

A THEORY OF MASS CULTURE

For about a century, Western culture has really been two cultures: the traditional kind—let us call it ‘High Culture’—that is chronicled in the textbooks, and a ‘Mass Culture’ manufactured wholesale for the market. In the old art forms, the artisans of Mass Culture have long been at work: in the novel, the line stretches from Eugène Süe to Lloyd C. Douglas; in music, from Offenbach to tin-pan alley; in art, from the chromo to Maxfield Parrish and Norman Rockwell; in architecture, from Victorian Gothic to suburban Tudor. Mass Culture has also developed new media of its own, into which the serious artist rarely ventures: radio, the movies, comic books, detective stories, science-fiction, television.

It is sometimes called ‘Popular Culture’,¹ but I think ‘Mass Culture’ a more accurate term, since its distinctive mark is that it is solely and directly an article for mass consumption, like chewing gum. A work of High Culture is occasionally popular, after all, though this is increasingly rare. Thus Dickens was even more popular than his contemporary, G. A.

¹ As I did myself in ‘A Theory of Popular Culture’ (*Politics*, February, 1944) parts of which have been used or adapted in the present article.

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Henty, the difference being that he was an artist, communicating his individual vision to other individuals, while Henty was an impersonal manufacturer of an impersonal commodity for the masses.

The Nature of Mass Culture

The historical reasons for the growth of Mass Culture since the early 1800's are well known. Political democracy and popular education broke down the old upper-class monopoly of culture. Business enterprise found a profitable market in the cultural demands of the newly awakened masses, and the advance of technology made possible the cheap production of books, periodicals, pictures, music, and furniture, in sufficient quantities to satisfy this market. Modern technology also created new media like the movies and television which are specially well adapted to mass manufacture and distribution.

The phenomenon is thus peculiar to modern times and differs radically from what was hitherto known as art or culture. It is true that Mass Culture began as, and to some extent still is, a parasitic, a cancerous growth on High Culture. As Clement Greenberg pointed out in 'Avant-Garde and *Kitsch*' (*Partisan Review*, Fall, 1939): 'The precondition of *kitsch* [a German term for "Mass Culture"] is the availability close at hand of a fully-matured cultural tradition, whose discoveries, acquisitions, and perfected self-consciousness *kitsch* can take advantage of for its own ends.' The connexion, however, is not that of the leaf and the branch but rather that of the caterpillar and the leaf. *Kitsch* 'mines' High Culture the way improvident frontiersmen mine the soil, extracting its riches and putting nothing back. Also, as *kitsch* develops, it begins to draw on its own past, and some of it evolves so far away from High Culture as to appear quite disconnected from it.

It is also true that Mass Culture is to some extent a continuation of the old Folk Art which until the Industrial Revolution was the culture of the common people, but here, too, the differences are more striking than the similarities. Folk Art grew from below. It was a spontaneous, autochthonous expression of the people, shaped by themselves, pretty much without the benefit of High Culture, to suit their own needs. Mass Culture is imposed from above. It is fabricated by technicians hired by businessmen; its audiences are passive consumers, their participation limited to the choice between buying and not buying. The Lords of *kitsch*, in short, exploit the cultural needs of the masses in order to make a profit and/or to maintain their class rule—in Communist countries, only the

second purpose obtains. (It is very different to *satisfy* popular tastes, as Robert Burns' poetry did, and to *exploit* them, as Hollywood does.) Folk Art was the people's own institution, their private little kitchen-garden walled off from the great formal park of their masters' High Culture. But Mass Culture breaks down the wall, integrating the masses into a debased form of High Culture and thus becoming an instrument of political domination. If one had no other data to go on, the nature of Mass Culture would reveal capitalism to be an exploitative class society and not the harmonious commonwealth it is sometimes alleged to be. The same goes even more strongly for Soviet Communism and *its* special kind of Mass Culture.

Mass Culture: U.S.S.R.

'Everybody' knows that America is a land of Mass Culture, but it is not so generally recognised that so is the Soviet Union. Certainly not by the Communist leaders, one of whom has contemptuously observed that the American people need not fear the peace-loving Soviet state which has absolutely no desire to deprive them of their Coca-Cola and comic books. Yet the fact is that the U.S.S.R. is even more a land of Mass Culture than is the U.S.A. This is less easily recognisable, because their Mass Culture is *in form* just the opposite of ours, being one of propaganda and pedagogy rather than of entertainment. None the less, it has the essential quality of Mass, as against High or Folk, Culture: it is manufactured for mass consumption by technicians employed by the ruling class and is not an expression of either the individual artist or the common people themselves. Like our own, it exploits rather than satisfies the cultural needs of the masses, though for political rather than commercial reasons. Its quality is even lower: our Supreme Court building is tasteless and pompous but not to the lunatic degree of the proposed new Palace of the Soviets, a huge wedding-cake of columns mounting up to an eighty-foot statue of Lenin; Soviet movies are so much duller and cruder than our own that even the American comrades shun them; the childish level of *serious* Soviet magazines devoted to matters of art or philosophy has to be read to be believed, and as for the popular press, it is as if Colonel McCormick ran every periodical in America.

