

crosscutting identities, but where these limits lie empirically needs to be further clarified. In addition, readers of this book will likely wonder how much exclusion prompts a response from large ethnic minorities to form a CWC. Both the Pashtuns and the Acholis enjoy some measure of representation in the civil service and the military (pp. 141, 222) and, for the authors, their intermittent inclusion means that minority leaders may “perceive the group as stronger than its numbers would suggest” (p. 141). But compared to other ethnic groups who enjoy even less representation, some may claim that the Pashtuns and Acholis at least have a foot in the door and may not need to form an alternative winning coalition.

Overall, this is an impressive book that broadens our understanding of identity-based mobilization. As Birnir and Şatana show, identity mobilization is a tool not only for majorities and rulers. Minorities also have an array of identity-based mobilizational choices at their disposal, and they use them to forge a path to a winning coalition.

**Twisting in the Wind: The Politics of Tepid Transitions to Renewable Energy.** By Oksan Bayulgen. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. 310p. \$80.00 cloth.

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The study of renewable energy, long confined to engineering schools, became a topic of interest to political scientists in the early 2000s. This was probably driven by two factors: (1) renewable energy technology was on a path to becoming cost competitive, and (2) the Bush administration’s decision in 2001 not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol meant that technological innovations, such as clean energy, became even more important, given the weak prospects for international climate cooperation.

The first wave of research on the politics of renewable energy engaged in considerable effort to figure out how to break what Gregory Unruh (“Understanding Carbon Lock-In,” *Energy Policy* 28, no 12, 2000) famously called the “carbon lock-in.” Researchers paid particularly close attention to the role of domestic audiences and interest groups. This focus was unsurprising: voters’ preferences and lobbies appeared to be critical players in climate politics, especially given what people saw as the key factors behind George W. Bush’s decision to withdraw from Kyoto. It was thus plausible that the same would hold true in (renewable) energy politics.

Yet this focus on audiences and interest groups was (and still is) not entirely satisfactory when studying renewable energy politics cross-nationally. For one, it applies more naturally to settings in which these actors have an institutionalized and regulated access to power, such as in typical

liberal democracies. Although policy makers are responsive to societal demands in autocracies and hybrid regimes as well, the mechanisms through which these interactions take place often differ considerably. Furthermore, bottom-up approaches tend to erase the agency of political elites. Understanding elites’ priorities becomes important precisely in cases in which we cannot substitute their preferences with those of voters or lobbies. In sum, our models may fit Denmark and Germany quite well, but they do not necessarily travel very far beyond them.

This, I believe, is one way to read Oksan Bayulgen’s excellent book on the “tepid” clean energy transition in Turkey. The book is organized around six chapters. After an introduction that summarizes the book and its contributions, chapter 2 discusses renewable energy policy and its history. It starts with a useful review of the design and types of policies needed for renewable energy infrastructure to emerge. It also offers a careful historical account of energy policy making in Turkey (pp. 48ff), helping set the stage for later chapters and familiarizing readers who might not yet be familiar with it.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical model underpinning the book. Bayulgen begins by reviewing conventional models of energy politics that, by and large, focus on bottom-up, societal demands for (or against) green public goods. She then expresses doubts regarding the relevance of such models outside the set of wealthy, pluralistic Western democracies to which they are typically applied. A battle of interests and voters is helpful in understanding the path of Germany and the United States but will have limited explanatory power outside similar cases (pp. 75–76). Here is where Bayulgen makes her theoretical contribution: she suggests an alternative approach based on a state-led model of opportunistic political elites (pp. 77ff). This model takes elite agency seriously while acknowledging constraints imposed by institutions, such as the degree of concentration of power and the presence of veto players (pp. 90ff). The model is resolutely centered around ruling elites’ own preferences; nonstate actors matter insofar as they can contribute to the elite’s plans.

Chapters 4 and 5 build the empirical case in support of the book’s theory. Chapter 4 focuses on the first part of Turkey’s flirtation with renewable energy, a period that lasted from about 2001 to 2008. In the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis, the newly installed AKP government undertook a series of reforms that included the promotion of renewable energy. Bayulgen makes a compelling case that societal demands were not the key driver of these policies: “for the governing AKP elites the promotion of renewable energy was never the ultimate goal” (p. 107). Instead, the AKP’s desire and (institutionally enabled) ability to launch a pro-growth program to consolidate its power were key. Renewables were, one could say, a lucky side effect of this program.

