

KIRKLAND (N.B.) **Herodotus and Imperial Greek Literature: Criticism, Imitation, Reception.** New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xii + 377. £64. 9780197583517. doi:[10.1017/S0075426923000733](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0075426923000733)

N. Bryant Kirkland's work seeks to understand the reasons behind some of the receptions of Herodotus in a range of Imperial authors from Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Pausanias. Kirkland's choice of 'Imperial' over terms such as the 'Second Sophistic' is used deliberately to reflect the position of the chosen authors as writers rather than rhetoricians and so infers to readers a pre-existing set of expectations (21–22). Kirkland considers not only how the reputation of Herodotus influenced these authors' engagement with the *Histories* but also how the ways in which they received Herodotus would then affect how they themselves were received. So here, the generally negative treatment of Dionysius on account of his positive take on the work of Herodotus is a case in point. Kirkland's approach to the judgement of these receptions is one that is not 'about whether various ancient writers were "right" in their judgement but rather about how the categories of perceived rightness have been configured and sustained' (8). In doing this the study accounts for two forms of reception, here called kinetic and hypotextual activation, which deal respectively with explicit criticism and nuanced allusions.

The first of Kirkland's case studies is Dionysius of Halicarnassus in chapters 1 and 2, taking the view that Dionysius approaches Herodotus as a window through which one might view Imperial Rome via the magnifying lens of empire. Here the significance of Dionysius' linguistic reception of Herodotus, specifically the use of elements of the proem adds further weight to the analysis of the importance Dionysius attributes to the stylistic qualities of Herodotus' work. This idea is also evident in Dionysius' use of the story of Croesus in *Comp.* 4.8.

Kirkland then turns to Plutarch in Chapter 3. The analysis provides an interesting new approach to Plutarch's complex engagement with the historian. The assertion that Plutarch marks Herodotus as a figure worthy of attention upends some previous readings of *On the Malice of Herodotus*, as does the assertion that Plutarch does at least make an acknowledgement of some of the difficulties faced by Herodotus. This works well to show an ancient writer and critic who was engaged with his source in a way that offered scope for nuance.

Chapter 4 concerns Dio Chrysostom, who is described as both an 'imitator of tradition and a contributor of its ambiguities' (153). Again, the focus in this chapter turns to the linguistic similarities of the two authors and Kirkland highlights the use of coordinate particles by Dio as being directly influenced by the syntactic style of Herodotus. Kirkland also illustrates the linguistic jokes made by Dio which draw upon the Herodotean narrative, such as references to Scythian cartography, demonstrating the degree to which the engagement of the two has been addressed as part of what Kirkland determines to be kinetic receptions.

Chapters 5 and 6 chart the receptions of Herodotus in two works by Lucian, *Herodotus and Aëtion* and the *True Histories*. Kirkland marks Lucian out as different in his use of Herodotus from the other authors discussed in the volume on account of being affected by a sense of otherness brought about by his own experience of Roman rule (188). For Kirkland, Lucian invites direct comparison between himself and Herodotus through which, particularly in *Herodotus and Aëtion*, the historian features as a 'quasi-authorial force' (194). Kirkland's analysis of the subversion of Herodotean ethnography in Lucian's *True Histories* is equally convincing in that it articulates the process of self-othering brought about by his engagement with Herodotus' Egyptian *logos* and through the upending of Herodotus' Solon as part of Lucian's narrative.

Finally, attention in chapters 7 and 8 turns to Pausanias who, it is argued, looked to Herodotus for help on how to 'think about Greece' (263). Kirkland analyses Pausanias'

ability to turn the Herodotean ethnographic dialogue and propensity for wonder inwards and onto Greece itself in a way that encapsulates the Herodotean approach to ethnographic observation. He draws once again on the linguistic and stylistic choices and their similarities to the *Histories*, but also evaluates how Pausanias takes this approach and applies it to space (physical, textual and temporal) in a manner reminiscent of Herodotus.

Kirkland's volume ends not only with an assessment of the nature of Herodotean reception in writers of this period, which echoes the sentiments expressed in the introduction of some of the dangers of viewing Herodotus through later historiographers, but also of the very nature of reception itself as one which 'valorizes a source even as it also fragments and parcels that source out into the "halo of the multiple"' (334). Overall, this volume is of great interest to any reader concerned with the afterlife of the *Histories* and how the progression of that afterlife has affected what has come to be expected of both Herodotus and his readers.

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CANDIOTTO (L.) and RENAUT (O.) (eds) **Emotions in Plato** (Plato Studies Series 4). Leiden: Brill, 2020. Pp. vi + 396. €140. 9789004429437.  
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*Emotions in Plato* is the first edited volume on Plato's treatment of emotions, and it is a wide-ranging and sensitive exploration of this underdiscussed aspect of his thought. The editors Laura Candiotta and Olivier Renaut rightly argue that Plato's dualism has led to commentators either over-cognizing emotion, thus removing all non-rational qualities, or denying all cognitive content, reducing emotions to hinderances of rational thought. This volume treats emotions as 'complex events which require several faculties' (5): perception, belief, judgement and some calculation.

The editors and contributors successfully show that, for Plato, emotions should not be avoided, stamped out or ignored in favour of rational deliberation. Rather, they should be utilized and cultivated, so rendering them useful for individual and state.

The volume's three parts cover a variety of dialogues across Plato's corpus, and their discussions of *pathēmata* – a term most easily translated as 'emotions' but which covers affections, feelings and experiences of all types. Part 1 addresses the taxonomy of emotions, Part 2 turns to the rationality and non-/ir-rationality of various emotions, and their origins, and finally, Part 3 discusses the relevance of the emotions to individual and city, in terms of education, morality and politics.

While there is some overlap between the sections, this structure does systematically navigate the reader through Plato's varied (and often incomplete) discussions of *pathēmata*, and allows the editors and contributors to argue that one only appreciates how Plato puts emotions to use by first understanding their origin and nature. Indeed, Laura Candiotta and Olivier Renaut stress that Plato is usually interested in the emotions because of what they can *do for* him: how they can promote his own visions of virtue, knowledge, temperance and excellence.

Part 1 opens with Laura Candiotta and Vasilis Politis' discussion (17–39) of the role of wonder (*thauma*) in enquiry. They argue that wonder is the beginning of philosophical enquiry because it is an 'emotive reaction' to the state of *aporia*, in which the philosopher finds herself. This is an enticing argument, which takes seriously Socrates' and Theaetetus' language in the *Theaetetus*' beginning, where the eponymous interlocutor remarks that his