Gresham's Law in Culture

The separation of Folk Art and High Culture in fairly watertight compartments corresponded to the sharp line once drawn between the common

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people and the aristocracy. The irruption of the masses onto the political stage has broken down this compartmentation, with disastrous cultural results. Whereas Folk Art had its own special quality, Mass Culture is at best a vulgarised reflection of High Culture. And whereas High Culture could formerly ignore the mob and seek to please only the *cognoscenti*, it must now compete with Mass Culture or be merged into it.

The problem is acute in the United States and not just because a prolific Mass Culture exists here. If there were a clearly defined cultural *élite*, then the masses could have their *kitsch* and the *élite* could have its High Culture, with everybody happy. But the boundary is blurred. A statistically significant part of the population, I venture to guess, is chronically confronted with a choice between going to the movies or to a concert, between reading Tolstoy or a detective story, between looking at old masters or at a TV show; i.e., the pattern of their cultural lives is 'open' to the point of being porous. Good art competes with *kitsch*, serious ideas compete with commercialised formulæ—and the advantage lies all on one side. There seems to be a Gresham's Law in cultural as well as monetary circulation: bad stuff drives out the good, since it is more easily understood and enjoyed. It is this facility of access which at once sells *kitsch* on a wide market and also prevents it from achieving quality.² Clement Greenberg writes that the special æsthetic quality of *kitsch* is that it 'predigests art for the spectator and spares him effort, provides him with a shortcut to the pleasures of art that detours what is necessarily difficult in genuine art' because it includes the spectator's reactions in the work of art itself instead of forcing him to make his own responses. Thus 'Eddie Guest and the Indian Love Lyrics are more "poetic" than T. S. Eliot and Shakespeare'. And so, too, our 'collegiate Gothic' like the Harkness Quadrangle at Yale is more picturesquely Gothic than Chartres, and a pin-up girl smoothly airbrushed by Petty is more sexy than a real naked woman.

When to this ease of consumption is added *kitsch*'s ease of production because of its standardised nature, its prolific growth is easy to understand. It threatens High Culture by its sheer pervasiveness, its brutal, overwhelming *quantity*. The upper classes, who begin by using it to make money from the crude tastes of the masses and to dominate them politically,

²The success of *Reader's Digest* illustrates the law. Here is a magazine that has achieved a fantastic circulation—some fifteen millions, much of which is accounted for by its foreign editions, thus showing that *kitsch* by no means appeals only to Americans—simply by reducing to even lower terms the already superficial formula of other periodicals. By treating a theme in two pages which they treat in six the *Digest* becomes three times as 'readable' and three times as superficial.

end by finding their own culture attacked and even threatened with destruction by the instrument they have thoughtlessly employed. (The same irony may be observed in modern politics, where most swords seem to have two edges; thus Nazism began as a tool of the big bourgeoisie and the army *Junkers* but ended by using *them* as *its* tools.)

Homogenised Culture

Like nineteenth-century capitalism, Mass Culture is a dynamic, revolutionary force, breaking down the old barriers of class, tradition, taste, and dissolving all cultural distinctions. It mixes and scrambles everything together, producing what might be called homogenised culture, after another American achievement, the homogenisation process that distributes the globules of cream evenly throughout the milk instead of allowing them to float separately on top. It thus destroys all values, since value-judgments imply discrimination. Mass Culture is very, very democratic: it absolutely refuses to discriminate against, or between, anything or anybody. All is grist to its mill, and all comes out finely ground indeed.

