


ARTICLE

If You Must Give Them a Gift, Then Give Them the Gift of Nonexistence

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Abstract

I present a qualified new defense of antinatalism. It is intended to empower potential parents who worry about their possible children's life quality in a world threatened by environmental degradation, climate change, and the like. The main elements of the defense are an understanding of antinatalism's historical nature and contemporary varieties, a positional theory of value based on Epicurean hedonism and Schopenhauerian pessimism, and a sensitive guide for reproductive decision-making in the light of different views on life's value and risk-taking. My conclusion, main message, to the concerned would-be parents is threefold. If they believe that life's ordinary frustrations can make it not worth living, they should not have children. If they believe that a noticeably low life quality makes it not worth living and that such life quality can be reasonably expected, they should not have children, either. If they believe that a noticeably low life quality is not reasonably to be expected or that the risk is worth taking, they can, in the light of their own values and beliefs, have children. The conclusion is supported by a combination of the extant arguments for reproductive abstinence, namely the arguments from consent, moral asymmetry, life quality, and risk.

Keywords: antinatalism; risk; pessimism; Epicurus; Schopenhauer

Many people of reproductive age have decided not to have children, or to have fewer children than they originally intended, due to the state of the world.^{1-2,3} Motivations vary. Some want to avoid causing further environmental damage and climate change. Others want to avoid creating a life that might not be worth living. I address the decision of the latter group and analyze its moral status in view of ideas presented in the discussion on antinatalism. Are they allowed to refrain? Are they duty-bound to do so?

Antinatalism, essentially the view that people should not have children, has been defended by three main person-centered arguments.⁴ These are the arguments from moral asymmetry and quality of life,^{5,6,7,8,9} consent,^{10,11} and risk.^{12,13} Some colleagues credit the original version of the risk argument to my 2004 article "A rational cure for prereproductive stress syndrome."¹⁴ My aim here is to add nuances to the view I then introduced by presenting a positional (as opposed to universal)¹⁵ defense of the risk argument, augmented by the other approaches and my axiology of hedonistic pessimism.

I will start by presenting a heuristic dialogue-form account of how contemporary discussion on antinatalism could have emerged and explaining the significance of its turning points to my own narrative. I will then go on to describe hedonistic pessimism as a theory of value based on Epicurean and Schopenhauerian ideas. After more detailed descriptions of the main views at play, I will move on to ideas on the value of life and risk-taking.

From Perfection to Suffering

The following imaginary conversation contains the building blocks of modern antinatalism as I understand it. Familiarity with all the characters is not necessary. The conversation can be read just as an exchange of ideas by random participants in the spirit of Socratic dialogues. The references, however, point to primary and secondary sources in case further information is needed. Every line is needed for my ensuing analysis, and I will summarize the main points immediately after the conversation.

Immanuel Kant: We should aim at moral perfection.¹⁶

Arthur Schopenhauer: Capital idea! How do we get there?¹⁷

Kant: We do not. We try and we try but we never get there.

Schopenhauer: Oh, dear. Isn't that frustrating?

Kant: It would be. That's why we have to imagine an afterlife that makes us perfect.

Schopenhauer: Too rich for my blood. I refuse to deceive myself like that.

Kant: Your call. But then you suffer the frustration.

Schopenhauer: So be it. I'll build a philosophy around that. "Life is suffering." My name will be praised for centuries.

David Benatar: Sorry, I come into existence only a couple of centuries later, but I could not help overhearing, so let me just say that I agree, full-heartedly. Life IS bad. That's why we should not have any children.¹⁸

Schopenhauer: I never said that.

Benatar: No, but your philosophical view implies it.

Impartial Observer: Erm, David, if no one has children, humankind will become extinct.

Benatar: Yes, what of it?

Ludwig Wittgenstein: "If suicide is allowed, then everything is allowed."¹⁹

I (Id): No one asked you. Go back to your states of affairs.

I (Superego): Do not be rude. That's a perfectly legitimate traditional view.

I (Ego): Yes, well, let us see how this continues, shall we?

R. Ninian Smart: Some utilitarians fall into that one, too.^{20,21} They say that we should eliminate pain – and getting rid of humanity would be the only way to achieve that.²²

Elizabeth Anscombe: Ridiculous ramblings. Of course we must have children.²³

Seana Shiffrin: Well, maybe. But it's a pretty momentous thing, to be brought into existence. We should ask them if they want it. But we cannot.²⁴

Majority Philosopher: Nonsense! Everyone wants to live. We should all be grateful for our lives.²⁵

Shiffrin: Not necessarily. The future life could be full of suffering. Can we really commit new individuals to that without their consent?

