REVIEW ESSAYS

THE LATIN AMERICAN LEFT SINCE ALLENDE: Perspectives and New Directions*

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LA FUERZA DEMOCRATICA DE LA IDEA SOCIALISTA. By JORGE ARRATE. (Barcelona: Ediciones Documentos, 1985. Pp. 287.)

MEXICAN COMMUNISM, 1968–1983: EUROCOMMUNISM IN THE AMERICAS? By BARRY CARR. (La Jolla, Calif.: University of California, San Diego, 1985. Pp. 36. $6.00.)

"SENDERO LUMINOSO." By CARLOS IVAN DEGREGORI. (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1986. Pp. 54.)

REVOLUTION AND INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. Edited by MARLENE DIXON and SUSANNE JONAS. (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1983. Pp. 344. $10.95.)

THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE ROAD TO SOCIALISM. By CARMELO FURCI. (London: Zed Books, 1984. Pp. 204.)

GUATEMALA: UN PUEBLO EN LUCHA. Edited by EDUARDO GALEANO, JOSE GONZALEZ, and ANTONIO CAMPOS. (Madrid: Editorial Revolución, 1983. Pp. 279.)

SOLDIERS OF PERON: ARGENTINA'S MONTONEROS. By RICHARD GILLESPIE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. 310. $34.95.)

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INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION. By DONALD C. HODGES. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. Pp. 378. $27.50 cloth, $11.50 paper.)

HISTORIA DEL COMUNISMO EN MEXICO. Edited by ARNOLDO MARTINEZ VERDUGO. (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1985. Pp. 501.)

REVOLUTIONARY TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA. By RONALDO MUNCK. (Montreal: Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 1984. Pp. 154. $6.50.)

DEL OPTIMISMO DE LA VOLUNTAD: ESCRITOS POLITICOS. By TEODORO PETKOFF. (Caracas: Ediciones Centauro 87, 1987. Pp. 273.)

REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: THE CHILEAN SOCIALIST PARTY. By BENNY POLLACK and HERNAN ROSENKRANZ. (London: Frances Pinter, 1986. Pp. 234.)

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by DAVID SLATER. (Dordrecht, Holland: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation, 1985. Pp. 295.)

VANGUARDIA Y REVOLUCION EN LAS SOCIEDADES PERIFERICAS. By JAIME WHEELOCK, interviewed by MARTA HARNECKER. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1986. Pp. 118.)

The death of Che Guevara in 1967 and the overthrow of Salvador Allende six years later were traumas for Latin American leftists that moved them to question long-held assumptions and strike out in new directions. Yet neither event induced the Left to discard completely the strategies to which Che and Allende had adhered: guerrilla warfare and the electoral road to socialism. The lull in the armed struggle after 1967 proved to be short-lived, and guerrilla movements subsequently reactivated in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia could count on more recruits and greater support among popular sectors than in the 1960s. Similarly, the coup against Allende did not rule out the possibility of achieving socialism through elections, although it forced the Left to examine the Chilean experience carefully and to admit that the peaceful road to power had potential dangers and serious pitfalls. The criticisms and self-criticisms expressed by those who continued to defend a nonviolent approach included the need to eschew intransigent rhetoric and slogans and to avoid massive expropriation in order not to alienate the middle sectors.[1]

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the Left since 1973 has been its greater willingness to accept diversity and pluralism. This attitude is actually part of an international trend involving the disappearance of monolithic Communism. Acceptance of diversity has led to different kinds of agreements among leftists, a more common development in Latin America than in Europe, where Communist parties monopolized the Marxist Left for a long time. The most successful example

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of intra-Left unity by far was the pact established in March 1979 between three distinct currents of the Sandinista movement, which until then had operated as three virtually distinct political parties.

The studies reviewed in this essay can be divided into three categories: those by leading representatives of the Latin American Left (Martínez Verdugo, Wheelock, Petkoff, and Arrate); those by scholars who obviously sympathize with the leftist cause (Munck, Hodges, Furci, and Dixon-Jonas); and those written by scholars who maintain a greater distance from their subject matter (Slater, Gillespie, and Degregori). These works analyze not only unity agreements among different leftist movements and the acceptance of pluralism but also other tendencies: rejection of the mechanical two-stage theory of revolution in which anti-imperialism and socialism are two separate and almost unrelated goals; the greater willingness of orthodox Communist parties to engage in the armed struggle; acceptance of the "war of positions" strategy designed by Antonio Gramsci, in which the Left attempts to penetrate civil society and the government bureaucracy; the Left's attraction to and utilization of national symbols and traditions; efforts to perfect internal democracy in forms not tried by nonsocialist democratic parties; and the growing importance of popular movements that carefully maintain an autonomous status vis-à-vis political parties, including those of the Left.

The process of organic unification involving the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) and a host of smaller leftist groups, as discussed in the two works on Mexico under review, led the Left down an untrodden path replete with difficulties and setbacks. Creation of the Partido Socialista Unificado de México (PSUM) in 1981 raised great expectations, especially when it was joined by Demitrio Vallejo, the legendary leader of the railroad workers who had helped found the Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores (PMT). Yet the PSUM consisted only of parties that had themselves split off from traditional leftist parties including the Communist party itself, while the more heterodox PMT refused to join, despite Vallejo's decision to enlist. Furthermore, former loyalties persisted within the PSUM, leading to several subsequent divisions. Only more recently have renewed efforts brought all the parties together, including the PMT, which had originally participated in the plans to found the PSUM.

In *Mexican Communism, 1968–1983: Eurocommunism in the Americas?*, Barry Carr discusses the issues that have generated heated debate on the Left and impeded the achievement of broader unity. Carr shows that the Mexican Communist party's four sister parties that joined the PSUM were tied to timeworn slogans and dogma and thus retarded the reforms advocated by former members of the Communist party influenced by the innovative spirit of Eurocommunism. As a result, the

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Communist movement's endeavor to break out of its former mold has been "confused" (p. 26), "tentative and highly uneven" (p. 36). Carr perceives the Communist party's publication of *Machete*, an offbeat monthly containing numerous articles by nonparty members, as typical of the party's effort to reach out to the more freethinking and unconventional members of the middle sectors, in accordance with Eurocommunist strategy. *Machete*, however, was discontinued on the eve of the founding of the PSUM because of the publication's critical stand toward the Soviet Union and other positions that threatened to obstruct the Mexican Communist party's plans to coalesce with its more orthodox allies. Carr also points to the party's failure to deepen its analysis of the democratic road to socialism, which Mexican Communist theoreticians had explored in the early 1970s under the influence of Eurocommunism. Another example of slippage was the PSUM's insistence on analyzing youth and women's problems exclusively according to class analysis, after the Mexican Communist party had made strides in "granting [these issues] a more autonomous status" (p. 32). Carr is obviously sympathetic to the renovation process and views it as a sine qua non for achieving authentic interparty unity encompassing the PMT and other heterodox parties and movements, which are far more significant in Mexico than those of the traditional Left.

The same topic is covered in *Historia del comunismo en México*, most of whose contributors are leading Mexican Communists. The editor, Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo, served as the secretary general of the Communist party in the 1960s and 1970s and the PSUM's presidential candidate in the 1982 elections. This volume, however, differs sharply from official histories of Communist parties in other Latin American nations, which gloss uncritically over abrupt policy changes and obvious party errors.[2] These essays avoid a static view of the Mexican Communist party by acknowledging the importance of outside events, such as the student rebellions of the 1960s, in shaping party policies. Despite the contributors' identification with the Mexican Communist party, they recognize that it was markedly influenced since its origins in 1919 by dogmatism and even anarchism.[3] One essay cites a document drafted by the party's central committee pointing out that the "sectarian and vanguardist inheritance [of the party] derives from the ideas of Stalin, which prevailed for a long time . . . [through] authoritarian forms of leadership" (p. 337). The contributors to *Historia del comunismo en México* especially criticize Dionicio Encina, who headed the party in the 1940s and 1950s, for unjustly hurling epithets of "Trotskyist" and "renegade" at dissident Communists, thus preventing the kind of unity that was achieved only in 1981.[4] In similar fashion, Eurocommunist leaders have reviewed their parties' history and have attempted to reconcile their rejection of the dogmatic attitudes embedded in the Com-

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munist movement with their identification with their parties' traditions.

