

ally advanced firms could also be prosecuted for evasion. These findings reinforce one of Gray's main points that the image that was emerging during the period of the well-regulated factory governed by enlightened employers was a major *cultural* product of the debates over the factory question.

In concluding Gray suggests that while the factory acts surely had positive effects by eliminating some of the worst abuses, the benefits of factory legislation were unevenly distributed. "Employers recouped the concessions made by means of tighter control and intensified labour, and the burden of this fell disproportionately on the very workers to whom protection was extended, semi-skilled women and young people." Yet the debates over factory reform were crucial in shaping an "industrial culture of some duration".

I have been able to touch upon only a few of Gray's analyses in this very densely written book. Because of restrictions of space I could not cover Gray's intelligent discussion of paternalism; nor his provocative analysis of post factory acts stability and consensus as a cultural settlement. I had to omit detailed mention of his interesting observations on official inquiries and on the connection between religious teachings and the cultural contradictions of industrial capitalism.

If I have a complaint about the book, it is that Gray's delight in complexity, and his refusal to simplify by stressing main trends and single variables in the service of historical narration does not make this book an easy read. The book, in fact, raises questions about how to present effectively a history of linguistic slippages and variability rather than one of hegemonic ideologies and dominant trends in social behavior and attitudes. While Gray's approach makes this a difficult book to summarize because of its complex structure, it is highly successful in arguing for the importance of culture in the analysis of industrialization and social transformation.

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BOYER, JOHN W. *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna. Christian Socialism in Power, 1897–1918.* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago [etc.] 1995. xvi, 702 pp. \$43.25; £29.95.

Books of major importance on *fin de siècle* Vienna are usually written not by Austrians but by American scholars. Thus it is hardly surprising that we now have to add John W. Boyer to the names of Carl E. Schorske, William M. Johnston and Andrew G. Whiteside, who did fundamental work on the pan-German movements some years ago.¹ Boyer, Professor of History at the University of Chicago and co-editor of the *Journal of Modern History*, is of course already a well-known author in Austria too. He published his first work on Viennese *fin de siècle* politics in 1981.² The significance of his new book is that it provides for the first time a fundamental historical analysis of a political mass movement that – together with social democracy – has until now formed the basis of Austria's two-party system. Since 1907, the first year of universal male suffrage, the Christian Social Party has

¹ See, for example, Andrew G. Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools. Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism* (Berkeley, 1975).

² John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: The Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897* (Chicago and London, 1981).

represented Vienna's petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry of the alpine regions, constantly gaining 30 to 40 per cent of the vote. Together with its ally, the Catholic Church, it was responsible for the establishment of an authoritarian state in the 1930s, only to be considered a fusion of socio-cultural conservatism and economic and political liberalism after World War II. Boyer's book is the first to deal with this paradox, going back to the formative years of the Christian Social Party and demythologizing its origins, challenging the series of legends perpetuated by the generally hagiographic literature on the subject.

Boyer starts with an analysis of Vienna's "Municipal Revolution", which took place under the city's famous mayor Karl Lueger, whom Franz Joseph disliked as a "Radical". The Emperor did not appoint Lueger until 1897, two years after Lueger had secured a majority in the elections of 1895. Structural changes were introduced: street railways and electrical works were socialized, municipal gas-works constructed, the woods surrounding Vienna were turned into a protected area of nature, and so on. The city itself received a new legal status that strengthened its independence against both the imperial court and the county of Lower Austria and brought control of an expanding administration to the city government. Finally, in 1900, municipal suffrage was extended to include small shopkeepers, artisans, civil servants and skilled workers. But, as the book demonstrates, the process of modernization coexisted with reactionary political and cultural targets. Today Karl Lueger – one of the young Hitler's "schoolmasters" – is better known for the anti-Semitism and xenophobia he used to mobilize the German-speaking petty bourgeoisie in (and outside) Vienna than for the municipal projects he instigated and which still symbolize the city today.

According to Boyer, Christian Social politics was nothing but a very simple and brutal method of gaining and maintaining power in the city. Thus the municipal administration served as a labour market for party members and public expenditure was used as revenue for employers supporting the party leadership. Political opponents – including members of Liberal and Social-Democratic teachers' associations – were repressed and prosecuted by the school administration. On the other hand, as Boyer points out, those methods led to the integration of important elements of the middle classes (and the peasantry) into the political system, making it more democratic and popular in the long run. Boyer's characterization of Lueger as a reactionary modernist turns out to be a splendid and stimulating narrative. But it is a difficult act of "balancing". Might there have been an equilibrium between the irrationalism of anti-Semitic populism and straightforward political pragmatism? Sometimes Boyer seems to overestimate the democratic potential of Luegerism. To support his conclusion that the political function of anti-Semitism did not affect Lueger's fundamentally humanistic character, Boyer quotes Arthur Schnitzler, who wrote in his memoirs that "at heart, even at the height of his popularity, he was no more anti-Semitic than he had been in the days when he played tarot at the home of Dr. Ferdinand Mandl, with his brother Ignatz and other Jews" (p. 27). Boyer ends here, while Schnitzler, Lueger's contemporary, continues: "There were and are people who consider it to have been a quality that even in his time as the hardest anti-Semite he retained a preference for certain Jews and did not hide this. For me personally this has always been convincing evidence of his moral dubiousness."³ It is of great importance to direct

³ Arthur Schnitzler, *Jugend in Wien. Eine Autobiographie* (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 142.

our attention precisely to that problem for, in the Austrian discourse, Christian Social anti-Semitism is often legitimized as being a “soft” version in comparison with the racism of National Socialism.