Benatar: Of course we cannot. And remember, ALL life is bad.

I: David, I've been meaning to talk to you about that. People are not really buying that "all life is bad" line. They think that their own lives are OK. End of story for your argument.

Benatar: I've been sensing that, too. I now say that we should go extinct to stop degrading the environment and suppressing nonhuman animals.²⁶

I: And I'm fully with you in that, too. It's just that then the decision to make or not to make babies would be dictated by the Climate Police and I do not think that it would go down too well.

Benatar: Perhaps not. Well, if you have a better idea, I'm all ears.

I: Right. Remember when Majority Philosopher said that everyone wants to live?

Benatar: Yes. And?

I: I think I know someone who does not. See, I've thought about this Offer That I Could Not Refuse...

Before I go on to explain the "offer" I have in mind, let me reiterate the main points of this fictitious conversation. I started with Immanuel Kant's idea of transcendental perfection and Arthur Schopenhauer's denial of it. This served as an introduction to David Benatar's influential early philanthropic (person-centered) view—and it will help me build my new narrative later.

The idea of the extinction of humankind, implied by Benatar's take, has widely been used as a *reductio ad absurdum* argument not only against antinatalism but also against Schopenhauerian ethics and a philosophical doctrine called *negative utilitarianism*. Extinctionist antinatalists are not impressed by this counterargument, because it merely repeats what they think and believe in, anyway. Ludwig Wittgenstein's dictum, however, summarizes well the sense of disbelief that most others have in the face of voluntary suicide either on an individual or collective level. Elizabeth Anscombe's traditionalist view gels naturally with Wittgenstein's, and the philosophical majority follows suit.

Seana Shiffrin dented the armor of unquestioned reproductive autonomy by pointing out wrongful-life incidents in which parents seem to exceed the limits of sensible and legitimate childbearing. Benatar's views, partly wrongly, have been associated with such truly miserable-life cases and his extension to all lives has been seen as counterintuitive. His later work has introduced a misanthropic version of antinatalism, based on stopping anthropogenic environmental degradation. My revisory attempt here is linked with Benatar's early view, with an aspiration to make it more comprehensible (to me, if not others).

The Offer I Could Not Refuse

The doctrinal background outlined, let me sketch my axiology, or theory of the value of human life, by using a hypothetical example and my response to it. Let us suppose that a perfectly trustworthy and omnipotent entity makes me the following offer:

If you so choose, your consciousness ceases to exist while your physical avatar continues to exist and does all the things that you would have done. No one will ever notice your mental withdrawal and nothing in world history will change. The only difference is that you, as a psychological person, will not experience the rest of your life with its twists and turns.

This is what I call The Offer I Could Not Refuse.

When philosophers present made-up scenarios like this, the point is usually to declare a universal truth about something. It would be wrong to turn a trolley on an innocent passer by even if this would save many other lives.²⁷ Or it would be right to disconnect oneself from someone who is lethally ill even if this would spell the end of the patient's life.²⁸ Anyone in these situations should or may act according to the specified rule.

Not so in my case. I am simply telling what I would choose given the chance to exit totally, quietly, inconspicuously, and leaving no mess for anyone to clean. I would accept the offer. I do not, as things stand, mind the idea of not existing after accepting the offer. I would certainly not mind not existing after the switch, as there would be no one to mind. And I would not have to worry about the impact on others. According to the terms of the offer, there would be none.

I am not suggesting that everyone would or should think like this. I am, in fact, reasonably confident that most people would refuse the offer. That is perfectly fine by me. Who am I to tell others how they should see their own lives? I am, however, also reasonably confident that some people, not just me, would think along my lines, given an explanation.

Hedonistic Pessimism

My acceptance of the offer is not based on clinical depression or existential visions of great suffering.²⁹ I have lived a relatively good life, as far as human lives go, and it is perfectly possible that I will continue to do so. With any luck, I can fake it to the end and create a fairly decent bionarrative. Yet I do not particularly want to experience any of it. How come?

