

prone to revolutionary overthrow, the more adequately it has fulfilled its 'historical mission' of developing the forces of production. As Martin Nicolaus points out (see his Foreword, and also *New Left Review* 48, March/April 1968), this adds much to the material on the 'breakdown of capitalism', Marx's views on which are too often rigidified by his disciples.

To look back, then, for a moment. What is the connection between the *Grundrisse* and, for example, the *Paris Manuscripts*? Here Nicolaus's Foreword is less sound. He seems intent on downgrading the 1844 work, but his evidence is at best weak, at worst plain wrong. He furthers a common misapprehension, which arises, I believe, mainly from the fact that people either skip over, or else completely ignore, the first third of the *Paris Manuscripts*: in these, Marx is just as much, and as straightforwardly, an *economist* as he was ever to be in later works. Before we get down to 'alienated labour' and so on, we have long sections on wages, profits and rent, on which Marx unequivocally bases the subsequent 'philosophical' critique. It may be asked whether this 'over-philosophising' of the early Marx really matters. It does matter: firstly, because it is important anyway to get important thinkers right; secondly, and far more importantly, because as the 'philosophy' comes to be increasingly built into the 'economics' during the course of Marx's lifetime, it is vital to grasp the relations between economic analysis and the critique of that analysis which he first and deeply explores in the *Paris Manuscripts*.

Because Nicolaus wrongly downgrades the *Paris Manuscripts*, he distorts the source from which, albeit with modifications and crucial developments, Marx's 'continuing meditation' (McLellan) begins. He rightly singles out the concentration on *production* rather than circulation as basic, as a major development in the *Grundrisse*. But he greatly over-stresses the circulation-orientatedness of the *Paris Manuscripts*, in which Marx tells us, for example, that:

the analysis of (the concept of alienated labour) shows that although private property appears to be the basis and cause of alienated labour, it is rather a consequence of the

latter, just as the gods are *fundamentally* not the cause but the product of confusions of human reason. At a later stage, however, there is a reciprocal influence. Only in the final stage of the development of private property is its secret revealed, namely, that it is on one hand the *product* of alienated labour, and on the other hand the *means* by which labour is alienated, the *realisation of this alienation*'. (Bottomore, T.B., Ed. and trans., *Karl Marx: Early Writings* (London, 1973), p. 131).

This, by the way, not only makes production central, but foreshadows much of the sophisticated argument of *Grundrisse*, 452-8, which I have already discussed. Nicolaus is simply wrong when he says that the *Paris Manuscripts* tend to identify alienation with objectification: their whole aim and achievement is *precisely* to reject this identification. He also ties Marx's early analysis more closely to the notion of absolute and inevitable immiseration than is warranted. In thus quarrelling with Nicolaus's otherwise excellent presentation, I am not at all concerned to resurrect the pseudo-existentialist caricatures of Marx spawned by early enthusiasts for the *Paris Manuscripts*: on the contrary, I am concerned to show that even at this early stage Marx had broached the kind of question which we associate with the 'mature' writings, and thus to show that these early works can contribute to putting the latter in a richer and truer perspective.

So, then, should you buy the *Grundrisse* or not? Not if you haven't got *Capital* I; and there's a lot to be said for even *Capital* III and II (in that order) before the *Grundrisse*. We should read Marx according to what he thought he was at, and *Capital* I is the major finished product which he himself loosed on the world. But if you are concerned to get a full and accurate picture of the *development* of Marx's thought and/or of the *method* of which *Capital* is the fruit, then the *Grundrisse* are essential reading. Despite my disagreement with his comments on the early development, Nicolaus's Foreword is useful on the first of these two concerns, and excellent on the second.

JOHN MAGUIRE

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY, by Jeremiah Newman. *Talbot Press*, Dublin, 1972. 242 pp. No price given.

Maybe there's a Maynooth school of clerical sociology. Reading this book—lectures given at Maynooth and elsewhere by the President of Maynooth—is like having your moral tutor along. Not overbearing particularly, but firmly keeping you on the right track. Thus he

says Durkheim allows no place for human rights and the human soul; there is a danger in many fields of Marxist innuendo; divorce laws are increasingly invoked by the selfish and lax; and so on.

