined by Unamuno in the prologue to his *Tres novelas ejemplares*)—surely this would sharpen our perception and understanding of stances and strategies in contemporary urban society. The skilled literary eye can do even more. It can reconstruct the logic of a whole society, as Antônio Cândido (1970) does for early-nineteenth-century Rio by his reading of the *Memórias de um Sargento de Milícias*.

C. Third-World Migrations in Comparative Perspective

Various researchers have suggested that urbanization in Latin America can usefully be compared with the process in other parts of the Third World, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and India. Friedmann (1970: 23–30) notes differences in migration patterns in these three areas but subordinates them to a global paradigm for the urbanization process. Little (1964) compares migrants' regional associations in West African cities and Lima, Peru, to conclude that in both cases they mediate between primary groups and “units of the urban industrial structure” to help “the rural migrant to assume an urban role.” For Chile, Herrick (1965: 55) emphasizes the nature of the migratory movement; because it follows the fill-in pattern, the urbanization of migrants is gradual and “does not provide strain for the society in the same way that African and Indian migrations have.” Kahl (1959: 68) claims that family structure facilitates the transition. “The Mexican rural family system is better adapted to urban needs than is the African, and thus less change is produced when people move cityward.” Lewis (1965b: 503) endorsed and generalized this hypothesis: “On purely theoretical grounds I would expect that culture shock would be greater for tribal peoples” than for peasants who move into cities.³³ Southall (1964: 21) agrees: “The peasant value system in a class-stratified society is less incompatible with urban living than that of a classless tribal society; there is more that is transferable and therefore has higher survival value.”

These formulations suggest two distinct hypotheses: (1) migrants are advantaged for urban life when they carry with them "pre-urban" tribal, caste, kin, or locality-group associations which can be reworked for protective and supportive purposes in the city; (2) migrants are advantaged for city life when they come from "urbanized" rural areas where castes or primary associations have disintegrated and persons are psychologically prepared to participate in an individualistic, class-based society. Rare is the scholar who can bring comparative research to bear on the issue, such as the late Oscar Lewis conducted in Mexico and North India. Confronted with these specific cases, Lewis cautioned against premature typologies (1965a: 303–37). In some respects the caste-based North Indian village "has somewhat the quality of our urban communities with their variety of ethnic and minority groups and a high degree of division of labor." In Tepoztlán, Mexico, the population and its traditions are "more homogeneous, and there is nothing comparable to the divisive effects of the caste system." Yet Rampur, India, also has more "primitive" features, such as an extended family system which plays a vigorous integrating role in village life. In Tepoztlán the extended family is weak, despite elaborate *compadrazgo*; religious and political life is organized on non-kinship bases, and social relations are "atomistic." Similar ambiguity characterizes the two villages' regional involvements. Rampur with its haphazard alleys and lack of plaza and government buildings seems more rural and "village-like;" yet its affinal and lineage ties link it to multiple networks of over four hundred other villages, "making for a kind of rural cosmopolitanism." Tepoztlán has a plaza, church, market, and centrally organized religious and political institutions; yet this centripetal, self-contained settlement pattern, heir of the Spanish colonial model, keeps the villages of highland Mexico in relative isolation each from another.

Since Lewis did not follow his North Indian villagers to the city as he did the Tepoztecs, we fail to learn whether what helps them adapt to urban life is the experience derived from the urban-like or heterogeneous quality of their home community or whether it is the organizational support afforded by a more "primitive" extended family system (or perhaps a combination of the two). Such theorizing as emerges from his Latin American research alternately enlightens and perplexes. His article "Urbanization without Breakdown" (1952) was a valuable corrective to generalizations about the disorganization of urban societies. His insight, however, threatened to collapse into the truism that migrants not yet absorbed by the city are not yet fully urbanized. Lewis (1965b) valiantly resisted this reduction to the obvious, sharpening his attack on the folk-urban construct that is alleged to idealize village life and to derogate the big city. He even came close to implying that Tepoztecs in their village habitat are withdrawn, distrustful, envious, violent, sorcery-ridden, and atomistic but that once they relocate in Mexico City their *vecindades* blossom with social interaction, mutual aid, shared experience, and revitalized family and religious life.

Lewis' stimulating work confronts us with two intriguing paradoxes: (1) he challenges Redfield's folk-urban continuum, asking that we redirect ourselves to

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"controlled, narrow-focus comparison of subunits" (1965: 502); he then smuggles in his own continuum theory (tribal-peasant-urban) by suggesting that peasant migrants to cities experience less culture shock than tribal migrants; (2) he criticizes Louis Wirth's description of urban social disorganization for its assumption that "all people who live in cities are affected by this experience in profound and similar ways" (1965b: 496); he then offers his own "culture of poverty" (1966; 1968: xlii–lii) as a generalized ethos to be encountered in such dissimilar settings as London, Glasgow, Paris, Harlem, San Juan, Mexico City, and in one version (1964: 151) the "courtyard cultures" of African cities.

Some deft casuistry could undoubtedly save the appearances of this private system. But Mangin (1968a; 1968b) seems justified in making the criticism that Lewis swept national cultures under the rug too easily and that the "culture of poverty" might more appropriately be called a "cognitive orientation" than a culture.³⁴

Global comparisons of urbanization are treacherous for many reasons, the most obvious being intracontinental diversity. For Epstein (1969), the heterogeneity of urban Africa requires that its cities be classified along scales of civic,³⁵ industrial, and demographic structure; these factors in turn affect ecology, administrative attitudes, welfare policies, employment possibilities, forms of voluntary association, and other elements of the migrant-absorption process. Balán (1969) makes a comparable proposal for Latin American cities. Not only, he believes, should migrants be classified by provenience (see above, Section II) but also cities themselves should be ranked by two variables: degree of "credentialism" (or, entry requirements of the occupational structure) and rate of increase of jobs in high-productivity sectors. Cross-tabulation produces four ideal-types of Latin American city.³⁶

Generalization is even more difficult when we turn from the assimilation to the acculturation and adjustment of migrants.³⁷ For however we may wish to characterize the *tendencies* of urban value schemes (organic solidarity, universal-achievement traits, Southall's "density of role texture"), the cultural amalgam of any given city is embedded in a larger regional or national culture. While one can devise crude comparative indices for assimilation (e.g., housing, income, employment), cultural and psychological indices are more relative, as indicated above in the discussion of deviance. It would be misleading, for example, to use rates of prostitution, thievery, or mendicancy as a cross-cultural index of maladjustment or cultural breakdown.

The best hope for comparisons of continental scope seems to lie not in evaluating the relative success with which cities accommodate migrants—which is a little like trying to establish a yardstick for "happiness"—but in identifying broad ecological and migratory patterns. In the literature on Indian and African migrations one is struck by the recurrence of the term "network." Epstein (1969: 256) and Richards (1966) report that African urban-dwellers are involved in a complex network of relations with neighbors, workmates, and friends, centering on persons defined as kinsmen and fellow tribesmen. These ties make for stability in a fluid situation.

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[They] link together large numbers of individuals not only within the one town, but between one town and another, and between town and country. More than this, they provide the basis for a more elaborate scheme of organizing social relationships in the new environment.

In the Copperbelt towns, where kinship and affinity are no longer a viable basis for social action, tribalism continues to offer beliefs and reference points that are drawn upon by the principle of "situational selection."

In this way the network of tribal relationships operating within the town provides a framework by means of which any African is able to fix his relationship with any other. Here therefore "tribalism" is a category of interaction in day-to-day social intercourse (Epstein, 1958: 224-40).

In rural India, villages may be interlinked by common descent and village exogamy, caste assemblies, work obligations, and participation in religious or political movements. Urban contacts are only one form of external relationship for the village. Supralocal networks may link as many as 100,000 people directly or indirectly. "Traditional routes of contact outside of the village are mostly with other villages, and travel is in the time-honored pathways or 'networks' " which lessen the urban impact on rural areas (Lambert, 1962: 120-23).³⁸

An obvious reflection is that Latin America is more urbanized than Sub-Saharan Africa and India and that its cities exert stronger disruptive or polarizing force on rural areas (Table 8). Ellefsen (1962: 96) notes the limited reach of metropolitan

TABLE 8
Population Distribution in Latin America, Africa, South Asia: 1940-80
(millions)

	1940	1960	1980 (projected)	absolute growth	
				1940-60	1960-80
Latin America					
total population	130	213	374	83	161
rural and small-town	105	145	222	40	77
urban	25	68	152	43	84
(large cities)	(12)	(35)	(100)	(23)	(65)
Africa					
total population	192	276	449	84	173
rural and small-town	178	240	360	62	120
urban	14	36	89	22	53
(large cities)	(3)	(11)	(47)	(8)	(36)
South Asia					
total population	610	858	1366	248	508
rural and small-town	560	742	1079	182	337
urban	50	116	287	66	171
(large cities)	(13)	(42)	(149)	(29)	(107)

Source: Castells, 1970b: 1159.

hinterlands in India: "Much of the area fairly close to the city, . . . which would be an active hinterland for a comparable Western city, remains as isolated and tied to agriculture and a barter-type economy as many points lying at great distances from any major city." In much of Sub-Saharan Africa urban communities developed in modern times under European colonial auspices. Hamdan (1969) reports that sixteen African states have "pygmy" capitals of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants; some he even calls "capital-less." Younger, peripherally located capitals have a regional rather than national character and recruit migrants mostly from their close environs, while certain traditional cities, such as the ten or more Yoruba "mud cities" or "agrotowns" of 100,000 inhabitants each (Hance, 1970: 342), are barely "urban" by some criteria.