Both Carr and the contributors to the Martínez Verdugo volume perceive the transformation of the Mexican Communist party over the last two decades as closely related to its reexamination of the trajectory of the Mexican Revolution. Until the 1960s, most of the Mexican Left accepted the ruling elite's claim to be the legitimate heirs of the Mexican Revolution and on this basis characterized the government as constituting an anti-imperialist coalition that could serve as an agent in favor of socialism at a future date. Several of the contributors to the Martínez Verdugo volume, however, have discarded this optimistic view as based on an "illusion regarding the eternal everlastingness of the Mexican Revolution" that endows "the struggle in that nation and the political ideas [related to it] with a unique character" (p. 278). Nevertheless, leftists in general and the different currents within the PSUM in particular have scarcely reached a consensus regarding the legacy of the Mexican Revolution. Those like PSUM National Deputy Arnaldo Córdova who see the revolutionary tradition as represented in the government hail its pro–Third World foreign policy and its takeover of the banking system in 1982 and call for a strategy of working within pro-government labor organizations.[5] Carr belittles this tendency in his observation that "the language and practices of populism form an important part of its [the tendency's] intellectual baggage."[6]

Carr and the contributors to the *Historia del comunismo en México* diverge in their evaluations of the proposal to "legalize internal currents of opinion," which was put forward by a "renovation" faction of Communists in order to democratize the party's internal structure. Under this system, those who defend minority opinions are represented at all levels of the party's leadership and are provided with ample opportunity to present their viewpoints within the party. Carr seems to support this setup and maintains that the only real chance that the renovation faction had to put forward their positions was at the party's national congress.[7] In contrast, the contributors to the Martínez Verdugo volume point to the danger that "legalization of internal currents" would have posed to the party by allowing well-organized minority factions (such as the "renovators") to gain disproportionate representation in the party's hierarchy. In addition, they argue, the system would have paralyzed the Mexican Communist party by converting it "into a party of opinion rather than action" (p. 398).

At the time that the Mexican Communist party began to embrace heterodox positions, the Latin American party that most resembled it was the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), founded in 1971 by dissident Venezuelan Communists. In the course of the following decade and a half, however, MAS continued to evolve in directions that were in many ways unprecedented in Latin America. My analysis, *Venezuela's*

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Movimiento al Socialismo: From Guerrilla Defeat to Innovative Politics, examines the degree to which MAS is the unique Latin American leftist party that it claims to be.[8] MAS presents a contrast with the PSUM in five basic ways. From the outset, the Masistas (unlike Martínez Verdugo and other Mexican Communist leaders) rejected the advice of certain Eurocommunist leaders to remain in the Communist movement in order to try to reform it from within.[9] Second, after originally calling itself a "Communist" movement, MAS quickly distanced itself from established Marxist-Leninist doctrine and even ceased to identify with the Left. Third, MAS has become an ardent critic of the Soviet Union, in contrast with the Mexican Communist party, which despite its condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, "energetically pronounced itself against the proposed anti-Soviet alliance of China and the United States" and has generally supported Moscow's foreign policy (Martínez Verdugo, p. 385). Fourth, while Mexican Communists have attempted to promote broad-based leftist unity electorally and organically, MAS has deliberately undermined that process in Venezuela in order to avoid blurring ideological distinctions. Last, since 1980 MAS has implemented the system of "legalization of internal currents of opinion" that the Mexican Communist party rejected at its last congress in 1981.

In *Del optimismo de la voluntad*, MAS's leading theoretician and standard bearer, Teodoro Petkoff, discusses the party's efforts to perfect internal democracy. Its most recent reforms have included direct election of party candidates and authorities, rotation in office, and "legalization of internal currents." Petkoff writes of these measures, "We are determined that everything be open [and] that everything be subject to elections" (p. 36). Thus MAS emphasizes the struggle for democracy instead of socioeconomic change, based on its interpretation of the exceptional conditions prevailing in Venezuela over the last two decades. While other Latin American countries were ruled by military juntas or subjected to mass upheavals or both, Venezuela enjoyed political as well as social stability. Petkoff attributes Venezuela's privileged position to its oil wealth, an explanation that many Venezuelans resent as slighting the efforts of their fellow citizens in favor of democracy.[10] Petkoff argues that the oil income that has filtered down to the lower classes "buttresses the notion that life will improve with each passing year" (p. 58) and thus has been a godsend for nonrevolutionary reformist ideology. He adds that as a result of the oil boom of the 1970s, "the Left, which people associate with radical change . . . , could find no receptivity" for its ideas (p. 163). This political atmosphere has led MAS to emphasize elections and political reforms, reject widespread mobilizations, and avoid intransigent slogans. Another salient feature of the Venezuelan political culture is its deeply rooted anticommunism. Petkoff affirms that MAS's response to this reality is to strive to achieve

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ideological clarity and not, "as some simple-minded people claim" (p. 84), to imitate the strategy designed by Rómulo Betancourt, who in his radical youth called on leftists to conceal long-range socialist goals. In this way, MAS hopes to show that its democratic brand of socialism has no affinity with the totalitarianism inherent in Communist doctrine.

As in Mexico and Venezuela, leftist parties in Chile have undergone radical change over the last fifteen years. Until the overthrow of Allende, the Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh) was more vocal than its counterparts elsewhere in arguing for the feasibility of the peaceful road to socialism. Now Chilean Communists are not only engaged in the armed struggle but allied with the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), which they had previously denounced for undermining the government of Unidad Popular (UP) and engaging in ultra-leftist tactics. The Partido Socialista (PS) has also been thoroughly transformed through the emergence of two main factions critical of the policies followed prior to 1973. In fact, the point of departure for understanding trends on the Left since Allende is the contrasting analyses offered by leftists of the fatal period from 1970 to 1973, and more generally, of the history of the Chilean Left since the founding of the Communist party in 1922 and the Socialist party in 1933.

In *The Chilean Communist Party and the Road to Socialism*, Carmelo Furci credits the party with devising the strategy of the "Chilean road to socialism" followed by the Left from the 1952 presidential elections until the coup in 1973. The Chilean Communist party favored electoral agreements with parties to its right, specifically the Radical party (Partido Radical), and understandings with the conservative Christian Democrats. The Socialists, who would have preferred more exclusive alliances based on a more explicitly socialist platform, reluctantly accepted the inclusion of the Radical party in the UP coalition that brought Allende to power. Furci interprets this opening up to the Right as sufficiently at odds with orthodox practice to draw the conclusion that "the PCCh is one of the few Latin American Communist Parties to have elaborated an autonomous political strategy in line with the socioeconomic conditions of the country" (p. 181). According to Furci, this originality explains the Chilean Left's success in electing a Socialist president. What actually made Chile unique was not so much the alliance between the Communists and the moderate leftist Radicals (themselves of minor electoral significance) but the Communists' agreement with the Socialist party in four presidential elections between 1952 and 1970. In this sense, the Partido Socialista contrasted with its socialist and social democratic counterparts in other Latin American nations, which were less radical and more influenced by anticommunism.

