

Power, Influence, and Behavioral Compliance

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Social psychologists have traditionally been concerned with problems of social conflict, power, influence, and persuasion. Yet, when one looks for systematic theory and evidence regarding the determinants of behavioral compliance to rules, norms, or influence attempts, few prescriptions can be garnered by the practical man of affairs for developing policy in matters of law and order. In a day when shouts of black power, student protests, and antiwar demonstrations reverberate through the legitimate institutions of the country and when violence commissions report the degree of disorder existing in the urban centers of America, lack of social scientific evidence upon which to base policy is a disquieting comment upon the relevance of social scientific research.

For the past forty years, social psychologists have focused much of their interest upon the processes of attitude formation and change. The assumption motivating such research is that once we know how to measure attitudes, how to understand structural factors involved in belief systems, and how to produce attitude change, then the basis for predicting and controlling behavior will have been established. Unfortunately, after thousands of experiments have been performed and scores of theories have been developed, little evidence has been produced to prove that attitudes mediate behavior in any direct fashion. It is noteworthy that relatively few studies even attempt to establish the relationship between attitudes and behavior, but rather, studies are more

concerned with the effects of behavior on attitudes (Festinger, 1964; Rokeach, 1968).

A plausible argument can be made that attitudes and behaviors actually follow different psychological laws and serve parallel but separate functions for the individual. For example, behavior may occur as a simple function of the cost-reward structure of the perceived environment, whereas the verbal expression of attitudes may serve the function of rationalizing the actions as "good" or at least necessary. Durkheim (1951) suggested that persons need to view their own actions as "good." A person who cannot find sufficient justification for his actions in his personal value system is likely to change his attitudes in a manner consonant with his behavior so that he can rationalize his conduct (Festinger, 1957). In addition to the function of rationalization for behavior, expressed attitudes can be used to legitimate a power position (authority) or as influence techniques to gain power over the behavior of other people. Also, it is clear that verbal behavior is seldom rewarded or punished to the same degree or in the same circumstances as are other behaviors. A person is brought to trial for a behavior he has allegedly shown, but a man who expresses remorse for his crime is likely to gain a more lenient sentence or to be paroled.

The above arguments provide reason to reject the basic assumption underlying most social-psychological research pertaining to the social influence processes—that a person's attitudes directly mediate his behaviors. Once this assumption is rejected, a number of different research strategies are suggested: (1) study how people use their attitudes for purposes of influence and power, (2) study how individuals use their attitudes to rationalize their behaviors, or (3) focus upon how influence attempts gain behavioral compliance and avoid the pitfalls associated with the labyrinth of attitude structures. The last strategy has been adopted by the present authors.

The deliberate attempt by one person to elicit behavioral compliance from another person has been viewed by political scientists, sociologists, and social psychologists as an attempt to use social power or exercise social influence. The concepts of power and influence are sometimes used interchangeably, but some theorists are wont to make fine distinctions between the two terms. The remainder of this paper will review some of the concepts of power and attempt to integrate them into a more comprehensive theory of influence within dyads. Evidence for the theory will be presented and some conclusions of interest to policy makers will be proffered.

THEORIES OF POWER AND INFLUENCE

In our everyday behavior to achieve certain goals and avoid certain unpleasanties, we are inevitably confronted with an obstacle. Whether the

obstacle is in the form of the conflicting goals of another with whom we are interacting, or the norms and rules of the group to which we belong, we must decide to reach some mutual accommodation of interests, to exert pressure to achieve an all-or-nothing solution, or to just give up on that particular goal. As long as people desire similar or mutually exclusive goals, and as long as most societies inculcate similar values into their members, social conflict must be engendered. Social conflict may be simply defined as a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals (Coser, 1956).

In classical sociological thought, conflict was considered dysfunctional and detrimental to the social system. Parsons (1949) thought social conflict was a disease which should be treated by propaganda specialists as a doctor treats his patients. Lewin (1946) desired the social management of conflict to achieve harmony. However, Simmel (1950) recognized that groups require disharmony as well as harmony. Coser (1956) has pointed out some of the functional and beneficial effects of change which conflicts permit. Thus, the current view seems to place conflict in the role of a societal stimulant, which, if held within bounds, is essential to the development of progress.

However, whether one views conflict as functional or dysfunctional, beneficial or harmful, it nonetheless pervades all forms of social interaction, and its mitigation can only be temporarily achieved by the exercise of social influence which allows bargaining and the accommodation of interests, or alternatively, a settlement of the conflict in favor of the stronger adversary.

The resolution of conflicting interests has been a central problem in political science and in economics. Social scientists in these disciplines have developed a number of theories of power to help account for both the development and solution of conflicts. However, there has been little agreement as to a definition of power. Schur (1969: 85) defines power as the "ability to determine the behavior of others in accord with one's own wishes." MacIver (1964: 77) similarly considers power to be the "capacity to control, regulate, or direct the behavior of persons or things." Hans Morgenthau (1964) has offered the most general definition of power, which he defines as coextensive with any behavioral changes in one person which can at least partially be attributed to the actions of another person; the latter, as the controlling person or the causative agent, is considered the powerful individual. The breadth of these definitions is almost as broad as the area of social science and yields little precision in theory and no testable predictions either about the use of power or the compliance gained. Yet it can be seen from the above definitions that power and influence are in all social interactions. For example, Deutsch (1966) considers political science to be the study of how compliance is obtained. Similarly, Nieburg (1969) notes that politics is nothing more than the struggle for influence and authority within presently established formal authority structures. In this regard, Lord Acton considered the

continental governments, formed after the French Revolution, to be based on the people's participation in power, not their security or freedom. Similarly, cries for black power are based not on a vague desire for the value of freedom, but on a share in the socioeconomic power base from which freedom will follow.

