

structure of the Organized Section may be a useful tool for conducting discussion or debate about such issues, or announcing the formation of an independent group.

[2] If the Organized Section would like to speak out in its own name as an Organized Section of APSA, its position must be consistent with the APSA Constitution and legal status, and the Section should include a disclaimer in its statements that its views do not necessarily represent those of the APSA.

[3] If an Organized Section wishes APSA as a whole to make a public statement, the position needs to be approved and expressed by the APSA Officers or Council, through whatever procedures they endorse.

At the recommendation of the Organized Sections Committee, the Council deferred action in order to get views from Organized Section heads, who are meeting later.

c. Organized Section Update

Brintnall reported that two smaller sections which have not met the 250 member threshold for a full year will leave Organized Section status. The Applied Section will merge with Public Policy, and the Life Sciences Section will change to related group status. With the addition of the new Section on Race and Ethnicity, there will now be 31 active Sections.

The Organized Section on Internships and Experiential Education has recently been notified by the Organized Sections Committee that its membership has been below 250 for the year. The Section will not be included on the 1997 Program Committee and has a year to gain members. Section leaders are already considering a plan to change the Section focus to Undergraduate Education broadly defined.

13. Report of the Committee on International Programs

Hauck reported on the activities of the Committee on International Programs. Four representatives of the Japanese Political Science Association are attending our 1995 meeting. Foundation support is being explored to provide stable funding for future bilateral exchange.

The International Programs Committee has set a high priority on having the proposed Centennial Center respond to needs and interests of scholars from abroad. Discussion is underway at the Annual Meeting to strengthen the working relationships between APSA and IPSA. Ted Lowi, APSA's representative to the IPSA Executive Committee, has helped spearhead this effort.

14. Report on Education Programs

Sheilah Mann reported that APSA expects to receive funds from the Fund for the Improvement of Post Secondary Education (FIPSE) for a syllabi project addressing syllabi for new introductory courses in political science. The objective is to develop syllabi which integrate comparative and American perspectives in the first year course.

She also noted another successful USIA Summer Institute on the American Political System, run jointly by American University and APSA. Institute participants are faculty and advanced graduate students in political science, international relations, and law, and came this year from countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Western and Eastern Europe, Asia, and South Asia.

15. Recognition of President Verba

President-Elect Arend Lijphart congratulated Sidney Verba on his good services for the Association. He said Verba is his role model for wise, generous, and accessible leadership. The Council also thanked President Verba, and Lijphart presented him with a certificate and with an antique print.

16. Adjournment

The meeting adjourned with no further business.

APSA Awards Presented at 1995 Annual Meeting

DISSERTATION AWARDS

Gabriel A. Almond Award (\$250)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1993 or 1994 in the field of comparative politics.

Award Committee: George Ross, Brandeis University, Chair; Robert Fatton, University of Virginia; and Ellis Krauss, University of Pittsburgh

Recipient: **Jonah Levy**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Dissertation: "Tocqueville's Revenge: Dilemmas of Institutional Reform in Post-Dirigiste France"

Dissertation Chair: Suzanne Berger

Citation: Analyzing the changing role of the French state is part of one of the more important research problems in the comparative politics of industrial

societies. *Dirigiste* France in the 1960s was a model for Andrew Shonfield and a central case for John Zysman and others later. The end of high post-war growth and the growing interdependence of European and global economies threatened to turn French *dirigisme* into a monument to inflexibility, however. By the mid-1980s the Mitterrand administration was engaged in serious efforts to de-statize and deregulate France, involving privatizations and decentralization. Jonah Levy's work explores the fascinating consequences of these efforts for the French state. Bracketing misleading French public rhetoric, Levy's field work, in two well-chosen locations in provincial France, traces these consequences "on the ground." He finds that abandoning *dirigisme* is easier said than done. Statist networks and lines of political influence continue to function in the new setting, but only partially because actors at the center are reluctant to give up their centrality. The real barrier to change, Levy concludes, is the absence of a sufficiently autonomous "civil society" in France, whether in the financial and corporate worlds or in the provinces. *Tocqueville's Revenge*, therefore, lies in the weakness of the socio-political foundations for an effective decentralization of initiatives of all kinds in France. Levy leaves open for future consideration whether France will eventually reconfigure into a more effective "neo-dirigiste" model or founder on its inability to change.

Levy's work is full of comparative insight about changing state roles in the context of rapidly changing economic contexts, is written with grace and elegance and, while joining central issues in comparative politics also makes a contribution to general public debate about such matters. It raises profound questions about the complexity of comparative analyses of phenomena as complicated as "the state" and should provoke considerable scholarly debate. The state, as an object of study, having been "brought back in" a while ago, has been allowed of late quietly to move off the stage. At a moment when state roles are changing in unpredictable ways and directions and when politicians themselves are quite consciously trying to steer such changes, Levy's dissertation is an important step towards regenerating a fundamental discussion.

William Anderson Award (\$250)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1993 or

1994 in the field of intergovernmental relations.

Award Committee: Ester Fuchs, Columbia University, Chair; Mark Schneider, SUNY–Stony Brook; and Harvey J. Tucker, Texas A&M University

Recipient: David A. Pizza, University of Chicago

Dissertation: “Structure and Cooperation in Party Politics: The Development of Urban Party Organizations in the United States, 1896–1930”

Dissertation Chair: John Mark Hansen

“Structure and Cooperation in Party Politics: The Development of Urban Party Organizations in the United States, 1896–1930” is a fascinating study of the institutional conditions of local governments that gave rise to the strong/patronage based urban machines. By joining the approaches of political development and exchange theory with rich case study data on Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia, Mr. Pizza provides a convincing model of the successful urban party organization. Extending his analysis beyond the traditional elite and mass base theories of machine development, Mr. Pizza is able to identify the conditions that allowed party bosses to cooperate, to monopolize access to electoral support and consequently to more easily control elected officials. Mr. Pizza has also shown how studies that focus on the city are also relevant (dare I use that word) to broader issues in American politics. By reconsidering the Doctrine of Responsible Party Government in light of his findings on the development of the urban party organization, Mr. Pizza demonstrates that there is no simple relationship between centralization of authority in government and the centralization of authority in parties. Finally, Mr. Pizza’s work does not shirk from confronting the difficult normative questions concerning the role of strong parties in a democratic political systems. In this age of media politics, Mr. Pizza’s impressive work should bring political parties back in to the debate concerning effective citizen participation in American politics.

