

Saul fails to distinguish between the cadres and the sympathizers of the various Revolutionary parties at many points, lumping both together as "Bolsheviks" or "S.R.'s" when the reality was considerably more complex. This practice is particularly unfortunate in regard to the pre-1917 period, when the very existence of a Revolutionary movement in the Baltic Fleet is questionable, and the presence in the fleet of "Bolshevik" sailors adhering to a recognizably Bolshevik party line is at best doubtful. Saul's book also contains a number of minor factual errors, none of them crucial, such as assertions that Trotsky, Lunacharskii, and Chudnovskii were Bolsheviks in May 1917, and that certain coastal defenses on the mainland were located on the same island as Kronstadt.

Khesin's work can best be measured against his own *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i flot* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1971), which is certainly the best Soviet treatment of the subject in recent years. Whereas the earlier work was a scholarly monograph, this one is a popular history, with annotation kept to a minimum and confined largely to published sources. The central theme in both works is the bolshevization of Russia's naval forces in 1917. Parts of *Moriaki* are obviously condensed from *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia*, but with less factual reporting and more quotations from Lenin (and Brezhnev). *Moriaki* also differs from *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia* in that it goes beyond the Bolshevik seizure of power to cover the first months of Soviet rule, and it is here that it makes a contribution to the literature on the subject. More than half of the book is devoted to the establishment of Soviet control over the various fleets, the sailors' role in safeguarding the new regime from counterrevolution, and the employment of men from the fleets to implement the first of the new government's decisions. Although the story is told in far too general terms to satisfy the serious scholar and with an eye to illustrating the sailors' devotion to the Bolshevik regime, it does offer some useful information on an important period in Soviet history. On balance, however, this Soviet popular history compares rather unfavorably with its scholarly predecessor.

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PHILIP MIRONOV AND THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR. By *Sergei Starikov* and *Roy Medvedev*. Translated by *Guy Daniels*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. xvi, 267 pp. \$15.00.

Starikov and Medvedev set out to rehabilitate one of the genuine military heroes of the Revolution and civil war—the Don Cossack general, Philip Mironov. Through impressive research in Soviet archives, the authors have re-created the career of Mironov, and in doing so, they have provided a vivid picture of the chaos and violence which ravaged the Cossack lands in the post-Revolutionary period. Mironov emerges as a brilliant tactician who earns the loyalty and admiration of his troops, and also the envy and fear of both the White and Red political leadership in the Don. Although devoted to the Revolution, Mironov appears to have been more concerned about the fate of the Don Cossacks. He was not hesitant to speak his mind, particularly when he believed that local political officials were not acting in the interests of the Cossack population.

Mironov was a decisive and active military man, often irked by what he perceived as inaction or delay. His own drive to act often caused him to run afoul of his superiors and, in one episode, led to charges of treason and the suspicion that he was about to take his troops over to the side of the Whites. Nonetheless, he was released, and in an era of desperate need his outstanding talents came to the attention of Soviet leaders. Yet they temporized in utilizing Mironov in large part because of his reputation for independent action.

Ironically, Mironov fell victim to the petty intrigues of local officials which he so disdained. It is an indication of the chaos of the times that a general in the Red Army preparing to report for an important position in Moscow could be arrested and imprisoned on the evidence provided by one unreliable local Cheka agent. The authors suggest that some high officials must have arranged Mironov's arrest and subsequent "execution" in the courtyard of the prison in Moscow. While their suggestion seems reasonable, they are unable to determine which officials might have had a hand in the affair. In addition to Lenin, Kalinin, and Trotsky, Dzerzhinskii and Menzhinskii also seemed unaware of Mironov's fate. It seems unlikely, however, that any more definitive explanation of Mironov's demise will be found.

The authors' argument is that Mironov represented precisely that combination of courage and revolutionary idealism which was needed to preserve the spirit of the Revolution, but it was precisely these characteristics which produced the envy and hatred of petty military and party officials. In the chaos of the period, the corrupt and self-seeking seemed to have had the upper hand. It can be argued that it was Mironov's penchant for independent action which inevitably caused him to come into conflict with the hierarchy. Increasingly, the fragile Bolshevik regime valued the qualities of discipline and obedience in the face of multiple threats to the fragile Revolutionary government. In the end, Mironov was a Cossack loyalist who became a confirmed revolutionary without ever giving up his primary concern for the welfare of the Cossacks. He could never tolerate the destruction of Cossack traditions and society no matter in whose name the campaign was mounted.

Mironov's rehabilitation by a military collegium in 1960 was not followed by a posthumous recognition of his military and political accomplishments. In fact, friends and relatives of those who had been credited with Mironov's achievements formally protested his rehabilitation. Starikov and Medvedev therefore determined to set the historical record straight in this book. Philip Mironov deserves the sensitive treatment that he receives from the authors.

Finally, although the art of translation is usually a thankless one which often goes unnoticed unless the reviewers wish to chide the translator about specific usages, Guy Daniels deserves our appreciation for producing a highly readable and accurate rendition of the original text.

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THE SOVIET AGRARIAN DEBATE: A CONTROVERSY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1923–1929. By *Susan Gross Solomon*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. xvi, 309 pp. \$15.25.

Until now, only a few succinct studies have treated the debate which, in the 1920s, brought into opposition the two main schools of thought in Soviet rural economics and sociology regarding the nature of the peasant economy and the social differentiations within the peasantry. Thanks to this work which is praiseworthy for its erudition, clarity, and precision, scholars now have at their disposal a much more comprehensive investigation, allowing them to follow the evolution of the research and the controversies of the principal antagonists. Professor Susan G. Solomon has a talent for summing up the essential elements without deviating from textual evidence. She not only reexamines the theses of the organizational school, led by A. Chayanov, but she finds new perspectives as well. Professor Solomon does this in two ways. On the one hand, she emphasizes the true scientific contribution of the agrarian Marxists, which is not widely known in the West. On the other, she analyzes the debate from a sociological point of view. In particular, the author focuses both on the solidarity and divisions which appear in a specifically scientific milieu and on their impact on the content of rural studies.