The range of a theory of power clearly exceeds the bounds of political science. For example, law was considered by Weber (1954) as orders which are externally guaranteed by a high probability of coercion, designed to bring about conformity and avenge violations and administered by a group possessing the legitimate right to do so. Thus, whether a subtle and frequently unadmitted power struggle occurs (the word "power" sometimes carries negative connotations in relations between friends) to decide whether the husband plays golf or the wife takes him to the opera, or the more overt struggle for power among nations is the focus of interest, much of social behavior seems ultimately to boil down to the question of how social influence is wielded.

As often happens in the field of science, concepts are continually redefined in an attempt to develop a coherent theory. In this tradition, Harsanyi (1962) suggests that compliance of one party to the wishes of the other constitutes the criterion for the successful exercise of power. In a condition of bilateral power, where each person has some influence over the behavior of the other, the amount of P 's power over P and W 's joint policy with respect to some controversial issue, "X," is defined as the probability (p) of P 's being able to get the joint policy X_p adopted when P favors this policy X_p and W favors a different policy X_w . For Harsanyi, a condition of a power relationship is that two or more individuals have conflicting preferences and a decision must be made as to whose preferences will prevail. Power is a relevant factor in social interactions only where social conflict exists. Harsanyi's analysis has the virtue of attempting to identify the conditions under which power is exercised. However, the possibility of compromise or the failure of a power attempt are not considered nor does the theory indicate the processes by which the conflicting parties resolve their differences.

Parsons (1963) analytically separates the concepts of power and influence. For him, power is a form of abstract currency and legitimacy and relies upon the psychological factor of trust. The influence processes are conceived as ways of getting results in interaction. In a manner of speaking, it may be said that Parsons' four systems of influence specify the processes by which conflicting parties resolve their differences and, consequently, serve to fill a gap in Harsanyi's theory of power. One form of influence, deterrence, relies on threats, coercion, and punishment for effectiveness. Promises of rewards or inducements constitute a second form of influence. Attempts to restructure the goals or attitudes of target individuals through the use of arguments or propaganda is a process labeled persuasion. Finally, Parsons suggests that the technique of activating commitments by appeals to norms may be effective in

gaining compliance because the target individual reassesses what constitutes appropriate behavior for the situation.

Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) have developed a number of base values that they believe serve as basic resources for those who wield power and influence. These base values are respect, moral standing, affection, well-being, skill, wealth, enlightenment, and power (which can be used as a basis for accruing even more power). French and Raven (1959) have also delineated factors which serve as the bases of power. Reward power and coercive power derive from a source's ability to administer reinforcements and punishments and correspond with Parsons' distinction between inducements and deterrence and Lasswell and Kaplan's categories of wealth and power. French and Raven also suggest that a target individual often complies with a source's wishes because the former identifies with or is attracted to the latter—a form of attraction or referent power. Referent power can be viewed as equivalent to the categories of respect and affection in the Lasswell and Kaplan system and both inducements and activation of commitments in Parsons' system. Referent power is clearly related to Schopler and Bateson's (1965) proposal that the dependency needs of the target may be a basis of power for the source. Expert power is defined by French and Raven as a source's ability to persuade a target because of the former's superior knowledge or skill. It may be considered as equivalent to Parsons' persuasion process and the categories of skill and enlightenment in the typology of Lasswell and Kaplan. Persuasion systems appear also to be equivalent to Jones and Gerard's (1967) notion of information control. The fifth and last basis of power offered by French and Raven depends upon a target's belief that the source of influence deserves compliance because of the latter's role position (legitimate authority). Legitimate power is the only kind of power recognized by some theorists (Parsons, 1963; Gamson, 1968) and is consistent with the categories of moral standing and well-being among the bases of power suggested by Lasswell and Kaplan.

A number of social scientists define power as related to outcome control. March (1955) argues that the greater the power of *P*, the greater the ability of *P* to restrict *W*'s outcomes. Thus, if *P* cannot by his own actions lessen the range or value of outcomes for *W* in a situation, then *P* has no control over the future. Karlsson (1962), a sociologist, argues that the greater the range over which *P* can determine *W*'s rewards, the greater *P*'s power over *W*. At a more operational level of analysis, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) have offered an analysis of outcome control in dyadic interactions where the values in simple two-choice situations yield a matrix of payoffs to the two parties involved. When one player has absolute control over the other's outcomes, regardless of what the latter does, the former is said to possess fate control. Behavior control refers to a situation in which one or both parties in a dyadic interaction partially control the other's outcomes but do not possess fate control.

Many other issues have been raised concerning definitions of power and influence. For example, some reserve power for coercive influence attempts (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963), and others attempt to distinguish between power and force (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). However, the above review of concepts of power and influence and some of the factors contributing to compliance indicate that a wide range of phenomena are considered and that the language generally used by theorists (though often heuristic) does not meet the formal criteria expected for scientific theories. What is clearly needed at this point in the development of social science is a theory of power or influence which takes into consideration some of the analyses and definitions that have so far been offered, and which is clearly and precisely formulated so that testable theorems or predictions can be derived. Science is not just a process of intuitive analysis. It requires that concepts be imbedded in a system of functional relationships which can be empirically evaluated.