Edward S. Corwin Award (\$250)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1993 or 1994 in the field of public law.

Award Committee: Barbara Luck Graham, University of Missouri–St. Louis, Chair; Tom Walker, Emory Uni-

versity; and Susan Lawrence, Rutgers University.

Co-Recipient: James F. Spriggs, II, Washington University in St. Louis

Dissertation: “The Impact of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on Federal Administrative Agencies, 1954–1990”

Dissertation Co-Chairs: Lee J. Epstein and William Lowry

Co-Recipient: Cary Coglianese, The University of Michigan

Dissertation: “Challenging the Rules, Litigation and Bargaining in the Administrative Process”

Dissertation Chair: Kim Lane Scheppelle

Citations:

JAMES F. SPRIGGS, II: James F. Spriggs’ II dissertation is an ambitious and provocative piece of work on how the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia influence federal administrative agency decision making. Using two datasets based on the population of Supreme Court opinions reversing and/or remanding agency decisions from the 1953–1990 terms and a random sample of D.C. Circuit opinions reversing and/or remanding agency decisions from the years 1954–1990, Spriggs questions the paradoxical findings about the nature of judicial impact: either courts cause policy change or courts have little or no impact. His thesis is that courts have resources that, given certain mixes of agency preferences and resources, can compel agencies to implement court opinions. While courts have limited control over implementation, they are not without resources. One of the judiciary’s most potent resources is the written opinion. He then conceptualizes court opinions as formal institutions that influence agency expectations about what courts will do in the future. Spriggs offers three sets of hypotheses about whether and to what extent agencies implement court opinions based on the following resource factors: (1) clarity of the court’s legal interpretations, (2) internal agency factors, and (3) the political, social and economic environment. If agencies believe that the court’s commitments and threats are credible, then judicial policies are more likely to be effective.

The dissertation engages in a comprehensive analysis of how courts influence agency policy outcomes. The specific questions presented in his dissertation are: Why do agencies implement court opinions that are con-

trary to their goals and interests? How do courts, possessing few implementation controls, convince agencies to follow their orders? How does judicial review become a meaningful tool which convinces agencies to implement court opinions? In addressing these questions, Spriggs’ dissertation is based on the teachings of rational choice, organizational theory and institutional theory. He first investigates the extent to which federal agencies complied with court opinions, measuring compliance on a four-point ordinal scale from evasion to full compliance. He then estimated how extensively court opinions modified agency decisions, gauging policy change on a four-point scale from no change to major alterations. Spriggs employs a very high degree of methodological sophistication in addressing these questions, relying on ordered probit analysis is assessing multivariate relationships.

Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation investigates and explains the Supreme Court’s impact on federal administrative agency action and chapters 5 and 6 describe and explain federal agency response to the D.C. Circuit. The findings support Spriggs’ theoretical claim that agencies act strategically in reacting to courts based on resource asymmetries between them. He finds that federal administrative agencies comply with Supreme Court opinions because it is in their long-term interest to do so. Noncompliance costs are sufficiently large to induce agencies to adhere to the Court’s opinion and change their policy, if necessary. Among other important findings, Spriggs’ analysis revealed that the Supreme Court compelled agency compliance in 88% of agency reactions and that Supreme Court opinions caused a significant amount of agency policy change in 67% of its cases. Similar findings but more moderate influences were reported for the D.C. Circuit. The Supreme Court produced more policy change than the D.C. Circuit—an average of 2.5 per term whereas the D.C. Circuit’s impact produced 1.5 per year.

Spriggs’ analysis is rigorous, compelling and creative. His findings are significant because they demonstrate that judicial review can be a powerful tool. According to Spriggs, researchers can no longer argue that courts have no influence. He convincingly demonstrates that courts have substantial impact and that they matter. The extensive and impressive effort that went into data collection deserves high praise. In sum, this dissertation represents an enduring contribution to a debate that is central to the field of public law.

CARY COGLIANESE: Cary Coglianese's dissertation beautifully exemplifies the study of public law and politics. Coglianese's dissertation advances our understanding of disputing, of the relationship between interest groups and government, and the place of judicial review in the administrative state, by artfully juxtaposing, challenging, and expanding several disparate strands of conventional wisdom about litigation, law, and bureaucratic governance. He shows us that while judicial review litigation has principally been viewed as a means of protecting against the dangers of interest group bargaining in the administrative legislative process, in practice, it functions not as a check on bargaining, but as a forum for the continuation of that bargaining. Judicial review litigation is itself a political act.

Coglianese's dissertation focuses on judicial review challenges to Environmental Protection Agency rules and the interest groups that pursue such litigation, assessing how litigation affects the relationships environmental and industry groups have with the EPA. Unlike previous studies, his analysis begins long before the groups appear in court and situates litigation within the broader rule-making process. He relies on his own ambitious data collection efforts, allowing his to be the first study to systematically examine cases filed by groups, not just cases decided by courts. His original data set catalogues the rules made by the EPA and the suits filed challenging those rules, and taxonomically records group involvement in each stage of the process. He supplements this quantitative data with a rich storehouse of qualitative data gained from extensive interviews with interest group representatives and government personnel.

From Coglianese's work, we gain an unusually deep picture of the place of judicial review litigation in the administrative rule making process, tracing group involvement in the drafting of rules, the filing of petitions for judicial review of those rules, settlement negotiations, adjudication of cases before judges, and post decision negotiations. Coglianese's findings challenge the prevailing view that judicial review litigation is both rampart and antithetical to cooperative regulatory decisions. Rather than the often cited 80% litigation rate, Coglianese's systematic data collection effort reveals that only about 25% of all EPA rules get challenged, and even the most significant rules only get challenged about 35% of the time. Judicial review litigation is most often brought by industry groups, not disad-

vantaged or citizen groups; and, in deed, the groups that participate in the rule making process also file litigation the most. Coglianese finds that most suits settle before any judicial involvement, when judges do get involved they usually uphold the EPA, and when they do not, negotiations between groups and the EPA continue after the decision. Litigation does not adversely affect group-agency relations; in some ways it even helps to sustain and enhance those relationships. And, rather than checking interest group bargaining, it facilitates it in that it provides a mechanism for escaping strict congressional deadlines, narrowing the number of parties, and allowing negotiations to occur in secret.