Furci criticizes the Communist party for failing to offer a thorough self-criticism of its errors under Allende and for exaggerating the

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harm inflicted by the MIR as a result of its ultra-leftist actions. Furci observes: "[T]he party placed the responsibility for [the coup] on other political forces and their policies, without analyzing its own failure to implement alternative policies. . . . If it is correct to say that the triumph of Popular Unity was mainly due to the success of the PCCh's policies, why did the PCCh not consider in more depth its role and its failure?" Although Furci correctly faults the Communist party for scapegoating the MIR,[11] it is not true that the party has avoided rigorous self-criticism of its behavior during the Allende years. In fact, the Communist party's reevaluation of the Allende experience is closely related to the party's move to the Left and its decision to participate in the armed struggle in 1980. Soviet and Chilean Communist theoreticians accuse the party, in the lexicon of orthodox Communism, of "opportunistic deviation to the Right" during the Allende years.[12] According to this analysis, the party erred in several respects: it failed to implement new forms of mass mobilization; it failed to take measures to restructure the state; it failed to translate the slogan "people's power" into alternative sources of authority; it failed to respond to the violence perpetrated by the Right with "revolutionary violence"; it overemphasized the need to respect the nation's constitution; and it naively trusted in the neutrality of the armed forces. Chilean Communists also argue against the assertion made by moderate Socialists that a revolutionary situation did not exist in Chile between 1970 and 1973.[13]

Furci offers various explanations for the Communist party's about-face in abandoning its traditional strategy and participating in the armed struggle along with its erstwhile leftist adversary, the MIR. Furci notes that the refusal of the moderate faction of the Socialist party (the PS-Núñez) to cooperate with the Communists induced the party to look to its Left for allies. In addition, the "apparent institutionalization of the military regime" precluded the possibility of abiding by the rules of the political game in order to radically alter them (p. 166). Finally, the Chilean Communist party was influenced by the triumph of the Sandinistas in 1979 and the subsequent incorporation of the Communist party of El Salvador into the guerrilla movement. Furci hints that the decision to take up arms resulted from pressure from rank-and-file Communists active in Chile and was only reluctantly accepted by top Chilean Communists in exile. Brian Loveman has argued that the Communist party leaders actually opposed the armed struggle but lost control of the political organizations inside Chile that they had helped create.[14] In this sense, the Chilean case differs from that of El Salvador, where Communist party Secretary General Schafik Handal defended electoral politics in the 1970s but is now a fervent champion of the armed strategy.[15]

In *Revolutionary Social Democracy: The Chilean Socialist Party*, Benny Pollack and Hernán Rosenkranz perceive internal organization as being

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at the heart of the differences between the Communist and Socialist parties in Chile. Unlike the Communist party, the Socialist party was a "part-time" organization that depended almost entirely on the voluntary work of its members rather than on paid functionaries, who were "absent for most of the party's history" (p. 94). The authors prove empirically that Socialist leaders were not fully aware of the looseness of the party's internal structure and were committed to a tighter organization based on the Leninist concept of discipline and vertical lines of command. The lack of internal constraints, while conducive to rank-and-file input in decision making, proved to be a serious liability. Regional leaders accumulated inordinate authority and often refused to obey orders from higher levels, a situation that Pollack and Rosenkranz call *caciquismo*. In addition, the Socialist party was transformed into a patchwork organization with different factions commanding the loyalty of its members and undermining party discipline in the process. These problems cut into the party's capacity to take the initiative and forcefully assert its positions. The authors show that the policies set by the Socialist-Communist electoral alliance more often than not reflected Communist positions that Socialists were often loath to accept. This negative experience should serve as a lesson to democratic socialists (like some MAS leaders in Venezuela) who favor a federalist structure as an alternative to Leninist forms of organization. Pollack and Rosenkranz demonstrate that the Socialist party's organizational weakness proved fatal following the 1973 coup. The loosely knit party became easy prey for security forces, and the legacy of disunity led to a balkanization process that produced two separate parties and a host of factions. Unfortunately, the authors' conclusions regarding attitudes of party leaders toward internal organization are based on numerous interviews and other data that are marred by incomplete references and a lack of methodological rigor.[16]

The influence of pre-1973 party history on the new directions taken by Communist and Socialist parties following the coup, a topic in the works by Furci and Pollack and Rosenkranz, is a central theme in Jorge Arrate's *La fuerza democrática de la idea socialista*. A member of the central committee of the moderate PS (Núñez), Arrate believes that the long-standing principles and basic propositions of the Socialist party are the point of departure for designing a viable strategy to confront the Pinochet regime. The PS (Núñez) accuses its Socialist rivals, the PS (Almeyda), of having betrayed the party's tradition by advocating a tight-knit working-class party that is indistinguishable from orthodox communism.[17] Arrate points out that the Socialist party pioneered reforms and revisions in Marxist thinking that have been popularized by Eurocommunists and others in more recent years. For example, he extols the Socialists' 1947 program entitled "Fundamentación Teórica,"

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which advocated such advanced concepts as workers' management and the autonomy of each party within the international socialist camp. Arrate notes that democratic socialists worldwide in recent years have followed the Fundamentación's call for disputing the claim of nonsocialists to being the true defenders of democracy. Finally, Arrate points out that the attitude of the Chilean Socialists toward the armed forces anticipated recent formulations of nondogmatic Latin American leftists. Because the Socialist party was not perceived by the military as being subservient to a foreign power, the party was able to develop "relations based on reciprocal sensibilities" with the armed forces (p. 143), and to call for acceptance of political debate within the institution.

The rejection by the PS (Núñez) of alliances with the Communist party is also derived from a critical reading of the history of Chilean socialism. As both the Furci and Pollack-Rosenkranz works note, throughout its lengthy electoral alliance with the Communist party, the Socialist party took a back seat to the Communists in formulating platforms and other campaign decisions. To provide Socialists with the opportunity to develop their own identity, Arrate favors avoiding pacts with the Communist party. This is the reason why Arrate highlights the Socialists' 1947 program, which was drafted at a time when Socialist-Communist relations were particularly strained as a result of Cold War tensions.[18] Arrate nonetheless recognizes the historical and numerical importance of the Communist party and leaves open the possibility of a future alliance. He also refrains from using the standard anti-Communist arguments employed by MAS and other moderate socialist parties in Latin America. Moreover, in an obvious reference to the Christian Democrats, he questions the sincerity of those who applauded the violence unleashed against the Left following the 1973 coup but later denounced the Communist party for supporting the armed struggle.[19]

Argentina's urban guerrillas of the early 1970s, the Montoneros, also based their political strategy on a particular interpretation of their national history. According to Richard Gillespie in *Soldiers of Perón: Argentina's Montoneros*,[20] the Montoneros were more populists than socialists[21] in that they reduced Argentine history to a struggle between popular heroes (like the *gauchos*) who defended national interests and representatives of the oligarchy and foreign powers. In Gillespie's view, the Montoneros' deification of Perón did not result merely from this erroneous historical conceptualization but from their being a group whose members were naive and lacking in political experience. Gillespie's depiction of the Montoneros as unwilling to accept the facts regarding Perón's lack of revolutionary commitment (even after he turned against them) suggests that they were imbued with a mystical fascination with their leader, like sons' attachment to their father. Gillespie contends that in maintaining a posture of being more *peronista*

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than Perón, the Montonero leaders were trying to compensate for their own right-wing and (in some cases) Catholic backgrounds.

Gillespie is much harsher in his view of Perón as an unadulterated opportunist, if not a cynic. While out of power, Perón simulated revolutionary qualities and goaded the leftist Peronist youth with promises of greater influence in the movement over the course of the struggle. In actuality, he intended to use the youth movement as a counterpoise to organized labor and to undermine those Peronist leaders (like Augusto Vandor, who was assassinated by future Montoneros) who favored reaching an accommodation with the military government under the formula of "*peronismo* without Perón." Once back in power in 1973, Perón had no further use for the Montoneros. He accused them of being "infiltrated" and gave his security force carte blanche to deal with them. This repression later found its maximum expression in the "dirty war."[22] Gillespie thus perceives the Montoneros as victims of their own ingenuous faith in Perón. An alternative interpretation, however, denies that the Montonero leaders harbored illusions regarding the revolutionary inclinations of their aging leader. They acted in his name in order to capitalize on his widespread popularity in the hope that they would inherit leadership of the movement once he died. According to this perspective, the Montoneros were opportunists who were far from naive but still no match for Perón.[23]

Gillespie argues that the main strategy of the Montoneros was to win Perón over to the revolutionary cause and to fortify their position within the Peronista movement rather than to galvanize class struggle. The Montoneros viewed government repression as evidence of the futility of legal forms of struggle and thus did not take into account the coincidence between their ascendence in the early 1970s and the upsurge of labor militancy. Because of their faith that the masses would respond to their calls for action, the Montoneros made no effort to establish organic links with the working class, and they even remained isolated from the most militant sectors of the movement. Elsewhere Gillespie has stated that the Montoneros, Tupamaros, and other urban guerrilla organizations active in the early 1970s corresponded to a stage in the armed struggle in Latin America that was characterized by priority of military considerations over mass political work, steady escalation in tactics that led to spectacular military action,[24] and a "theoretical and ideological guerrilla poverty."[25] By the late 1970s, however, these errors and shortcomings had been overcome, and in more recent years, urban actions have been conceived of as "just tactical supports for strategic mass challenges"[26] (as in Chile) or as subordinate to the rural struggle.