Theorists have delineated factors associated with the source of social influence, the types of influence attempts that might be made, the conditions under which influence takes place, and the target's characteristics rendering him influenceable, all of which are important for any theory of social influence. Thus, source characteristics, such as respect, moral standing, affection, wealth, skill, well-being, enlightenment, and power yield credits for future influence attempts. Different means of exercising influence correspond with inducements, deterrence, activation of commitments, and persuasion. The belief by the target-of-influence in the legitimacy of source's authority should be related to the degree of compliance or deference given to the source's influence attempts.

Tedeschi (1968) has developed a theory of social influence within dyads that attempts to capture most of the components of an influence system suggested by the above review of the concepts of power and influence. The theory predicts behavioral compliance by target individuals but also suggests factors relevant to source behaviors. The remainder of this paper will present Tedeschi's theory and will review evidence gathered to evaluate the theory.

A DYADIC THEORY OF INFLUENCE

The theory proposed by Tedeschi is deliberately simplified, first of all, to dyadic interaction and, second, to explicit contingent threats and promises sent from a specified source to a known target. The modes of influence thus correspond to Parsons' categories of deterrence and inducements, French and Raven's types of coercive and reward power, and Lasswell and Kaplan's bases of wealth and power. The theory is static in that it does not fully discuss opportunities for counterinfluence. The focus is upon behavioral compliance and largely ignores cognitive change (and thus the entire area of social

persuasion). The source of influence is presumed to be motivated to maximize gains and has already chosen a target. Although specific characteristics of both source and target are defined operationally and linked to the ongoing influence process, the more complex cognitive factors that presumably help mediate the behaviors of both individuals are deliberately simplified. The result is a testable theory, the value of which will depend upon how well it predicts behavior. The theory is developed in a manner calculated to serve as a basis from which to develop a more complex theory once the simpler components are understood.

The basic components of a theory of influence are a source, a signal system, and a target. The present theory restricts the signal system to explicit contingent threats and promises. A threat takes the form "if-then" and asks for the performance of a behavior or the inhibition of a behavior and specifies the punishment for noncompliance. The punishment is an action, the withholding of an action, the production of a noxious stimulus, or the removal of a positive reinforcement, any of which may be perceived by the target as detrimental, costly, and punishing. Law, the nuclear deterrence system existing between the United States and the Soviet Union, and escalation are all examples of contingent threats. The classical theory of law reasons that if the punishment for noncompliance is large enough, man will stay within the bounds of cultural rules. The deterrence system tries to force decision makers into rational forms of behavior (i.e., aggression below certain specified limits) by the threat of annihilation. Escalation can be viewed as a contingent threat whose punishment is greater than the act which precipitated it (e.g., kill one of my soldiers and I will kill ten of yours). Contingent promises similarly take the form: "if you do X (or not X), then I will do Y," where Y is an action considered beneficial by the target. Bazelon (1965) has conceptualized the economic system largely in terms of contingent promises. For example, he reviews contracts as mutual contingent promises enforced by a court of law (threat system). Modern paper money can be considered a contract with unknown parties for the future delivery of pleasures which one can decide upon at a later date. A check is a promise from a bank that a bookkeeper will place a mark on his books in the appropriate place. The use of promises in political behavior to gain election support is known by every schoolboy. Advertising is also a promise made by a manufacturer that if their product is used, the purchaser will smell better, have more dates, and be happier than if he went without the product (the credibility of advertisements is another question). Contingent threats and promises thus seem to pervade our lives and are indeed essential for an individual who wants to maximize his outcome attainment when interacting with others who might have dissimilar goals.

The paradigm used for the study of compliance to contingent threats and promises is the message-modified version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) developed by Horai and Tedeschi (1969). The important features of the unmodified form of this game are illustrated by Luce and Raiffa (1957: 95):

Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The District Attorney is certain that they are guilty of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He points out to each prisoner that he has two alternatives: to confess to the crime the police are sure they have done, or not to confess. If they both do not confess, then the D.A. states he will book them on some very minor trumped-up charge such as petty larceny and illegal possession of a weapon, and they would both receive minor punishments; if they both confess they will be prosecuted, but he will recommend less than the most severe sentence, but if one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning state's evidence, whereas the latter will get "the book" slapped at him.

Thus, the PDG is a mixed-motive, non-zero-sum game in which both parties can win, both can lose, or one can win while the other loses. In the experimental situation, if both parties cooperate, both can win a certain number of points. If both parties compete, both lose a certain number of points. Finally, if one party competes while the other cooperates, the former will win points while the latter will lose points. A certain degree of conflict is thus built into the situation in that there is a temptation to exploit the other rather than cooperate and face the possibility of being exploited yourself. However, if both parties reason this way, both will continually lose. In the modified PDG, messages (e.g., threats and promises) can be intermittently exchanged by the parties. By using a simulated player as one of the parties, source characteristics, frequency of message use, and strategy selections can be systematically manipulated, and the effects of these independent variables on conflict and compliance can be delineated. All of the studies to be presented used the message-modified PDG as the research tool.