Coglianese's dissertation tackles the puzzling inconsistencies between the conventional wisdoms that administrative agencies are generally "captured" by interest groups; that groups virtually automatically challenge administrative rules in court; and that litigation occurs when relationships between disputants are distant, fleeting, or simply over, not when disputants are engaged in long term cooperative relationships. Drawing together three generally disparate research traditions on dispute resolution, Coglianese's work challenges, and ultimately refines, sociolegal research on disputing, game theoretic analysis of cooperation, and political scientists' political disadvantage theory of interest group litigation. Coglianese begins untangling this puzzle by considering the meaning of litigation contextually. In that regulatory relationships are all about law from their beginning, judicial review litigation does not represent the introduction of law into relationships that are otherwise informal and non-legal. In this context, litigation is not inherently a form of social defection and does not necessarily signal the end to agency-interest group relations. Coglianese expands and refines our theories of disputing by introducing the concept of "disturbance" which relates the choice of dispute resolution alternative to the relative amount of disruption created by moving from one mode of dispute resolution to another. Thinking about "disturbance," rather than a more abstract conception of litigation, allows Coglianese to solve the puzzle of interest group judicial review litigation.

Through his careful, insightful, and creative analysis, Coglianese enriches our understanding of law and politics. He revels and challenges the bifurcation of law and politics deeply implicit in our most entrenched theories of disputing. He demonstrates that in the ad-

ministrative rule making process, and perhaps elsewhere, the turn to law and courts is not a disruption of political bargaining, or a check on it, but rather a continuation of the political bargaining, or social interaction, that creates law. To quote from Coglianese's eloquent closing passage, "what we find is that law is interwoven with politics in a complicated, symbiotic relationship, much in the way a riverbank both defines and is defined by it. . . . At the same time that judicial review checks interest group politics, it is also checked by that politics."

Harold D. Lasswell Award (\$250)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1993 or 1994 in the field of policy studies.

Award Committee: Terry Moe, Stanford University, Chair; Wendy Hanson, University of New Mexico; and Kaare Strom, University of California-San Diego

Recipient: **John M. Carey**, University of California-San Diego

Dissertation: "Term Limits and Legislative Representation."

Dissertation Chair: Arend Lijphart

Citation: The committee members are pleased to present the Harold Lasswell award to John M. Carey. His dissertation is an ambitious attempt to bring quantitative evidence to bear on the issue of term limits. This is clearly an important issue in recent American politics, and well worth studying for that reason alone. But it is also an issue of genuine theoretical significance, because it raises a fundamental question that our current, reelection-based theories can't answer: how should we expect legislators to behave when they are not subject to reelection?

Carey addresses this question through a creative exercise in comparative research. He compares Costa Rica, which has had term limits for decades, with Venezuela, which is similar on many political and historical grounds, but does not have term limits. His analysis is based, moreover, on an impressively wide range of data—on careers, appointments, elections, budgets, and more.

What he finds, briefly, is that term limits do not really transform politics as we know it, but channel it in somewhat different directions. With term limits, for instance, legislators no longer see the legislature as a career in itself, but they do see it as a stepping stone to

other government positions. They remain motivated by the self-interested pursuit of political careers, and they continue to cater, as before, to whoever controls their future career opportunities.

Carey's research is a welcome—and rare—source of empirical evidence on this important subject, and a much-needed antidote to the kinds of simplistic arguments about term limits that tend to dominate the public debate. It is also a theoretical contribution, pushing for a broader perspective on the foundations of legislative behavior.

For his efforts and achievements, we think John Carey richly deserves the Lasswell award, and we want to offer him our warmest congratulations.

Helen Dwight Reid Award (\$500)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1993 or 1994 in the field of international relations, law and politics (supported by the Helen Dwight Reid Educational Foundation).

Award Committee: Rudolph Gordon, Norfolk State University, Chair; Helen Milner, Columbia University; and Harvey Starr, University of South Carolina

Recipient: **Walter Mattli**, University of Chicago

Dissertation: "The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond"

Dissertation Chair: Charles Lipson

Citation: In his doctoral dissertation, "The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond", Walter Mattli puts forth a well-developed theory of why nations form economic unions and why these associations seek to enlarge their membership. The dissertation is sustained throughout by a masterful research design that creatively combines formal theory, quantitative empirical comparisons, and historical examples. In the process of establishing the "tripwire" of threshold for integration, he critiques functionalism, neofunctionalism, custom union and optimal currency area theories of integration. The answer to the demand side question of why countries form or join economic unions is found in the analysis of two economic models—the Optimal Public Goods Area Model (OPGA) and The Integrated Production Frontier Model (IPF). The Integrated Production Frontier Model builds upon The Optimal Public Goods Area Model and explains the interrelationship between these two as-

pects of integration in creating the precondition for regional integration within a supranational context. Implicit in Mattli's theory is the assumption that the main preoccupation of states is not with survival but with economic growth. In his conclusion, Mattli avers that: "Integration follows its own logic across time and space" and that "the propelling forces of regional integration are radically improved technologies in transportation and communication and new production techniques that demand larger markets."

Mattli's study of the processes and logic of regional integration over time and space explains a variety of cases from the formation of the Federal Union and the German Zollverein to the on-going expansion of the European Union. In examining regional integration, he focuses on one of the central components of global order in the post-Cold War period. Thus an important problem is addressed—that of international order.

Not only does Mattli's work contribute significantly to the literature in the field, it also has, at the level of a comprehensive theory of integration, a "cutting edge" quality.

Leo Strauss Award (\$250)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1993 or 1994 in the field of political philosophy.