My thinking in this matter could be Epicurean. Positive experiences (pleasures) are the only intrinsic good in a person's life and negative experiences (pain, anguish, and suffering) are the only intrinsic bad. Pleasures should be sought in moderation lest their pursuit or achievement paves the way to subsequent pain, anguish, or suffering. The best that can happen to a mind is *ataraxia*, a state of serene calmness without high emotions.^{30,31}

As to my own life, the pleasures that I can expect are small. The taste of the morning coffee, the completion of yet another funding bid, the odd intellectual exchange with a colleague, the tear for a good tune, and the occasional hope for more. The negatives are unknown until they transpire, but they are inevitable. The favorite cup will break, many bids will be rejected, and exhilarating encounters and esthetic experiences can leave a void in their wake. In addition, the flat has to be cleaned, the guitars have to be restrung, and a plethora of other daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly chores have to be completed.

Although the visible balance may look pretty even, Schopenhauerian pessimism leads me to conclude that the rest of my life is not worth experiencing if the alternative is immediate oblivion without untoward external consequences. My life may not be dramatic suffering, as suggested for every life by Schopenhauer's philosophy, but the impossibility of continued Epicurean tranquility and the unreachability of completed Kantian perfection (with the ensuing Schopenhauerian frustration) are sufficiently haunting prospects for me. Not to mention worse things, which are, of course, also possible.

Benatar has presented a similar position more elegantly and using also other theories of value.³² Debates on antinatalism have a tendency, however, to slide into more dramatic directions, for reasons that will become clear in the next sections. One difference that I should mention already here is that Benatar's case is universal (meant to apply to all people) while mine is positional (meant to apply only to myself and to those who share my view on values). Combined with the consent, moral-asymmetry, quality-of-life, and risk arguments, my axiology provides a new small building block to my risk view on antinatalism.

Would Not Every Rational Person Want to Live?

One person-regarding (regarding the person to be or not to be) reason for bringing a life into existence is that this is what the future individual would want. Children cannot, as noted by Shiffrin, be asked before they exist, so there can be no explicit, actual consent.³³ Implicit, assumed consent is a possibility, though. It can be argued that any rational person would want to be rather than not to be; and that once people are born, their willingness to stay alive shows that existence is preferable to nonexistence.

My response to the offer testifies that the first part of the argument is false. I am, I believe, a rational person, yet I have no urge to live. I also believe that there are others who agree with me. Not all people, not most of them, but sufficiently many to support my findings later. Even a tiny majority would be enough for my modest conclusions.

As for the second part of the argument, the caveats in the formulation of the offer demonstrate how a person need not be actively suicidal to prefer nonexistence to existence. The avatar that I would leave behind would ascertain that my psychological demise does not harm others in any way. If someone cares for me, "I" am still there for them, and if society is desperate for my contribution, society will have

it. Those are my philanthropic reasons for staying reluctantly alive when the offer is not on the table and the avatar approach is not available. To say that the deception can be exposed, causing people in “my” circle disappointment and suffering would be breaking the rules of the thought experiment.

An understanding of these could, I believe, convince at least some that my view is not completely insane. People tend to be good and kind and often go on living for others, feeling duty-bound to do so; and dare not think about exiting lest their dependents would be hurt. The avatar removes the problem on an intellectual level for those who can grasp its function and liberates the possible antinatalist within.

Would It Not Be Good to Come into Existence?

Another person-regarding reason for bringing a life into existence is that the act benefits the future individual. The first antinatalist answer to this is moral asymmetry. The prospect of creating a good life provides little or no reason for making babies while the prospect of creating a bad life provides a very good reason against it.³⁴ This idea has been contested as a general rule, and perhaps rightly so.³⁵ At least it is easily conflated with the different and slightly callous idea that we have no moral duties to help other people as long as we refrain from harming them.³⁶

I recorded my own take on the matter in my 1994 *Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics* by stating in what I called the “Principle of actual or prospective existence” that

it is always right to satisfy the basic needs of an existing being [...]. Non-existent beings who will never come into existence need not be counted in the evaluation, since they do not have and will not have needs which could be satisfied or frustrated. [*Endnote*: There is no need to become existent.] On the other hand, however, non-existent beings who will come into existence as a consequence of our actions [...] will in the foreseeable future have needs. [If a] couple are directly responsible for the existence of [a] suffering child, they are also directly responsible for the child’s suffering.³⁷