Figure 1 presents an overview of the concepts of the theory and indicates the relationships between them. Source characteristics are assumed to be measurable and constitute the independent variables of the theory. Source characteristics must be perceived or interpreted by the target and these second order variables are considered to be cognitive attributes of the target which correspond to the objective determination of the characteristics. Each of the second order variables are assumed to have specific functional relationships with the predictor variable, believability of the communication, which if the target cannot or chooses not to "leave the field" for some alternative social relationship, is directly related to behavioral compliance. The specific effects of each of the independent variables on compliance will now be discussed under their appropriate headings.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT POWER

A source of influence who uses promises and threats to obtain compliance to his wishes from a target individual can be expected to be successful in proportion to the degree to which his deeds match his words. If a source




Figure 1.

offers rewards for compliance but does not follow through by giving the reward when the occasion arises, then the target should begin to doubt his word. Similarly, the believability of threats will be decreased if the target's defiance is not punished. As Nieburg (1969) has observed, the rational goal for the use of violence in carrying out a threat is the demonstration of the will and capability of action, thereby establishing high credibility for future threats. In addition, the degree of magnitude of rewards and punishments should be an important determinant of believability and subsequent compliance. Maclver (1964) notes that obedience to the law is a result of the costs for noncompliance, whether from the actual punishments or from guilt and loss of respect, and the like, being higher than costs of compliance. As has previously been noted, both the classical theory of law and the deterrence system rest on the premise that if the punishment is made severe enough compliance will result.

Source credibility can be operationally defined and measured as the proportion of times the source does what he says he will do. Thus, the proportion of times the source rewards compliance to promises is a measure of promise credibility, and the proportion of times the source punishes noncompliance to threats is a measure of threat credibility. It should be noted that these

definitions explicitly assume that unsuccessful promises and successful threats have no objective credibility, although there is no presumption that such events either do or do not affect believability. It is quite possible that compliance to threats or noncompliance to promises will have cognitive effects on the target so that he rationalizes his responses by feeling that he definitely would have been punished had he not complied to the threat, or would definitely not have been rewarded if he had complied to the promise. Such rationalizations could produce increments in believability apart from objective credibility effects.

Since message credibility refers to the probability of an event, and magnitude of reward or punishment refer to the value of the event to the target, the concept of utility, as used by decision theorists and economists, seemed to be applicable to target's perceptions. The concept of utility has been used to express the subjective expected value of a future event perceived by a particular individual and is presumed to mediate the individual's choices (holding all else constant). The relationship between probability and value is usually believed to be multiplicative (Edwards et al., 1965). In a controlled laboratory experiment, both message credibility and value can be specified and measured. If the multiplicative relationship of credibility and value is assumed to be directly related to target's perception of message utility, and utility is assumed to be functionally related to believability, it can be predicted that compliance will be a direct function of message utility. Horai and Tedeschi (1969) were the first to test the relationship of message utility and compliance, and found that compliance to threats was a direct linear function of both credibility and punishment magnitude. The finding that as the negative utility of threats increases, compliance by target individuals also increases has been replicated a number of times (Lindskold et al., 1969; Faley and Tedeschi, 1969).

Tedeschi et al. (1968) found that when the punishment magnitude threatened for noncompliance was no greater than the costs to target for complying, the target resisted the threats, irrespective of message credibility. This result implies that the target is not indifferent when the punishment for noncompliance equals the costs of compliance but in fact derives some satisfaction from depriving the source of the gains to be gotten from the target's compliant behavior. Also, it could be inferred that when significant target values are at stake, threats are unlikely to be effective in gaining compliance.

It is quite clear that promises are not merely symmetrical to threats in that the former offers rewards and the latter offers punishments. Several studies (Lindskold and Tedeschi, 1969a; Lindskold et al., 1970; Schlenker, Bonoma, Tedeschi, et al., 1969) reveal that promise credibility, magnitude of reward, and positive message utility have no effects upon a target's compliance. Apparently, a promisor is perceived as generally benevolent, even when his promises are not fulfilled. In such a situation, the target is predisposed to be

cooperative. Demos (1957) has suggested that promises create a moral obligation for the promisor, while threats carry no moral claim against the threatener. Our results suggest that promises connote normative obligations for the target as well as for the source. Apparently, a promisor is perceived as helpful and the normative rule is "help those who help you." Complementary to the effects of threats (when punishment for noncompliance is less than or equal to the costs of compliance), a target of promises ignores the small advantages to be gained by competitive noncompliant actions if he can gain almost as much by compliance. The important factor is that the promise itself, apart from source credibility or the magnitude of reward offered for compliance, carries strong normative connotations which are effective in mediating the target's compliance.

In the experiments so far reviewed, either threats or promises were sent by the source intermittently during the course of continuous dyadic interactions. Contrary to common sense, the use of threats does not exacerbate the ongoing conflict between individuals. However, the use of promises does ameliorate conflict. The strategist formulating policy must determine whether he prefers to use threats to gain compliance and accept a low level of cooperation by the target during other interactions in which threats are not used, or whether he prefers to use promises to gain a slightly lower level of compliance but more cooperative behavior by the target individual during interactions in which direct influence is not wielded.

ATTRACTION POWER

The degree of liking of the target for the source of influence may be considered a basis of power for the source. Festinger et al. (1950) demonstrated that the number of friendship choices in a group was positively correlated with conformity to group standards, a result that has been often replicated (Festinger et al., 1952; Gerard, 1953; Schachter, 1951; Lott and Lott, 1960; Thibaut and Strickland, 1956; Walker and Heyns, 1962). If attraction is a mediator of conformity to group norms, it may also be considered an important factor in mediating compliance to threats and promises.

