

UNTANGLING THE COLD WAR: A STRATEGY FOR TESTING RIVAL THEORIES. By *William A. Gamson* and *Andre Modigliani*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. xv, 222 pp. \$6.95.

The cold war is over; it ended almost a decade ago. Intellectually, however, the issue is very much alive today; it is being fought over with vigor, determination, and enterprise. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., did not manage in 1966 "to blow the whistle before the current outburst of revisionism . . . goes much further." He had in mind cold war "revisionists" such as Williams, Alperovitz, Fleming, Horowitz, and Marzani. But since then, Christopher Lasch, Ronald Steel, Walter LaFeber, and Carl Oglesby, among others, have failed to obey Schlesinger's whistle, just as did the "traditionalists" or "orthodox" historians and social scientists, such as Louis J. Halle, George Kennan, Joseph Starobin, Dexter Perkins, and David Rees. Who is responsible for the cold war? The aggressive, expansionist, inflexible Soviet Union? The pushy, naïve, and righteous West? Or both?

Gamson and Modigliani have contributed a great deal, in my opinion, toward ending the quarrel. Like their predecessors they have not had the benefit of access to secret Western or Soviet data, which would once and for all resolve the dilemma. But thanks to their imaginative research strategy *Untangling the Cold War* promises to become the obiter dictum on the issue of guilt for the cold war for some time to come.

The two authors investigated the cold war as a sustained eighteen-year interaction process between two coalitions, the East and the West. Then they extrapolated and tested competing theories of major authors on both sides, the traditionalists as well as the revisionists, against the data generated by their interactional study. What emerged is an inventive, persuasive analysis of the two protagonists' mutual behavior from 1946 to 1963.

All in all, conclude the authors on the basis of their data, the responsibility for the cold war must be assigned to both parties equally. The strategic goal of both adversaries was essentially *consolidation* of their own respective positions in the world—that is, they wanted to keep what they had. Their respective overall objective, however, was neither expansion nor destruction of the enemy. As a consequence, their mutual behavior tended to be defensive rather than offensive, conciliatory rather than aggressive, and oriented toward bargaining rather than violence. At the same time, both alliances believed that their opponents' views of their own consolidatory goals were accurate. Unfortunately this was not the case on either side. Both parties in the cold war viewed the other coalition as opportunistic and bent on *expanding its influence* by hook or crook. Although they did not perceive each other as an entirely *destructive* force, they both did think that the other side hoped to fool them enough to achieve its own strategic objectives—*expansion* in the world.

To make their case, the authors systematically coded articles on the cold war that had appeared in the *New York Times* in the period between 1946 and 1963 (216 months, 6,574 days) for the adversaries' mutual actions, which the coders first assessed to be either refractory, conciliatory, or neutral, depending on the content of the report. Then they measured the magnitude of those actions as assessed by the *New York Times* editors (location on the front page, size of the headline). Finally, the authors combined both results to yield an overall belligerent-accommodative score for the whole time period for both parties. This relatively

simple though systematic and thorough process yielded the conclusions mentioned above.

Unfortunately, despite the authors' inspired efforts to show that use of the *New York Times* as the sole source of data for the purposes of their study is entirely satisfactory, the outcome, in this reviewer's opinion, can only be viewed as culture-bound, American-oriented, and biased. It is not that the *New York Times* cannot be accepted as one of the finest data sources of this sort; it is simply that for an *interactional* analysis, one side's source is just not enough. An original, prestigious American source must be matched and compared with and balanced against an original, prestigious Soviet source, both for assessment of mutual actions and for measurement of their magnitude. The authors' attempt to show that a high correlation exists between the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* translations of *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* articles and the *New York Times* articles on cold war issues, as explained in their addendum to appendix B, and that there is no need therefore for using *both* as data sources for their study, is just not persuasive. This is a real pity, because the outcome of their research would be greatly strengthened by this additional consideration, and their conclusions would be confirmed, I am fairly certain, by including the other side's data.

Still, given its major methodological thrust, this is a remarkably lucid and readable book. And given its clarity, its research strategy—with this one exception—is singularly well suited to the authors' objectives. An important book.

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STAAT ODER KOMMUNISMUS: LENINS ENTSCHEIDUNG GEGEN DIE KOMMUNISTISCHE GESELLSCHAFT. By Günther Wagenlehner. 2nd revised edition. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1971 [1970]. 260 pp. DM 19.80.

The great revolutions of Western history have all been made in the name of an ideology of deliverance, and thus proclaimed themselves to be the last revolution. The promises are never fully honored. All revolutions have in some sense been betrayed and given rise to new coercion, new oppression, new inequities, and a new establishment. Inevitably they are criticized from two sides: on the left are those who insist on taking the liberational ideas seriously and wish to undo their "betrayal"; on the right are those who regard the ideas in the name of which the revolution was made in the first place as folly. Both kinds of critic may make significant contributions to social philosophy. But the critic on the right places himself in an awkward position when he succumbs to the temptation of using the liberational rhetoric as a mirror in which to view and judge the postrevolutionary society. Since he does not subscribe to these ideas in the first place, his use of them makes him a hypocrite. His hypocrisy becomes more obvious when he expressly refuses to hold the same mirror up to his own society, as Mr. Wagenlehner does on page 216, because realization of the ideas just mentioned would disturb economic efficiency.

Wagenlehner argues that Marxism makes demands that cannot be realized, and that the attempt to realize them will yield an oppressive dictatorial state. He contrasts this state with the bourgeois-capitalist order described as benign and humane (*menschenwürdig*), and from which the almighty capitalist has disappeared as definitely as the propertyless proletarian (p. 215), although some reforms might still be called for.