This period of slow but real progress ended with the Great Recession of 2008, which is where chapter 5 starts. By then, the AKP controlled power more firmly. At the same time, bureaucratic capacity decreased (pp. 202ff). In this new constellation, the AKP government became freer to follow its “neoliberal developmentalist” project. Fossil fuels were a more advantageous means to fulfill this political plan, especially because they offered ways to generate patronage networks via low-skill jobs. As a result, the further development of renewable energy infrastructure stalled.

The last chapter both summarizes the book’s main contributions and ponders their implications. For instance, an important conclusion of this study is that, in contrast to the claims of several influential authors such as James Lovelock (p. 227), democracies may indeed have an advantage in the long-term politics of clean energy. More generally, it helps us make sense of, as the title describes it, the tepid growth many countries experienced over the last 10 to 20 years.

Overall, this book offers something to both researchers and instructors. From a scholarly perspective, it makes a compelling case that is deeply rooted in political economic models of policy making. It can also easily be integrated into the classroom because of its abundance of examples and concrete policy decision, while it avoids overly abstract theorizing.

Despite these strengths, there are areas where one may wish to push back. Some are fairly minor and caused by the passage of time. Fortunately, the notion that there is a dearth of research on non-Western renewable energy politics is no longer accurate. In fact, Bayulgen cites several counterexamples (fn 11, p. 234).

Perhaps more challenging is that the theory is rich in independent variables and relatively poor in outcomes. To be clear, parsimony for its own sake should not be a goal. However, one of the book’s purported contributions is to expand the set of countries that could be studied. Yet this would have been easier to achieve had the theory offered crisper statements and additional implications, perhaps by contrasting the politics of the power sector with areas such as transportation or cooking, thereby offering opportunities to evaluate the plausibility of competing models.

This should not distract from the fact that this book is a very valuable contribution to the literature. With it, Bayulgen contributes to an idea that has emerged from several directions in recent years: live by the political sword and die by the political sword. A favorable political constellation helped a new clean energy industry in Turkey to emerge from nothing. Yet the depoliticization of renewable energy is harder than expected, even in places where it scored early successes. How to complete the energy transition in rougher (political) terrain remains, undoubtedly, a critical question.

**Contemporary State Building: Elite Taxation and Public Safety in Latin America.** By Gustavo A. Flores-Macías. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 260p. \$99.99 cloth.  
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If we had to choose the two most fundamental functions of the state, there is a good chance that most of us would settle on the provision of public safety and, to this end, the gathering of revenue. And if you asked a Latin American tax official about the most important failure of revenue gathering in the region, it is even more likely that he or she would point to the extraordinarily weak taxation of the rich. Hence the importance of this book, another fine, well-researched, and crisply written contribution from Gustavo Flores-Macías.

Flores-Macías spotlights recent moments in which Latin American governments, facing high or rising levels of crime and insecurity, sought to bolster state capacity with new funding from taxes levied on rich firms and households. His focal case is Colombia’s Democratic Security Tax (*Impuesto de la Seguridad Democrática*), a capital levy imposed by decree in 2002 by a right-wing president, Álvaro Uribe, and then renewed for another two years by Congress in late 2003 after a series of negotiations with business organizations. Looking across Latin America, the author offers a clear step-by-step model: countries undergo a public safety crisis (although eight countries in the region did not); the crisis affects their elites directly (however, for those in the largest cities of Brazil and in Mexico City, it did not); and targeted elite taxation then emerges where government–business linkages are strong (Colombia, Honduras, and those Mexican states governed by the Right). By way of contrast, we see diffuse taxation (Costa Rica, El Salvador in 2015) or failed tax reforms (El Salvador in 2011, Mexican states governed by the Left) where those linkages are of medium strength or weak, respectively (pp. 47–59). After asserting persuasively that abundant natural resources and inequality do not forestall such reforms, Flores-Macías then explains the argument with short narrative chapters about Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico.

There is a lot to like about this analysis. Although it is based on recent Latin American experience, the model could apply wherever there is a sustained surge of violent crime: therefore, the book is truly what its title proposes—a story of contemporary state-building. At the same time, the analysis agrees well with two important theoretical traditions in the literature on the politics of taxation: the median voter model, in which democratic electorates push taxation onto the rich (and benefits toward themselves), and the idea of the fiscal contract, by which politicians build or strengthen state institutions (or agree to limit their power constitutionally) in exchange for resources,