The rest of my argument back then is muddled because I tried to address two issues at one stroke: the rightness and wrongness of reproductive decisions and the mutual superiority of the negative and positive versions of utilitarianism.^{38,39} The first issue, however, gets a clear and asymmetric solution. Our decision not to have a child does not frustrate any potential-future-individual needs. Our decision to have a child, on the contrary, can make us responsible for potential-future-individual need frustration. When I 10 years later formulated the risk argument, this must have been the forgotten source of my thinking.⁴⁰

The second antinatalist answer to the question of the bliss of existence is that life is always bad and never worth living.⁴¹ This view has not attracted wide support. Most people think that their lives are quite good despite a few setbacks here and there. Benatar has carefully demonstrated, using psychological theories, that they are wrong and guilty of unwarranted Pollyannaism.⁴² My hedonistic pessimism is a milder, personal, and positional version of Benatar’s view.

Common sense seems to repel the arguments from consent, asymmetry, and quality of life when they are presented as universal truths. We cannot ask potential future people whether they want to be born and we cannot absolutely guarantee that their lives will be good, but surely there is some room for responsible reproduction? Whatever Schopenhauer, Benatar, and other gloomy antinatalists claim, life is not that bad. And we could aid nature by science, adhering, say, to the principle of procreative beneficence and having only children who will have the best possible lives.⁴³ Who can object to that?

The Varieties of Badness

The stage is now set for my revised, positional risk argument. As a reminder, I am addressing the concerns of the would-be parents who are worried about their potential children’s well-being in a world challenged by environmental degradation, climate change, and the like. They should already be in tune with at least parts of my message.

Let me begin by distinguishing different kinds of possible badness in human lives, focusing on the kinds that are relevant to the concerned would-be parents.

Human life can be bad in at least the following senses:

- 1) It is very short and seems to contain nothing but suffering. This was discussed in the late twentieth century in the context of newborns with untoward medical conditions.⁴⁴
- 2) It is longer but seems to contain too much suffering. This was the starting point and basis of Shiffrin’s wrongful-life arguments and the necessity of consent.⁴⁵
- 3) It is of normal length, but circumstances lower its quality drastically. This is the concern of the would-be parents who worry about the state of the world.⁴⁶
- 4) It is normal, but normal lives are never worth living for their own sakes. This is the cornerstone of Benatar’s philanthropic antinatalism.^{47,48}
- 5) It is normal, but normal lives can sometimes be not worth living for their own sakes. This is my axiology here and the starting point of my original view.^{49,50}

On the list, items 1 and 2 can mostly be ruled out by prenatal selection as suggested, for instance, by the principle of procreative beneficence. It should also be kept in mind that disability scholars have denied the intrinsic badness of even lives with conditions that seem irredeemably debilitating. They argue that the debilitation is caused by discriminatory social constructs.⁵¹ The debate is ongoing.⁵²

Item 3 is politically contentious, because preventing bad lives in the sense it specifies can turn against the reproductive autonomy of women living in hostile conditions.^{53,54,55,56} This emphasis marks a distinctly twenty-first-century approach to feminist bioethics. Earlier feminism often saw antinatalist suggestions as liberating, especially in well-defined contexts.⁵⁷ Despite the peril, however, the concerns of the people who want to have children but are in doubt about the quality of their future lives need to be addressed. I suggest that a sensible and sensitive combination of items 3–5 forms the best foundation for empowering them. Before going on to instructions to them, however, a few words about scales of value in human lives, other values, and attitudes toward risk.

Scales of Value in Human Lives

Different views assign different values to the goodness and badness of human lives. Figure 1 presents the variation schematically.⁵⁸

Pronatalists posit that the value of human lives ranges from full positive to very limited in the case of debilitating conditions and the like. Normal (whatever that means) lives populate the upper end and the rest of the scale is for exceptional cases. Whether or not human life can ever be totally devoid of value (zero) is an issue of some contention. Philippa Foot famously argued that rare cases of almost no value are possible,⁵⁹ but others do not necessarily agree.⁶⁰ It is clear, however, that life can never be positively bad (have truly negative value).⁶¹




Figure 1. Scales of the value of human lives in different views.

Benatar in his philanthropic antinatalism seems to argue that the value of human lives ranges from fully negative to slightly less negative. His normal is well below zero and no human life has actual positive value. In his own words, “even the best lives are very bad.”⁶²

I place myself (and those who agree) a little left of the middle in Figure 1. My willingness to accept the offer indicates that my life has no positive value to speak of but I am not sufficiently unhappy to qualify for the seriously negative, either. According to Benatar, I am deceiving myself, and perhaps I am. All this is, however, rather pseudo-precise and abstract, and my only point in presenting the figure is to point out the possibility of the negative dimension. For the rest, let me move on to sketch my ideas about other values and risk-taking.