He has a real problem of course. While

obviously sociology does not concern itself with the truth or otherwise of the supernatural, by looking at things in a relative sort of way (i.e. precisely as social phenomena) sociology does tend to reduce the special claims of all world views to equality. This applies not just to Christianity, but to any world view, whether religious, Marxist, or that of Western rationality. It is this threat of relativism which seems to lie behind Dr Newman's book. It's a real threat and there are real arguments going on (not least within sociology) about relativity and reductionism, about whether Durkheim (or Marx for that matter) adequately accounts for the way people experience things. But the way to discuss these matters is not to use sociology as a kind of background for expounding your privileged moral philosophy. Or at least the exposition should not be presented as an introduction to sociology.

Part of the trouble is the amount of ground covered by Dr Newman. Under neatly subdivided headings, the 24 pages of the opening chapter on the origin and development of sociology whip the reader through 65 characters (and this excludes those mentioned in the footnotes). Naturally there is hardly getting to the bottom of any of them. So one turns to the chapter on political sociology hoping that some of them will turn up again, or that there will be a discussion of how power is exercised or perceived or attributed, or maybe something about conflict or opposing interests. Instead what one finds is basically a collection of definitions of such things as forms of government with examples and the kindly advice that established government should not be disturbed in the interests of an unreasonable desire for self government on the part of a national minority.

All this gives a sense of superficiality. Take two examples from the same page. When considering the effect of migration on popula-

tion, Dr Newman informs us that 'until the advent of interplanetary migration it cannot be a factor from the global point of view'. Assuming he can't be saying migration is never international, is he telling us that population studies are at present confined to the earth? Or is he lightening the text with a space age joke? Two paragraphs along he tells us that the chief cause of declining population is moral decay—'practices such as homosexuality, artificial birth control, divorce and infidelity, and all sorts of selfish habits which cause avoidance of marriage or the birth of children'.

Some of this is just prejudice. In the chapter on the sociology of the family we learn that the American Womens Liberation movement is 'suspect of tendencies in the direction of lesbianism'. (No evidence given—so there's a bit of innuendo if you like.) The woman's position is basically in the home. Man is more fitted for leadership. She is 'more often than not unequal in powers of management. He is stronger, less emotional, more rational. Hence the wife, within reason, should be subject to the husband'.

There is no point in multiplying instances. Dr Newman is sometimes shrewd enough and it is not only conservatives who tell you what to think or rely mainly on assertion—and any analysis is from a particular point of view and generally contains some moralising. Occasionally here there's the interest of a specifically Irish problem being considered—bilingualism in Ireland for instance. And in what other sociology book could you read that 'the wife is Queen in the truly Christian home'.

Still in the end one can only hope that the students who listened to these lectures were as irritated as this particular sociology student who read them, and that they were driven by their irritation to read some of the sociology Dr Newman's schoolbook so inadequately refers to.

ANTHONY ARCHER, O.P.

THE THEORY OF MYTH, edited by Adrian Cunningham. *Sheed & Ward*. £4.75.

WHEN THE GOLDEN BOUGH BREAKS. by Peter Munz. *Routledge & Kegan Paul*. £2.25.

Christian theologians and exegetes, as Adrian Cunningham points out in the introduction to this set of six papers on the theory of myth, have been slow to make use of the resources and findings of the current debate on the subject. This collection is the first in a series from the semi-annual colloquia organised by the Department of Religious Studies, University of Lancaster. The two most immediately impressive papers are the devastating exposure of Mircea Eliade by Ivan Strenski and the equally penetrating attack upon Claude Lévi-Strauss by Caroline Hubbard. When the giants in the field

are so ruthlessly and plausibly cut down to size the outsider might well decide to put off getting involved until the smoke has cleared from the arena. Only the trouble is that the theologian is not really an outsider here. One of the main tributaries in the current debate is the study of stories (Vladimir Propp is the precursor), and if the Christian theologian is understandably wary of being categorised simply as a student of *myth* he cannot deny that his principal object of study is a *story*. That theologians are beginning to remember this, and perhaps to ask themselves questions