Award Committee: William Connolly, Johns Hopkins University, Chair; Pamela K. Jensen, Kenyon College; and Tracy Strong, University of California—San Diego

Recipient: **Patrick Deneen**, Rutgers University

Dissertation: "The Odyssey of Political Theory: Homer's *Odyssey* as Political Theory and as Read and Interpreted in the History of Political Thought"

Dissertation Chair: Wilson Carey McWilliams

Citation: The Leo Strauss committee was extremely impressed with the set of dissertations nominated for the political theory award this year. It is a minor miracle that we finally settled upon a winner out of such a strong field. Patrick Deneen's thesis, chaired by Carey McWilliams at Rutgers University, is entitled "The Odyssey of Political Theory: Homer's *Odyssey* as Political Theory and as Read and Interpreted in the History of Political Thought." Deneen examines readings of the *Odyssey* offered, respectively, by Plato,

Rousseau and Adorno/Horkheimer, demonstrating how this founding text of Western political thought retains its amazing power to inspire wonder, pose questions, and foment thought. Along the way Deneen explores the complex relations of poetry to philosophy, myth to rationality, and morality to mastery, focussing on the relation between wandering and homecoming, the effects of the human quest to master nature, and the extent to which the gods, or nature, exist in eventual harmony or profound tension with the quest for moral political order. Deneen's engagements ignited a series of feuds between the Greek gods assigned to this committee. Some of us are more drawn to his appreciation of homecoming than others, and some even suspect that Adorno's negative dialectic provides a modern transcription of the mythic injunction to probe cruelties and violences hidden inside stable codes of morality and rationality. It is partly because he inspired these debates between us that Deneen drove us to bestow the Leo Strauss Award upon him. This is a mature work of political theory, one that instructs its readers as the author wanders across history in search of the home he will never reach.

Leonard D. White Award (\$250)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted in 1993 or 1994 in the field of public administration.

Award Committee: Kenneth Meier, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee, Chair; Robert Spitzer, SUNY—Cortland; and Barry Rabe, University of Michigan.

Recipient: **Robert Charles Lieberman**, Harvard University

Dissertation: "Race and the Development of the American Welfare State from the New Deal to the Great Society"

Dissertation Chair: Paul E. Peterson

Citation: Robert Charles Lieberman in "Race and the Development of the American Welfare State from the New Deal to the Great Society" makes contributions to the study of public administration, neoinstitutionalist theory, and race and public policy. He argues that public policy reflects bureaucratic institutions and these institutions are in turn shaped by the demands for racial exclusion. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, he looks at three programs: old age insurance, unemployment insurance, and aid to depen-

dent children. The old age program, administered nationally, excludes minorities by excluding classes of occupations. The aid to dependent children program is administratively decentralized thereby allowing local administrators to discriminate on an individual basis. The unemployment insurance program, a national program with state administration, is a mixture of both processes and produces a mix of policy outcomes. When national pressures developed to end policies of racial exclusion, the old age program, because it was nationally administered, responded best in ending discrimination.

Lieberman has demonstrated how excellent historical analysis of bureaucracies is done. He painstakingly assembled data bases from old bureaucratic records and reconstructed a trail of evidence that demonstrates how policy was actually administered. He has marshalled some impressive evidence to support his contention that "Opposition to welfare policy does not stem from general opposition to helping the poor, but from more specific objections to the characteristics of welfare beneficiaries, particularly racial objections." This scholarship will be widely read and should have a lasting impact on the discipline.

E.E. Schattschneider Award (\$250)

For the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1993 or 1994 in the field of American government and politics.

Award Committee: Daniel Mazmanian, The Claremont Graduate School, Chair; Jan Leighley, Texas A&M University; and Arthur Sanders, Drake University

No award given

PAPER AND ARTICLE AWARDS

Franklin L. Burdette/ Pi Sigma Alpha Award (\$500)

For the best paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting.

Award Committee: Robert S. Erikson, University of Houston, Chair; Frances Hagopian, Tufts University; and Donald Sylvan, Ohio State University

Recipients: **Kenneth Schultz**, Stanford University and **Barry Weingast**, Stanford University

Paper: "The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition"

Citation: Many excellent papers were nominated for the Burdette award, presenting a challenge to the Award Committee. The award goes to "The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition," by Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast. Substantively, the paper focuses on a central issue in the International Relations field: the sources and consequences of democratic rules for international relations. Theoretically, the paper draws on the "new" institutional political economy of property rights.

Schultz and Weingast make a compelling case that the institutions of liberal democracy provide an advantage in wars and other international competition. Democracies are more "efficient" in international competition, they argue, primarily because they are better credit risks than nondemocratic regimes. Democracies are better able to raise the revenue to meet international challenges because of the greater credibility of their promises to repay loans. And with their greater credit, by "tax smoothing" democracies can lessen the tax burden on their populations.

Nondemocratic regimes face the predicament that they cannot make credible commitments to repay. "Because the credit available to the sovereign is limited by the ability of potential lenders to sanction him for default, the sovereign benefits from an increase in the penalties that can be imposed on him." Liberal democratic political institutions distribute power in such a way as to provide the necessary limits on the government's behavior. Thus, the very institutions that are often criticized for handicapping democracies during crises actually do the opposite.

The argument is richly illustrated with two important case studies with provocative parallels: the competition between liberal England and authoritarian France, 1689–1815, and the recent Cold War between the US and USSR, 1945–1991. The paper concludes with the observation that the end of the Cold War makes evident the competitive advantage of democratic institutions, thus helping to explain the surge toward democracy. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the paper is an exemplar in terms of clarity of presentation.

Heinz Eulau Award (\$500)

For the best article published in the *American Political Science Review* during 1994.

Award Committee: Allan J. Cigler, University of Kansas, Chair; Leslie Anderson, University of Florida; and Charles Franklin, University of Wisconsin–Madison

Award Recipients: **Andrew Gelman**, University of California, Berkeley, and **Gary King**, Harvard University

Article: "Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting"

Citation: The Heinz Eulau Award Committee reviewed an outstanding collection of articles from the 1994 *American Political Science Review*. The piece finally chosen by the Committee illustrates convincingly how effective carefully-crafted, empirically-rigorous contemporary political science research can be in disentangling normatively important political issues.

In their article, Gelman and King assess the impact of state legislative redistricting upon American representative democracy. Specifically, the authors address a series of controversies in the literature revolving around how electoral responsiveness and partisan bias are affected by the often competing goals and intense conflicts that drive the redistricting process in the American states.

The authors bring to bare an impressive amount of data on such questions. The data include individual-level district information from every state legislative lower house in the nation that used single-member districts in all elections from 1968 to 1988, spanning 30 state legislatures, 60 redistrictings, 267 statewide elections, and 29,679 elections held at the district level. Recognizing that previous researchers had often used simple, indirect measures of partisan control of the redistricting process (such as whether unified or divided government prevailed in a state), Gelman and King interviewed state election officials, court justices, redistricting commission members, academics and party officials in an attempt to assess the "partisan intention" of each of the redistrictings attempted.