Interpersonal attraction can be measured by various sociometric instruments. Experimental samples of existing friendships, strangers, or enemies can be obtained or attraction can be induced by manipulating attitude similarity in the laboratory (Byrne, 1969). In any case, the degree of the target's liking (or disliking) for source can be induced and measured.

The theory specifies that if a target likes the source, the target is more likely to believe promises of reward and to disbelieve threats of punishment. These predictions assume that the target will find it easy to believe that a friendly source will pay off for compliance to promises but will find it

difficult to believe that a friendly source will use coercion. Alternatively, if the target dislikes the source, the target should be all too willing to expect punishment for noncompliance to threats and to disbelieve promises of reward. Thus, positive attraction for the source should lead to compliance to promises, while negative attraction should lead to compliance to threats.

Schlenker, Bonoma, Tedeschi, et al. (1969) have carried out two separate experiments to test the above hypothesis. The first study induced high or low attraction for source and exposed subjects to threats of either low or high credibility. Targets who disliked the source did comply as often to the low as to the high credibility threats, confirming that dislike does cause the target to overestimate message utility, increasing believability, estimated costs for non-compliance, and subsequent compliance. However, targets who liked the source were not prone to underestimate the credibility of the threats; such subjects were realistic in their appraisal of the situation and complied more often to the high than to the low credibility threats. Demos' comment that threats carry no moral obligation for either the source or target seems to be confirmed by the latter result. Dislike is a form of power when threats are used as the mode of influence, but positive attraction is not a basis of power in a coercive relationship. It may be concluded that when a source of threats does not have the resources or the intention of spending resources for punishing noncompliance, he can still be effective in exercising influence if he can gain the target's dislike. The exchange of attraction for power can occur in a coercive relationship. But if positive attraction is maintained, compliance can be gotten only with the resolute enforcement of threats.

In the second study, it was found that neither attraction nor message credibility significantly affected compliance to promises. Again, the operation of reciprocity norms (Gouldner, 1960) which apply to promises and which state that one should help those who help him caused compliance to occur about fifty percent of the time irrespective of credibility or attraction. It would appear that the mere statement of the promisor is enough to gain intermediate levels of compliance to promises even if the source is disliked. However, it was found that those subjects who were highly attracted to the "other" player cooperated more (over the course of the entire interaction) and were more trusting of the other than were subjects in the low attraction condition. Individuals who are highly attracted to one another generally seem to share the same attitudes (Byrne, 1969; Smith, 1957; Newcomb, 1961) and, thus, feel that they have similar goals which will not meet interference by cooperation. Thus, trust, which can be defined as the expectation that another will be helpful (Pruitt, 1965), can develop between highly attracted individuals and overall cooperation will increase without affecting compliance to specific promises. High attraction can be considered a base of power in an inducement relationship only when the interaction is taken as a whole and not when a specific promise of reward is dangled before the individual.

LEGITIMATE POWER

Authority derives from a role position rather than from the individual who holds the particular office or decision-making role (Freidrich, 1958). The authority is considered to be legitimized by a process of "reasoned elaboration"—the use of shared norms to demonstrate that the authority is worthy of deferential behavior. In a society of formal groups and organizations, hierarchies in role position as regards authority are often clearly established. The perception by a target individual that another person's role position deserves deference (compliance) is represented in the dyadic theory of influence as the perception of status. Within a group or institution it is assumed that status will be a direct function of role position. Furthermore, status is presumed to have a direct relationship to believability of and compliance to threats and promises.

Faley and Tedeschi (1969) have recently completed an experiment testing the relationship between status of source and compliance to threats by target individuals. They used ROTC cadets as the subject population. Cadets, who were themselves either low or high in authority or role position, were targets of threats from a simulated source, who was believed to be of either high or low status. The results confirmed the theoretical prediction; low status targets were more compliant (deferential) when the source was of high (rather than of low) status and high status targets were defiant of threats sent by a low status source. A somewhat surprising finding was that high status targets were as compliant to a high status source as were low status targets to the same source. The purely hierarchical notion of the effects of status is challenged by the latter result. Apparently, high status equals are likely to yield to each other's demands—presumably out of respect for rank or because similar deference is expected when the influence relationship is reversed, or because neither wants to be placed in the position of punishing the other. It is possible that, as long as they are equal in rank, the higher the authority positions of the two individuals, the more compliance they give to each other's verbal demands.

Intuitively, it seems reasonable that role position confers control over the allocation of decisions and resources. For this reason, there is a question whether status and message utility are really separate or orthogonal to one another in their effects on a target's level of believability and compliance. The Faley-Tedeschi study clearly shows that the effects of message utility and status are orthogonal to each other, but both contribute to the degree of compliance obtained by a source of threats.

At the moment, no evidence has been gathered concerning the relationship of status and compliance to promises.

DEPENDENCY POWER

A target may have certain needs that render him susceptible to influence. If an individual feels competent and feels that he deserves approval from others, presumably because of his own history of success in accomplishing objectives and solving problems, then he can be said to have high self-esteem. Such a confident individual could be expected to trust a source who promises rewards for compliance, while a low self-esteem person, who feels incompetent and disapproved of by others, could be expected to distrust the promisor. Thus, the theory predicts that a high self-esteem target is more likely to believe a promisor and more likely to comply to promises than is a low self-esteem target. On the other hand, a target who has low self-esteem is likely to believe that a threatener will punish him, and will comply more often with threats, particularly when the credibility of the threat is low and compliance is unwarranted.