Beyond quantitative indices of urbanization, however, lies the question of configuration. Just as Latin American development does not replicate the stages of the Rest of the West, neither do India and Africa accompany the Latin American, as Milton Santos (1969: 134–37) brings out in a broadly sketched comparison. Hoeslitz (1962: 180–81) finds that India's resource endowment and structure of investment are very different from Latin America's and will dictate different urban solutions. Cities are considered an unnecessary evil in India; industrial policy has favored dispersal over concentration and, to an uneconomic degree perhaps, handicrafts over factories (Peach, 1968: 302). The historic continuities of rural social organization have no parallel in Latin America. In southern South America, Brazil, and the Caribbean, Amerindian settlement patterns disintegrated under the impact of European economic institutions. In Meso- and Andean America this was less true, and seventeenth-century Tunja, described above in Section I-A, may have Third World counterparts as a control center for an indigenous rural populace. But even in highland America the trauma of conquest was so severe, the Amerindian population decline so precipitous, and the reconcentration of rural workers so widespread that extended indigenous social systems such as one finds in India and Africa had no chance for survival. Although Tax (1953: 10) describes active regional trade among Amerindian communities of modern Guatemala, he also concludes that: "The only effective social segment is the individual household, whatever its constitution."

Given the pattern of European colonization in Latin America, the usual rural-agricultural settlement is, according to Wolfe (1966b: 16–17), "a small and loosely organized cluster of families, constituting a primary neighborhood and usually found in combination with still more dispersed settlement by single families. Large agricultural villages deserving the name of 'community' can be found but are not typical." Present trends are toward "even greater dispersal and impermanence of rural settlement," exemplified by irregular "line settlements" along roads and nuclei of flimsy shelters at the sites of temporary jobs. Such rural leadership as is developing for migrants and urban squatters may come from displaced small cultivators representing a "mobile, adaptable, and aggressive new cultural type, detached from rural localism and traditionalism," who mediate between rural groups and the larger society as traders, truck owner-drivers, and leaders of peasant unions and local political movements (also Schaedel, 1967: 53–54).³⁹

In this ecological setting migration flows vertically from smaller to larger centers (Arriaga, 1968: 242), as though respecting the memory of the colonial urban hierarchy. It receives virtually no lateral pull from the gravitational fields of regional intervillage or extended-kinship systems. Although urban migrants frequently visit their communities of origin, little permanent return migration is reported.⁴⁰

In North India, Rowe (1964: 16) reports that entire village families do not often migrate because the village tie generally provides more security than the city can be expected to offer. Migration becomes a "way of life," and in contradiction to the claim that the city will destroy the village, Rowe finds that "in economic terms at least, the city makes the continuance of the North Indian village possible." The typical African who leaves his tribal area to seek work in town returns after a varying period "whether he has realized his goals or not" (Eames-Schwab, 1964). Elkan (1960: 134–38; also 1967) observed "perpetual flow between town and country" in Uganda, where the worker views his life "as a whole and is well aware that his income consists not solely, or even necessarily mainly, of wages and other benefits of employment, but also of the income which his family draws from farming in the countryside." If it was the "most economic choice" for the nineteenth-century English agricultural migrant to stay put in the towns, in "most parts of tropical Africa it clearly is not." In Northern Rhodesia, where tribal lands symbolize national freedom, the African keeps a foot in the rural camp however long he may have lived in town.

This state of affairs not only militates against the growth of a stabilized urban population; it also serves to maintain the Africans' interest in the land, and consequently in the tribe from which their claims to land derive (Epstein, 1958: 238–39).

Generalization, to repeat, is tricky. Berg (1965: 161–62) and Hance (1970: 142–61) survey the wide variety of African migration patterns, though the latter emphasizes a prevailing tendency to circularity. Kuper (1965: 120–22) points out the multiplicity and sociological subtleties of urban tribalism in comparing research on the Copperbelt, West Africa, and South Africa. The innovative, even protean possibilities of urban tribalism enthusiastically described for West Africa by Little (1965) must be set against the situation of migrants in Southern Rhodesia who are residentially segregated in towns and primarily confined to unskilled labor (Eames-Schwab, 1964). The "encapsulated" rural tribalism of "Red" migrants to East London, South Africa, contrasts with the experimentalism of "School" migrants (Mayer, 1963).

Despite the caveats, a few broad contrasts between Latin America and Africa-India still seem viable: (1) not only is urbanization in Africa-India less advanced than in Latin America, but regional village systems are more elaborate, have more adaptive resiliency vis-à-vis the urban impact, retain a stronger hold on the out-migrant; (2) tribal, village-caste, and rural kin or associational networks are making important and lasting contributions to the structure of urban society in Africa-India, however extensively they may become reworked. Because the creolized Ibero-Catholic societies of Latin American countries are more homogeneous (save for tribal com-

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munities of forest Indians),⁴¹ rural areas make fewer distinctive contributions to the urban environment. Sociologically speaking, less rural-urban dialectic occurs within the large cities—a point Roberts (1970b: 9) makes even for Guatemala, where one might have assumed considerable cleavage in this regard; (3) the fact that migrants in Africa-India are more likely than in Latin America to maintain a rural economic base accentuates circulatory migration and keeps rural economic alternatives open to lower-class urban workers.⁴² The very fact that rural Latin America is more “urbanized,” that its settlement patterns tend toward “dispersal and impermanence,” reduces possibilities for urban-rural symbiosis.

One need not discount the importance of city-village ties in Latin America in the form of kinship bonds, visiting habits, urban regional associations, or transplanted saints’ cults (Lewis, 1952; Mangin, 1965; Butterworth, 1970a; Browning-Feindt, 1971). They may selectively mitigate problems of culture shock, temporary indigence, and job placement. Durable economic relationships, however, are not plentifully reported. Roberts (1970b: 11) does find that 25% of his city-born and migrant family heads in Guatemala City go to the provinces for periods of a year or less to harvest coffee or maintain small farms; Doughty (1970: 42) states that remittances from a regional association in Lima are sometimes the sole source of external assistance for a rural community; temporary migration to La Paz for outside income is increasingly frequent (Preston, 1970: 19); and in Ecuador a majority of the internal migrants are seasonal (*pequeños comerciantes*, cane workers for coastal *ingenios*), though their destinations are not generally the large cities (Molina, 1965: 43).

Despite these cases there is little evidence that city-village ties in Latin America are widely supported by economic symbiosis between town and country; and if such ties yield more psychological than structural support, one can easily exaggerate their therapeutic potential. Mangin (1965: 314), Montoya (1967: 96), and Doughty (1970: 35) report factional splitting in the regional clubs of Lima, while migrant case histories for the city (Turner, 1970: 6; Mangin, 1970; Dietz, 1969) assign no role at all to regional associations at the critical moment of squatters’ invasions. In Brasília, Pastore (1969: 119) finds that the migrants’ home visits may increase their dissatisfactions and hinder their urban adjustment. For São Paulo, Berlinck (1969) reports that kinship systems are no less important for upper than for lower classes in adapting to social change and that for lower classes the resources of the extended family are largely consumed in mere “tension management.” Sayres (1965) suggests that *compadrazgo* is in part “a program of psychologically constricting and socially enervating restraints and controls” which engenders negative affect, then inhibits its release.

If primary-group ties, patron-client arrangements, and particularism are prominent in Latin American urban societies, it is not because these features are imported from the countryside but because they permeate entire national societies. Doughty’s analysis (1970) of the Lima regional associations makes clear that they are not exclusively or perhaps even primarily oriented to the priority needs of the lower-class migrant.⁴³ Club headquarters are regularly located in the inner city, not the

barriadas, and the prestige rankings of the clubs, or of members within a club, suggest that while they may help “integrate” poor migrants to city life, they also insert him into a control system whose more formal mechanisms are not fully articulated. Where, as in Buenos Aires, one finds regional groups specific to lower-class migrants, they serve the function of *insulation* (Margulis, 1968: 165–75). And in Guatemala, Roberts (1970a: 372, 379) discovers that while common village origin may inspire a clientage relationship, it cannot serve even for group insulation in the absence of a “situational basis for group solidarity among low-income families.” Where one does encounter effective organizations for non-patronal integration of the urban poor (squatters’ invasions, *juntas de vecinos*, cult groups), they are by and large unrelated to regional and ethnic backgrounds. The cumulative effect of urban pressures on lower-class locality groups is not to preserve or reorganize but to atomize them with the promise, however illusory, of external sources of succor or support (Medina, 1969; Roberts, 1970a.)⁴⁴

Some years ago Beals (1953: 172) posed this query with respect to cityward migrations: “Is it, by chance, easier to induce the radical culture changes of industrialization or urbanization if there is a wider gulf between the cultures rather than a narrower one?” Subsequent research in Latin America has tended to supply a commonsensical negative answer. Leeds-Leeds (1967) stress the importance of prior urban exposure in the adaptation of migrants, while Balán (1968) stresses educational and occupational status—whether or not the migrant is an urbanite—in assisting the transition. As Testa (1970: 96) intimates, such conclusions seem suspiciously in debt to Redfield’s folk-urban continuum; for Monterrey, in fact, Browning-Feindt (1968) go so far as to establish a socioeconomic migrant-native “continuum,” stepped in three plateaus.

From Africa, however, comes an affirmative reply to Beals’ question. In Nigeria, Henderson (1966) compared the adaptation to town life of persons from urban-based tribal communities and those from rural ones. Although urbanites are accustomed to greater diversification of roles, innovators among them may be forced into “situations which are particularistically defined in terms of these roles and prerogatives.” Innovation, or adaptation, may come more easily:

. . . when the urbanites’ tribal community is rural, remote, and lacking in educational advantages, for in this situation a “simplification” of the frame of reference occurs for the urban immigrants which makes possible a more universalistic approach to the organizational problems of city life (1966: 388–89).