Theoretically, the researchers recognize the enormous uncertainties operating in any redistricting context, and the inherently competing goals of the individual actors and the constraints under which they operate. Incumbent protection goals are often in conflict with the desire for partisan advantage, for example, and the redistricting process typically includes legal and political constraints ranging from the necessity of minority representation to district compactness. Often the result is a compro-

mise, with little assurance of the likely impact.

The authors then turn to their data analysis. Using an original statistical model in order to estimate the degree of electoral responsiveness and partisan bias for each of the 267 election years under study, the researchers then subject both dependent variables to a regression analysis in order to access the effects of redistricting. The results challenge much of the previous research and conventional wisdom concerning the impact of the highly controversial redistricting process. They find, counter-intuitively, that redistricting typically acts to increase electoral responsiveness and to decrease partisan bias compared to an electoral system without it. While they uncover evidence that gerrymandering does indeed tend to be biased in favor of the party in control of the redistricting process, and that bipartisan redistricting leads to the most normatively preferred result, any type of redistricting reduces the partisan bias in an electoral system compared to one in which no redistricting takes place.

Overall, the findings presented in the article have profound implications for those who wonder whether or not the contentious, often unpredictable redistricting process contributes to the normative goals of high electoral responsiveness and low levels of partisan bias. The authors argue that in a very real sense legislative redistricting should be viewed as an opportunity for "political renewal." They suggest that requiring bipartisan control of all redistricting processes may be the very best way to ensure fair elections.

The article represents the best of modern social science research: important substantive problems are addressed in theoretically-relevant ways; comprehensive data are collected and analyzed in an innovative, yet appropriate and understandable manner; data interpretations are cautious, yet clear; and, finally, the link between the research and broad public concerns is made. Gelman and King have produced an article likely to be viewed as a "classic" by those who study changes in the electoral system.

BOOK AWARDS

Ralph J. Bunche Award (\$500)

For the best scholarly work in political science published in 1994 which explores the phenomenon of ethnic and cultural pluralism.

Award Committee: John A. Garcia, University of Arizona, Chair; Kenneth Wong, University of Chicago; and Jesse Owens Smith, California State University-Fullerton

Recipient: William H. Tucker, Rutgers University-Camden

Book: *The Science and Politics of Racial Research*, published by University of Illinois Press

Citation: *The Science and Politics of Racial Research* represents an important examination of the role of scientific research on race in relation to racial policies and debates. "Scientific efforts" to investigate the innate inferiority of a race have been scientifically unproductive and socially harmful, according to Tucker. The author identifies the development of scientific theories that are consistent with the scientist's personal values, attitudes, and prejudices; and then enter their "laboratory" to find the facts to validate the scientist's beliefs about the world.

Tucker adds to the understanding of the causes of conflict in multiculturalism. The book catalogues and analyzes the philosophical basis for American racial policies from a historical perspective. The racial controversy has always been a political one and "the debate has no strictly scientific purpose or value. Tucker presents argument for the appropriate domain of race to be couched in political course rather than the domain of science. Finally, the book contributes to the debates revolving around the Bell Curve and current attempts to dismantle liberal social programs.

Gladys M. Kammerer Award (\$1,000)

For the best political science publication in 1994 in the field of U.S. national policy.

Award Committee: Benjamin Page, Northwestern University, Chair; Richard Boyd, Wesleyan University; and William Browne, Central Michigan University

Recipient: Paul Pierson, Harvard University

Book: *Dismantling the Welfare State*, published by Cambridge University Press

Citation: Paul Pierson's *Dismantling the Welfare State?*, a contribution to the macro-historical type of "new institutionalism", tackles a large and substantively important topic: the fate of various social welfare policies in the

United States and Britain in the face of Reagan and Thatcher administration efforts at retrenchment. It finds great welfare state resilience in general, but also striking variations across programs and between nations. These variations enable Pierson to offer a number of theoretically interesting insights about institutional and program-related influences on policy making.

It turns out, for example, that aspects of state "capacity" like concentrated authority (as vs. separation of powers and federalism) do not straightforwardly translate into success at policy change; instead, such institutional features interact with program popularity and visibility (since capacity can be offset by accountability) and with specific program characteristics to hinder or facilitate change. The most important program characteristics are not those most often associated with programs' political strength or weakness (e.g., means-testing vs. universality), but rather technical features that alter the consequences of inaction and thus change the impact of multiple veto points: e.g., indexing, entitlement status, existence of trust funds, and the like. The fine-grained analysis of these program features is a major contribution of the book.

The book also offers interesting discussions of policy feedback (which often locks in benefits and/or builds program constituencies); the efficacy of different retrenchment strategies (obfuscation and low-visibility actions being most successful for attacking popular programs); and systemic changes (e.g. Reagan's "defunding of the left" and tax cuts) with profound long-term consequences. In a brief and compact fashion, it makes a number of important contributions to our understanding of the politics of policy making.

Benjamin E. Lippincott Award (\$1,500)

Presented biennially to recognize a work of exceptional quality by a living political theorist that is still considered significant after a time span of 15 years since the original publication.

Award Committee: Robert Dahl, Yale University, Chair; Arthur Melzer, Michigan State University; and Nancy Rosenblum, Brown University

Recipient: Charles E. Lindblom, Yale University

Book: *Politics and Market: The World's Political-Economic Systems*, published by Basic Books

Citation: The Benjamin Evans Lippincott award was established in 1973 to honor a living political theorist who has written a work of exceptional quality that is still considered significant after a time span of at least fifteen years since the original date of publication. This year's recipient is Charles E. Lindblom for *Politics and Markets, The World's Political-Economic Systems*, published in 1977.

The award is particularly timely, coming as it does at an annual meeting devoted to the theme, "Liberalism at Century's End: Competing Perspectives." Throughout his scholarly career, Lindblom has provided us with deeply informed analyses of the advantages and disadvantages of the major socio-economic systems that have dominated thought and practice in this century and, without question, will continue to do so in the next century as well.

Pursuing the grand tradition of political economy established by such illustrious predecessors as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill, in his work Lindblom has united politics and economics. In his perspective, then market is not just an economic system but a political system as well, one with enormous and sometimes deleterious consequences for political life. Democracy, or better, polyarchal democracy, are not just political systems; they are deeply implicated in economic life as well. He has analyzed, among others, communist systems, central planning, policy-making, alternative market systems, and the market-oriented private enterprise system that has now become a nearly universal model.