Lindskold and Tedeschi (1969b) have only partially tested these predictions. Subjects were pretested on a measure of chronic self-esteem and divided into high and low groups. They were then sent either threats or promises by a simulated source who established one hundred percent credibility for each type of message. High self-esteem individuals were more compliant to promises than were low self-esteem targets, confirming the theory's prediction. However, high self-esteem targets were also more compliant to threats. It could be said that since the threats were one hundred percent credible, it was more realistic to comply with them and self-destructive to defy them, an interpretation not inconsistent with the theory. A second study is underway to find out whether targets of low self-esteem will comply more frequently than those of high self-esteem when threats have a low credibility. In any case, it is clear that the needs of the target are implicated in the degree of compliance he gives to influence attempts. The kind of influence attempt that will be successful in gaining compliance from a particular individual and the kind of source behavior which is likely to be most effective will depend upon the personality characteristics of the target. Lasswell and Kaplan's basis of power referred to as "well-being" may reside in the target, or the target and the wielder of power.

EXPERT POWER, RESPECT, AND ESTEEM

Although the discussion of legitimate power and the study by Faley and Tedeschi indicated that respect for another's authority (legitimacy) is an important factor in the social influence process, Lasswell and Kaplan apparently reserved the term, respect, for the person and not the office he holds. Homans (1961) has not been entirely consistent in his definition but has used

the concept of esteem to refer to the perceived approval that another person has gained from those around him. An individual's esteem or respect would thus be orthogonal to his legitimacy and status. Esteem, a target cognition, should be a direct function of how much approval the other person (in this case, the source) is actually receiving from third parties. Homans suggests that a person will receive approval in direct proportion to the value and quantity of help he gives other people. Help is thus exchanged for the socially valuable reinforcer of approval. French and Raven's type of power referred to as "expert power" implies the value of, availability of, and ability to provide help or information. If help is directly related to approval, and approval produces the perception of esteem, then the concept of esteem considerably overlaps, and may even be coextensive with, the notion of expert power.

The present theory specifies that esteem for a promisor is directly related to believability and subsequent compliance by the target individual. A target who perceives another person as generally helpful will err on the side of believing the source's promises when such belief is unwarranted. On the other hand, low esteem for the source should lead the target to make the inference that the source is not generally helpful to others; the target should thus believe threats issued by a source perceived as low in esteem.

A pilot study conducted by Smith et al. (1969) attempted to establish high esteem by allowing the target subject to overhear another person give praise to a confederate for help rendered. Low esteem was established by allowing the subject to overhear another person admonish a confederate for having his father call the chairman of the psychology department in an attempt to affect a grade for a course. Unfortunately, this manipulation was unsuccessful in inducing the appropriate levels of esteem. Probably, the perception that the other was an active manipulator in either induction procedure led to the failure to produce the intended effects. Another attempt will be made to induce different levels of esteem by the manipulation of the perception of a passive or active source who either does or does not have anything to gain by giving help, or removing himself as an obstacle to the attainment of the other person's goals. At this time, no study of the esteem of another as it affects a subject's behavior or attitudes has ever been done in any context and certainly not in an influence situation.

PRESTIGE POWER

A threat from a court jester to his monarch is hardly taken seriously and may just cause robust laughter. The reason for this audience response is that the jester is not perceived as having the capacity to carry out the coercion which a king has. A threat is empty of coercive meaning for the target if the source is completely lacking in the resources required to levy the threatened

punishment. Furthermore, even if the source is perceived as possessing the resources to punish noncompliance to his threats, he may still be perceived as unwilling to spend his resources for purposes of punishment, hence lacking the intentions to punish, and be defied by the target.

Analysis of the influence process reveals that when a threat is unsuccessful, the source is placed in the position of either punishing or not punishing the target but has not achieved the gains sought through the target's compliance. As Harsanyi (1962) has pointed out, opportunity costs are incurred by the source whenever he exercises his power. The source may be unwilling to spend the resources needed to punish the target unless there is concern about establishing a precedent (and credibility) for a future influence attempt. Similarly, when a target complies to promises, the source has already gained what he was after and will be tempted not to reward the target, unless concern for future interactions is present.

The target will be sensitive to the capabilities and intentions of the source (Pruitt, 1965; Singer, 1963). The source's available fluid resources will be perceived as his influence capability. The perception of intentions will depend upon how the source behaves in the interaction. Thus, even though a source sends threats, he may use them for the purpose of signaling in order to coordinate cooperative opportunities (Nardin, 1968). Additionally, the purely rational goal in the sending of a threat of violence is not provocation of actual violence but the coordination and accommodation of interests (Nieburg, 1969). Schlenker, Bonoma, Pivnick, et al. (1969) tested the hypothesis that a threat could be perceived as a signal to cooperate. Following the sending of a threat, they had the simulated source behave either totally accommodatively or totally exploitatively. Additionally, they had the simulated source send threats which were phrased in either a compellent or a deterrent form. Schelling (1966) has distinguished between compellent and deterrent threats by stating that the former is phrased in a form, "If you do *not* behave in a certain way, I will punish you," while the latter is phrased, "If you *do* behave in a certain way, I will punish you." The compellent threat thus specifies an action which the source must perform to escape punishment and thus can be perceived as more coercing, hostile, and manipulative than the deterrent threat, which only demands that the target not do a specified action to escape punishment. The results indicated that a subject faced with an accommodative source reciprocated that accommodation by being more compliant himself, while a subject faced with an exploitative source reciprocated exploitation with defiance. Also, subjects who received the more hostile compellent threats were more compliant than were those subjects who received the more static deterrent form of threat.