Consider *Life*, a typical homogenised mass-circulation magazine. It appears on the mahogany library tables of the rich, the glass end-tables of the middle-class, and the oilcloth-covered kitchen tables of the poor. Its contents are as thoroughly homogenised as its circulation. The same issue will contain a serious exposition of atomic theory alongside a disquisition on Rita Hayworth's love-life; photos of starving Korean children picking garbage from the ruins of Pusan and of sleek models wearing adhesive brassieres; an editorial hailing Bertrand Russell on his eightieth birthday ('A GREAT MIND IS STILL ANNOYING AND ADORNING OUR AGE') across from a full-page photo of a housewife arguing with an umpire at a baseball game ('MOM GETS THUMB'); a cover announcing in the same size type 'A NEW FOREIGN POLICY, BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES' and 'KERIMA: HER MARATHON KISS IS A MOVIE SENSATION'; nine colour pages of Renoirs plus a memoir by his son, followed by a full page picture of a roller-skating horse. The advertisements, of course, provide even more scope for the editor's homogenising talents, as when a full-page photo of a ragged Bolivian peon grinningly drunk on coca leaves (which Mr. Luce's conscientious reporters tell us he chews to narcotise his chronic hunger pains) appears opposite an ad. of a pretty, smiling, well-dressed American mother with her two pretty, smiling, well-dressed children (a boy and a girl of course—children are always homogenised in American ads.) looking raptly at a clown on a TV set ('RCA VICTOR BRINGS YOU

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A NEW KIND OF TELEVISION—SUPER SETS WITH “PICTURE POWER”’). The peon would doubtless find the juxtaposition piquant if he could afford a copy of *Life* which, fortunately for the Good Neighbour policy, he cannot.

Academicism and Avantgardism

Until about 1930, High Culture tried to defend itself against the encroachments of Mass Culture in two opposite ways: Academicism, or an attempt to compete by imitation; and Avantgardism, or a withdrawal from competition.

Academicism is *kitsch* for the *élite*: spurious High Culture that is outwardly the real thing but actually as much a manufactured article as the cheaper cultural goods produced for the masses. It is recognised at the time for what it is only by the Avantgardists. A generation or two later, its real nature is understood by everyone and it quietly drops into the same oblivion as its franker sister-under-the-skin. Examples are painters like Bougereau and Rosa Bonheur, critics like Edmund Clarence Stedman and Edmund Gosse, the Beaux Arts school of architecture, composers like the late Sir Edward Elgar, poets like Stephen Phillips, and novelists like Alphonse Daudet, Arnold Bennett, James Branch Cabell and Somerset Maugham.

The significance of the Avantgarde movement (by which I mean poets like Rimbaud, novelists like Joyce, composers like Stravinsky, and painters like Picasso) is that it simply refused to compete. Rejecting Academicism—and thus, at a second remove, also Mass Culture—it made a desperate attempt to fence off some area where the serious artist could still function. It created a new compartmentation of culture, on the basis of an intellectual rather than a social *élite*. The attempt was remarkably successful: to it we owe almost everything that is living in the art of the last fifty or so years. In fact, the High Culture of our times is pretty much identical with Avantgardism. The movement came at a time (1890–1930) when bourgeois values were being challenged both culturally and politically. (In this country, the cultural challenge did not come until World War I, so that our Avantgarde flourished only in the twenties.) In the thirties the two streams mingled briefly, after each had spent its real force, under the aegis of the Communists, only to sink together at the end of the decade into the sands of the waste land we still live in. The rise of Nazism and the revelation in the Moscow Trials of the real nature of the new society in Russia inaugurated the present period, when men cling to the evils they know

rather than risk possibly greater ones by pressing forward. Nor has the chronic state of war, hot or cold, the world has been in since 1939 encouraged rebellion or experiment in either art or politics.

A Merger Has Been Arranged

In this new period, the competitors, as often happens in the business world, are merging. Mass Culture takes on the colour of both varieties of the old High Culture, Academic and Avantgarde, while these latter are increasingly watered down with Mass elements. There is slowly emerging a tepid, flaccid Middlebrow Culture that threatens to engulf everything in its spreading ooze. *Bauhaus* modernism has at last trickled down, in a debased form of course, into our furniture, cafeterias, movie theatres, electric toasters, office buildings, drug stores, and railroad trains. Psychoanalysis is expounded sympathetically and superficially in popular magazines, and the psychoanalyst replaces the eccentric millionaire as the *deus ex machina* in many a movie. T. S. Eliot writes *The Cocktail Party* and it becomes a Broadway hit. (Though in some ways excellent, it is surely inferior to his *Murder in the Cathedral*, which in the unmerged thirties had to depend on WPA to get produced at all.)