In *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*, Donald Hodges reviews Latin American revolutionary thought throughout the

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twentieth century in an effort to trace the political and intellectual strands that make up the basic tenets of Sandinismo. In documenting the eclecticism of the Sandinistas, Hodges's work responds to the movement's detractors who claim that Managua's identification with Sandino is a mere cover for adherence to Marxist-Leninist dogma.[27] Hodges points out that Sandino's rediscovery by Carlos Fonseca and Tomás Borge, the key founding members of the Sandinista movement, led to their withdrawal from the pro-Moscow Partido Socialista, which (along with Soviet historians) belittled the deceased guerrilla fighter as a representative of the petty bourgeoisie. Fonseca's study of Sandino (and the more theoretical, albeit indirect, influence of José Carlos Mariátegui) convinced him that "more than scientifically based theory is needed to mobilize the masses for revolution, that revolutionaries must appeal to nonrational as well as rational motives . . . and to basic human sentiments. A revolutionary must learn to make concessions to the people's lack of political awareness" (Hodges, pp. 188–89).

Perhaps the most striking evidence of this pluralistic approach has been Sandinista acceptance of Christian thought. The incorporation of three ordained priests into the cabinet goes beyond the religious toleration recently proclaimed by Fidel Castro[28] to indicate the Sandinistas' doctrinal flexibility. In searching for ideological precursors of the Sandinista movement, however, Hodges overstates his case regarding the diversity of influences that were exerted over time. In analyzing the thinking of Ernesto Cardenal, Hodges posits a link between the iconoclastic Sandinista poet and the anarchist component in Sandino that was partly shaped by the Mexican anarcho-syndicalist Ricardo Flores Magón: "The new theology of liberation encouraged by the FSLN represents the single most important carrier of [Sandino's] anarcho-communism" (p. 294). Hodges goes on to state that the theology of liberation represents a "left wing" of the Sandinista movement. But these assertions are misleading in that despite Cardenal's fame and prestige in and out of the Sandinista movement, he is hardly typical of the Christian wing of Sandinismo, as the author himself acknowledges. Furthermore, libertarian concepts notwithstanding, Cardenal and other Sandinista Christians cannot easily be placed on a Left-Right continuum.

Hodges also traces the insurrectional strategy that was instrumental in overthrowing Somoza back to Sandino. This approach attempts to activate diverse forms of struggle while assigning a primary role to general strikes, mass resistance, and ultimate insurrection as a means of toppling the regime. Hodges points out that Humberto Ortega, the key strategist who designed the final Sandinista offensive, was inspired by Sandino's military example. After the initial phase of hit-and-run battles, Sandino's war of liberation took on national proportions as guerrilla columns extended beyond their original base of opera-

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tion and the general populace was ready to respond in a massive way. Another precedent cited by Hodges is the Cuban Revolution. Not only was the Moncada assault in 1953 designed to spark a mass uprising, but Castro hoped that the Granma invasion three years later would produce an insurrection. Only when his urban apparatus failed to respond effectively did Castro fall back on rural guerrilla warfare.

Just as the Sandinistas have been receptive to diverse intellectual and political currents, they have accepted input from the rank and file of popular organizations in the decision-making process. This aspect may be the most far-reaching implication of Hodges's study. Of all the unique features of the Nicaraguan Revolution noted by Hodges and other pro-Sandinista writers, popular participation both before and after July 1979 is undoubtedly the most significant.[29] James Petras and Marta Harnecker, for instance, have pointed out that the abortive uprising of September 1978 was set in motion by the general populace and only reluctantly supported by the Sandinistas, who realized that conditions were not ripe to seize power. In addition, the ill-equipped Sandinista guerrillas were forced to rely on mass organizations to collect arms.[30] Carlos Vilas (who has written extensively on popular participation in Nicaragua) argues that mass organizations have enjoyed a semi-autonomous status, even in financial matters, since before the revolution triumphed and that they occasionally clash with the Sandinistas.[31] Vilas nevertheless recognizes that the violence unleashed by the Contras after 1982 has limited the radius of independent behavior.[32]

In *Vanguardia y revolución en las sociedades periféricas*, Nicaraguan Minister of Agriculture Jaime Wheelock discusses the various theoretical and strategic positions assumed by the Tendencia Proletaria, which he headed within the Sandinista movement. This movement favored concentrating efforts on organizing urban sectors, especially workers, while the rival faction led by Tomás Borge, the Guerra Popular Prolongada, gave priority to guerrilla warfare in the countryside and the Tendencia Insurreccional, headed by Daniel and Humberto Ortega, called for combining diverse methods of struggle to set off an insurrection in the immediate future.[33] In this book, Wheelock displays none of the aggressive partisanship that led to the Tendencia Proletaria being expelled from the Sandinista movement in 1975, and he acknowledges the "contributions" of each faction to the overthrow of Somoza (p. 9). Instead of viewing the three approaches as mutually exclusive, Wheelock points to successful efforts in the final months of the revolution to devise an integral strategy that gave each form of struggle a complementary role. Wheelock even engages in self-criticism in admitting that the Tendencia Insurreccional was correct in spurning his faction's emphasis on organizing activity over militant action and in forming a coalition with business representatives. In fact, the triumph of the revolution

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was a tribute to the correctness of the Tendencia Insurreccional approach, although the "insurrectionalists" did not attempt to parlay their victory into control of the Sandinista movement.

Wheelock offers an extensive analysis of the economic elite in Nicaragua and concludes that "the local bourgeoisie is economically and politically tied to imperialism in such a way that it is difficult to find [a sector of] the bourgeoisie that primarily represents local [national] interests." This viewpoint contradicts the Sandinista government's efforts to win over or at least neutralize the local bourgeoisie with a strategy of developing a mixed economy in which imperialism is portrayed as the main enemy. If the entire local bourgeoisie is intricately linked to foreign interests, as Wheelock affirms, it will scarcely support the anti-imperialist thrust of government policy. Like other leftists who have been influenced by dependency theory's perception of the local bourgeoisie as fully committed to the established international order, Wheelock recognizes that the extreme backwardness of socioeconomic conditions in Nicaragua forced the Sandinistas to reach an accommodation with local business interests before and after the overthrow of Somoza.