What Henderson alludes to is not the protective or buffer function of rural folkways—which Lewis describes for Tepozteicans in Mexico City—but the rural tribesman’s potential for “radical” psychological response to urban conditions. In some African cities the spectrum of migrant backgrounds may be broader and the shape of future urban societies more innovative than is predictable for Latin America. The fact, however, that the Latin American rural exodus is becoming more cross-sectional—

that is, less selective for status and education (Quijano, 1967a: 11; Browning-Feindt, 1969)—may inject new catalysts, as well as “problems,” into the urban setting.⁴⁵

V. CITIES AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Research on Latin American urbanization shows increasing awareness that urban societies should not be considered in isolation from national societies. As points of demographic attraction, poles of economic growth, centers of institutional power, lightning rods for technological change, theaters of political ferment, or catalysts for cultural homogenization, cities are now seen to be critical centers of influence, whether for control or for development, over regional and national hinterlands. Three approaches to the role of cities in national development will be examined here: (1) geohistorical primacy analysis, concerned with urban hierarchies and with historical explanations for cases of preponderant growth; (2) regionalization analysis, or regional science, concerned with strategies that will decentralize impulses for change from privileged urban centers to spatially extended urban systems, attracting interstitial areas into the development orbit; (3) dependency analysis, concerned with systems of domination by which central places control peripheries through mechanisms sometimes referred to as “internal colonialism.”

Certain key issues may be highlighted in anticipation of the discussion. Primacy analysis turns us toward national systems, multifactoral explanations, and historical and comparative perspectives. As practiced by geographers, however, it relies on indicators and correlations that are short on explanatory value, while historical case studies give us trees but no forest. Regional science alerts us to spatial systems, natural ecological units, and possibilities for planned intervention in the development process but tends to neglect lessons of the past, to underestimate the logic and recalitrance of present institutional arrangements, and to exalt the role of enlightened technocracy. Although dependency analysis is realistic about historical determinants, its sobering institutional descriptions may conceal simplistic assumptions about the predatory compulsions of power groups that leave no margin for psychological considerations.

A. *Primacy*

Urban primacy has various definitions. Some refer to national pyramids of cities, ranked by population size, culminating in a primate city which is by one or another criterion abnormally large. Looser definitions emphasize concentration of functions and services. Interest attaches to the phenomenon because of the suspicion that primate cities may be dysfunctional, parasitic, and symptomatic of underdevelopment.

The fact that urban concentrations of population and functions are linked to complex sets of historical, institutional, economic, and cultural factors makes generalization perilous. Rejecting the hypothesis that primacy correlates with economic underdevelopment, Berry (1961; 1965) favors the assumption that progression from primacy to the lognormal stage occurs as societies become older and more complex

and the patterning effects of any single force become lost. His evidence is that when primacy is found in developed countries it is in small, less complex ones, while log-normal distribution may be found in large, less developed countries having long histories of urbanization. Linsky (1969) finds a major pattern of primacy in countries with "geographically limited, densely settled areas, low income, export-oriented and agricultural economies, a colonial history, and fast population growth." He discerns a secondary pattern in about half of the smaller highly developed countries, with further knowledge required to explain this finding. Mehta (1969) denies that primate cities are a function of level of economic development, industrialization, or urbanization. He finds primacy to correlate most strongly with small national areas and populations (though not with population density). He finds a slight correlation with export dependency on raw materials and also with per capita international trade.

Regional examination of primacy reduces variables without significantly facilitating generalization. Browning (1958) and Davis (1962) assert the primacy index for Latin America to be higher than for any other world region. Here Davis finds primacy loosely linked with several factors: "small size of the country, political centralization (including the combination of political, economic and ecclesiastical power), a 'tributary economy', and location of the government in the primate city." He also discerns a weak negative correlation between primacy and economic development (1962: 375). Wingo (1969: 121), on the other hand, suggests positive correlation with economic development in stating that the foremost cause of primacy is the need of developing countries for up-to-date technologies requiring organizational and institutional advantages of a minimum urban scale.

We know that severe shortages of technical, professional, and managerial skills characterize the state of underdevelopment. The economic scale of the primate metropolis may provide the threshold conditions for mobilizing such skills productively. As these thresholds are met, more conventional industrial technologies may benefit, thus expanding employment and reinforcing centralization tendencies.

Although the term "primacy" is used below for convenience, one might wish to distinguish between primacy and predominance. The question of whether a primate city (large population) is overcrowded or unhealthy resolves into the question of optimum size and a calculus of efficiency curves for public services and utilities, posing problems for the physical planner. The question of whether a predominant city (concentration of functions and power) is monopolistic, parasitic, or constraining for development requires analysis of national socioeconomic institutions. Optimum-size calculus focuses on the well-being of urbanites, socioeconomic analysis on the well-being of the tributary hinterland.

There are further complexities, however. First, although primacy-predominance rankings are based on national units, it may be that a large regional center such as Recife in a country with "normal" city-size distribution might pose more severe "problems" than the primate capital of a small Central American country. Second, primacy-predominance calculus may oversimplify urban-rural cleavage. On one hand,

many urbanites receive no benefit at all from the public services of a primate city, and on the other, while one may speak of a predominant city monopolizing utilities or industries, it is more difficult to speak of it monopolizing power in a country having regional patriciates. For example, Lima, with 20% of Peru's population, handles 97% of the country's financial affairs and 49% of its domestic commerce, employs 53% of its commercial and 67% of its industrial workers, produces 82% of its consumer and 92% of its durable goods (Saravia, 1968: 69–70). Yet the highland Indian departments in Peru, with 14% of the electorate, send 50 of the 185 representatives to the national Congress; to elect a representative in the department of Lima take five times as many voters as in the Sierra (Cotler, 1970: 422).

The ultimate challenge laid down by primacy analysis is historical explanation: "The same degree of primacy may be efficient or inefficient, depending on the effects produced . . . We believe that primacy in itself has few important consequences but that the factors responsible for it may be very significant" (Davis, 1962: 375). "In most countries," writes Browning (1958: 115), "the [primacy] pattern was set very early and subsequently never seriously modified."⁴⁶ Even more interesting than the exceptions to this statement is the process by which predestined primate cities consolidate comparative advantage. Three case studies are summarized below to illustrate different historical situations and contrasting modes of explanation. But first, a glance at the growth figures for Caracas, Santiago, and Buenos Aires (Tables 9–11) inspires the preliminary observation that all three cities show a primacy dip in the immediate post-independence period. This phenomenon, which seems to contradict customary assumptions about the expanded commercial and political functions of the new national capitals, dovetails with Halperin's assertion (1969: 140–49) that after independence, power was displaced from urban to rural zones. In many countries, he argues, the wars occasioned great loss of movable assets and capital, and wealth was more easily recreated on the land. Further, the institutions with which urban elites were identified lost power and prestige with the flare-up of antimetropolitan feelings. Formerly privileged urban groups skidded to subordinate stations in the new order, and high status became even more contingent than previously on political favor that afforded access to land.

In tracing the history of Caracas, Carrera (1967) takes the distant temporal horizon of 1577 when the government of the province was shifted there for economic and military reasons. For two centuries the city led a "precarious" life, cramped in a narrow valley, maintaining weak communications with its territory, providing amenities for a small agro-commercial patriciate. Its course toward primacy is explained by increments of bureaucratic and cultural function, with the establishment of a bishopric (1637), seminary (1696), military regiment (1708), and university (1722). In 1777, Caracas was designated capital of the new captaincy general, initiating "a second and important stage in its progress toward *capitalidad*;" it thenceforth became seat of an intendency (1777), audiencia (1786), consulado (1793), and archbishopric (1803). Caracas seemed "destined from the start to become step by step head of the Province and Captaincy."

The historian distinguishes between "full" and "limited" capitalidad on the eve of independence—"full" referring to the city's sway over urban centers in a semicircular hinterland 150 miles in radius, "limited" referring (1) to restricted politico-administrative influence over the whole country and (2) to lack of communication with even nearby rural zones. When the Venezuelan Congress of 1811–12 discussed convening at another site, contrary arguments featured reasons of prestige and sentiment: Caracas was the center of enlightened and influential opinion or, in the words of one deputy, "Caracas would be the same without the Congress, but the Congress would not be the same without Caracas." Perforce, Bolívar later made Angostura the provisional capital, but as a base from which to "reconquer the true historic capital," whose strategic importance was better appreciated once Spanish military, religious, and political power was galvanized there under pressures of war.

The political leadership of Caracas had not, Humboldt (1814–29: III, 442) found, made it a center of commerce like Mexico, Bogotá, or Quito. Each of the seven provinces of the captaincy had its own port, and the disposition of mountain ranges and rivers worked against the centripetal pull of the capital. Humboldt felt it an advantage that Venezuela's wealth was not "directed to one point," that its many towns of comparable size formed "so many centres of commerce and civilization." National independence did little to spur the growth of the capital. Although urban primacy is often associated with export-oriented or tributary economies, in this case the capital may even have lost commercial leverage. In the early national period:

... free trade stimulated the direct relation of each interior zone with its nearest port and the external markets, producing less and less dependence on Caracas, weakening commercial and cultural ties with it, and isolating the capital probably more than in colonial times. Each port was oriented overseas and to its own hinterland, a situation which would hold back the true unification and integration of the country for many decades while providing a setting for the caudillism and consequent political activity of the period (Carrera, 1967:64).