The type creator of *kitsch* today, at least in the old media, is an indeterminate specimen. There are no widely influential critics so completely terrible as, say, the late William Lyon Phelps was. Instead we have such grey creatures as Clifton Fadiman and Henry Seidel Canby. The artless numbers of an Eddie Guest are drowned out by the more sophisticated though equally commonplace strains of Benet's *John Brown's Body*. Maxfield Parrish yields to Rockwell Kent, Arthur Brisbane to Walter Lippman, Theda Bara to Ingrid Bergman. We even have what might be called *l'avantgarde pompier* (or, in American, 'phoney Avantgardism'), as in the buildings of Raymond Hood and the later poetry of Archibald MacLeish, as there is also an academic Avantgardism in *belles lettres* so that now the 'little' as well as the big magazines have their hack writers.

All this is not a raising of the level of Mass Culture, as might appear at first, but rather a corruption of High Culture. There is nothing more vulgar than sophisticated *kitsch*. Compare Conan Doyle's workmanlike and unpretentious Sherlock Holmes stories with the bogus 'intellectuality' of Dorothy M. Sayers, who, like many contemporary detective-story writers, is a novelist *manquée* who ruins her stuff with literary attitudinising. Or consider the relationship of Hollywood and Broadway. In the twenties, the two were sharply differentiated, movies being produced for the

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masses of the hinterland, theatre for an upper-class New York audience. The theatre was High Culture, mostly of the Academic variety (Theatre Guild) but with some spark of Avantgarde fire (the 'little' or 'experimental' theatre movement). The movies were definitely Mass Culture, mostly very bad but with some leaven of Avantgardism (Griffiths, Stroheim) and Folk Art (Chaplin and other comedians). With the sound film, Broadway and Hollywood drew closer together. Plays are now produced mainly to sell the movie rights, with many being directly financed by the film companies. The merger has standardised the theatre to such an extent that even the early Theatre Guild seems vital in retrospect, while hardly a trace of the 'experimental' theatre is left. And what have the movies gained? They are more sophisticated, the acting is subtler, the sets in better taste. But they too have become standardised: they are never as awful as they often were in the old days, but they are never as good either. They are better entertainment and worse art. The cinema of the twenties occasionally gave us the fresh charm of Folk Art or the imaginative intensity of Avantgardism. The coming of sound, and with it Broadway, degraded the camera to a recording instrument for an alien art form, the spoken play. The silent film had at least the *theoretical possibility*, even within the limits of Mass Culture, of being artistically significant. The sound film, within those limits, does not.

Division of Labour

The whole field could be approached from the standpoint of the division of labour. The more advanced technologically, the greater the division. Cf. the great Blakett-Semple-Hummert factory—the word is accurate—for the mass production of radio 'soap operas'. Or the fact that in Hollywood a composer for the movies is not *permitted* to make his own orchestrations any more than a director can do his own cutting. Or the 'editorial formula' which every big-circulation magazine tailors its fiction and articles to fit much as automobile parts are machined in Detroit. *Time* and *Newsweek* have carried specialisation to its extreme: their writers don't even sign their work, which in fact is not properly theirs, since the gathering of data is done by a specialised corps of researchers and correspondents and the final article is often as much the result of the editor's blue-pencilling and re-writing as of the original author's efforts. The 'New Yorker short story' is a definite genre—smooth, minor-key, casual, suggesting drama and sentiment without ever being crude enough to actually create it—which the editors have established by years of patient, skilful

selection the same way a gardener develops a new kind of rose. They have, indeed, done their work all too well: would-be contributors now deluge them with lifeless imitations, and they have begun to beg writers not to follow the formula *quite* so closely.

Such art workers are as alienated from their brain-work as the industrial worker is from his hand-work. The results are as bad qualitatively as they are impressive quantitatively. The only great films to come out of Hollywood, for example, were made before industrial elephantiasis had reduced the director to one of a number of technicians all operating at about the same level of authority. Our two greatest directors, Griffith and Stroheim, were artists, not specialists; they did everything themselves, dominated everything personally: the scenario, the actors, the camera-work, and above all the cutting (or *montage*). Unity is essential in art; it cannot be achieved by a production-line of specialists, however competent. There have been successful collective creations (Greek temples, Gothic churches, perhaps the *Iliad*) but their creators were part of a tradition which was strong enough to impose unity on their work. We have no such tradition today, and so art—as against *kitsch*—will result only when a single brain and sensibility is in full command. In the movies, only the director can even theoretically be in such a position; he was so in the pre-1930 cinema of this country, Germany, and the Soviet Union.

Griffith and Stroheim were both terrific egoists—crude, naïve, and not without charlatanry—who survived until the industry became highly enough organised to resist their vigorous personalities. By about 1925, both were outside looking in; the manufacture of commodities so costly to make and so profitable to sell was too serious a matter to be entrusted to artists.