In his previous work Lindblom has shown why making decisions through processes like "muddling through", incrementalism, and what he has called "partisan mutual adjustment," can in practice often prove to be considerably more rational than a critic of these seemingly irrational processes would expect. Yet skeptical though he may be of our ability to re-order the world according to plan, he has remained committed to the Enlightenment belief that human reason is a major and necessary instrument for improving our lives, our politics, our societies, and our economic well-being.

Bold and penetrating in his analysis and critiques, Lindblom is constantly aware of the complexity and interconnectedness of modern social, political, and economic life, and perhaps as a consequence he is characteristically cautious and restrained in recommending solutions. Thus he has been deeply skeptical about the usefulness of con-

ceiving of the world as if it poses choices between "grand alternatives" like socialism and capitalism.

Between grand alternatives like these and the specific policies with which policy-makers must wrestle lies the large terrain of socio-economic systems about which Lindblom writes.

For his unique contribution to our understanding of these systems we and others around the world are and will remain greatly in his debt.

Victoria Schuck Award (\$500)

For the best book published in 1994 on women and politics.

Award Committee: Eileen L. McDonagh, Northeastern University, Chair; Susan Carroll, Rutgers University; and John Zaller, U.C.L.A.

Recipient: Barbara J. Nelson, Radcliffe College and Najma Chowdhury, University of Dhaka

Book: *Women and Politics Worldwide*, published by Yale University Press.

Citation: Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury as editors of *Women and Politics Worldwide* have overseen one of the most ambitious and successful projects to emerge from the rich literature on women and politics. Their remarkable book addresses the issue of women's political status from a cross-national perspective inclusive of 43 countries. In a study that took over nine years to complete, they brought together and coordinated the research and writing of 61 scholars who spoke 23 native languages written in 12 alphabets or symbol systems. They examined international processes and historical moments for each country as a foundation for understanding the level of women's political activism and accomplishments. Drawing upon the expertise of scholars from each country in question, country chapters begin with a political introduction to the history and institutions of that country. The authors analyze how diverse groups of women articulate their interests and their success in affecting the political process in their respective countries.

Not surprisingly, Nelson and Chowdhury find that a ubiquitous factor across all countries is women's political subordination. Regardless of the variety of cultures, economic arrangements, or regimes in which women live, no where are they included as equal partners with men in the governance of their political nation. Despite their exclusion, of course, women find ways to make

significant contributions, yet they do so in ways that appear always exceptional in some manner rather than a regular part of the political processes of a country.

For this reason, the authors turn to what they call "equalizing strategies" in which they analyze how "political institutions mold expectations, careers, and activities" of women who aspire to participate in formal politics (p. 15). Under their editorship, scholars from each country cast their nets widely when evaluating the relationship between institutional structures and women's political participation. They focus upon the impacts of economic forces, the changing nature of nationalism, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and the growth of international feminism.

The authors find, via the scholarship they have commissioned, that despite the diversity of national and cultural contexts, there are important political commonalities which stretch across all countries. Violence against women, for example, and women's ability to participate fully in economic activities are two issues consistently highlighted as severe problems, whether countries are rich or poor, democratic or state-socialist, authoritarian or liberal regimes (p. 11). For this reason, a key strategy for women is to be able to discern how different contexts undermine their ability to participate equally and to address that subordination even if they choose to affirm other components of their national identity. Marxist regimes which tell women their problems are secondary to reordering productive arrangements, liberal ideologies which tell women they have no problem because the system is gender-neutral, and authoritarian ideologies that claim patriarchal benevolence is the solution to women's problems, all point to the need for women to expose the inadequacies of all such ideologies in order to solve problems from women's perspectives.

Emerging from the author's breathtaking cross-national scope, we learn that no matter how gender might be socially constructed to constitute differences between women, there are universals operating as well. By understanding both the complexities of the differences as well as the intractable persistence of common problems, this book brings together invaluable new insights, to be found in no other collection, about the most basic of all questions informing the field of women and politics. Their book will be a research tool of unique benefit for a wide range of scholars seeking to learn more about the political status of women in comparative contexts, from an impressive

assemblage of scholars writing from the perspective of their own countries, and will be the definitive reference for years to come of cross-national studies of women and politics.

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award (\$5,000)

For the best book published during 1994 in the United States on government, politics or international relations (supported by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation).

Award Committee: Peter Gourevitch, University of California–San Diego, Chair; Paul Abramson, Michigan State University; and Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University

Recipient: **Beth A. Simmons**, Duke University

Book: *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years*, published by Princeton University Press

Citation: In a world of growing economic and financial interdependence, the boundary between domestic and international politics continues to erode. Political scientists have pushed this analytic boundary quite far. Beth Simmons' *Who Adjusts* is a splendid contribution to that effort. International agreements, she argues, require domestic support if they are to be honored. *Who Adjusts* examines the politics of domestic support around financial agreements made by European countries in the years between the two world wars.

The gold standard fixed as a norm for international cooperation that government use domestic economic policies to maintain a specified rate between their national currency and gold. Those policies caused domestic political pain, as they forced governments to accept foreign imports, or to raise interest rates at the cost of employment. What factors increased (decreased) the chances that governments would honor (break) their international commitments?

Simmons explores five variables that affect commitment: regime type, political orientation of the party in power, labor unrest, government instability, and central bank independence. She carefully operationalizes each of these political variables, then constructs a set of policy behaviors and economic outcomes to indicate compliance or defection from the international regime. She examines three types of deviance from the gold regime: devaluations of the

currency, tariff policy, and fiscal deficits. She conducts statistical tests of a large number of European countries correlating the political variable with these policy indicators, and finally she provides a detailed description of policy disputes in the UK, Belgium and France.

Simmons' findings confirm the importance of politics in shaping government behavior. Governments were more likely to obey the deflationary exigencies of the gold standard, when their coalitions were stable, when central banks were independent, when the left was not in the coalition, and when there were institutionalized limits on direct democracy (such as central bank independence). Creditors were more likely to lose confidence in governments that had unstable coalitions, included left parties, had non-independent central banks, and faced restive labor movements.

Simmons' book is a work of professional artistry. She is careful about theory, about operationalization, about testing, about argumentation, and about conclusions. She is self-conscious about methodology, locating the hypotheses in theory, specifying the tests, cross-checking the findings, and telling us just what the evidence can and cannot support. This book is a model for other researchers.