For decades Caracas failed even to keep pace with national population growth (Table 9). An upturn after 1880 is partly explainable by the new public works, rail and highway system, and communications facilities which benefited the capital in the 1870s. A stronger stimulus was the advent of the Gómez regime in 1908, which assured peaceful business conditions, marked the transition from regional *caciquismo* to centralized caudillism (Gilmore, 1964), and attracted regional elites and sinecure-hunters to the capital. Only after 1920, however, "did the relations and rhythm of urban life in Caracas grow complex" under the impact of petroleum profits (Carrera, 1967: 85). When finally industrialization took hold, the Caracas metropolitan area was favored because of its urban infrastructure and concentrated consumer demand (Maza, 1966).

The cases of Venezuela and Chile are loosely comparable if far from identical. The countries are of commensurate population and area. Both were peripheral zones of colonial administration. Both have historic agropastoral economies blessed by nine-

TABLE 9
Population Growth of Venezuela and Caracas

year	(a) population of Venezuela	(b) population of Caracas metropolitan area	(b) as % of (a)
1825	785,000	50,867*	6.48
1847	1,267,692	56,928*	4.49
1873	1,732,411	68,057	3.93
1881	2,005,139	77,911	3.89
1891	2,221,572	98,325	4.43
1920	2,479,525	118,312	4.77
1941	3,850,771	354,138	9.20
1961	7,523,999	1,336,464	17.76

* figures for the *cantón* of Caracas
Sources: Brito, 1966: I, 258–68; Llovera, 1966: 121.

teenth- or twentieth-century mineral bonanzas. Both capitals have ecologically central locations and nearby seaports, though in both cases the nineteenth-century routes that brought exports to world markets were for a time transversal ones that failed to interconnect the regions of the country and funnel exports through the capital.

As we saw, the historian’s study of Caracas stressed latent capitalidad, derived from long-term accrual of bureaucratic functions, which survived the centrifugal tendencies of the nineteenth century to polarize the migrations, commercial development, and industrialization of the twentieth. Santiago had a similar history of colonial predominance (Meza, 1958: 19–47); and although its post-independence growth did not quite keep pace with the country’s (Table 10), its development in services, transportation, and industry in those years was much in advance of Caracas. In explaining

TABLE 10
Population Growth of Chile and Santiago

year	(a) population of Chile	(b) population of Santiago	(b) as % of (a)
1835	1,010,336	67,777	6.71
1865	1,819,223	115,377	6.34
1875	2,075,971	129,807	6.25
1885	2,527,320	189,332	7.49
1907	3,231,022	332,724	10.30
1930	4,287,445	696,231	16.22
1960	7,772,000	1,907,378	24.54

Sources: Hurtado, 1966: 61 and Table 22; Statistical Abstract, 1967: 51.

population concentration in Chile, the economist Hurtado (1966) rehearses, then in effect dismisses, the long-term sedimentation of functions and prestige in Santiago when he speculates that as of 1860 Santiago, Valparaíso, and even Concepción were all in the running for primacy. Although certain commercial and transportation developments advantaged the capital over its seaport soon after that date, not until the early twentieth century, he believes, did Santiago clinch its primacy. Discounting stagnancy in the agricultural sector and the "unbalanced" regional distribution of public investment as explanations, Hurtado (1966: 134) hypothesizes that:

... it was the transformation of the Chilean economy from the production of raw materials toward the production of manufactured goods and of services for the internal market, that produced the concentration of population in Santiago between 1900 and 1930.

The historian's and economist's explanations are not necessarily incompatible (nor indeed would one expect duplicate treatments for Caracas and Santiago). One emphasizes long-term functional accrual with alternate periods of inertia and fresh momentum; the other is prepared to call off all historical bets from time to time and erect fresh calculi of economic factors. In both analyses, the capital seems a passive beneficiary of economic or administrative determinants somehow external to it. We fail quite to grasp the special magic of capitalidad in Latin America or the process which transforms "factors" into an urban presence. We perch on too precarious a tightrope between offhand generalization and self-evident phenomena. More serious, we find no purchase for the Durkheimian moral judgement. We are torn between the historian's gloomy reminder that four centuries of history weigh like an incubus on the chaotic, megaloccephalic capital and the economist's brisk assurance that impoverished migrants to the metropolis have made a rational, long-term choice, even though at the cost of short-term indigence and malnutrition.

A study of Buenos Aires written half a century ago by Juan Alvarez (1918) offers something of the integral vision that has become so elusive for contemporary social scientists.

From the eighteenth century on, the case of Buenos Aires draws apart from those of Caracas and Santiago. As the maritime entrepôt for a vast hinterland, Buenos Aires challenged the "insured primacy" of Lima, becoming itself a viceregal seat in 1776 (Céspedes, 1947). Although, like Caracas and Santiago, it suffered a primacy dip in the first half of the nineteenth century, its geohistorical advantages, the productivity of its agropastoral hinterland, and foreign immigration made it a metropolis by the century's end (Table 11). "There is no country in the world," wrote Alvarez (1918: 28), "of about 8,000,000 inhabitants and more than a million and a half in a single city." The Argentine case is of special interest to the primacy question because the Buenos Aires-interior dichotomy figures so prominently in the Argentine historical and literary imagination and because the long indecision over the location of the national capital caused political aspects of urban predominance to become fully articulated.

TABLE 11
Population Growth of Argentina and Buenos Aires

year	(a) population of Argentina	(b) population of Buenos Aires	(b) as % of (a)
1825	578,000	55,416 (1822)	9.59
1837	675,000	62,228 (1836)	9.22
1855	1,271,000	90,076	7.09
1869	1,913,029	239,059*	12.50
1895	4,046,761	781,611	19.31
1914	8,044,294	2,034,799	25.29
1947	16,058,765	4,723,918	29.42
1960	20,735,200	6,751,769	32.56

(*) figures from 1869 on for Greater Buenos Aires.

Source: Aparicio-Difrieri, 1958-63: VII, 94, 201, 202 and IX, 138.

Alvarez's exposition is in five parts. (1) The "problem." The Buenos Aires of 1918 represented an "artificial" concentration of functions. Its peripheral location placed its monopolistic commercial and warehousing facilities at an uneconomic distance from the national heartland, requiring excessive reliance on expensive foreign-owned railways rather than cheap river transportation. (2) Shipping. In the last third of the nineteenth century the port facilities of Buenos Aires were given preferential attention to make it the natural port of entry and distribution. Although secondary ports claimed an increasing share of the export traffic, they could not break the capital's stranglehold on imports. Thus while Buenos Aires handled 75.1% of the value of Argentine exports in 1873 and only 35.3% in 1913, its share of imports remained almost steady, shading off from 83.6% to 80.1%.⁴⁷ (3) Industry. The nineteenth century witnessed an exodus of industry from the Argentine interior to the capital; the 1869 and 1914 censuses show an absolute decline in textile workers in the interior. Alvarez gave four reasons for industrial investment in Buenos Aires: (a) Labor. The immigrants' preference for employment in the capital was reinforced by the elimination of immigrant reception centers in the interior in favor of a "colossal hotel" built in Buenos Aires in 1905 as "the only place where immigrants receive protection and lodging from the government." (b) The cartorial state. The pseudo-protectionist policies of the government created such cumbersome bureaucratic machinery, and the annual revision of customs duties was so responsive to personal pressures, that peripheral location severely disadvantaged industrial management. (c) Freight rates. Rates for rail cargoes were scaled "parabolically" to discourage warehousing or transshipment in other cities. (d) Credit. Public sources of credit, notably the Banco Hipotecario Nacional, favored investment in the capital. (4) The question of the capital. After Buenos Aires province rejoined the nation in 1862, it played reluctant host to the national capital for eighteen years. The

chief executives fully appreciated Buenos Aires' capitalidad, and four times they vetoed transfer of the capital elsewhere.⁴⁸ So great, however, was the regional concentration of national resources that *porteños* and their provincial governor saw large risks in federalizing their young metropolis. Capitalidad was not necessarily an advantage to be seized on by the patriciate of a wealthy, semiautonomous region. Conversely: "The laws which have transformed Buenos Aires into the overgrown head of the republic are spontaneous fruit of the will or *non curanza* of congresses in which the city was always in the minority" (Alvarez, 1918: 155). (5) Proposals. Aware of the impracticability of inducing an exodus from Buenos Aires, Alvarez outlined measures to stimulate internal development and the growth of several cities to an ideal size of 500,000 inhabitants. They included: decentralization of government offices (especially those dealing with agriculture, rural economics, irrigation, bridges and highways, health); rescaling of railway rates; protection for agriculture and manufactures; extension of credit; attracting immigrants to the interior. These proposals were linked to a scheme for two parallel urban axes extending inland from ports north (Rosario-Córdoba-Tucumán) and south (Bahía Blanca-Mendoza) of Buenos Aires. Whatever the economic or political feasibility of Alvarez's recommendations at the time, they are prophetic of modern prescriptions such as that of Hardoy (1967: 16) to: "Redistribute urbanization [in Argentina] in a few selected major poles . . . to maximize the effects of the investments concentrated in them and to emphasize their regional influence."

Alvarez's analysis of primacy is persuasive not only because he interrelated political and economic factors in historical context but also because, with the personal involvement of an educator and jurist, he perceived a city as shaped and shapeable by specific groups and persons.