‘One word of advice, Von’, Griffith said to Stroheim, who had been his assistant on *Intolerance*, when Stroheim came to him with the news that he had a chance to make a picture himself. ‘Make your pictures in your own way. Put your mark on them. Take a stand and stick to your guns. You’ll make some enemies, but you’ll make good pictures.’ Could that have been only thirty years ago?

Adultised Children and Infantile Adults

The homogenising effects of *kitsch* also blurs age lines. It would be interesting to know how many adults read the comics. We do know that comic books are by far the favourite reading-matter of our soldiers and sailors, that some forty million comic books are sold a month, and that some

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seventy million people (most of whom must be adults, there just aren't that many kids) are estimated to read the newspaper comic strips every day. We also know that movie Westerns and radio and TV programmes like 'The Lone Ranger' and 'Captain Video' are by no means enjoyed only by children. On the other hand, children have access to such grown-up media as the movies, radio and TV. (Note that these newer arts are the ones which blur age lines because of the extremely modest demands they make on the audience's cultural equipment; thus there are many children's books but few children's movies.)

This merging of the child and grown-up audience means (1) infantile regression of the latter, who, unable to cope with the strains and complexities of modern life, escape via *kitsch* (which in turn confirms and enhances their infantilism) (2) 'overstimulation' of the former, who grow up too fast. Or, as Max Horkheimer well puts it: 'Development has ceased to exist. The child is grown up as soon as he can walk, and the grown-up in principle always remains the same.' Also note (1) our cult of youth, which makes 18–22 the most admired and desired period of life, and (2) the sentimental worship of Mother ('Momism') as if we couldn't bear to grow up and be on our own. Peter Pan might be a better symbol of America than Uncle Sam.

Idols of Consumption

Too little attention has been paid to the connexion of our Mass Culture with the historical evolution of American society. In *Radio Research, 1942–3* (Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ed.), Leo Lowenthal compared the biographical articles in *Colliers* and *The Saturday Evening Post* for 1901 and 1940–1 and found that in the forty-year interval the proportion of articles about business and professional men and political leaders had declined while those about entertainers had gone up 50 per cent. Furthermore, the 1901 entertainers are mostly serious artists—opera singers, sculptors, pianists, etc.—while those of 1941 are *all* movie stars, baseball players, and such; and even the 'serious' heroes in 1941 aren't so very serious after all: the businessmen and politicians are freaks, oddities, not the really powerful leaders as in 1901. The 1901 *Satevepost* heroes he calls 'idols of production' those of today 'idols of consumption'.

Lowenthal notes that the modern *Satevepost* biographee is successful not because of his own personal abilities so much as because he 'got the breaks'. The whole competitive struggle is presented as a lottery in which a few winners, no more talented or energetic than any one else, drew the lucky

tickets. The effect on the mass-reader is at once consoling (it might have been me) and deadening to effort, ambition (there are no rules, so why struggle?). It is striking how closely this evolution parallels the country's economic development. Lowenthal observes that the 'idols of production' maintained their dominance right through the twenties. The turning-point was the 1929 depression when the problem became how to consume goods rather than how to produce them, and also when the arbitrariness and chaos of capitalism was forcefully brought home to the mass-man. So he turned to 'idols of consumption', or rather these were now offered him by the manufacturers of Mass Culture, and he accepted them. 'They seem to lead to a dream world of the masses', observes Lowenthal, 'who are no longer capable or willing to conceive of biographies primarily as a means of orientation and education. . . . He, the American mass-man, as reflected in his "idols of consumption" appears no longer as a centre of outwardly-directed energies and actions on whose work and efficiency might depend mankind's progress. Instead of the "givers" we are faced with the "takers". . . . They seem to stand for a phantasmagoria of world-wide social security—an attitude which asks for no more than to be served with the things needed for reproduction and recreation, an attitude which has lost every primary interest in how to invent, shape, or apply the tools leading to such purposes of mass satisfaction.'

Sherlock Holmes to Mike Hammer

The role of science in Mass Culture has similarly changed from the rational and the purposive to the passive, accidental, even the catastrophic. Consider the evolution of the detective story, a genre which can be traced back to the memoirs of Vidocq, the master-detective of the Napoleonic era. Poe, who was peculiarly fascinated by scientific method, wrote the first and still the best detective stories: *The Purloined Letter*, *The Gold Bug*, *The Mystery of Marie Roget*, *The Murders in the Rue Morgue*. Conan Doyle created the great folk hero, Sherlock Holmes, like Poe's Dupin a mage whose wizard's wand was scientific deduction (Poe's 'ratiocination'). Such stories could only appeal to—in fact, only be *comprehensible* to—an audience accustomed to think in scientific terms: to survey the data, set up a hypothesis, test it by seeing whether it caught the murderer. The very idea of an art genre cast in the form of a problem to be solved by purely intellectual means could only have arisen in a scientific age. This kind of detective fiction, which might be called the 'classic' style, is still widely practised (well by Agatha Christie and John Dickson Carr, badly

