

philosophy at its best, and are in a privileged position for watching how it developed over a period of twenty years.

The first essays, from 1950 ('On Referring', 'Truth'), already illustrate the shift in the method and intent of British philosophy that had taken place after the war. There was a clear move away from the more formalist approach to language that had dominated the '20s and '30s. In Strawson's own words, 'Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic' (p. 27). A close attention to the wealth of ordinary usage, and an inductive (though fairly unsystematic) move from examples drawn from ordinary usage toward some sort of rules, characterised the style of philosophising of those years. There was a dual effort to unmask those perennial problems of philosophy that were really based on uncaredful use of words, and, at the same time, to point out the inadequacies of pre-war attempts to reform philosophical language.

Although much of this early approach continues to inform Oxford philosophy, important changes have taken place. Significant among these are a growing interest in linguistics and a gradual coming to terms with pre-war ideal language philosophy. These trends are best exemplified in 'Grammar and Philosophy' and 'Meaning and Truth', both from 1969. In the former essay, Strawson confronts the transformational grammar of Chomsky and his followers, and clearly sees its importance for ordinary language philosophy. Transformational grammarians have respected ordinary language philosophers' concern for empirical usage and its underlying rules, but have deplored their lack of any systematic procedure. Strawson acknowledges this problem but points out at the same time that the transformational grammarians' continuing problem with the semantic component of language (despite its success with the syntactic and phonological aspects) calls for the philosopher. For trans-

formational theory at that time (the situation has changed somewhat since) could provide no unified theory of language that brought together the three aspects of sense, syntax and sound. And it is at this point—in closing the gap between sense and syntax—that ordinary language philosophers have been disagreeing for years. The dilemmas of structure without structure and meaning without muddle becomes most evident here. In 'Meaning and Truth', Strawson considers both philosophical approaches on the battleground of what is without a doubt the central question in contemporary British philosophy: the question of meaning. And in this confrontation we can see how ordinary language philosophy has grown from a reaction to ideal language philosophy into an opponent of equal status. The older approach is now seen more as an emphasis on the need for rules and logical structure, while the younger protects philosophy from the illusion of being able to fully account for all of linguistic usage by means of a formalized system. Although Strawson sees ordinary language philosophy's contribution as the more weighty, he does not fail to give ideal language philosophy its due credit.

But Strawson presents more than a method. For method without significant subject matter results either in ungrounded flights into abstraction or an equally disastrous sinking away into a mire of banality. Strawson, however, has wider philosophical interests. If there is one topic that does bind all these essays together and so prevents their argumentation from slipping into triviality, it is the issue of *reference*. It is along this line, where mind meets world, where concept meets phenomenon, that the discussions of meaning, truth, predication, universals and method, coupled with a concern for central philosophical issues, make this book not only a quarry of exciting philosophical ideas, but also a brilliant portrait of ordinary language philosophy in its finest form.

ROBERT SCHREITER

POPERY AND POLITICS IN ENGLAND 1660–1688, by John Miller. *Cambridge University Press*, 1973. 288 pp. £4.90.

Herbert Butterfield once remarked about English historiography, 'It might be argued that our general version of the historical story still bears the impress that was given to it by the great patriarchs of history-writing, so many of whom seem to have been whigs and gentlemen when they have not been Americans'. Dr Miller does not proffer the damaging confession that he is a whig or an American, but his analysis of Restoration political life shows him to possess those qualities of fairness, candour and generosity of judgment that mark the seventeenth century ideal of the

gentlemen, the man of virtù. It was, of course, Lord Macaulay (no gentleman he) Butterfield had in mind, that perilously brilliant stylist, scanning the historical process through a mist of dubious historical parallels and literary reminiscences, whom Sidney Smith advised to take two tablespoonfuls of the waters of Lethe every morning before breakfast. If we see the reign of James II through Macaulayan spectacles now, it will not be for want of Dr Miller's trying.