A recent attack on the question of urban primacy by Vapñarsky (1969) uses Argentina as a case study but returns us to theoretical considerations. His formulation is refreshing in that it recognizes regional as well as national city distributions and it helps to identify successive historical stages. Vapñarsky assumes: (1) that city distribution must be considered in relation to ecological systems, not mere administrative or geographic units, and (2) that primacy and rank-size (lognormal) distributions are not mutually exclusive and are related to different variables. Thus, primacy depends on the level of closure or self-containment of an area (i.e., proportion of interactions beginning and terminating within the system) and rank-size distribution upon the level of internal interdependence or interaction of an area. This creates four possibilities, schematized in Table 12. By this analysis Argentina, at the time Juan Alvarez wrote, was moving from low closure-low interdependence (primacy, no rank-size distribution) to low closure-high interdependence (primate city or group, rank-size for the rest)—precisely the evolution his policies were designed to encourage.

Vapñarsky goes on to divide Argentina into six nodal regions and the "residual" area of Southern Patagonia. Four regions replicate the national pattern of a primate city followed by rank-size distribution (though the Bahía Blanca region, with less internal interdependence, is patterned more like the Argentina of 1869); two regions

TABLE 12

Variables Determining Urban Primacy and Rank-Size Distribution

		CLOSURE	
		high	low
INTERDEPENDENCE	high	rank-size rule applies to all cities (United States)	largest city or cities show primacy; rest follow rank-size rule (modern Argentina)
	low	no primate city nor clear rank-size pattern (undeveloped, isolated areas)	primate city linking with outside world; no clear rank-size pattern for other cities (19th-century Argentina)

Source: Adapted from Vapñarsky, 1969: 585.

(the Littoral and Cuyo) show “group primacy” followed by approximate rank-size distribution; and Patagonia remains ill-defined.

Vapñarsky’s two cross-cutting variables—closure and interdependence—serve as matrices for many factors and allow a focus on urban systems that is adjustable both temporally and spatially. His insistence that primacy and rank-size distribution may develop and coexist within a single system is congenial to the distinctive segmental patterns which the principles of hierarchy and modernization blend to create in contemporary Latin America.⁴⁹

If Vapñarsky offers the geographer a bridge from primacy analysis to regional science, Wingo offers one to the economist. While careful to distinguish between urbanization policy (focused on “the web of external relations among economic activities which gives the city its uniquely productive environment”) and regional development (focused on “natural resources, input-output relations, and accessibility”), Wingo (1969: 116–117) emphasizes the need to yoke the two. His own analysis interprets urbanization as a confluence of three productive factors: movements of labor or population, investment in industry, and investment in urban infrastructure. “These flows take place through quite distinct processes and at rates only partially interdependent” (1969: 130). Wingo raises key questions about the economies of scale which may be sacrificed when economic activities are decentralized; the feasibility of decentralization under the auspices of centralized yet uncoordinated national agencies; and the failure of planners to come to grips with

institutional resistance and the vagaries of the decision process. Thus his reflections link ahead to the balance of this paper.

B. *Regional Science*

In 1961, Rodwin (1964: 43) observed that economists, with rare exceptions like Hirschman, have taken a sectoral rather than a regional approach to the issues of development. Since then the gap has occasionally been bridged for Latin America, notably by Furtado, but we need only set Mamalakis' thesis of sectoral clashes and the accompanying commentaries (1969) alongside the papers of the recent regionalization seminars (Instituto, 1969a and 1969b) to see that exchange between sectoral and spatial analysts is still modest, despite their shared terminology ("growth poles," "leading" and "lagging" edges, "horizontal" and "vertical" interactions). Chilean planners seem to be an exception. Only five years ago Geisse (1965: 42) could claim that:

Chilean planners have restricted themselves to the sectoral distribution of investments and to objectives that only partially reflect the aspirations of the national community. The effect upon economic growth rates of the regional distribution of investments has not been taken into account to this day.

Yet in the late 1960's, Chile became the only Latin American country to fashion a regional development policy embracing its whole territory. In the absence of strong traditional regionalisms, the national government has avoided the usual phase of power conflicts and provided central guidance for "a pluralistic system of cooperation between national, regional and local forces." Chile has advanced far toward regionalizing the national budget, while many Latin American countries lack even basic information on how public investment is allocated in space. Chilean planners, in short, point the way toward linking regional with global and sectoral planning (Stöhr, 1969b: Annex 1; also Achurra, 1969).

Stressing the importance of urban systems or "fields" to the study of regions, Friedmann-Stöhr (1966: 4) accept the applicability to Latin America of a "propositional" regional science based on a body of testable hypotheses about city-size distributions, the spatial structure of economic activities, regional multipliers and linkage effects, core-periphery relations, and migration flows.⁵⁰ Drawing on three decades of accumulation of regional science literature (sampled in Friedmann-Alonso, 1964), Stöhr attempts in two broad papers to adapt the categories of regional analysis to Latin America (1969a) and to summarize Latin American regional development experience and prospects (1969b).⁵¹ Rather than venture such a head-on assault, I will approach some central issues through the work of John Friedmann, an active, articulate, and wide-ranging spokesman for the regionalists.

Friedmann's studies pay special attention to urbanization and are informed by broad experience in Latin America and elsewhere. They are also distinguished by the author's cross-disciplinary breadth and his conviction that the interests of practitioner and theorist should be complementary. The fact that he fails quite to resolve

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the tension between the specific and the general only enhances the heuristic value of his work.

In his studies of Latin American urbanization, Friedmann accepts the rural exodus and urban primacy pattern as healthy phenomena despite "serious social dislocations" (1964; also Friedmann-Lackington, 1967). Not only are large cities growth poles and sources of innovation transmitting economic change to smaller centers,⁵² but they accelerate "political development" and the erosion of elitism. When he considers urban systems rather than single cities, Friedmann (1969a) detects natural progression from simple to complex, imbalanced to balanced, and partially to fully integrated spatial structures. In this way, nations are eventually transformed into innovative systems with a generous capacity for self-renewal.⁵³

While Friedmann's grander passages suggest that spatially extended ecological systems develop and become integrated in obedience to transcultural laws, he is well aware that the process may go awry without informed human intervention. In Latin America he finds that the "hierarchical, authoritarian nature of social organization" follows a static or vegetative "bureaucratic" model rather than an "innovative" model which, when bombarded with pressures for change, "may transcend the goal of organizational maintenance to include the possibility of structural transformation" (Friedmann, 1968a). In a "bureaucratic" setting, the "self-reinforcing character of core region development" has positive results only to a point. Feedback effects eventually centralize services and innovation at the core, accentuating the imbalance between core and periphery. The dialectic then continues when innovative counter-elites at the core win control of the state apparatus and promulgate a populist ideology that purports to resolve the "crisis of inclusion." The dialectic finally comes to rest when such a nationalizing regime establishes a "reconciliation system" that draws marginal interest groups into the national polity.⁵⁴

In summary, economic and ecological forces conspire to produce hyperurbanization, or core development; this gives the national society a source of innovation while incubating political forces that will eventually pull the periphery into the development process. The planner's role becomes critical once unrestrained core growth proves detrimental, at which point he should "act upon social and economic processes . . . to guide society towards desired objectives" (Friedmann, 1967b: 229; see also Wingo, 1969: 122). His primary efforts should be directed neither toward "traditional" peripheries nor toward "neo-patrimonial" centers dependent on direct initiative from a capital city (such as remote petroleum towns). Rather, cities of 50,000 to 250,000 population should be chosen which have access to markets, rapid population growth, education facilities, a large blue- and white-collar sector, vigorous political traditions, and local pride. With this strategy Latin America may witness "a great new age of city building" in the next thirty years, with public effort:

. . . primarily directed towards the internal ordering of core regions and the creation and expansion of social development poles in the periphery within the context of national and multinational development policies (Friedmann, 1968b: 31; also 1969-70).

Friedmann's vision of national territories as composed of complex, spatially extended urban systems is a welcome corrective to the bifocal image of standard primacy analysis. What clouds this vision, however, is his hesitancy to reconcile the "scientific" and historico-cultural perspectives. On one hand, he accepts a regional science that beckons planners to guide ecological systems in their inevitable path toward integration and self-development (Friedmann, 1970). The planner—however sensitive to constraints of time, place, and culture—is thus to exhibit a scientific "cool" and orientation to universals that distinguish him, say, from the architects of colonial Iberian mercantilism or from an "involved" public figure like Juan Alvarez. On the other hand, Friedmann dichotomizes the United States and Latin America as innovative and bureaucratic societies, so that one wonders how the latter is ever to internalize a self-generating capacity for innovation—assumed as part of the universal process of ecological development. Might not the cultivation of secondary core regions simply fragment or syncopate the polarization of core-periphery relationships, some geographically extended, others not?⁵⁵ As T. dos Santos (1969: 46) has warned:

Development is not a technical matter nor a transition guided by technocrats and bureaucrats toward a society defined by models more or less anchored in a formal abstraction from past experiences.

Development is an adventure of peoples and of humanity.