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by the more popular Erle Stanley Gardiner) but of late it has been overshadowed by the rank, noxious growth of works in the 'sensational' style. This was inaugurated by Dashiell Hammett (whom André Gide was foolish enough to admire) and has recently been enormously stepped up in voltage by Mickey Spillane, whose six books to date have sold thirteen million copies. The sensationalists use what for the classicists was the point—the uncovering of the criminal—as a mere excuse for the minute description of scenes of bloodshed, brutality, lust, and alcoholism. The cool, astute, subtle Dupin-Holmes is replaced by the crude man-of-action whose prowess is measured not by intellectual mastery but by his capacity for liquor, women, and mayhem (he can 'take it' as well as 'dish it out'—Hammett's *The Glass Key* is largely a chronicle of the epic beatings absorbed by the hero before he finally staggers to the solution). Mike Hammer, Spillane's aptly named hero, is such a monumental blunderer that even Dr. Watson would have seen through him. According to Richard W. Johnston (*Life*, June 23, 1952) 'Mike has one bizarre and memorable characteristic that sets him apart from all other fictional detectives: sheer incompetence. In the five Hammer cases, 48 people have been killed, and there is reason to believe that if Mike had kept out of the way, 34 of them—all innocent of the original crime—would have survived.' A decade ago, the late George Orwell, apropos a 'sensationalist' detective-story of the time, *No Orchids for Miss Blandish*, showed how the brutalisation of this genre mirrors the general degeneration in ethics from nineteenth-century standards. What he would have written had Mickey Spillane's works been then in existence I find it hard to imagine.

Frankenstein to Hiroshima

The real heirs of the 'classic' detective story today, so far as the exploitation of science is concerned, are the writers of science-fiction, a genre begun by Jules Verne and H. G. Wells that has of late become very popular. Or at least of the more sophisticated kinds of science-fiction, where the marvels and horrors of the future must always be 'scientifically possible'—just as Sherlock Holmes drew on no supernatural powers. This is the approach of the bourgeoisie, who think of science as their familiar instrument. The masses are less confident, more awed in their approach to science, and there are vast lower strata of science-fiction where the marvellous is untrammelled by the limits of knowledge. To the masses, science is the modern *arcanum arcanorum*, at once the supreme mystery and the philosopher's stone that explains the mystery. The latter concept

appears in comic strips like 'Superman' and in the charlatan-science exploited by 'health fakers' and 'nature fakers'. Taken this way, science gives man mastery over his environment and is beneficent. But science itself is not understood, therefore not mastered, therefore terrifying because of its very power. Taken *this* way, as the supreme mystery, science becomes the stock-in-trade of the 'horror' pulp magazines and comics and movies. It has got to the point, indeed, that if one sees a laboratory in a movie, one shudders, and the white coat of the scientist is as blood-chilling a sight as Count Dracula's black cloak. These 'horror' films have apparently an indestructible popularity: *Frankenstein* is still shown, after twenty-one years, and the current revival of *King Kong* is expected to gross over 2 million dollars.

If the scientist's laboratory has acquired in Mass Culture a ghastly atmosphere, is this perhaps not one of those deep popular intuitions? From Frankenstein's laboratory to Maidenek and Hiroshima is not a long journey. Was there a popular suspicion, perhaps only half-conscious, that the nineteenth-century trust in science, like the nineteenth-century trust in popular education, was mistaken, that science can as easily be used for anti-human as for pro-human ends, perhaps even more easily? For Mrs. Shelley's Frankenstein, the experimenter who brought disaster by pushing his science too far, is a scientific folk-hero older than and still as famous as Mr. Doyle's successful and beneficent Sherlock Holmes.

The Problem of the Masses

Conservatives like Ortega y Gasset and T. S. Eliot argue that since 'the revolt of the masses' has led to the horrors of totalitarianism (and of California roadside architecture), the only hope is to rebuild the old class walls and bring the masses once more under aristocratic control. They think of the popular as synonymous with the cheap and vulgar. Marxian radicals and liberals, on the other hand, see the masses as intrinsically healthy but as the dupes and victims of cultural exploitation by the Lords of *kitsch*—in the style of Rousseau's 'noble savage' idea. If only the masses were offered good stuff instead of *kitsch*, how they would eat it up! How the level of Mass Culture would rise! Both these diagnoses seem to me fallacious: they assume that Mass Culture is (in the conservative view) or could be (in the liberal view) an expression of *people*, like Folk Art, whereas actually it is an expression of *masses*, a very different thing.

