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ABSTRACTS

PARTITION AS A SOLUTION TO ETHNIC WAR

AN EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

By NICHOLAS SAMBANIS

Theorists of ethnic conflict have argued that the physical separation of warring ethnic groups may be the only possible solution to civil war. They argue that without territorial partition and, if necessary, forced population movements the war cannot end and genocide is likely. Other scholars have counterargued that partition only replaces internal war with international war, that it creates undemocratic successor states, and that it generates tremendous human suffering. This debate has so far been informed by very few important case studies. This article uses a new data set on civil wars to identify the main determinants of war-related partitions and estimate their impact on democratization, on the probability that war will recur, and on low-level ethnic violence. This is the first large-N quantitative analysis of this topic, testing the propositions of partition theory and weighing heavily on the side of its critics. Most assertions of partition theorists fail to pass rigorous empirical tests. The article also identifies some determinants of democratization after civil war, as well as the determinants of recurring ethnic violence. These empirical findings are used to formulate an alternative proposal for ending ethnic violence.

DEGREES OF DEMOCRACY

SOME COMPARATIVE LESSONS FROM INDIA

By PATRICK HELLER

This article draws on the case of India to address the question of democratization by exploring the dynamic interplay of the formal, effective, and substantive dimensions of democracy. Fifty-three years of almost uninterrupted democratic rule in India have done little to reduce the political, social, and economic marginalization of India's popular classes. Within India the state of Kerala stands out as an exception. Democratic institutions have effectively managed social conflict and have also helped secure substantive gains for subordinate classes. Kerala's departure from the national trajectory is located in historical patterns of social mobilization that coalesced around lower-class interests and produced forms of state-society engagement conducive to democratic deepening. Contrary to much of the transition literature, this case suggests that high levels of mobilization and redistributive demands have democracy-enhancing effects.

THE IDEOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF LIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORM

THE CASE OF PRIVATIZATION

By HILARY APPEL

The empirical literature on mass privatization in the postcommunist context emphasizes the preferences and power of interest groups in order to account for the design of privatization. This approach has been consistent with mainstream theories of property rights formation that focus on the self-interested, rationally calculated pursuit of wealth and/or power as the motivation behind the development of new ownership arrangements. Absent from these theories, however, are the ideological and cognitive components in the creation of property rights systems. This lacuna is extremely problematic when considering the postcommunist privatization experience in which specific ideologies—such as anticommunism, liberalism, pro- or anti-Westernism, and nationalism—have profoundly influenced the particular form that new property institutions have taken. This article explores how ideology interacts with the distribution of power and the formation of material interests in society. After considering the shortcomings of strictly material-based theories of property regime change, the article suggests four mechanisms by which ideology determines the design and implementation of privatization programs in postcommunist countries.

WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT A COUNTERFACTUAL?

By RICHARD NED LEBOW

The author contends that the difference between so-called factual and counterfactual arguments is greatly exaggerated; it is one of degree, not of kind. Both arguments ultimately rest on the quality of their assumptions, the chain of logic linking causes to outcomes, and their consistency with available evidence. He critiques two recent historical works that make extensive use of counterfactuals and finds them seriously deficient in method and argument. He then reviews the criteria for counterfactual experimentation proposed by social scientists who have addressed this problem and finds many of their criteria unrealistic and overly restrictive. The methods of counterfactual experimentation need to be commensurate with the purposes for which it is used. The author discusses three uses for counterfactual arguments and thought experiments and proposes eight criteria appropriate to plausible-world counterfactuals.

UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S REFORM

LOOKING BEYOND NEOCLASSICAL EXPLANATIONS

By SHU-YUN MA

The relative success of post-Mao reform in China has raised a number of questions regarding the neoclassical perspective: How could China have achieved rapid economic growth without privatization? Why have Chinese officials not been resistant to market reform? What makes the Chinese state developmental rather than predatory? The four recent works reviewed in this article attempt to answer these questions by moving away from the neoclassical approach, yet none offers a better alternative. The search for the secret of China's economic "miracle" must be continued.

E R R A T A

The following table replaces Table 1 in Judith S. Kullberg and William Zimmerman, "Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy," *World Politics* 51 (April 1999), 336.

TABLE 1
ELITE AND MASS ORIENTATIONS TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
(% AND NUMBER, IN THAT ORDER)

<i>Distribution Including All Respondents</i>				
	<i>1993 Elite</i>	<i>1995 Elite</i>	<i>Mass Sample, European Russia, 1993</i>	<i>Mass Sample Russia, 1995</i>
Liberal democrats	74.0 (148)	72.8 (131)	27.4 (341)	21.9 (621)
Market authoritarians	5.0 (10)	5.6 (10)	7.2 (89)	5.8 (164)
Social democrats	6.5 (13)	7.8 (14)	18.2 (226)	16.7 (473)
Socialist authoritarians	4.5 (9)	3.9 (7)	14.8 (184)	13.7 (388)
Ambivalent	7.0 (14)	9.4 (17)	16.7 (207)	27.4 (779)
Unmobilized	3.0 (6)	.6 (1)	15.8 (196)	14.6 (414)
Total	100 (200)	100 (180)	100 (1,243)	100 (2,839)
<i>Distribution Excluding "Ambivalent" and "Unmobilized" Respondents</i>				
	<i>1993 Elite</i>	<i>1995 Elite</i>	<i>Mass Sample, European Russia, 1993</i>	<i>Mass Sample Russia, 1995</i>
Liberal democrats	82.2 (148)	80.9 (131)	40.6 (341)	37.7 (621)
Market authoritarians	5.6 (10)	6.2 (10)	10.6 (89)	10.0 (164)
Social democrats	7.2 (13)	8.6 (14)	26.9 (226)	28.7 (473)
Socialist authoritarians	5.0 (9)	4.3 (7)	21.9 (184)	23.6 (388)
Total	100 (180)	100 (162)	100 (840)	100 (1,646)