Crime and Punishment in the Russian Revolution: Mob Justice and Police in Petrograd. By Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2017. xiv, 351 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Figures. Maps. $29.95, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.340

"Imagine," Tsuyoshi Hasegawa asks us, "if every couple of days, for months on end, groups of hundreds and sometimes thousands paraded through your hometown with the bloodied, unconscious husk of a recently beaten man. What if that parade ended with the man drowning as spectators laughed and hurled stones at his writhing body?" (167–68). Well, Hasegawa reasonably suggests, if we were put in that situation we might have a much different view about community and about the place of violence in everyday life. Terror, not of the political sort, but of the quotidian, street-wise variety, would come to "saturat[e] the atmosphere," and the "daily struggle for survival in an essentially failed state" (168) would displace most other political thoughts and social behaviors. In his account, the increase in danger and chaos in daily life was fundamental to the experience of 1917 and helps to explain why neither the Bolshevik seizure of power in October nor the anniversary of the February Revolution a few months later significantly engaged the attention of Petrograd citizens.

In making this argument, Hasegawa joins several other recent historians, including this reviewer, in turning attention to the consequences of state failure in the revolutionary era. He has chosen a useful angle from which to approach the question by looking at criminal behaviors, the transformation of the urban police system, and the emergence of mob "justice" (*samosud*) and mob "injustice" (in the guise of alcohol riots) over the course of 1917 and early 1918. The book is structured around alternating chapters that trace the changes in "crime" and "punishment" in the midst of revolution. There are terrific and telling details throughout, not just in the recounting of particularly notorious crimes but also in the collation of crime statistics. These statistics show the startling changes experienced by Petrograders. Not only were they witnesses to regular lynching parades, but other crimes like simple assault more than tripled between 1916 and 1917.

Hasegawa's sensitive and detailed description of the shifting modes of policing is also noteworthy. Following Murray Frame, he identifies two competing models of policing in early twentieth-century Europe: 1) a police-state model that puts the police under centralized control and gives them a variety of administrative tasks in addition to controlling criminality and 2) a decentralized "municipal police" model that focuses almost entirely on public safety. The tsarist state adopted the former model, and the Petrograd City Duma would try to implement the second over the course of 1917. The innovation of the revolutionary era was the creation of class-based militias, the goal of which "was neither to maintain order nor to secure life and property for all citizens. Rather it was to promote the exclusive interests of the working class against its class enemies" (118). All of this was well and good, but as Hasegawa points out, the key thing to understand is that all of these varieties of policing failed, and this "erosion of . . . police authority" was the most important reason for "Petrograd's frightening increase in crime" (109). The absence of this core state function accounts for the lynch mobs and then the alcohol riots that focused Bolshevik attention on the need to build a new, highly coercive police regime, not just to deal with "counter-revolution" but also with crime. Indeed, the lines between counter-revolution and crime were blurred not only conceptually, but also institutionally, as the Cheka came to play an important role in urban policing during the course of the Civil War.

The sources for this monograph are varied. Hasegawa uses the work of Russian scholars effectively and utilizes archival and newspaper documents extensively. The

https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2018.340 Published online by Cambridge University Press

newspaper accounts are critical, not just for illustration but also for tallying various sorts of crimes at a time when crime statistic reporting had virtually collapsed. I do wish that Hasegawa had been more explicit and consistent in his source criticism, as it is awkward to rely so heavily on sources that he describes at one point as "the breathless, sensationalist tabloid press" (172). The stain of yellow journalism seeps into the text at points, as when Hasegawa reports straightforwardly that "militia raids turned up many Chinese passed out on the floor in a haze of opium smoke," (104) a bit of color that may well have been more journalistic flourish than accurate reporting. This is not meant to suggest that this work is fundamentally flawed. To the contrary, Hasegawa's book is an important, even essential, addition to the literature on the Russian Revolution.

Joshua Sanborn
Lafayette College

Stalin's Defectors: How Red Army Soldiers became Hitler's Collaborators, 1941–1945. By Mark Edele. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. xvi, 205 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. $80.00, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.341

Mark Edele, a highly regarded specialist of the Soviet Union during World War II, based in Australia, has written *Stalin's Defectors*, a succinct scholarly monograph about the 117,000 Soviet citizens who voluntarily crossed the front toward the Germans. The author establishes clearly, on the basis of enormous research, that Soviet desertion was special. Its rate was at least three times higher than among the western Allies, where large-scale defection across the frontline was rare.

This peculiar Soviet phenomenon, as Edele calls it, is all the more remarkable because of the many obstacles to defection: the NKVD (which massively shot soldiers suspected of disloyalty—over 10,000 by October 1941 alone); rumors about, and confirmed realities of, Nazi atrocities; and, last but not least, strong disapproval of defection among the Red Army rank and file. Many Soviet soldiers and even Soviet POWs were not averse to killing such "traitors."

Edele explains the defections with discontent with Soviet life. Most defectors did not defect so as to collaborate with the Germans, but simply because they wanted out—they were refugees. As he puts it, "A significant minority of people were not only disinclined to fight for Stalin's regime, but were determined to leave it, cost what it may" (58).

The work engages very well with other studies, such as by Roger Reese, who has argued that the typical *non*-defector was young, urban, working-class or student, and Russian. Edele notes that Reese's observation needs to be qualified, for the "under-represented groups still made up extremely large sectors of those who willingly crossed over to the Germans. Russians constituted 55 per cent, 36 per cent were younger than thirty, 10 per cent were professionals, and 8 per cent held higher ranks" (89).

Edele grounds his findings in the larger debate on the role and impact of Soviet values. On the one hand, the defectors were special people, in taking a radical step evidently not made by most Red Army soldiers. On the other hand, however, defectors were "typical because the reasons to do so were widespread (but not universal) in a society polarized between a minority of supporters and another one of outright opponents of the ruling regime, with the majority stuck in the middle" (175–76). There is also a highly useful turn to the earliest interpretations, coined by the Mensheviks

https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2018.340 Published online by Cambridge University Press