There are theoretical reasons why Mass Culture is not and can never be any good. I take it as axiomatic that culture can only be produced by and

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for human beings. But in so far as people are organised (more strictly, disorganised) as masses, they lose their human identity and quality. For the masses are in historical time what a crowd is in space: a large quantity of people unable to express themselves as human beings because they are related to one another neither as individuals nor as members of communities—indeed they are not related to *each other* at all but only to something distant, abstract, non-human: a football game or bargain sale in the case of a crowd, a system of industrial production, a party or a State, in the case of the masses. The mass man is a solitary atom, uniform with and undifferentiated from thousands and millions of other atoms who go to make up ‘the lonely crowd’, as David Riesman well calls American society. A folk or a people, however, is a community, i.e., a group of individuals linked to each other by common interests, work, traditions, values, and sentiments; something like a family, each of whose members has a special place and function as an individual while at the same time sharing the group’s interests (family budget), sentiments (family quarrels), and culture (family jokes). The scale is small enough so that it ‘makes a difference’ what the individual does, a first condition for human—as against mass—existence. He is at once more important as an individual than in mass society and at the same time more closely integrated into the community, his creativity nourished by a rich combination of individualism and communalism. (The great culture-bearing *élites* of the past have been communities of this kind.) In contrast, a mass society, like a crowd, is so undifferentiated and loosely structured that its atoms, in so far as human values go, tend to cohere only along the line of the least common denominator; its morality sinks to that of its most brutal and primitive members, its taste to that of the least sensitive and most ignorant. And in addition to everything else, the scale is simply too big, there are just *too many people*.

Yet this collective monstrosity, ‘the masses’, ‘the public’, is taken as a human norm by the scientific and artistic technicians of our Mass Culture. They at once degrade the public by treating it as an object, to be handled with the lack of ceremony and the objectivity of medical students dissecting a corpse, and at the same time flatter it, pander to its level of taste and ideas by taking these as the criterion of reality (in the case of questionnaire-sociologists and other ‘social scientists’) or of art (in the case of the Lords of *kitsch*). When one hears a questionnaire-sociologist talk about how he will ‘set up’ an investigation, one feels he regards people as a herd of dumb animals, as mere congeries of conditioned reflexes, his calculation being which reflex will be stimulated by which question. At the same time, of

necessity, he sees the statistical majority as the great Reality, the secret of life he is trying to find out; like the *kitsch* Lords, he is wholly without values, willing to accept any idiocy if it is held by many people. The aristocrat and the democrat both criticise and argue with popular taste, the one with hostility, the other in friendship, for both attitudes proceed from a set of values. This is less degrading to the masses than the 'objective' approach of Hollywood and the questionnaire-sociologists, just as it is less degrading to a man to be shouted at in anger than to be quietly assumed to be part of a machine. But the *plebs* have their dialectical revenge: complete indifference to their human *quality* means complete prostration before their statistical *quantity*, so that a movie magnate who cynically 'gives the public what it wants'—i.e., assumes it wants trash—sweats with terror if box-office returns drop ten per cent.

The Future of High Culture: Dark

The conservative proposal to save culture by restoring the old class lines has a more solid historical base than the Marxian hope for a new democratic, classless culture, for, with the possible (and important) exception of Periclean Athens, all the great cultures of the past were *élite* cultures. Politically, however, it is without meaning in a world dominated by the two great mass nations, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. and becoming more industrialised, more mass-ified all the time. The only practical thing along those lines would be to revive the *cultural élite* which the Avantgarde created. As I have already noted, the Avantgarde is now dying, partly from internal causes, partly suffocated by the competing Mass Culture, where it is not being absorbed into it. Of course this process has not reached 100 per cent, and doubtless never will unless the country goes either Fascist or Communist. There are still islands above the flood for those determined enough to reach them, and to stay on them: as Faulkner has shown, a writer can even use Hollywood instead of being used by it, if his purpose is firm enough. But the homogenisation of High and Mass Culture has gone far and is going farther all the time, and there seems little reason to expect a revival of Avantgardism, that is, of a successful countermovement to Mass Culture. Particularly not in this country, where the blurring of class lines, the absence of a stable cultural tradition, and the greater facilities for manufacturing and marketing *kitsch* all work in the other direction. The result is that our intelligentsia is remarkably small, weak, and disintegrated. One of the odd things about the American cultural scene is how many brain-workers there are and how few intellectuals, defining the

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former as specialists whose thinking is pretty much confined to their limited 'fields' and the latter as persons who take all culture for their province. Not only are there few intellectuals, but they don't hang together, they have very little *esprit de corps*, very little sense of belonging to a community; they are so isolated from each other they don't even bother to quarrel—there hasn't been a really good fight among them since the Moscow Trials.

