

ability to turn the Herodotean ethnographic dialogue and propensity for wonder inwards and onto Greece itself in a way that encapsulates the Herodotean approach to ethnographic observation. He draws once again on the linguistic and stylistic choices and their similarities to the *Histories*, but also evaluates how Pausanias takes this approach and applies it to space (physical, textual and temporal) in a manner reminiscent of Herodotus.

Kirkland's volume ends not only with an assessment of the nature of Herodotean reception in writers of this period, which echoes the sentiments expressed in the introduction of some of the dangers of viewing Herodotus through later historiographers, but also of the very nature of reception itself as one which 'valorizes a source even as it also fragments and parcels that source out into the "halo of the multiple"' (334). Overall, this volume is of great interest to any reader concerned with the afterlife of the *Histories* and how the progression of that afterlife has affected what has come to be expected of both Herodotus and his readers.

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CANDIOTTO (L.) and RENAUT (O.) (eds) **Emotions in Plato** (Plato Studies Series 4). Leiden: Brill, 2020. Pp. vi + 396. €140. 9789004429437.
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Emotions in Plato is the first edited volume on Plato's treatment of emotions, and it is a wide-ranging and sensitive exploration of this underdiscussed aspect of his thought. The editors Laura Candiotta and Olivier Renaut rightly argue that Plato's dualism has led to commentators either over-cognizing emotion, thus removing all non-rational qualities, or denying all cognitive content, reducing emotions to hinderances of rational thought. This volume treats emotions as 'complex events which require several faculties' (5): perception, belief, judgement and some calculation.

The editors and contributors successfully show that, for Plato, emotions should not be avoided, stamped out or ignored in favour of rational deliberation. Rather, they should be utilized and cultivated, so rendering them useful for individual and state.

The volume's three parts cover a variety of dialogues across Plato's corpus, and their discussions of *pathēmata* – a term most easily translated as 'emotions' but which covers affections, feelings and experiences of all types. Part 1 addresses the taxonomy of emotions, Part 2 turns to the rationality and non-/ir-rationality of various emotions, and their origins, and finally, Part 3 discusses the relevance of the emotions to individual and city, in terms of education, morality and politics.

While there is some overlap between the sections, this structure does systematically navigate the reader through Plato's varied (and often incomplete) discussions of *pathēmata*, and allows the editors and contributors to argue that one only appreciates how Plato puts emotions to use by first understanding their origin and nature. Indeed, Laura Candiotta and Olivier Renaut stress that Plato is usually interested in the emotions because of what they can *do for* him: how they can promote his own visions of virtue, knowledge, temperance and excellence.

Part 1 opens with Laura Candiotta and Vasilis Politis' discussion (17–39) of the role of wonder (*thauma*) in enquiry. They argue that wonder is the beginning of philosophical enquiry because it is an 'emotive reaction' to the state of *aporia*, in which the philosopher finds herself. This is an enticing argument, which takes seriously Socrates' and Theaetetus' language in the *Theaetetus*' beginning, where the eponymous interlocutor remarks that his

aporia is *thaumatic*. However, perhaps discussion of the soul's wonder before the Forms in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* would have pushed the argument further, since these are overwhelmingly sensory, *thaumatic* experiences, but have cognitive content.

Part 1 concludes with Freya Möbus' chapter (61–83), which addresses a significant gap in Platonic scholarship: why we avoid pain. She argues, from discussions in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias* and *Hippias Minor*, that pain is essentially directional, because we perceive it as causing damage, and so avoid it. This conclusion, I think, could be used for interesting interpretations of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, where education is centred upon training citizens to feel pleasure and pain rightly (that is, to have correct responses to certain actions and stimuli).

In Part 2, Olivier Renaut's chapter (103–23) argues that the *Timaeus* presents a psycho-physiological account of emotion. Emotions only occur in the incarnate soul, where it must deal with necessity, the in- and efflux of sensations. His argument is mostly convincing, but I contest his assessment that the *Timaeus* is the first dialogue which proposes such a psycho-physiological account. In the *Phaedrus*, the gods' souls have two good horses, whereas human souls have one good one bad. Seemingly here, too, embodied souls must deal with the turmoil of how love and desire are experienced when embodied.

Karine Tordo-Rombaut's chapter (169–86) addresses the dialogue between the emotions in Plato's psychology. Crucially, it reinforces that emotion is the necessary push which makes us act rightly, and that perception is the seat of emotion: we begin from the sensations of pleasure and pain as children, and these perceptions remain fundamental throughout life. Virtue is a state where our internal dialogue is a *dialogue*, not an argument.

Luc Brisson and Beatriz Bossi both present articles on *phthonos*, meaning malicious envy or jealousy, and how Plato utilizes this culturally pertinent emotion, and reorients it towards his own conceptions of virtue, anger and justice (201–20, 220–38). Frisbee Sheffield offers an excellent and sensitive chapter on the roles of *philia* and *eros* in Plato's *Laws* (330–72). She argues that both are essential to the Athenian Stranger's Magnesia, because *philia* fosters a deep bond of connection between citizens, and *eros* makes us desire things passionately. This chapter convincingly argues for the importance of emotion, passion and human connection in the *Laws*' political theory, a dialogue which is often overlooked or considered dry.

David Konstan's afterword (372–82) closes the volume and harmonizes its three parts, by discussing the category of emotion itself, and its origin. He argues that the category 'emotion' is invented and defined by those who discuss it. This is a convincing conclusion to the volume, which reiterates that Plato's discussion of emotion is founded upon its *function*: epistemological, moral, and political.

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CARBONE (M.B.) **Geographies of Myth and Places of Identity: The Strait of Scylla and Charybdis in the Modern Imagination.** London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. Pp. xvi + 256, illus. £76.50. 9781350118201.
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A short note at the beginning of *Geographies of Myth and Places of Identity* observes that '[t]he author would like ... to respectfully distance himself from the denomination of "classics" usually employed by scholars' (xvi). With this, Carbone alerts the reader to the fact that his volume is rooted in present-day concerns. His qualms with the 'ideologically loaded' and