Revolution and Intervention in Central America consists of essays written by leftist scholars, interviews with guerrilla leaders, and documents issued by leftist groups in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. These pieces provide a clear picture of the transformations in the guerrilla movements and the modifications in their strategies over the last two decades. Most important, guerrilla organizations have largely succeeded in avoiding the isolation from the general population produced by the *foquista* approach of the 1960s. Susanne Jones asserts in the introductory essay that this greater linkage has been facilitated by the "rapid proletarianization" of recent years in Central America, largely the result of penetration of foreign capital in the countryside (p. 21). The volume also includes interviews with Salvador Cayetano Carpio, the top leader of the revolutionary movement in El Salvador until his startling suicide in 1983, and Joaquín Villalobos, who replaced him as the leading guerrilla strategist. Whereas Carpio favored a prolonged popular war, similar to that sought by the Guerra Popular Prolongada in Nicaragua, Villalobos is more receptive to the insurrectional approach followed by the Ortega brothers.[34] In the lengthy interview with Villalobos conducted by Marta Harnecker, the Salvadorean guerrilla points to the density of the population in El Salvador, its extensive road network, and the lack of isolated areas as key determinants of the guerrilla strategy followed. According to Villalobos, these factors represented "disadvantages at the beginning, but [they] also had some advantages, because we were born and grew up in constant communication with the peasant masses" (p. 75). He maintains that the semi-

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clandestine structure of mass organizations in recent years has enabled the guerrillas to achieve a greater degree of articulation with the popular movement.[35] As in Nicaragua, the guerrillas are not always able to maintain tight control of the insurrectional movement. Thus Villalobos attributes the execution of paramilitary personnel to the "insurrectional enthusiasm" of the masses, even though the practice was prohibited by the guerrilla command (p. 101).

In an essay on the revolutionary situation in Central America, Guatemalan scholar Edelberto Torres-Rivas points out that the leftist insurgents in the region have been grouped not in political parties but in fronts "with a political-military structure at the summit and a wide dispersion of mass organizations at the base, all held together by links that are not always organic or ideological" (p. 168). He also notes the diversity of social groups and "the coexistence of different forms of radical consciousness" within the popular movement (p. 169). According to Torres Rivas, such characteristics are rare in revolutionary movements on the verge of taking power, and they demonstrate that "pluralism" is not a vacuous catchword being employed opportunistically by the Sandinistas.

Guatemala, un pueblo en lucha is a collection of essays, documents, and interviews that set forth the positions of the four guerrilla organizations constituting the Unión Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). These pieces highlight the contrast between the political-military situation and the strategy followed by the Left in Guatemala in the 1960s, on the one hand, and the developments that have taken place over the last two decades, on the other. The guerrillas are more firmly rooted in the countryside and are therefore less dependent on supplies from urban areas than in the 1960s.[36] The new generation of guerrillas have avoided media exposure and the dramatic, well-publicized actions that were the rebels' stock-in-trade in the 1960s.[37] In fact, the leaders of the Organización del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), aware that the "law of counterinsurgency states that the [initial stage] is the best moment to annihilate the guerrillas" (p. 183), decided to keep their organization's existence a secret throughout the 1970s.[38] Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Guatemalan Left's reorientation is the nearly exclusive concern of the two guerrilla groups formed in the 1970s—the ORPA and, to a lesser extent, the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP)—with the economic and cultural plight of the Indians. One essay taken from the EGP's *Compañero* discusses the radical political potential of the Indians and asserts that even the bourgeois members of that race stand to gain rather than lose from revolutionary change. *Guatemala, un pueblo en lucha* documents a guerrilla movement as well-entrenched as its counterpart in El Salvador, a situation not generally recognized because of the scarcity of public information on rebel activities in Guatemala.

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One other important change in Guatemala since the 1960s should be mentioned. The orthodox Communists, grouped in the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), vacillated in supporting the guerrilla movement in the 1960s, for which they were harshly criticized by pro-Castro rebel leaders. Today in Guatemala, as in other Latin American countries, debate over the pros and cons of armed struggle has been eclipsed, if not superseded. Like its Communist counterparts in Colombia, El Salvador, and elsewhere,[39] the PGT (after dividing over the issue) has firmly committed itself to the armed struggle and is one of the four organizations making up the Unión Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. The PGT leader interviewed in *Guatemala, un pueblo en lucha* points out that Communist youth members were the most vocal in supporting the armed struggle (as was the case in Chile and elsewhere). He attributes the resistance of older party members to the PGT's late founding during a period when the popular front strategy encouraged Communists to look to their Right for allies. He further suggests that Communist support for the guerrilla movement has been heightened by their acceptance of a unified military-political command that has replaced two separate units, one engaged in political decisions and the other in the armed struggle.

Peru's enigmatic Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is a sui generis guerrilla movement that cannot be grouped with other organizations. Indeed, its strategy and positions run counter to those defended by the rest of the nation's Left. To appreciate Sendero's importance, its ascendence must be analyzed in the context of developments in the Peruvian Left. The structural reforms initiated by the regime of General Juan Velasco Alvarado after 1968 unintentionally set in motion popular mobilizations and led to a proliferation of unions that strengthened the Peruvian Left, despite its historically weak presence in Peru.[40] By unifying disparate leftist parties into the Izquierda Unida (IU) in the 1980s, the Left has been able to capture nearly a third of the nation's electorate, a feat that has radicalized the formerly more conservative APRA.[41] Like leftists in other countries examined in this essay, the Peruvian Left looked to the past to rediscover and glorify one of the nation's outstanding revolutionary leaders—José Carlos Mariátegui, whose ideas were considered applicable to the present political scene.[42] Although Sendero Luminoso has shared the Left's eulogistic attitude toward Mariátegui, it has spurned unity and condemned leftist-sponsored general strikes and land takeovers.

Carlos Iván Degregori points out in his *Sendero Luminoso* that while diverse sectors of the Left immersed themselves in the mass movement in the 1970s, Sendero developed a predominantly university base in the Department of Ayacucho and was cut off from the national

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worker and peasant contingents of the Communist party from which it had emerged.[43] Degregori employs Gramscian terminology to explain that Sendero's military approach of an "assault on power" coincided with a period of the "strengthening of civil society" that (according to the Italian theorist) should have led to a strategy of gradual leftist penetration of institutions and organizations (p. 51). After 1980 Sendero led peasants in a "popular war" in Ayacucho, capitalizing on regional resentment toward national authorities. Sendero's vision, however, was imposed on the rural population, and many of its ideas (such as the repression of the marketplace as part of a Maoist-inspired military strategy of laying siege to urban areas)[44] were accepted only reluctantly by the peasants. Degregori notes that the peasants accepted Sendero as though it was "a new good landlord" (p. 43) and that the movement's authoritarianism contrasted markedly with the rest of the Left. Finally, Sendero Luminoso invoked Mariátegui's outdated analysis of Peruvian society to argue that it was semifeudal,[45] in contrast with the view of the rest of the Left, which (influenced by dependency theory) perceived the nation's economy as capitalist.

In emphasizing the university origin and thrust of Sendero Luminoso, Degregori takes issue with Cynthia McClintock's argument that peasant hunger was the driving force behind the violence unleashed by Sendero. McClintock likens the Sendero movement to the peasant upheavals in Southeast Asia, as described by James Scott, in that they were propelled by "an objective threat to peasant subsistence."[46] (Scott's explanation too has been questioned by other researchers emphasizing the subjective causes of peasant unrest.[47]) Degregori's assertion that Sendero Luminoso did not truly represent the rural sector in Ayacucho suggests that McClintock's view of poverty in the countryside as the mainstay of the movement is misleading in that it exaggerates the extent of peasant commitment to Sendero Luminoso.[48]

Revolutionary Trends in Latin America by Ronaldo Munck presents a Trotskyist critique of the Latin American Left and includes a chapter on the history of Trotskyist movements in the region. Munck cites the influence of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution as proof of the existence of a "vigorous Trotskyist intellectual tradition in Latin America" (p. 117). According to the author, Trotskyism was particularly evident in the original ideas associated with the "first generation" of Latin American Communist leaders who were not as tightly controlled by Moscow as the "second generation" that emerged after Stalin consolidated power in the USSR.[49] Mariátegui, for instance, was evidently influenced by Trotskyism in his emphasis on the socialist thrust and content of the anti-imperialist movement. Later, the foundations of "dependency theory" were laid by such Trotskyists as Argentine Silvio

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Frondizi, who in the 1950s put forth the concept of "the development of underdevelopment" and questioned the revolutionary potential of the "national bourgeoisie."