What some planners find hard to face is that to infuse a "bureaucratic" society with self-fueling innovation may require revolutionary surgery. Social and institutional overhaul, that is, may be the prerequisite for mediating the requirements of organic solidarity to those of cultural ethos. Professional ethic or affiliation often commits the planner to an evolutionary view. He classifies access highways as innovation and urban guerrilleros as a dysfunctional nuisance. In Friedmann's case, a mildly ethnocentric definition of the "pluralistic interest-bartering system" kindled sanguine expectations for Venezuela and Frei's Chile, and even led for a while to the surmise that Brazil's 1964 crisis signaled a political realignment under which "force is slowly giving way to compromise in the management of national affairs as it becomes evident that power among old and new core regions must be shared" (Friedmann, 1967c: 55).⁵⁶

Mention should be made of two radical departures from the standard Harvard-M. I. T. urban development model so generously diffused in Latin America by North American philanthropy. The Bolivian new-town movement is unorthodox because of the *form* it takes (populist, grass-roots proliferation of minute urban centers where none existed); the Cuban reform, by contrast, follows the standard prescription rather closely (cultivation of secondary urban growth poles, strengthening of the urban network) but obeys an unorthodox *political dynamic*. The 1952 Bolivian Revolution unleashed social and political forces which have led to widespread creation of new highland towns. One might venture that they bear the same relationship

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to the nation's traditional system of cities that a *juntas de vecinos* movement bears to the archaic municipal structure of a single metropolis. Although the government encourages the new towns, the driving force comes direct from the communities (Marshall, 1970). Rural workers have reacted to their long victimization by urban monopolists. Aware of the benefits of urban life, yet aware also of the hostility that awaits rural migrants in cities, the *campesino* perceives no alternative but to create "an urban nucleus in his own community." As Preston (1970: 27) summarizes the process:

Attempts to use the pre-Revolutionary urban market centres for the dissemination of ideas seem doomed to failure. Such towns, even though undeniably changed, are socially very distinct from the countryside, and the nature of their relationship with rural communities seems to be still partly exploitive. The new towns on the other hand are more broadly based, more rapidly growing, and have a wider range of connexions with purely rural population. To the rural people these towns offer a socially attractive alternative to the larger more mestizo-dominated towns.

In Cuba the urban policies of the Revolutionary government are creating:

. . . a transformation of urban-rural relationships quite different from the kind of urban predominance toward which the other countries are moving. The urban upper and middle strata . . . have been eliminated through emigration and socialization of commerce, industry and professional practice. A two-way flow of population between city and countryside is systematically encouraged . . . while development policy—after some vicissitudes—has favoured large-scale "industrialized" agriculture over urban industry (Wolfe, 1967a: 13).

The 1962 ban on new construction in Havana helped slow the city's growth to 2.2% a year, as against 3% for the nation and 5% to more than 8% for medium and small towns. For the past three or four years, Havana's population seems to have steadied at about 1,750,000. Migrations are encouraged to centers of agricultural production, industry, or maritime activity such as Cienfuegos, Santiago, Camagüey, Bayamo, Sancti Spíritus, centrally located Santa Clara, the fast-growing manufacturing port of Nuevitás on the north coast, the mining town of Levisa in Oriente, and experimental Ciudad Sandino in Pinar del Río. The old mid-island axial rail and highway route, with its transversal spurs to the sugar ports, is now being complemented by two parallel routes (La Esperanza to Sagua-la-Grande on the north coast, Artemisa to Trinidad on the south) that will eventually form a true network. As Pérez de la Riva (1967: 109) summarizes the trend and the aspiration:

Hundreds of socialist villages with tens of thousands of modern houses supplied with running water, electricity, and European-type community services now shelter workers on the popular farms, a population formerly dispersed in huts little different from those of the Indians who peopled the island in the 15th century.

In a few more years this effort will change the face of the Cuban countryside. From a nation with scattered settlement, a showcase capital, and a few dozen sleepy, dusty little towns, it will create a new country with a populaion clustered in modern

villages and a network of medium towns of 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, appropriately distributed, animated, and aware of their individual function.

One instrument for decentralization is the Cuban urban reform legislation of 1959–60 (Vega, 1963), designed to abolish special privilege in urban society, erase the influence of elite groups on urban ecological patterns, and suppress speculation in urban and suburban land (Hardoy, 1970c). Castells (1970a: 58) adduces the Cuban and Chinese cases as evidence that accelerated primate urbanization is not an inevitable feature of underdevelopment and that spatial organization is a function of the system of production. Emphasizing the political premises of urban policy, he points out that key elements of the Cuban strategy (restraint of Havana's growth, rural development, nationwide expansion of the settlement network) are explained by the popular base of the Revolution, the agricultural stress in economic planning, military preparation for eventual guerrilla war, and the desire to minimize social differences among occupation groups.

In his plea for an "urban reform" having structural or even "revolutionary" connotations long associated with agrarian reform, Hardoy (1970a) recognizes contemporary Cuba as Latin America's only effective example. He stresses the need for comprehensive urban and regional strategies that will break the colonial mold of spatial settlement and at the same time revive certain powers of the old mercantilist state to permit its intervention in the urban and suburban land market. The position of Matus (1969), like Hardoy's, is more boldly stated than Friedmann's, if not wholly incompatible with it. He construes hyperurbanization and the regional development of peripheries not as Friedmann's sequential stages but as "vertical" and "horizontal" alternatives open to contemporary planners. Vertical development displaces resources toward existing population centers, profiting by economies of population density and infrastructure. Horizontal development displaces people toward resources, planning successive growth poles to appropriate new territory. Merely to cultivate "islands of modernity," Matus feels, has little potential for spreading development or absorbing marginal people, while merely to regionalize a national development plan reallocates resources but tacitly accepts an existing spatial system. He does not share Wingo's qualms (1969: 122) about the comparative cost of vertical and horizontal development. If the latter resolves problems of marginality, income distribution, and territorial occupation (an awesome "if"), one can compare its "cost" only with another strategy which attains the same goal. To *set* this objective is a political act.

The regional planner, then, may view himself as a midwife attending the parturition of ecological process or a Prometheus who creates anew. In either case his preoccupation with systems and resources may deceive him into thinking that his attempt to articulate priorities and strategies for spatial settlement has no historical precedents, that the ancient logic of institutions is easily snapped, and that patronage from above is more essential to success than collaboration from below.⁵⁷ Such assumptions are challenged by those institutional analysts who are convinced that patterns of social, political, and economic dominance cannot be broken by regional-

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ized planning from on high and may even be hardened by development and industrialization. Whereas Higgins (1969) asks that planners be receptive to multiple criteria for regional differentiation in underdeveloped nations (rich-poor, leading-lagging, new-old, frontier-metropolitan, dependent-independent) and for regional interaction (backwash, spread, and ratchet effects), many institutionalists assert the standard interregional relation in Latin America to be "colonial" dependency on metropolitan cores and the standard interaction to be limited "spread" from core to periphery. Under such conditions political mobilization must precede regional development.

If on one hand, then, Friedmann perceives the polarization of periphery and metropolitan core as a transitional stage toward the integration of spatial systems, the "internal colonialism" arguments construe it to reflect deep-seated institutional rigidities. The significance of this distinction is accented when we observe that once Friedmann elaborates his theory of core-region development for national societies he then inflates it for application at the level of international relations (1967c: 35–45), thus transferring to the global arena his guarded optimism about the evolutionary integration of national units. The internal colonialists, on the other hand, derive their theory from the international scene and shrink it to intranational dimensions, thus translating into microcosmic terms the standard account of international spoliation by the great powers.

C. Dependency

The internal colonialism argument bears on the study of cities insofar as they are alleged to be centers of "colonial" domination. In his chapter "Internal Colonialist Development and Capitalist Underdevelopment," Frank (1969: 190–201) asserts that "the São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro national metropolis" subjects the rest of Brazil, especially the Northeast, to "capitalist satellitization and exploitation." This occurs because of concentration of private and public investment in the "national metropolis," a regressive tax structure, and systematic transfer of economic surplus from satellite regions. The metropolitan bourgeoisie, in the service of international capitalism, serves as the agent of this exploitation, which victimizes the urban poor as well as the geographically satellite population. Thus Brazil is not a dual (capitalist-feudal) society, but one that is economically "integrated" for metropolitan-satellite exploitation.⁵⁸

T. dos Santos (1969: 58–61) criticizes Frank for perpetuating the ethnocentrism of nineteenth-century Marxist critics who failed to perceive imperialism from the viewpoint of client nations and who assumed that overseas investments would cause economic development in colonial areas once the metropolitan economies stagnated or collapsed. Dependency implies more than economic satellitization, Santos argues, and underdevelopment is not a stage preliminary to capitalism but a consequence and particular form of it—namely, dependent capitalism—which conditions the whole form and logic of a nation's internal structures.⁵⁹

This more perceptive approach is adopted in part at least by the ECLA analyses (Quijano, 1967b; *Urbanization*, 1968: 81–86), which hold that the entire history of Latin American urbanization since the conquest has been a “dependent process,” marked by an eighteenth-century watershed when the change from the market structure of colonial mercantilism to that of industrial capitalism shifted the axis of South American urban development from the Andean zone to Chile and the Atlantic countries. Each of these phases of international dependency exerted regional influences on the structure of urban networks and the organization of urban societies.⁶⁰ Without perhaps appreciating fully the implications, Quijano emphasizes that dependency relations extend beyond the economic and political realm to other orders of the dependent society, above all the cultural and psychosocial; dependency therefore denotes a reciprocal relationship, not one unilaterally imposed from without (1967b: 4, 15). Just as Latin America’s established urban centers of economic growth are dependent on metropolitan centers overseas, so they in turn dominate domestic, newly urbanizing zones which are still preindustrial. Quijano (1967b: 43–44) therefore challenges Friedmann’s argument that urbanization is linked with development. On the contrary, he maintains, it intensifies internal colonialism and “stimulates underdevelopment;” rational guidance of the urbanization process has no development potential unless external dependency is first eliminated.

A more intricate picture emerges from a focus on relations among social groups rather than on international flows of money, products, and control. González Casanova (1965: 36–37) lists 37 characteristics of internal colonialism, grouped under three headings: “monopoly and dependence,” “relations of production and social control,” “culture and living standards.” He finds internal colonialism to bear resemblances both to urban-rural relations in a traditional society and to international colonialism; it differs from them, however, because it arises from an encounter between two races or cultures that accentuates the ascriptive character of the society. It differs also from class exploitation in early industrial England in that it is not merely a relation of owners to propertyless workers, but a relation between two “total populations,” each with its own class structure. Internal colonialism in Mexico can therefore be seen in two complementary forms: the commercial and credit monopoly by which urban centers⁶¹ decapitalize Indian communities, and the exploitation of Indians by the different social classes of Ladinos.