Singer (1963) has proposed that capability and intentions are multiplicatively related and, like utility, refer to the probability of the occurrence of an event based on the perception of source's intentions and the amount of costs

or gains involved, based on the perceived capability of the source. Prestige, the target's perception, is considered to be a direct function of capability times intentions by the present theory. The higher the source's prestige, the more believable his influence attempts should be and the more compliance he should receive from target individuals.

Horai and Tedeschi (1970) manipulated the source's intentions while holding capability constant. They had a simulated source send threats to target subjects and behave either in a resolutely accommodative (i.e., the source was accommodative after sending a threat and always punished noncompliance), irresolutely accommodative (i.e., the source was accommodative after sending the threat but never punished noncompliance), or resolutely exploitative manner (i.e., the source was exploitative after sending the threat and always punished noncompliance). The results indicated that subjects who faced a resolutely accommodative source reciprocated the accommodative intentions by being both more compliant and more cooperative throughout the interaction, while subjects who faced a resolutely exploitative source reciprocated those exploitative intentions by being least compliant and least cooperative throughout the interaction. Sources who were perceived as irresolute in their accommodative intentions were intermediate on both compliance and cooperation. The results of Schlenker, Bonoma, Pivnick, et al. (1969) and Horai and Tedeschi (1970) indicate that when a source is clearly perceived as being accommodative in his intentions, and yet does not forfeit the capacity to punish noncompliance while striving for positive outcomes for both parties, more compliance ensues than when the source is perceived as being resolute in his intentions to exploit the subject. The Horai and Tedeschi (1970) study is consistent with Osgood's (1962) proposal for a series of unilateral conciliatory gestures which are clearly helpful to the opponent and which are aimed at the reduction of conflict in international affairs. The United States, a powerful nation with the acknowledged capacity to use its power in an enforcing manner, would thus appear to be able to initiate cooperative gestures and have them reciprocated by its targets. The results are also in direct opposition to theorists who desire to see a more aggressive policy on the part of the United States because they feel that a conciliatory response during conflicts will merely encourage aggression and exacerbate the conflicts.

The amount of resources possessed by a source can easily be manipulated while holding intentions constant. However, the study has yet to be done.

COUNTERINFLUENCE

So far, we have concentrated on the factors which cause the source of threats or promises to be more or less successful in gaining compliance from target individuals. The theory and evidence concerning these matters are

potentially useful to those in a position to wield influence and power. However, what about the source himself? How can the relatively powerless affect the behavior of the powerful? Very few studies have been done in the entire field of social psychology concerning the behavior of persons in the position of power, the focus almost always centering on the targets of power.

Without the benefit of systematic theory but under the assumption that some of the same factors that affect the target also affect the behavior of the source, the authors have undertaken several exploratory studies of source behavior. Tedeschi, Horai, et al. (1970) investigated the plausible hypothesis that as opportunity costs to the source for using his punishment power increased, the less likely the source would be to punish noncompliance to threats. Surprisingly, they found that the frequency of sending threats decreased as opportunity costs increased, but no effect of opportunity costs on the use of punishment power was observed. The source of threats evidently considered his own costs before sending threats but once he committed himself by sending the threat, he was likely to punish noncompliance, whatever the costs for doing so.

Schlenker and Tedeschi (1970) induced high or low attraction in sources of threats, promises, or threats and promises for the targets of the influence attempts. Although no effects of attraction were found, the kind of power possessed by the source was important in determining his behavior. The source sent more threats and punished noncompliance more resolutely when he did not also have reward power and sent fewer promises and rewarded compliance less often when he did not also have coercive power. Thus, a powerful source is likely to be more benevolent and accommodating when he has both reward and punishment power than when he has either alone.

Tedeschi, Novinson, et al. (1970) compared the behavior of a source who was faced with a target who invariably retaliated when the source used his punishment power, with a source who incurred an opportunity cost (equivalent to the retaliation in terms of costs to the source) for using his power. Although the costs were the same in either condition, the source used his punishment power more often when the target was armed with retaliatory capability. These findings confirm those of Deutsch and Krauss (1962) and support the conclusion that conflict is more intense when both parties are armed than when only one is armed. Until recently the London police took this principle seriously.

It is a common belief that passive compliance to threats only encourages the source to send more threats since he is, in effect, being rewarded for his behavior. Halle (1967), in his history of the Cold War, noted that there is a deep-seated tendency in both men and nations to turn on one who appears stricken and helpless. Gamson's (1964) "cold warriors" feel that we must avoid conciliatory gestures following conflict intensification by the USSR so as not to encourage further exploitation. Tedeschi, Bonoma, et al. (1970)

faced a source with a simulated target who was either completely compliant or always defiant. Within each condition, the simulated target was either honest and open in announcing his intentions to comply or defy the source's threats or dishonest in concealing his intentions. Open defiance was successful in deterring the source from sending threats. Open compliance converted the source into a mutual cooperator; and although the source sent the most threats in this condition of the experiment, the threat was used by the source as a signal to coordinate mutual cooperation rather than for exploitative purposes. These results seem to deny the predictions of Halle and Gamson and further support Osgood's (1962) GRIT proposal, which calls for a clear statement of intentions before a conciliatory gesture to reduce conflict.