Apart from that problem, the description of Lueger’s political style is of major importance. His approach to duping bureaucracy and sometimes even his own party by appealing to the masses, using a complicated mixture of militant activists, popular press and personal performance, still works as a genuine Viennese phenomenon. Even Social-Democratic mayors, who have ruled the city since 1920, make use of this tradition to realize those of their pet projects that would otherwise fail to receive the support of the city council or the administration.

The Christian Social Party was constituted in the 1880s as a kind of popular union opposing the two great power blocs in the Habsburg monarchy, namely the Catholic nobility and high clergy on the one hand and liberal intellectuals and industrialists on the other. But without a coherent programme it was shattered by factional infighting as soon as it came to power. Nor could it satisfy the very material demands of its Viennese petty-bourgeois clientele, nor the anti-capitalistic and anti-aristocratic sentiments of artisans and peasants. It started as a German democratic party and ended as a universal dynastic one. Participation in a coalition government in 1907 was immediately followed by a deep crisis, heavy losses in the elections and the rise of an internal opposition of young Catholic intellectuals who were to take power after the war. (From then on there was a radicalization of the so-called *Kulturkampf* between Catholics and Social Democrats which led to civil war during the inter-war period; unfortunately Boyer does not confront “culture” in the sense of *Weltbild* with the semantics of “urban culture”, which would include such fields as cinema, sport, department stores, etc. Given Catholic hostility to institutions like these, one could demonstrate the impact of the Christian social movement on styles of “modernization” more precisely than Boyer has done.)

Boyer has succeeded brilliantly, though, in reconstructing many hitherto undocumented (and unknown) facts. But even more significant, he offers a new perspective on contemporary Austrian history by comparing the Christian Social Party (and the Social Democrats) with nineteenth-century political parties in the United States:

Recent analyses of the political process in nineteenth-century America have observed the peculiar semiconstitutional role that American political parties came to play in the formation of the modern American state. In the United States mass parties preceded, rather than followed, mass bureaucracy and provided the nerve centers and instruments of democratic governance that later forced independent, executive, and managerial elites to maintain a constant adherence to political norms and to decentralized state practice [. . .] The later growth of a modern, industrial-based central bureaucracy could not displace completely the representational power [. . .] that the political parties enjoyed [. . .] In the multinational dynastic empire that was Austria we know that the reverse obtained. An enduring tradition of bureaucratic management of the state long preceded any party system. The party system that evolved between 1870 and 1900 was necessarily limited by the curial, regional-ethnic particularism and political modesty with which the Austrian Liberals defined “their” version of the state. (p. 351)

In short, Austrian parties failed to represent civil society but acted as an appendage of the state and semi-state institutions.

Boyer has produced an impressive work using a wide range of sources, including hitherto neglected archives, newspapers and memoirs. He explains the mechanisms of the Christian Social Party machinery, the personal rivalry and intrigues, the "politicization" of the city administration, all of which continue to regulate political life in major parts of Vienna. As a narrative *Culture and Political Crisis* has to disregard structures tied to *la longue durée* of the city's development – demography, ground rents, entertainment, public space, for example – and how these were interwoven with urban politics, especially with modern party structures. But this should not be considered a fundamentally significant omission. If there is an objection to the approach of the book as a whole, it might be that Boyer does not pay enough attention to the Christian Social ideology of a "third way" between capitalism and socialism. The phenomenon of economic regulation inspired by Christian ethics is still a powerful force not only in the post-communist states of Hungary, Croatia and Slovakia, but in Austria too. Nevertheless, Boyer's book will certainly stimulate scholars to consider more closely the inner-capitalistic corporatist "Alpine-Rhineland" alternative to the (liberal) "Atlantic" free-market economy.⁴

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BREMAN, JAN. *Footloose labour. Working in India's informal economy.* [Contemporary South Asia, 2.] Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [etc.] 1997. x, 278 pp. £50.00; \$59.95. (Paper: £16.95; \$22.95.)

In 1995, the World Bank produced a report wherein it claimed to offer a partisan solution for the dispossessed. Labour laws, the report argued, fetter the workers who will benefit from informalization. That is, less legislation does not benefit the congealed will of capital, but it will allow autonomous workers to fulfil their currently restrained potential. Jan Breman's new book is not only a culmination of his oeuvre, but it is a principled refutation of the premises of the World Bank's policy suggestion illustrated by Breman's longitudinal fieldwork (over thirty years) as well as his extensive use of the governmental and scholarly literature. *Footloose labour* offers a passionate, but analytical critique of the stereotypes that fuel academic research and policy development (both by agencies of the international finance organizations as well as the Indian government). With only 10 per cent of the Indian workforce in the "formal" sector, Breman notes that the "informal" sector is the norm and, from the standpoint of labour, the system resembles mercantile capitalism (p. 159 and p. 182). Further, those who argue from a dualist perspective (that the mission of capitalism in the periphery is incomplete) will find, on the contrary, that the pattern of capitalist development in regions such as South Gujarat operates with forms of exploitation quite different from those in advanced industrial states and in the mini-dragons, but which, nonetheless, demonstrate the dominance of the capitalist mode. As Breman argues, "after having been made mobile the workforce at the massive bottom of the economy is kept in circulation, does not become stabilized but finds itself

⁴ Michael Albert, *Kapitalismus contra Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt and New York, 1992).