Munck stops short of the dogmatism and purism characteristic of Trotskyism that have produced a welter of doctrinal currents and organizations within its fold. He admits that Trotskyism in Latin America has remained an isolated sect as a result of its "serious failure to connect with national reality" (p. 114). While harshly critical of the Cuban Revolution for its "international evolution toward the Soviet model" after 1970 (p. 58), Munck praises the innovative features of the Sandinista revolution. He takes issue with James Petras's pessimistic 1979 prediction that the Sandinistas would attempt to "demobilize the masses" (p. 137) and his assertion that the Tendencia Insurreccional of the Ortega brothers was "social democratic."[50] Munck justifies the alliances with bourgeois organizations promoted by the Tendencia Insurreccional as having facilitated the overthrow of Somoza, but he questions continuing such a policy in postrevolutionary Nicaragua and its application to the rest of Latin America. Munck's argument is surprising because Trotskyists have generally been harsh critics of leftist alliances with bourgeois sectors (dating back to the popular front period of the 1930s), although Munck's position on Nicaragua is shared by fellow Trotskyist Adolfo Gilly in his books on Nicaragua and El Salvador.[51]

In a noteworthy observation, Munck states that the pro-Castroite movements of the 1960s, specifically the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria in Chile, have followed Havana's lead in seeking reconciliation with the Soviet camp. He adds that the MIR hesitated in the 1960s to offer a thorough criticism of socialism in the Soviet Union, despite major ideological differences. This restraint paved the way for its new position of extolling Soviet bloc nations and working closely with its erstwhile leftist rival, the Communist party of Chile. Although Munck may be hesitant to recognize it, the MIR's reevaluation of the USSR reflects the renewed prestige of the Soviet Union among Latin American leftists, a trend furthered by the political initiatives taken by Mikhail Gorbachov over the last few years. Moscow's current image contrasts markedly with that of the 1960s, when the thinking of Latin American leftists was shaped by Chinese denunciations of Soviet "social imperialism."

The intriguing growth of new social movements in Latin America that were neither formally nor informally linked to political parties captured the interest of political scientists in the early 1980s. These new social movements were led by actors who had previously played marginal roles in channeling popular discontent: clerics, women, labor leaders unaffiliated with political parties, and representatives of neglected regions and disadvantaged ethnic minorities. Some analysts

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have argued that the new social movements were transitory in that they represented a response to the relaxation of restrictions on civil liberties in countries in transition from military to democratic rule, as in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In these countries, the new social movements became substitutes for political parties, particularly leftist parties that were still proscribed.[52] But many of the new social movements, such as the automobile workers movement in the São Paulo area led by the legendary "Lula" (Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva) and the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, have remained active even after democratic governments have been restored.

New Social Movements and the State in Latin America, edited by David Slater, presents a number of case studies and raises theoretical questions regarding the significance of the new social movements. The contributors are not entirely in agreement regarding the implications of the new social movements for the Latin American Left. Some, such as Tilman Evers, depict relations between the new social movements, which seek to maintain autonomy, and leftist political parties, which promote their own organizational and ideological objectives, as fraught with tension. Evers points out that most of the members of the new social movements in Chile are young people who lack political loyalties that predate 1973. For them, "a permanent dilemma of the new social movements . . . is making itself felt: will they have to integrate into established political structures to gain some efficiency, at the price of sacrificing their specific identity?" (p. 54).[53] Other contributors interpret the rise of the new social movements as an implicit critique of the Left's failure to channel popular energies. One example is the Brazilian automobile workers movement headed by Lula, who boasts that his union is independent of all leftist political parties, particularly the Communist party, despite his own position as president of the Partido dos Trabalhadores.[54] A parallel workers' movement, the "Matanceros," emerged in the Guayana region of Venezuela. This movement, which gained control of the national steel workers' union, has also lashed out at the Left for neglecting grass-roots organization. The Matanceros belong to the "Causa R," a political party that has twice run the former head of the steel workers for president of the nation, notwithstanding the Matanceros' antiparty rhetoric.[55]

Other contributors to *New Social Movements and the State* view these movements as opening up rich opportunities in Latin America for democratic forces and the Left. Ernesto Laclau writes that the new social movements themselves do not represent a radical challenge to the system because they can be taken over by conservatives seeking their own political objectives. But the nonspecificity of the new social movements, like the nonspecificity of populist movements he discussed in a celebrated essay,[56] implies that their evolution in a particular direction

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is not a foregone conclusion. Laclau suggests that under restored democratic regimes in the Southern Cone countries, multiplying new social movements may give rise to a new political structure with room for diverse interest groups that do not correspond to any particular position on the Left-Right spectrum. In another essay, Maxine Molyneux foresees this novel proliferation of political spaces as leading to a new model of democratic socialism, one that is currently being pioneered by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

Conclusion

The fact that the Nicaraguan Revolution has not produced a replica of previous revolutionary processes and is gravitating toward a new revolutionary model should not be surprising. The history of revolutions in the twentieth century is replete with efforts to universalize particular experiences: leaders in the Soviet Union after 1917, China after 1949, and Cuba after 1959 all became firm exponents of revolutionary theories and strategies that were identified with their respective national experiences. What is exceptional about Nicaragua is that Sandinista support for pluralism and elections and the semi-autonomous status of popular organizations are associated with the Gramscian approach to hegemony, which was designed to apply to European nations with a history of democratic rule where a peaceful, gradual road to socialism was feasible. Nicaragua obviously lacks a democratic tradition, and the Sandinista triumph in 1979 was achieved by an "assault on power" instead of a gradual takeover. The outstanding features of revolutionary rule in Nicaragua—collective leadership, novel forms of popular participation, and tolerance of the enemies of the revolution—are perhaps as much a commentary on the changing correlation of world forces as on the originality or ingenuity of Sandinista leadership. Certainly the initiatives and policies pursued by the Sandinistas would have been difficult to imagine twenty years earlier, when U.S. influence was at its apex and the polarized world setting produced by the Cold War largely determined the course of the Cuban Revolution.

The experimental directions of the Nicaraguan Revolution are typical of the new strategies and forms of struggle that have characterized leftist movements in Latin America over the last two decades. This essay has highlighted the diversity of experiences and approaches throughout the continent: a highly active mass movement that helped bring about leftist unity in the form of electoral pacts in Peru; organic unity encompassing orthodox and heterodox sectors of the Left in Mexico; and fronts that coordinate the activities of guerrilla organizations in Central America, each one committed to different tactical and strategic military approaches. Changing forms of struggle have also taken their

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internal toll in the form of leadership displacements. For instance, several traditional Communist parties, which some analysts claim were completely impervious to changes other than those dictated by Moscow, have been subjected to abrupt transformations. Long-standing Communist leaders were successfully challenged and knocked off their pedestals by a younger generation in Brazil (Luis Carlos Prestes), Costa Rica (Manuel Mora), and Argentina (Rubens Iscaro).

Leftists have at least one lesson to learn from developments in countries where the Left has been fortified in recent years. For the Left to advance, deep-rooted animosities will have to be put aside, which is to say that leftists must learn to live with diversity and relinquish any hope of achieving monolithic socialism. The new democratic commitment of the Latin American Left has been embodied in the pluralistic concept in which interparty unity encompasses a greater diversity of ideological positions on the Left than it did during the popular front period of the 1930s, and for this reason, unity is all the harder to achieve.[57] Solidifying this development looms as the Left's greatest challenge in the years to come.