It is a superbly researched and organised piece of work, moving from demography to

diplomacy with equal sureness. The book opens with an account of the English catholic community in the century—its numbers, social structure, priesthood, mixed feelings about the Roman see and fluctuating fortunes under patchily applied penal laws. Then Dr Miller goes on to assess the anti-catholic tradition, tracing its sources in popular chronicle and apologetic, in the collective psychology of a deeply disturbed society and also, be it said, in the realistic fear that Louis XIV's apparently overwhelming success in the market for monarchical politics would prove too attractive a lure for court statesmen. The longest section of the book provides an argued narrative of Charles II's reign, not quite so original in its interpretations as the author implies (several historians have seen double duplicity in the secret treaty of Dover with its promise of Charles' 'Catholicity' if only Louis would pay up—after all, Charles was the most consistent Lockeian pragmatist of his line), finally, and this will certainly be the most controversial feature of the book, Dr Miller gives a cogently argued rehabilitating statement of the aims and political integrity of James II.

His reflections on the varieties of recusant Catholicism are interesting; some of them are more suggestive, perhaps, than he sees. He offers evidence, based on the occupational descriptions of convicted recusants, that there was a flourishing urban Catholicism of artisans and shopkeepers in London. This in itself cuts across too facile interpretations, socially determinist in hue, of the relationship between political self-interest and fidelity to an allegedly ultra-conservative ideology. But the division between 'country' and 'court' catholics remains basic. The country catholics, chastened by their experiences and by consideration of the landed wealth they still had to lose, tended to regard the 'forward' policy of their co-religionist king as folly. Henry Howard expressed their attitude well enough: '... if we do but continue sober and humble, we shall not I hope have severe laws put in execution over us, for the indiscretion of some few impertinent, overzealous busy coxcombs'. This was to accept the 'pusillus grex' situation with a finality which is as sociologically understandable as it is inconsistent with credal profession. The court Catholicism had that confidence which so many moderns, in an era of self-inflicted christian gloom, bewail as typical of Baroque triumphalism; yet it was an argumentative or suasive, not a presumptive, confidence. James read himself into the church, devouring Hooker and the Reformation historians with an avidity which might be called intellectual excitement were it not for the thought that he was, basically, a supremely English naval officer. He used to buttonhole passers-by in the corridors

of the Palace of Whitehall to engage them in possibly slightly tedious but undoubtedly earnest theological debate. He was not only a contemporary of Louis XIV (whose bigoted self-deceptions were only one strand in catholic attitudes to religious toleration in the period, as a glance at Henry Kamen's *The Rise of Toleration* would show) but he was also a near-contemporary of St Francis de Sales who believed, as he said, that more flies are caught with honey than with vinegar. James resembled more a member of the Catholic Evidence Guild than he did le roi soleil.

The chief burden of Dr Miller's argument is that James' aim was not to impose absolutism but to secure civil and political freedom for English catholics on a permanent basis. The case has to be established against the following considerations: first, James' 'high' view of the royal prerogative, the doubtful legality of his appeals to the supreme governorship of the (Anglican) church to override parliamentary statutes in religious affairs, and his willingness to 'pack' Parliaments; second, his apparent dissimulation in courting the Protestant Dissenters whose tenets he had consistently declared, when advising his brother, to go counter to the monarchical principle (also the opinion, en passant, of Elizabeth I, whose mythology as the darling of the Protestant nation reached its apogee in James' reign); thirdly, his vindictiveness against the Anglican church at the time of the trial of the Seven Bishops. Dr Miller argues thus: on the first head, James' 'arbitrary' actions were all directed to securing civil rights for English catholics by *act of Parliament* and he had a strong case in the judges' verdict on *Godden v. Hales* for the legality of his actions—and anyway who did *not* try to pack Parliaments up to and beyond the irreproachable Whig Duke of Newcastle in the 1740s weeping with nervous exhaustion over the details of buying up his friends and colleagues; on the second, James feared incipient republicanism among the Dissenters but his anxieties on that score were outweighed by his trust that after a general indulgence the evident rightness of catholicism would lead naturally to the conversion of all. One might add that as a grudging admirer of the Dutch he saw the economic advantages of toleration (he welcomed the Huguenots with open arms); and as a creature of intense personal sympathies could be much moved by the friendship of individual Dissenters like William Penn. And on the third head, his treatment of the bishops and the universities in 1688 was provoked by the bitter surprise that the Tory strongholds should declare against him. Dr Miller places much weight on the absence of a catholic heir until 1687. 'It is widely implausible that James should have