The findings contribute strongly not only to our understanding of the very important interwar case, but to our analysis of the linkage between domestic and international politics. Institutions, such as central bank independence, matter. So do the preferences of social coalitions and their organizational forms, such as parties and unions. International cooperation requires that we understand just who it is in each country that wants to support the policies that give content to cooperation, and who is it that opposes those policies, and the means they have to affect the outcomes. Simmons' book is a significant contribution to our understanding. It allows us to understand the past in ways which guide us to comprehend the present and to speculate about the future. *Who Adjusts* is an outstanding achievement.

CAREER AWARDS

John Gaus Award (\$5,000)

The John Gaus Distinguished Lecturer Award honors the recipient's lifetime of exemplary scholarship in the joint tradition of political science and public administration and, more generally, rec-

ognizes and encourages scholarship in public administration.

Award Committee: Hal Rainey, University of Georgia, Chair; Susan MacManus, University of South Florida; and Larry Berman, University of California–Davis

Recipient: **Charles E. Lindblom**, Yale University

Citation: The John Gaus Award honors Charles E. Lindblom's contribution, throughout a distinguished career, of highly influential analyses of major topics in political science and public administration. He has provided internationally influential analyses of major institutional issues facing contemporary political economies. For example, he has insightfully analyzed the relations between economic markets and political processes, and clarified the relative advantages and disadvantages of different mechanisms for social organization, such as market systems, governmental hierarchies, and hybridized versions of such instrumentalities (*Politics, Economics and Welfare*, with Robert Dahl, 1953; *Politics and Markets*, 1977, winner of the Lippincott Award for a book of lasting significance, 1995). He has served as one of the truly preeminent scholars on the decision processes in public policy and government through, among other work, seminal analyses of characteristics of those processes such as "incrementalism" and "partisan mutual adjustment." Relatedly, he has analyzed the role of inquiry and knowledge development in those processes (*The Intelligence of Democracy*, 1965; *A Strategy of Decision*, with David Braybrooke, 1963; *Usable Knowledge*, with David Cohen, 1979; *Inquiry and Change*, Best Book on Government and Politics Award, American Political Science Association, 1990). His contributions have provided intellectual leadership on these profound questions in political science, while also exerting a major influence on public administration. For example, scholars in public administration treat as classics his *Public Administration Review* article on "The Science of Muddling Through," and a sequel article two decades later, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through." The John Gaus Distinguished Lecturer Award honors Charles E. Lindblom. Through his career of distinctive achievements, he returns the favor by bringing honor to the award. Other recipients will now value the award all the more, knowing that Lindblom has won it.

Ithiel de Sola Pool Award (\$1,000)

Given to a scholar selected to present a lecture exploring the implications of research on issues of politics in a global society and evoking the broad range of scholarship pursued by Ithiel de Sola Pool.

Award Committee: Bernard Cohen, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Chair; Samuel Popkin, University of California–San Diego; and Myron Weiner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Recipient: **Robert D. Putnam**, Harvard University

Citation: Ithiel de Sola Pool applied an orderly, systematic and creative mind to a wide range of problems of political life during his lifetime. He started in political theory, then became interested in political behavior, and then in political communication. He was always interested in technology and its impact on public policy. He pioneered in content analysis and in the simulation of presidential campaigns. His work on the politics of foreign trade policy is still germane more than 30 years later. His mix of creative imagination, rigorous research design, history, and practicality are beautifully illustrated in a gem of a book he published in 1983, the year before his death, under the title *Forecasting the Telephone: A Retrospective Technology Assessment of the Telephone*.

In his many and varied inquiries into the values and the performance of people and of institutions in democratic governments, Robert D. Putnam has displayed the same kind of mix of creative imagination, rigorous application of social science techniques, sensitivity to the constraints of history, and concern for realism and practicality.

Putnam received his Ph.D. from Yale in 1970. He spent the first ten years of his academic life at the University of Michigan, and since 1979 he has been at Harvard University, where he has served as chair of the Government Department, Associate Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and as Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is currently Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Center for International Affairs. He is a prolific scholar, having written or co-authored more than thirty-scholarly articles and book chapters, and seven books.

In his earliest days at Michigan, he and two young colleagues began to study the development of political institutions in Italy, work that continues to

shape his thinking about the very basis of democratic institutions and democratic government. His first major volume, *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy* (1973), examines the political style, the cognitive predispositions, and the operative political ideals of political leaders in those two countries. It is a “real world” study, and an intensely human interpretation of the implications of social-science research, combined with responsible social-science treatments of the research product. He argues for “a careful balance between the competing claims of rigor and precision, on the one hand, and common sense and sensitivity, on the other.” He takes his text from Aristotle, but it could as well have been Pool, whose work on symbols of democracy he refers to on several occasions.

In *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (1976), Putnam provides an overview of what he calls “cumulative answers . . . to the grand questions posed by classical elite theories.” Interweaving the results of his own studies with those of others, he provides a stimulating investigation into those with the power to shape policy. Again, his examination of real issues hauled in by the casting of a very wide intellectual net is disciplined by rigorous social science techniques.

In 1981 Putnam co-authored *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*, with Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman. Extending his prior work on politicians, he and his colleagues looked here at the similarities and differences between politicians and bureaucrats as policy makers in seven Western democracies, testing hypotheses about the convergence of the two roles in the modern democratic polity. Recognizing the importance of classic administrative values to the support of pluralist freedoms and of modern government, they stress the essential role of politicians in the support of modern democratic government. “If democratic ideals are to retain their traditional role as goads to political change, it is primarily to politicians that we must look. If governments are to be made more responsive to the wants and needs of ordinary citizens, it is primarily to politicians that we must look.” While that conclusion may ring the right bells with political scientists, it is a challenge to much of the contemporary public discourse about politics in democracies around the world.