NOTES

1. Sergio Bitar, *Transición, socialismo y democracia: la experiencia chilena* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1979), 283; and Ellner, "The MAS Party in Venezuela," *Latin American Perspectives* 49 (Spring 1986):101–4.
2. Despite his own pro-Communist sympathies, Carmelo Furci remarks in the book under review that the official history of the Chilean Communist party written by the renowned historian Hernán Ramírez-Necochea "is seriously limited by his partisan approach" (p. 173). See Ramírez-Necochea, *Origen y formación del Partido Comunista de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Austral, 1965).
3. Barry Carr also argues for the ongoing influence of anarchism in the PCM throughout its history. See Carr, "Marxism and Anarchism in the Formation of the Mexican Communist Party, 1910–19," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 2 (1983):305.
4. Usually, the thoroughgoing self-criticisms in official Communist party histories involve shorter periods. In the case of the U.S. Communist party, its denunciation of "Browderism" took in only the years 1943 to 1945, even though Browder himself was president of the party for over ten years.
5. Enrique Semo, "The Mexican Left and the Economic Crisis," in *The Mexican Left, the Popular Movements, and the Politics of Austerity*, edited by Barry Carr and Ricardo Anzaldúa Montoya (San Diego: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, 1986), 20–30; and Carr, "The Mexican Economic Debacle and the Labor Movement: A New Era or More of the Same?," in *Mexico's Economic Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Donald L. Wyman (San Diego: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, 1983), 95. Córdova relies on Gramsci's theory of hegemony to justify working within established organizations and institutions. See Córdova, *Sociedad y estado en el mundo moderno* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1976), 249–85. For a concise summary of the positions of the various Mexican leftist parties and movements with regard to the Mexican Revolution and its current relevance, see Donald Hodges and Ross Gandy, *Mexico: 1910–1976: Reform or Revolution?* (London: Zed Press, 1979), 100–117.
6. Carr, "The Mexican Left, the Popular Movements, and the Politics of Austerity, 1982–1985," in *The Mexican Left, the Popular Movements*, 18; and Carr, "The PSUM:

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The Unification Process on the Mexican Left, 1981–1985," in *Mexican Politics in Transition*, edited by Judith Gentleman (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987), 297.

7. Carr, "Impresiones del XIX Congreso del PCM, 1981," *Cuadernos Políticos* 29 (July–Sept. 1981):87.
8. Ellner, *Venezuela's Movimiento al Socialismo: From Guerrilla Defeat to Innovative Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988).
9. Ibid., 61.
10. In a particularly interesting analysis of the Venezuelan export sector, Terry Lynn Karl also argues for the stabilizing influence of oil on the social, political, and ideological life of the nation. See Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," *LARR* 22, no. 1 (1987):63–94. For an opposing viewpoint that minimizes the influence of oil, see Diego Abente, "Politics and Policies: The Limits of the Venezuelan Consociational Regime," in *Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela*, edited by Donald L. Herman (New York: Praeger, 1988), 133–54.
11. Carlos Altamirano, *Dialéctica de una derrota* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1977), 86–87.
12. Y. Koroliov and M. Kudachkin, "Revolución y contrarrevolución en Chile en las investigaciones de los científicos soviéticos," in *Revolución y contrarrevolución en Chile: Unidad Popular, la lucha por el poder* (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1980), 6–7.
13. A. Sobolev, "Revolución y contrarrevolución: la experiencia de Chile y los problemas de la lucha de clases," in *Revolución en América Latina: problemas y perspectivas* (Bogotá: Colección América Latina, 1976), 145–50; and M. Kudachkin, *Chile: la experiencia de la lucha por la unidad de las fuerzas de izquierda y las transformaciones revolucionarias* (Moscow: Progreso, 1978), 205–7, 223–24.
14. Brian Loveman, "Military Dictatorship and Political Opposition in Chile, 1973–1986," in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 28, no. 4 (Winter 1986–87):13.
15. In an interview with Mark Fried, Handal stated that Central America "has shown that armed struggle—and not simply guerrilla struggle—is going to play the principal role in Latin America's revolutionary process. . . . Unarmed forms of struggle, when not combined with armed struggle, have tended to go awry in Latin America." See "Schafik Handal," *Report on the Americas* 20, no. 5 (Sept.–Dec. 1986):39.
16. The authors frequently present empirical data without providing adequate reference information. For instance, an unspecified reference is made to "unofficial statistics" (p. 33) and to a "study of the Central and Regional Committees" of the Socialist party (p. 80). This shortcoming is particularly inexcusable with regard to statistical information prior to 1973 because the Socialist party, unlike the Communist party, enjoyed continuous legal status and had no need to suppress data regarding party membership.
17. All three books on Chile show particular concern for the controversial convention of Chillán in 1967, where the Socialist party declared itself "Marxist-Leninist." While moderate Socialists discount the decision as improvised and at odds with the historical democratic commitment of their party, left-wing Socialists point to the convention as proof that their ideological concepts do not represent an abrupt break with the party's past. See, for instance, Raúl Ampuero, "El socialismo chileno entre ayer y mañana," mimeo, Rome, 1985.
18. Interview with Daniel González, PS-Núñez leader and managing editor of *Nueva Sociedad*, 27 Jan. 1988, Caracas.
19. Elsewhere Arrate argues against the strategy of isolating the Communist party from the rest of the Chilean polity. See Arrate, *El socialismo chileno: rescate y renovación* (Rotterdam: Ediciones del Instituto para el Nuevo Chile, 1983), 15, 32. Arrate and other moderate socialists reject the armed struggle on pragmatic, rather than moralistic, grounds. See Gonzalo Martner, "La vía chilena al socialismo: planteamientos básicos y vigencia," in *Siete ensayos sobre democracia y socialismo en Chile* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Económicos y Sociales, 1986), 134–35.
20. The Spanish translation of Gillespie's book headed the best-seller list in Argentina. It was entitled *Soldados de Perón: Los Montoneros* (Buenos Aires: Grijalbo, 1987). Other popular accounts of the Montoneros have been written by journalist Pablo Guisani in *Montoneros: la soberbia armada* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1984); and by former guer-

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rilla Miguel Bonasso in *Recuerdos de la muerte* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Bruguera, 1984). Guisani is particularly harsh in his judgment of Perón, whom he labels a fascist.

21. The revolutionary potential of the Peronist movement has been the source of considerable debate. Ernesto Laclau, in keeping with his theory of the nonspecificity of populist movements, argues for the affirmative. Ronaldo Munck questions Laclau's conclusions in *Politics and Dependency in the Third World: The Case of Latin America* (London: Zed Books, 1984), 269–74.
22. Munck contends that the government repression of the mid-1970s was as much, if not more, directed against the rank-and-file labor movement (whose leaders were labeled "industrial guerrillas") than against the Montoneros and other clandestine leftist organizations. See Munck, *Argentina from Anarchism to Peronism: Workers, Unions, and Politics, 1855–1985* (London: Zed Books, 1987), 197, 207.
23. This viewpoint has been expressed to me by several Argentine leftists who were politically active during the period. One instance occurred in my interview with Francisco José Iturraspe, 25 Jan. 1988, Caracas.
24. Regis Debray, *Las pruebas de fuego: la crítica de las armas* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1975), 2:159.
25. Gillespie, "The Urban Guerrilla in Latin America," *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution: The Origins of Modern Political Violence*, edited by Noel O'Sullivan (Brighton, Engl.: Wheatsheaf, 1986), 171.
26. Ibid., 172.
27. H. Joachim Maitre, "The Network: Using Disinformation," in *The Red Orchestra: Instruments of Soviet Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean*, edited by Dennis L. Bark (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1986), 117.
28. See Betto's interview with Fidel Castro in *Fidel y la religión: conversaciones con Frei Betto* (Havana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 1985), 246.
29. Richard Parker argues that the unique features of the Sandinista model—state capitalism, a mixed economy, and a multiclass front in place of a working-class party—were anticipated by Haya de la Torre in his writings in the 1920s. See Parker, "Clase obrera y estrategia revolucionaria a la luz de la experiencia sandinista," paper presented at the "Jornada sobre la Revolución Nicaragüense," sponsored by the Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, 6 Oct. 1987.
30. James Petras, "Whither the Nicaraguan Revolution?," *Monthly Review* 31, no. 5 (Oct. 1979):9; and Marta Harnecker, *La revolución social: Lenin y América Latina* (Mexico City: Siglo Vientiuno, 1985), 133–34.
31. Carlos M. Vilas, *Perfiles de la revolución sandinista* (Havana: Ediciones Casa de las Américas, 1984), 183; and Vilas, "Socialismo en Nicaragua?," *Nueva Sociedad*, no. 91 (Sept.–Oct. 1987):168–71. See also Gary Ruchwarger, "Las organizaciones de masas sandinistas y el proceso revolucionario," in *La revolución en Nicaragua: liberación nacional, democracia popular y transformación económica*, edited by Richard Harris and Carlos Vilas (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1985), 169; and George Black, *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua* (London: Zed Books, 1981), 255–56.
32. Vilas, "The Mass Organizations in Nicaragua: The Current Problematic and Perspectives for the Future," in *Monthly Review* 38, no. 6 (Nov. 1986):24–25.
33. For a detailed analysis of the three factions in the Sandinista movement, see David Nolan, *FSLN: The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, 1984), 32–83. On conflict in more recent years between factional representatives, see Lucia Annunziata, "Democracy and the Sandinistas," *The Nation* 246, no. 13 (2 Apr. 1988):454–56.
34. Villalobos rejected the militaristic approach that had characterized his Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo during its early years. See Tommie Süe Montgomery, "El Salvador: The Roots of Revolution," in *Central America: Crisis and Adaptation*, edited by Steve C. Ropp and James A. Morris (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 90–94; and Helio Goldsztein and Omar de Barros Filho, *Un fusil para Ana Guadalupe: la guerra civil en El Salvador* (Bogotá: Editorial Pluma, 1980), 192.
35. A similar process took place in Guatemala. See Luisa Gutiérrez and Esteban Ríos,