Other Values and Risk-Taking

In a less-known 2004 article of mine, “If you must make babies, then at least make the best babies you can?”⁶³ I approached the matter by asking what reasons people cite for having children. Proposals include that it is natural and inescapable, that God demands it, that society requires it, that family expects it, and that it is kind and generous to pass on the gift of life. Later on, David Wasserman catalogued pronatalist motivations in more detail.⁶⁴ The outtake from these is that babies are not made solely, primarily, or at all for the sake of the babies. In reproductive decision-making, people typically consider other factors first and only then, as an afterthought, check the box marked “Let us hope and, if we can, make sure that the child will have a good life.”

The idea of the gift of life is the only person-centered line in my erstwhile list. To express my doubts about it, I presented an imaginary example with a question:

You have inherited, as an heirloom, a sealed box. You cannot open it, and you are not certain what is in it. There are two possibilities. The box may contain valuable jewellery. For all you know, this is the more likely alternative. But you may be wrong. The box may also contain explosives, which are set to go off when it is opened. As far as you can figure, this chance is smaller, but it is realistic.

You have a choice. You can keep the box to yourself, and never open it. Alternatively, you can give it to a complete stranger as a gift. If you give it away, the recipient cannot help but open it, although she does not know about the contents. If the box contains jewellery, she is lucky – she can keep it or sell it and buy things she would not otherwise have afforded. If it contains explosives, she is unlucky – she will be badly injured for life.

Should you give the box to a complete stranger or not?⁶⁵

The example is obviously disanalogous with procreation in that the recipient already exists. This is not a problem for the antinatalist case if my 1994 principle of actual or prospective existence is accepted.⁶⁶ But in my analysis I had to admit that passing the box can, even in the absence of consent, in some situations be seen as a rational choice. The recipient, already living, might be in dire need and not taking the risk could be seen as unnecessarily timid.

This is a reminder that in the world of the living, decisions are balancing acts. Assuming that the would-be parents have legitimate external reasons for having a child, these reasons, at least according to pronatalists, have to be weighed against the possible badness of the produced life and the probability of the badness occurring. This might well be the situation of the parents who worry about the state of the world and its impact on their potential progeny.

In my original risk argument,⁶⁷ I appealed to the game-theoretical *maximin* model of rationality, or perhaps its most precautionary interpretation: avoid the worst possible outcome at all costs. Since any life can, undisputedly, turn out to be really bad, I then deduced that it would always be irrational to reproduce. Perhaps this is too categorical. Colleagues, including Wasserman and Erik Magnusson, have presented analyses that question my interpretation.⁶⁸

One thing is for sure, namely, that attitudes toward risk in reproduction vary. Some would-be parents believe that any risk is worth taking to produce a new human being. Others think that the risks taken have

Explanations and Concluding Notes

My starting point in Table 1 is that the best interest of the child is an important factor in making the decision to reproduce or not to reproduce. The worried would-be parents whom I am addressing clearly agree with this. The child's best interest may not be their only motivation, but it is one and it is important. This settled, the counseling can move on to the knock-out stages.

The first and second questions on the value of human life rule out those who do not accept Benatar's view (that life is always bad) or the strict pronatalist idea (that life can never be bad). Again, the worried (yes, life can be bad) would-be parents (but not always, we hope) should, by definition, pass these tests.

The next questions sieve opinions on the sufficient badness of life for a choice not to reproduce. My hedonistic pessimism leads the way, but I doubt that my target audience would exit at this stage. Their concern runs deeper than that.

A considerably lower life quality compared to current expectations could well be their formal value threshold. Then the discussion turns to probabilities. The level of possible but not very probable tallies with my original precautionary risk view and could attract some but perhaps not all that many. The more advanced level of reasonably probable, however, is a default value in rational decision-making for all but bold risk takers,⁶⁹ and I would expect the worried would-be parents to take it seriously into consideration.

This is as far as nondirective counseling can go. The awareness of the questions involved would then in an ideal case make the clients think about their own values and risk strategies. What life quality would be too low for their potential child? How likely is it that it would happen? If, in the end, they decide to have the child, anyway, that is their choice. A choice that I, in the light of my own risk views, would resent but reluctantly respect.