In his 1993 book, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Putnam has drawn together his nearly a quarter of century of work on Italian

political institutions, and has shown us how a rigorous and accomplished work of social science can be a masterpiece of modern democratic theory. This is an impressive voyage of discovery, exploring the performance of democratic institutions, and investigating “the origins of effective government” in democracies. Concluding that differences in civic life—the norms and networks of civic engagement—play a key role in explaining institutional success, he brings history to bear on social science to determine why some regions in Italy are more civic than others. In the end, he concludes that “building social capital . . . is the key to making democracy work.” (In an observation about the relative roles of civic traditions and religious institutions that Ithiel Pool would have cherished, Putnam writes that “good government in Italy is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs, not prayer.”) *Making Democracy Work* has received awards from the National Academy of Public Administration, the American Political Science Association and the International Political Science Association; has been called a “classic” in a major *New York Times* book review; and has been praised by *THE ECONOMIST* as “a great work of social science, worthy to rank alongside de Tocqueville, Pareto and Weber.”

Putnam’s account, in *Making Democracy Work*, of life in the less-civic communities in Italy gives us a veiled warning about the direction of our own democracy. There is some cheer to be found, however, in the fact that Robert Putnam is now directing a major interdisciplinary investigation of “Social Capital and Public Affairs” for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and that his own current research is focused the revitalization of the American democracy.

Hubert H. Humphrey Award (\$500)

To recognize notable public service by a political scientist.

Award Committee: Theda Skocpol, Harvard University, Chair; Mark Peterson, University of Pittsburgh; and Eugene Skolnikoff, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Recipient: **The Honorable Madeleine Albright**, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Citation: We enthusiastically recommend the Honorable Madeleine Albright for the 1995 Hubert Humphrey Award of the American Political Sci-

ence Association. Albright is a scientist whose career exemplifies the highest standards of our discipline, and she has performed outstanding service to the public and the nation.

Born in 1936 amidst the emerging turmoil in Europe, Albright immigrated to the United States with her family as a refugee following the post-war communist coup in Czechoslovakia. With her interest in politics and international affairs forged by these early experiences, she went on to receive a B.A. in political science with honors at Wellesley College in 1959, an M.A., a Ph.D. from Columbia University's Department of Public Law and Government, and a Certificate from the Russian Institute at Columbia.

Throughout her career she has orchestrated an admirable blend of academic and public roles, starting after graduation as chief legislative assistant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie and followed by a staff appointment to the National Security Council in the Carter administration. After her first stint in government service, she returned to the academy, as the William H. Donner Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She earned four "teacher of the year" awards while at Georgetown University. Immediately prior to her current position, she was president of the Center for National Policy, a nonprofit research organization. Albright has always been an active participant in international affairs, applying her expertise in government positions, in advisory roles in support of major candidates for national office, in frequent appearances in the national media, and as a leader endeavoring to develop foreign policy alternatives for the country.

Today Madeleine Albright is the highly effective and well regarded United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, a position of cabinet rank in the Clinton administration. In an era in which the mission and structure of the United Nations are undergoing significant reexamination and change, Ambassador Albright, in one of the more difficult assignments for any public servant, is providing thoughtful, forceful, and distinguished representation of the goals and foreign policies of the United States.

Ambassador Albright represents the highest standards as a teacher, a policy analyst, and a public servant. She is eminently deserving to receive the Hubert H. Humphrey Award in recognition "of notable public service by a political scientist."

Carey McWilliams Award (\$500)

Presented each year to honor a major journalistic contribution to our understanding of politics.

Award Committee: G.R. Boynton, University of Iowa, Chair; Russell W. Neuman, Tufts University; and Shanto Iyengar, University of California—Los Angeles

Recipient: **Brian Lamb, C-SPAN**

We recognize Brian Lamb who is one of the heroes of Americans who care deeply about their country. He had the original vision, he negotiated with Congress and the Cable Industry to set up CSPAN, and he has been the chief executive officer from its initial gavel to gavel coverage of the House of Representatives to its current 48 hours a day of coverage of American politics on CSPAN and CSPAN 2. CSPAN realizes the dream of bringing the work of government into our homes that we may be as informed as we want to be. Every minute of the House and the Senate, and congressional hearings in profusion are available to citizens. In addition, there is election coverage, meetings of government officials, meetings of a wide variety of organizations, seminars about public affairs, and call-in programs on a daily basis. He is putting American government into our schools with the CSPAN bus. He is putting American government onto the internet with CSPAN's electronic connections.

He has created a communication network with that most precious of resources—time. Enough time that each word of a speech may be heard, that each witness and questioner will be heard, that each seminar will be carried to its conclusion. Enough time to give us the detail of American politics. We who love the detail of American politics salute you.

Charles E. Merriam Award (\$500)

Given to a person whose published work and career represent a significant contribution to the art of government through the application of social science research.

Award Committee: Twiley Barker, University of Illinois—Chicago, Chair; Jack Levy, Rutgers University; and John Kingdon, University of Michigan

Recipient: **Alan Rosenthal, Rutgers University**

The Charles E. Merriam Award is given to a person whose published work and career represent a significant contribution to the art of government through the application of social science research. My committee colleagues (John Kingdon and Jack Levy) and I are pleased to announce the selection of Alan Rosenthal of Rutgers University as the 1995 recipient.

This is a career award and Alan's career reflects, in a profound way, the critical attributes that characterized Merriam's work at the University of Chicago during the first half of this century. For more than three decades, Alan has been at the forefront of serious and imaginative research on state government institutions. He is particularly known for his works on state legislatures and is considered by many as the premier scholar on those institutions. His books on *Legislative Life: People, Process, and Performance*, *Governors and Legislatures: Contending Powers*, *Legislative Performance in the States: Explorations of Committee Behavior*, and *The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States* are representative of his social science research over the years.

True to the Merriam model, Alan Rosenthal has compiled an impressive record of service to governmental institutions at both the state and national levels. Notwithstanding his valuable service to the U.S. Office of Education, the Law and Governmental Studies Panel of NIE, and the National Science Foundation, Alan's most noteworthy public service efforts have been in the state legislative arena. He directed legislative organization studies in eight states and aided four states in developing Legislative Ethics codes. And he has been particularly active in his own state of New Jersey, recently chairing the Commission on Legislative Ethics and Campaign Finance and the Congressional Redistricting Commission. Overall, Alan's reputation in this area is underscored by persistent requests for his advice and service by some two-thirds of our state legislatures.

Finally, for more than two decades, Alan has put forth vigorous efforts to encourage a heightened professionalism in the public service generally, and more particularly, in state government operations. Under his directorship of the Eagleton Institute of Politics, many graduate students were encouraged and trained for careers in the public service and the Institute became well known as a center for the study of state government. Alan is richly deserving of this award.