tried to create an absolute monarchy in England for the benefit of his Dutch son-in-law whom he disliked' (p. 197). Well, let us not be absolute for defining the absolute, but kings with an exalted sense of their office do not always stoop to consider that they 'dislike' their probable successors. This argument carries force only if we assume that the 'grand design' of catholicity was the *sole* aim of James' policy to which all else was ordered—and that is precisely the thesis it is meant to prove. The book's tendency is to blur slightly the distinction between the predominant and the exclusive.

What is wrong with that Whig tradition which Macaulay represents? It is a philosophy of success rather than justice or just success (witness Trevelyan's revealing remark that had not Parliament triumphed decisively in 1688 'England could neither have been strongly governed at home, nor have maintained her sea-power, world-wide trade and Empire in the

face of the growing power of France'); and it fails in the imaginative effort to see why men might have supported the king (they were not all fools or rogues)—the monarchy, by the very distance from the 'political nation' which its tradition and prerogative rights conferred, could counterbalance the more narrowly sectional interests of Parliament. Lastly, it has no sense of the ambiguity of that word 'freedom' whereby it must include both the bare scope for the action of individual agents and the power that enables men to perform what they ought. The last popish king of England perhaps knew that. At least he was not like the doctrinally generous 'church papists' of his day (and ours?), one who 'would make a bad martyr and a good traveller, for his conscience is so large he could never wander from it, and in Constantinople would be circumcised with a mental reservation'.

AIDAN NICHOLS, O.P.

ANGLICAN/ROMAN CATHOLIC DIALOGUE: THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION, edited by Alan C. Clark and Colin Davey. *O.U.P.*, London, 1974. 129 pp. £1 (paper).

PARTNERS IN MISSION: ANGLICAN CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL SECOND MEETING, Dublin, Ireland, 17–27 July 1973. *S.P.C.K.*, London, 1973. 94 pp. 60p.

Two unexciting but no doubt necessary additions to the documentation sections of ecclesiastical libraries. The scope of the former is disappointingly limited, containing neither an account of the extent to which the Preparatory Commission's recommendations, especially the Malta Report of 1968, have found acceptance and implementation within the two communions, nor any evaluation of its influence on its successors, the A.R.C. International Commission. It is wholly documentary, with Colin Davey's description of the meetings and publication for the first time of some of the key papers; inevitably at that stage, these lack the rigour and detail of the work done later for A.R.C.I.C., from which came the two Agreed Statements, and seem somewhat tame, a preliminary kick-about before the game proper got under way.

*Partners in Mission* documents the second meeting of the Anglican Consultative Council (Dublin 1973) established as a result of Lambeth 1968. Unlike some international Church gatherings, the A.C.C. does not restrict its agenda to any one theme, and so here can be found accounts of present Anglican law, practice and/or attitudes on such questions as polygamy and monogamy, the ordination of women, liturgical revision, and the W.C.C.

programme to combat racism, as well as an admirably concise memorandum on Confirmation by Professor Fairweather (pp. 44–46). For Catholic readers, it may be instructive to see how a world-wide communion of autonomous provinces functions collegially, and for the English provides a corrective to the tendency to identify the Anglican Communion and the Church of England.

Both books illustrate the regular over-emphasis on bilateral dialogue in official statements on ecumenism, and the corresponding neglect of significant development at the local level. Whilst Dr McAdoo's Malta paper on three possible stages to full organic unity notes that 'the theological and practical steps must . . . be regarded as part of one operation', the latter are seen as consequent to the former, and the possibility is not seriously envisaged that pioneering groups may precede the rest of the Church on the road to organic union, and that the experience of such groups must be an important source for the reflection of theologians. *Partners in Mission* does recognise at various points that the practical may precede the theological, but illustrates the advantage held in such relatively brief conferences by what was on the agenda last time.

PETER HOCKEN