My reluctance is partly based on the objectification, or instrumentalization, of the child. To reach the nondirective conclusion, I had to assume the pronatalist idea that the needs and preferences of already living people, including but not limited to the potential parents, can be legitimately weighed against the interests of the future individual. In this model, the child is used as a means to somebody else's ends. Not as a mere means, pronatalists would be quick to point out, but for me that is too little too late. When the ensuing individual says, "My life is not worth living," I do not see "But think of all the joy you brought us" as a proper response.

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32. See note 6, Benatar 2006, at 69–88.
33. See note 10, Shiffrin 1999; note 11, Singh 2012.
34. See note 5, Benatar 1997; note 6, Benatar 2006, at 32; note 20, Narveson 1967; note 21, McMahan 1981.

35. See note 9, Magnusson 2019; note 25, Sprigge 1968.
36. See note 6, Benatar 2006, at 32.
37. Häyry M. *Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics*. London: Routledge; 1994, at 121 and 187, end-note 56.
38. See note 37, Häyry 1994, at 121–4.
39. Häyry M. Just better utilitarianism. *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics* 2021;30:343–67. doi:10.1017/S0963180120000882. (I keep coming back to whether or not I am a utilitarian, and if so, a “positive” or “negative” one. I think the latter is winning now.)
40. My emphasis, then and now, on the duties of the would-be parents rather than the experiences of the potential new individual reflects my hesitation concerning the consent argument for antinatalism. (See note 10, Shiffrin 1999; note 11, Singh 2012.) Discussing the non-existing being’s willingness to live or not to live somehow bestows the entity an unwarranted air of existence.
41. See note 5, Benatar 1997; note 6, Benatar 2006.
42. See note 6, Benatar 2006.
43. Savulescu J. Procreative beneficence: Why we should select the best children. *Bioethics* 2001;15:212–35. doi:10.1111/1467-8519.00251.
44. Häyry M. Is it undesirable that children are born infected with HIV? In Häyry M, ed. *Playing God: Essays on Bioethics*. Helsinki: Helsinki: University Press; 2001:32–43. doi:10.31885/9515704952.
45. See note 10, Shiffrin 1999; note 11, Singh 2012.
46. See note 1, Green 2021; note 2, Shead 2021; note 3, Williams 2021.
47. See note 5, Benatar 1997; note 6, Benatar 2006.
48. Schopenhauer’s philosophy does not make the list, because it seems to accept life’s misery as a given and does not advocate antinatalism as such. There is a deliberate jump in my imaginary conversation between Schopenhauer’s “suffering” and Benatar’s “badness” that demonstrates the sometimes nonlinear advances in philosophical thinking.
49. See note 12, Häyry 2004.
50. Häyry M. The rational cure for prereproductive stress syndrome revisited. *Journal of Medical Ethics* 2005;31:606–7. doi:10.1136/jme.2005.011684.
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56. Pande A, ed. *Birth Controlled: Selective Reproduction and Neoliberal Eugenics in South Africa and India*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; 2022.
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58. My thanks are due to Amanda Sukenick who, in preparation of an antinatalist podcast (<https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-exploring-antinatalism-podcast/id1497076755>), prompted me to dig deeper into the development of my thinking and to remember this 1995 idea, then related to babies born infected with HIV—see note 44, Häyry 2001.
59. Foot P. Euthanasia. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 1977;6:85–112; available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2264937> (last accessed 22 July 2022).
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61. See, for example, note 8, Smilansky 2012.
62. See note 6, Benatar 2006, at 61.

63. See [note 52](#), Häyry 2004.
64. See [note 4](#), Wasserman 2015.
65. See [note 52](#), Häyry 2004, at 106.
66. See [note 37](#), Häyry 1994, at 121, 126. It is not a problem because *not* passing the box on or *not* having a child does *not* enter calculations, only the passing the box on does. This applies only to my need-based axiology, not necessarily to aggregative hedonistic utilitarianism.
67. See [note 12](#), Häyry 2004.
68. See [note 4](#), Wasserman 2015; [note 13](#), Magnusson 2022.
69. Häyry M, Takala T. Genetic engineering and the risk of harm. *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy* 1998;1:61–4. doi:[10.1023/A:1009937922873](https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009937922873).