On this analysis, internal colonialism in its pure form affects only 10% of the Mexican population “at the crossroads of Ladino and Indian Mexico.” As Indians adopt the ways of the national culture, they enter the national class structure. Although at “the national level the problem is certainly not a racial one,” the colonial sector interacts with the national society to produce a “continuum of colonialism” extending to “regions and groups in which only residues of paracolonialist manipulatory forms remain.” Internal colonialism, presented in its structural rather than psychologistic or value-oriented dimensions, is thus perceived as arising at grass-roots urban-rural and Ladino-Indian thresholds and, at the national level, as dictating discriminatory government policies.

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In a more historical analysis of the Middle American case, Stavenhagen (1969: 193–264; 1970), who claims his study falls within González Casanova's "general approach," contrasts the "colonial" relationships under Spanish rule with the class relationships of contemporary "internal colonialism." In the early period, "the Indian society as a whole confronted colonial society." Colonial relationships, based on mercantilist interests, eventually became intermixed with class relationships, based on capitalist ones. Many Indians were drawn into a class structure and ceased being Indians; yet by and large: "Colonial relationships dominated class relationships." It was left for the expansion of the capitalist economy after the mid-nineteenth century to transform the national society itself into a colonial society and produce the phenomenon of "internal colonialism." This transition from ethnic to socioeconomic stratification has been unsteady because Ladino and Indian groups are often ambivalent, for their respective reasons, about the advantages of the transition. (Indeed, Stavenhagen asserts that "Ladinos have not yet acquired a capitalist spirit".) But wherever capitalist economy has managed to penetrate, "relations between colonizer and colonized, between Ladino and Indian, were transformed into class relationships."⁶² The city's privileged position is still maintained; once an instrument of conquest, it remains today—as for González Casanova—a center of monopsonic commercial exploitation. The asymmetrical relationship between city and country, however, masks what is fundamentally a class relationship between groups with differential access to the means of production and the distribution of wealth.

On one hand, then, González Casanova distinguishes internal colonialism from class exploitation, describing the former as a dual society composed of two populations—each with its internal class structure—which are in a dominant-submissive relationship. Stavenhagen, on the other, holds that Indian communities are incorporated into the class system of the national capitalist economy. His formulation, that is, allows accommodation between two points of departure for the internal colonialism argument: interethnic relations (González Casanova), and international capitalism (Frank, Quijano). In extrapolating "colonialism" to the national society, however, he may add an eighth "fallacy" about Latin America to the seven he has so persuasively identified (1968).

For one thing, the argument overlooks the dual marginality that Butterworth (1970b) reports for Tilantongo. Here the Indian, though estranged from his own community, "does not feel so alienated from the nation because of his relative unawareness of national institutions." The mestizo, on the other hand, because he dominates a community which is in economic decay, feels "alienated from the institutions which embody national Mexican progress." Yet even with this nuance, the imputation of asymmetry to urban-rural relations in Middle America may be Ladino-centric. From the Indians' viewpoint the town may not represent an agent of domination but a supplier of needed services (commercial, health, educational, technical, religious) to be used selectively, guardedly, and without cultural surrender. In Guatemala City, Reina (1966: 73–78) reports, the Indians of nearby Chinautla:

... act with indifference to the market surroundings and behave as they are expected to

behave at home. Although the ways of the city market are well known and used by them while in the city, *very little there is considered valuable*. This aloofness to the ways of the market thus preserves them from the psychological stress that would surely result from any attempt to reconcile the competitive values needed to operate in the market with those values needed for living at home. [Italics supplied].

The pueblo's contacts with the city are felt to be extensions for survival, not an external pressure, "and the psychological accommodation has not been toward the city, but vice versa."

The internal colonialism argument tends to be short on institutional as well as cultural description. Cotler (1970) observes that the writers discussed above "endeavor to explain the relations between metropolitan and peripheral social strata—without explaining how this situation is linked with the metropolitan region and its different social sectors." By what mechanisms, for example, is the status of the Puno mestizo sustained from the metropolis and the coast? And what implications have they for the larger social system? Cotler describes for Peru a nationwide system of internal domination of which Indian-mestizo relations and economic exploitation are limited manifestations. He asserts that the system as a whole is determined by privatization of power by the "oligarchy" and a "segmentary" orientation of the social sectors. As change occurs, segments of the population are incorporated to positions of dominance over the peasant mass and urban unemployed. As the system becomes pluralized it loses its traditional clientage features and allows subordinate groups to shift among different sources of influence in an institutionalized setting that limits the power of patronal figures. At the same time the system is not really "opened," because the organized sectors aspire more to particularized benefits than to generalized, open-ended possibilities for mobility.⁶³

The shifting dependencies of increasingly numerous subordinate groups throw the burden of response on the state and weaken the role of middlemen. Pressures for structural change emanate both from the urban proletariat and, independently, from the rural peasantry as it is released from servility by the process of *cholificación* (see Quijano, 1964). Sociopolitical innovation is thus associated neither with the urban setting exclusively nor with a national class stratum but with the mobilization of certain depressed sectors of both urban and rural population.⁶⁴ In short, Cotler's analysis—which offers a contemporary analogue to what I elsewhere call (1969a: 309–11) Gilberto Freyre's patriarchal "field theory" for nineteenth-century Brazil—provides a more adequate sociopolitical matrix than does most dependency theory for the study of growth poles and spatially extended urban systems.

The term "colonialism"—which presumably denotes a relationship between two systems showing discontinuities of structure and inherent purpose—is richer in political implication than analytical nuance. T. dos Santos (1969: 64) disputes the notion that Latin American elites are "alienated" and perceive their countries as "colonies." Rather, the *dominateur dominé* is the inevitable role of dominant groups in the culture of dependency:

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The concept of alienation leads to falsifying reality, and one must replace it with the concept of "compromise" among the various international and national actors in the situation of dependency.

The designation "colonial" might be salvageable to cover certain interethnic situations in Latin America or *certain forms* of international influence and manipulation. Applied to the workings of a total national society, however, the term becomes tendentious, while applied to relations between "city" and "country" it obfuscates. There are of course suitable perspectives from which to view "the city" as a discrete entity. But when we enter the domain of collective attitude and social action, the city becomes a theater, not a player—a node of forces, not a quantum of energy. As Buechler (1970: 70) concludes from research in the northern highlands of Bolivia, it is by discovering linkages and parallels of city institutions with those of smaller settlements, "rather than by seeing cities, towns, and peasant communities as separate, bounded entities, that changing Andean social systems can best be studied." Cities and rural areas "do not constitute two specialized poles. Rather the city simply occupies a privileged position in an otherwise undifferentiated system" (Buechler, 1968: 55).

Several social scientists explore the hazards of easy analogies and linkages between patterns of external and those of internal domination (including national urban systems). Kaplan (1970) warns against a mechanistic, Manichean construction of dependency, noting that in Latin America the state, arbitrating between a national society and a metropolis, may profit by certain international situations to force a path toward greater autonomy. Dependency is thus a structural feature, not an external variable, and constitutes "a global and contradictory social process." Rofman (1970), who relates the shape of Latin American urban systems to successive varieties of external domination, speaks of national "frontiers" between internal and external systems of power that have varying degrees of permeability; in many countries these frontiers were stiffened in the period 1930–50, although inertial forces greatly dissipated the impact of this change on urban systems.

Cardoso-Faletto (1969) treat the problem with special attention to national differences. While recognizing that Latin American countries are proceeding from the stage of "outward" to that of "inward" development without benefit of prior mobilization of internal resources (unlike Japan, USSR, China), these authors also refuse to admit a "metaphysical" relation of dependency among nations. "Such relations become possible, concretely, through a network of interests and pressures which establish links among social groups and classes" (1969: 162). Neither external dependency nor underdevelopment implies that a national history is a mere reflex of shifts in external hegemony, although such shifts obviously condition national autonomy. As foreign interests relocate their engagement from export sectors to internal markets, new alliances with urban groups take shape. Industrial growth on the periphery of the international capitalist system:

. . . minimizes the effects of typically colonial exploitations and requires solidarity not

merely with the dominant classes but also with the cluster of social groups linked to modern capitalist production: white collar workers, technicians, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, and so on (1969: 164).

Within the structural limits of each country, the action of groups, classes, organizations, and social movements may maintain, modify, or break the links of dependency. The "course of events" thus issues from an internal dynamic, "without an understanding of which no political science is possible."

In exploring approaches to the role of cities in national development this paper ventures no grand synthesis. It merely tries to identify shortcomings and complementary strengths. Informed use of all three orientations seems required, whether for the task of reconstructing and explaining the historic course and regional patterns of urbanization in Latin America or for the not unrelated task of adumbrating political, institutional, and technical strategies for today. Many of the studies cited are evidence that parochial boundaries, whether national, disciplinary, or methodological, are evaporating in this enterprise.