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"El movimiento armado en Guatemala," *Cuadernos Políticos* 29 (July–Sept. 1981):98.

36. The distinction between rural and urban strategies is no longer the source of heated debate among guerrillas that it was in the 1960s. See Mark Falcoff, "Cuba: First among Equals," in *The Red Orchestra*, 74.
37. George Black, "Introduction: Guatemala's Silent War," *Monthly Review* 35, no. 3 (July–Aug. 1983):8. This special edition contains Mario Payeras's *Days of the Jungle: The Testimony of a Guatemalan Guerrillero, 1972–1976*.
38. Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, "The Indian People and the Guatemalan Revolution," in *Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History*, edited by Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham (New York: Grove Press, 1983), 272.
39. The debate was particularly pronounced in Colombia in the 1960s. The Communists, who had favored a strategy of self-defense in regions under military siege, were by the 1970s supporting offensive operations when their Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) emerged as the largest guerrilla organization. Communist party president Gilberto Vieira wrote that although the main form of struggle in Colombia was peaceful, "the armed struggle is the principal form in the guerrilla zones and there other forms of struggle are subordinate to it." In recent years, the FARC has developed fraternal relations with other guerrilla organizations, partly in response to the failure of the government-sponsored peace accords. See Vieira, "La táctica leninista del Partido Comunista de Colombia" in *Política y revolución en Colombia (táctica de los comunistas)* (Bogotá: Biblioteca Marxista Colombiana, 1977), 49; Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, *Che Guevara: Guerrilla Warfare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 278–90; and "Proletarización," *¿De dónde venimos, hacia dónde vamos, hacia dónde debemos ir?* (Medellín: Editorial de Junio, 1975), 205. According to Michael S. Radu, the Central American Communist parties' revised positions regarding armed warfare reflect "Moscow's strategic change of attitude" toward the continent. See Radu, "Soviet Proxy Assets in Central America and the Caribbean," in *The Red Orchestra*, 97.
40. For the best account of how the Left was able to parlay mass mobilizations into electoral gains, see Evelyne Huber Stephens, "The Peruvian Military Government, Labor Mobilization, and the Political Strength of the Left," *LARR* 18, no. 2 (1983):57–93. On the role of the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS), created by the Velasco government in 1971, in activating the mass movement, see Carlos Franco, *Perú: participación popular* (Lima: Ediciones CEDEP, 1979).
41. Degregori, "Sendero Luminoso: el desafío autoritario," *Nueva Sociedad* 90 (July–Aug. 1987):34; and Teresa Tovar, "Barrios, ciudad, democracia y política," in *Movimientos sociales y democracia: la fundación de un nuevo orden*, edited by Eduardo Ballón (Lima: DESCO, 1986), 118.
42. As in the case of Sandino in Nicaragua and Farabundo Martí in El Salvador, the legacy of Mariátegui served to facilitate leftist unity, as all sectors of the Left concurred in their appreciation of his historical importance. José Martí exerted a similar influence on the Cuban revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro. See Jorge Nieto, *Izquierda y democracia en el Perú, 1975–1980* (Lima: DESCO, 1983), 122; José Antonio Vidal Sales, *América Latina en el paredón* (Barcelona: ATE, 1981), 113; Sheldon B. Liss, *Roots of Revolution: Radical Thought in Cuba* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 171; and Saul Landau, "Understanding Revolution: A Guide for Critics," *Monthly Review* 39, no. 1 (May 1987):4.
43. Manuel J. Granados, "El PCP Sendero Luminoso: aproximaciones a su ideología," *Síntesis* 3 (Sept.–Dec. 1987):233–34 (Madrid).
44. Degregori rejects the explanation offered by other authors that the closing of the market was part of the Sendero's autarchic vision based on Maoist ideology. See, for instance, Vera Gianotten, Topme de Wit, and Hans de Wit, "The Impact of Sendero Luminoso on Regional and National Politics in Peru," in the Slater collection under review here (p. 194).
45. Ronald H. Berg, "Sendero Luminoso and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 28, no. 4 (Winter 1986–87):166.

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46. Cynthia McClintock: "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics* 37, no. 1 (Oct. 1984):58; and James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
47. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974); and Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).
48. Degregori's emphasis on the university base of Sendero Luminoso and its failure to become a true peasant movement is shared by Berg in "Sendero Luminoso and the Peasantry," 170; and by Gianotten, de Wit, and de Wit in "The Impact of Sendero Luminoso," 185.
49. For a recent analysis of the "first" and "second" generation of Latin American Communist leaders, see Manuel Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
50. An opposing view has been offered by a Trotskyist group known as the Brigada Simón Bolívar, which participated in the anti-Somoza struggle and was particularly critical of the Tendencia Insurreccional of the Sandinista movement, in Carlos Vig, *Nicaragua: ¿reforma o revolución?* (Bogota: n.p., 1980), 1:125.
51. Adolfo Gilly, *La nueva Nicaragua: antimperialismo y lucha de clases* (Mexico City: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1980), 31–32; and Gilly, *Guerra y política en El Salvador* (Mexico City: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1981), 150.
52. Interview with Alberto Koschuetzke, director of *Nueva Sociedad*, 27 Jan. 1988, Caracas.
53. Fernando I. Leiva and James Petras, "Chile: New Urban Movements and the Transition to Democracy," *Monthly Review* 39, no. 3 (July–Aug. 1987):123.
54. Christian Tyler, "Trade Unionism in Brazil," *Third World Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (Apr. 1982):315 (London).
55. *Andrés Velásquez en entrevista* (Caracas: Ediciones del Agua Mansa, 1987), 28; Daniel Hellinger, "Venezuelan Democracy and the Challenge of 'Nuevo Sindicalismo,'" paper presented at the Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Boston, 23–25 Oct. 1986; and Ellner, *Venezuela's Movimiento*, 158–62. The antiparty thrust of the Matanceros was made evident to me at a conference organized by the group in Puerto Ordaz in April 1987, where I was invited to give a lecture on the Venezuelan labor movement from 1936 to 1958. During the question and answer period, several Matanceros leaders (including Andrés Velásquez) criticized my remarks on the positive role played by political parties in the formation and growth of the labor movement. They argued emphatically that political parties had consistently sold out the workers movement throughout Venezuelan history.
56. Ernesto Laclau, "Toward a Theory of Populism," in his *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism* (London: NLB, 1977). Laclau also explores the implications of this theory in "Tesis acerca de la forma hegemónica de la política," in *Hegemonía y alternativas políticas en América Latina*, coordinated by Julio Labastida Martín del Campo (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985), 19–44.
57. Rodney Arismendi, *Vigencia del Marxismo-Leninismo* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1984), 267.

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