The Future of Mass Culture: Darker

If the conservative proposal to save our culture via the aristocratic Avant-garde seems historically unlikely, what of the democratic-liberal proposal? Is there a reasonable prospect of raising the level of Mass Culture? In his recent book, *The Great Audience*, Gilbert Seldes argues there is. He blames the present sad state of our Mass Culture on the stupidity of the Lords of *kitsch*, who underestimate the mental age of the public, the arrogance of the intellectuals, who make the same mistake and so snobbishly refuse to work for mass media like radio, TV and movies, and the passivity of the public itself, which doesn't insist on better Mass Cultural products. This diagnosis seems to me superficial in that it blames everything on subjective, moral factors: stupidity, perversity, failure of will. My own feeling is that, as in the case of the alleged responsibility of the German (or Russian) people for the horrors of Nazism (or Soviet Communism), it is unjust to blame social groups for this result. Human beings have been caught up in the inexorable workings of a mechanism that forces them, with a pressure only heroes can resist (and one cannot *demand* that anybody be a hero, though one can *hope* for it), into its own pattern. I see Mass Culture as a reciprocating engine, and who is to say, once it has been set in motion, whether the stroke or the counterstroke is 'responsible' for its continued action?

The Lords of *kitsch* sell culture to the masses. It is a debased, trivial culture that voids both the deep realities (sex, death, failure, tragedy) and also the simple, spontaneous pleasures, since the realities would be too real and the pleasures too *lively* to induce what Mr. Seldes calls 'the mood of consent': i.e., a narcotised acceptance of Mass Culture and of the commodities it sells as a substitute for the unsettling and unpredictable (hence unsalable) joy, tragedy, wit, change, originality and beauty of real life. The masses, debauched by several generations of this sort of thing, in turn come to demand trivial and comfortable cultural products. Which came first, the chicken or the egg, the mass demand or its satisfaction (and

further stimulation) is a question as academic as it is unanswerable. The engine is reciprocating and shows no signs of running down.

Indeed, far from Mass Culture getting better, we will be lucky if it doesn't get worse. When shall we see another popular humorist like Sholem Aleichem, whose books are still being translated from the Yiddish and for whose funeral in 1916 a hundred thousand inhabitants of the Bronx turned out? Or Finlay Peter Dunne, whose Mr. Dooley commented on the American scene with such wit that Henry Adams was a faithful reader and Henry James, on his famous return to his native land, wanted to meet only one American author, Dunne? Since Mass Culture is not an art form but a manufactured commodity, it tends always downwards, towards cheapness—and so standardisation—of production. Thus, T. W. Adorno has noted, in his brilliant essay 'On Popular Music' (*Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, New York, No. 1, 1941) that the chorus of every popular song *without exception* has the same number of bars, while Mr. Seldes remarks that Hollywood movies are cut in a uniformly rapid tempo, a shot rarely being held more than 45 seconds, which gives them a standardised effect in contrast to the varied tempo of European film-cutting. This sort of standardisation means that what may have begun as something fresh and original is repeated until it becomes a nerveless routine, *vide* what happened to Fred Allen as a radio comedian. The only time Mass Culture is good is at the very beginning, before the 'formula' has hardened, before the money-boys and efficiency experts and audience-reaction analysts have moved in. Then for a while it may have the quality of real Folk Art. But the Folk artist today lacks the cultural roots and the intellectual toughness (both of which the Avantgarde artist has relatively more of) to resist for long the pressures of Mass Culture. His taste can easily be corrupted, his sense of his own special talent and limitations obscured, as in what happened to Disney between the gay, inventive early Mickey Mouse and 'Silly Symphony' cartoons and the vulgar pretentiousness of *Fantasia* and heavy-handed sentimentality of *Snow White*, or to Westbrook Pegler who has regressed from an excellent sports writer, with a sure sense of form and a mastery of colloquial satire, into the rambling, coarse-grained, garrulous political pundit of today. Whatever virtues the Folk artist has, and they are many, staying-power is not one of them. And staying-power is the essential virtue of one who would hold his own against the spreading ooze of Mass Culture.