NOTES

23. Larson-Bergman (1969: 289–90) caution against exaggerating the innovative potential of the "new" technicians, who "do not appear as a new power but rather as an interesting development within the administrative elite." Johnson (1968–69: 84) finds no shred of evidence that Chile's "entrepreneurial and propertied classes possess a nationalist, developmentalist, or reformist orientation."
24. No attempt is made here to survey the literature on social structure, social change, and political behavior in urban Latin America. For bibliography and research inventories see Rabinovitz-Trueblood-Savio (1967), Rabinovitz (1968; 1969), Daland (1969), Nelson (1969), Leeds-Leeds (1968), and Cornelius (1970).
25. Heintz (1964) points the way for those who would save the anomie concept for contemporary developing societies. He distinguishes among individual anomie (marginality, isolation), collective anomie (symbolic participation in the institutional order), and interinstitutional anomie (maladjustments among the political, educational, and economic orders), showing how transformations occur from one type to another.
26. See, for example, the United States urban case study by Powell (1962).
27. I have not followed Merton's distinction (1964) between "anomie" (a property of the social system) and "anomia" (state of mind of an individual within the social system); it presumably corresponds to the distinction made by Heintz and Cardona between *anomia colectiva* and *anomia individual*.
28. Criticizing Merton in their Santo Domingo study, Corten-Corten (1968: 88–89) suggest that when a society provides insufficient means to attain desirable goals, ". . . why not imagine that this same society might create deviant institutions? Deviance would thus be located at the level not of social but of cultural structure. *In this way society would offer to individuals diverse patterns of parallel or concurrent behavior.*" (See also Corten, 1967: 68–73.) The question of religious ethic and urban change is further treated in Morse, 1969b; 1971b.
29. Along with deviance and anomie, the terms "alienation" and "marginality" need refurbish-

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- ing for the Latin American context; see Yalour-Soubie, 1967; Nun-Murmis-Marín, 1968; ECLA, 1969: 82–88.
30. Maris (1969: 178) reexamines "fatalistic" suicide, which Durkheim dispatched in a footnote, and finds it important as a reaction to external constraint.
 31. The urban poor of Guatemala "are active manipulators of urban social organization. They, however, see themselves as apart from the formal mechanisms by which this social organization is maintained or changed" (Roberts, 1970a: 379).
 32. "Fatalism" here designates not a motivational or integrative disorder of the personality but an assumption—no more or less realistic than others—about the exercise of power in society.
 33. With possible inconsistency Lewis (1968: xlv) elsewhere noted a "striking contrast" between tribal African and rural Latin American migrants because the village ties and "well-organized traditional culture" of the former inhibit formation of "a full-blown culture of poverty in many of the African towns and cities." Since Lewis defined the culture of poverty both as a form of marginalization in capitalist societies and as a protective response to marginalization, it is not wholly clear whether this statement meshes with the one quoted in the text.
 34. In fairness one should add that Lewis came to be pommelled immoderately for his lack of conceptual rigor (Opler, 1968; Valentine, 1968; Silberstein, 1969; González, 1969). After all, the immediacies he so voluminously and perceptively reported scarcely required elaborate theoretical validation.
 35. "Civic" structure refers to administrative policies governing location and housing of migrants. Rogler (1967) contrasts three Latin American cities in this respect.
 36. Critical comments by other scholars are appended to both the Epstein and Balán articles.
 37. Trout (1968) distinguishes among "structural assimilation" (integration to functional institutional roles), "acculturation" (acquisition of attitudes and knowledge pertinent to urban society), and "adjustment" (degree of psychological stress experienced).
 38. Piddington (1965) gathers several studies of kinship and spatial mobility in India and Africa. Bailey (1961) offers a distinction between tribe and caste.
 39. González (1970) advances the term "neoteric" to describe "nontraditional" societies conspicuous in modern Latin America, whether rural (plantation workers) or urban (squatters), characterized by varied ethnic origins, relative poverty, "openness," secularity, technicways in lieu of folkways, face-to-face relations, and organizational inventiveness.
 40. Pozas (1962) documents the now-famous case of one return migrant and his problems of readjustment to a Mexican Indian village. From research in Brazil, Sahota (1968: 242) suspects that at some point on the urban ladder prospects of higher earnings exert more influence on migration flows than does the mere size of target cities.
 41. For the urbanization of tribal Amerindians see Oliveira (1968) and Watson (1968).
 42. Gutkind (1969: 391), however, observes that should an agrarian revolution in Africa cause a wholesale shift from subsistence to surplus cropping and an exodus from agricultural activities, then for many urban Africans "the break with the land and rural traditions is likely to be complete and final."
 43. Doughty loosely compares the regional clubs to immigrants' associations in the United States, neglecting a central finding of the classic Thomas-Znaniecki study of Polish immigrants,

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namely, that membership in influential voluntary association was largely restricted to immigrants who had already "made it."

44. Family control of mobility made for "smoother" urbanization in Japan precisely because younger sons who were not to inherit property were judiciously exported to *make their own way* in cities. "The younger son came to the city at a time of life when he was able to learn new urban patterns, and there was no strong kinship or provincial association in the city which interfered with his rapid adaptation" (Vogel, 1963: 257).
45. In a preliminary study of the responsiveness of Chilean rural culture in urban settings, Ronceray (1966) finds it "very elastic" with respect to "symbols of social participation."
46. This was not true of little-urbanized Central America. Coronel (1962: 112–19) describes the "bucolic" society of colonial Nicaragua. "Aristocratic" Cartago, colonial capital of Costa Rica (founded 1564), was overtaken in population and resources by "liberal" San José (founded 1736), where the capital was transferred in 1823 (Fernández, 1941: 89–110). As late as 1920, San Salvador, with a population of 66,000, was larger than Santa Ana by only 6,000 (Tricart, 1964: 230).
47. Examining economic causes for Buenos Aires' growth in the last century, Cortés Conde (1968) shows that it correlates with level of imports and of public and private investment, rather than with exports and the agropastoral productivity of the hinterland, as was the case with the port of Rosario. This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that Buenos Aires' annual growth rate dropped from 5.5% to 3.9% in the early 1890s, while Rosario's rose from 4.5% to 8.7%.
48. Gandía (1969) summarizes Alberdi's contemporary analysis of the problem.
49. In contrast, the exclusively national focus of Unikel (1968: 160–61) leads to a one-sided stress on the diminution of primacy and the emergence of a network of interdependent cities.
50. The propositions of a universal regional science need to be uncommonly versatile, however, to accommodate Stöhr's distinction (1969a: 82) between European countries that have aggregated "units of regional consciousness into larger states" and Latin American ones where "nation-building has rather started from the continental level downward by disaggregation."
51. The recent seminars (Instituto, 1969a and 1969b) contain regionalization studies for many individual countries; see also the extensive analysis for Brazil (Fundação IBGE, 1968).
52. Pedersen (1970) offers a statistical study of innovation transmission; his analysis of diffusion within the Chilean urban system is considerably more sophisticated than his analysis of diffusion among Latin American national systems. For small town-to-village diffusion see Poggie-Miller (1969).
Urban-to-rural diffusion presents somewhat different problems. In rural São Paulo, Nicholls (1967) finds capitalization and productivity of agriculture to correlate positively with proximity to industrial-urban centers. Martins (1969), however, questions the metropolitan "spread" effect for the Paraíba valley, where he finds modern, capitalistic enterprises to be less profitable than traditional, labor-intensive, unspecialized *caipira*-type farming with its low marginal costs. Paiva (1969: 230) shows that mechanization of Paulista farms greatly increases yields, both per acre and per worker, but also causes a stiff rise in unit costs of production. Finally, Singer (1963: 161–62) asserts that the reserve labor pool in traditional Paulista agriculture keeps wages depressed in the modernizing sector.
Darwent (1968) offers a critique and bibliography of the "growth pole" literature.
53. Elsewhere (1971a) I question Friedmann's unilinear view of historical process and his exclusive identification of innovation—used in so broad a sense—with large cities.

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54. The scheme is outlined in Friedmann (1967c); partial applications are made to Venezuela (Friedmann, 1966; 1969c) and Chile (Friedmann-Lackington, 1967).
55. Thus in each of Peru's subordinate regions, Cotler (1970: 410) observes, "stratification relationships of the same nature are produced and successively repeated in a branching pattern." In a critique of "development pole" theory, Casimir (1968) asks whether a core region may not be a manifestation rather than a source of development. Even Friedmann's recent work (1969-70) is tinged by a more somber note.
56. This appraisal of Brazil was finally omitted from the fourth revision of the paper (1969b)!
57. Disputing the third point, Utria (1969) stresses the importance of the social component of development, of the need to motivate, capacitate, and organize people in lieu of treating them as object or beneficiary. (See also ECLA, 1969: 287-302).
58. Yalour-Soubie (1967: 133-62) makes a similar analysis for Argentina. From five case studies of Brazilian cities, however, Singer (1969) concludes that foreign investment is an efficient but far from sufficient cause of regional disequilibria.
59. Lewis (1968) and Leeds (1969) seem not to have recognized this distinction when they respectively linked the culture of poverty and squatter settlements to "capitalist" societies.
60. Furtado (1968: 91) and Kaplan (1970) further distinguish between the developmental implications of nineteenth-century British hegemony, based on international division of labor, and of twentieth-century United States hegemony, based on international projection of an oligopolistic market structure. (Also Cardoso-Faletto, 1969: 39-101; Fernandes, 1970; T. dos Santos, 1969).
61. Here the urban centers are not national metropolises but towns like Tlaxiaco (the market town studied by Marroquín, 1957), San Cristóbal, and Huauchinango.
62. Even *compadrazgo* is seen as a mechanism of subordination and is thus purged of *Gemeinschaft* qualities fondly ascribed to it by anthropologists.
63. Piel (1969) adds historical and extranational dimensions to Cotler's explication. Matos Mar (1969) provides both conceptual and illustrative studies for the Peruvian case; see in particular the analysis (132-34) of how Lima dominates a microregion through a mediatory town, an example of what Friedmann (1969-70: 180) calls "nested hierarchy." Pascal's Chilean case study (1968) also documents Cotler's argument.
64. See Delgado's criticism (1968) of class stratification analysis as applied to Peru.

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