Obviously, there is a need to develop a theory of how a source of influence will use his power. Further experiments like those reported above may be necessary to develop a body of data suggestive of the relevant variables and functional relationships that will lead to such a theoretical development.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

A scientific theory of social influence within which is incorporated some of the more important and generally accepted definitions of power is only in its earlier stages of development. A systematic program of research is under way to evaluate, change, and expand the theory. The focus of the theory is on how behavioral compliance is gained from another person under conditions of social conflict and limited communications. This emphasis is a clear break with the tradition in social psychology which has been mainly concerned with attitude development and change.

It would probably be premature and also wrong to generalize from the theory and the laboratory results presented above to the serious problems of law and order in American society or to international conflict situations. However, a few such generalizations will be offered as a heuristic exercise and to point out the implications that could derive from the development of a mature and coherent theory of social influence.

Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany and Emperor Hirohito of Japan have both been quoted as pessimistic about the outcomes of the wars that each chose to enter. The Kaiser has been quoted as saying that at least Germany would make India bleed, while Hirohito succinctly expressed his position by noting that sometimes there is no alternative to leaping off a tower (Frank, 1967). If each of these leaders entered war with low expectancy of victory, why did they do so? Historians and strategic analysts, such as Tuchman (1962) and Kahn (1960), suggest each believed that he had no choice and that the alternative to war was perceived as worse than war itself. These historical events bear a striking resemblance to the results obtained in the laboratory

when the punishment for noncompliance to threats is perceived by the target as being no worse than the costs of compliance. Given such a least-of-evils choice, when both alternatives are unsavory and relatively equivalent in terms of costs, the individual chooses to defy the source of threats rather than bear the ignominy of compliance and the detrimental costs associated with such surrender.

Analogous is the willingness of a few college students to defy the military draft system and accept incarceration implying that at least for these few, the legal punishment for their defiant actions is no worse in their hierarchy of values than serving in the armed forces. In corporate America, this principle is even more clearly illustrated. The penalties for price fixing and collusion are not severe. The profits to be gained by such activities are so vast that some large corporations have been tempted to violate the law many times (Nossiter, 1964). Only by increasing the penalty for price fixing to the point where it is "cheaper" to comply than to defy the law, while concomitantly establishing high probability of punishment or enforcement, can corporate recidivists be deterred.

An interesting finding in our research is that dislike is a form of power. Observation establishes that the young black militant is openly hostile to whites and challenges middle-class blacks, charging them with Uncle Tomming "the Man." The backlash in America is a reaction to this new form of black militancy. But, the finding that dislike is a form of power may indicate that the black militant is gaining some power and can be expected to be somewhat successful in threatening whites even though he does not have sufficient punishment power to enforce his threats. Thus, many jobs are opening to blacks from the fear that violence may occur if such action is not taken. However, the study by Tedeschi, Bonoma, et al. (1970) indicates that open and honest compliance to some black demands could be successful in converting even the most militant into cooperative partners in social change. The experience at many universities is that compliance to the demands of black students has not led just to more demands but rather has led black students to work closely with college administrators in developing new programs.

A process similar to that advocated by Charles Osgood (1962) for the mitigation of international tension could be employed as a matter of policy in domestic conflicts. Graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT) involves a series of announcements on the part of the instigating nation to the effect that some low-risk actions will be taken which are designed to benefit the other party. Such unilateral announcements are then followed by the performance of the stated behavior and require no specific reciprocation from the other party. GRIT is a strategy to build trust between nations, calculated to reduce tensions and elicit spontaneous reciprocation from the target nation. Our studies indicate that the proposal has a sound foundation, since both open announcement of accommodative intentions and the behavioral demon-

stration of good faith do result in mutual cooperation. Perhaps GRIT could be applied to ameliorate the distrust and conflict prevalent between blacks and whites in America.

The experimental findings that high self-esteem individuals are more compliant to both high credibility threats and promises than are low self-esteem individuals is a pessimistic one when applied to black-white problems, juvenile delinquents, criminals, or the deprived poor of America. For centuries the white man has taught the black man to believe that black is ugly and second-best, to accept a subservient blue-collar role in America, and to doubt that black men have the native ability to acquire the skills of a technological society. The consequences of such consistent inculcation is that most lower-class blacks have powerful identity problems and generally low self-esteem. Speedy social change toward integration may have been obviated by white Americans long ago by rendering blacks relatively uninfluenceable to the threats and promises of a white society. It would appear that a prerequisite for a true integration of American society presupposes that the average Negro believes that black is beautiful and that he is as competent and deserving of approval as the average white person. When black Americans have gained self-respect, they should be as compliant to the laws and norms of society as the average middle-class white American.

Young critics of "the system" are quite aware of the consequences of success in our society. Once an individual begins to work his way up the hierarchy of a structured organization, he receives rewards for the acceptance of responsibility, but he also necessarily becomes more conforming to the norms and goals of the organization. The fact is revealed indirectly by the experimental finding that high-status equals are very compliant to each other's social influence attempts. Giving an individual a stake in the institutions of the society is a way of gaining compliance and conformity to the norms of that society. This lesson has not been entirely lost on the social reformers of America. The disaffected, the poor, and the blacks must be given the skills by which they too can escape the confines of low status, as well as low self-esteem. This type of social therapy may be viewed as a hedge against disorder and possible large-scale violence.

Many other speculative generalizations could be made, but the purpose of demonstrating the potential importance of a general theory of social influence has been accomplished. The task now is to provide a firm scientific foundation that can be used with confidence by policy makers faced with the great issues of our time.

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