

- 4 Paris, 1979—80; E.T. London, 1983. Pp. 218—28 of Vol. II are most relevant here.
- 5 *The God of Jesus Christ*, trans. M.J. O’Connell (London, 1984), p. 227.
- 6 See, for instance, St. Gregory Nazienzen *Or.* 34:8; and Congar, *op. cit.* Vol. III, p. 153, note 28, for further references.
- 7 *op. cit.* p. 200. See also Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord* Vol. I, trans. E. Leiva-Merikakis (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 320f. for the eschatological character of beauty.
- 8 See, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1a. 35.2 and St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Dialogue on the Holy Spirit* (P.G. 75:1144) and *Thesaurus on the Holy and Undivided Trinity* 34 (P.G. 75:597). St Irenaeus anticipated such developments in *Adv. Haer.* IV. vii. 4, V. vi. 1 and V. viii. 1.
- 9 In our own times Hans Urs von Balthasar, following Barth, has developed an avowedly Christological theological aesthetics (*op. cit.* above).
- 10 See my *Spirit, Saints and Immortality* (London, 1984), for a development of this argument.
- 11 *Word and Revelation* (New York, 1964), p. 162.

Reviews

THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE by Anthony Kenny, *Firethorn Press, London, 1985*, p. x + 103, £4.95.

It seems likely that everything that could be said about the ethics of nuclear deterrence has by now been said many times over. In fact, most of the really important things were said by 1965, and with greater clarity than is now usually achieved. While many of us are suffering from chronic mental fatigue after six years of continually refined and very repetitious argument, Anthony Kenny—who was a major contributor to the earlier debate—has lost nothing of his appetite for the topic and writes with all his former moral passion and logical precision.

The first half of this short book is an admirable summary of the moral debate as it now stands, worked out live with David Fisher of the Defence Ministry, whose own book, *Morality and the Bomb* is an instructive contrast in lengthy obfuscation. The very conclusiveness of Kenny’s moral arguments against nuclear deterrence are enough to make us wonder why nothing, however rational and morally compelling, ever seems to make any difference to those who implement or support nuclear policies. One of the reasons is—as Kenny implies—that some of the main principles of Western moral tradition are no longer shared by them. It is no longer the case, for instance, that everyone—even among Catholic moral theologians—accepts the Socratic principle that it is better to suffer evil than to do it. This makes it impossible for them to distinguish between what may *happen* and what we may *do* in a future nuclear war. Likewise, St Paul’s principle that it is wrong to do evil that good may come is also no longer accepted by those who think that the often reasonable course of choosing the lesser evil is a matter of doing something wicked in case someone else does something even worse. Both these positions are implied by support for nuclear deterrence.

Kenny is on safe ground with his critical arguments, despite their historical

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ineffectiveness. But in the second half of the book he commendably launches himself on to ground that is not nearly so safe: the practical steps to be taken in renouncing the willingness to commit murder on a massive scale, which is the true foundation of Western defence policy. Anyone who tries to plot a rational and moral way out has to run the gauntlet of worse-case 'realists' on the one hand and moral rigorists on the other. Kenny has been criticised by the latter for including among his unilateralist proposals that, until the Soviet Union makes adequate response to Western renunciation of nuclear use and withdrawal of theatre nuclear weapons, the Western SLBM force should be retained, though plans to use the missiles should be openly abandoned. The idea is that the residual deterrent effect—based on uncertainty in the mind of the potential enemy rather than on any real intention to use, or on bluff—could serve as a bargaining counter. Although this proposal is worth serious attention, since the reassurance that it gives to the electorate is one of the main side effects of the deterrent which cannot be simply abandoned without replacement, it must be said that Kenny's argument is not convincing, as he himself suspects. It is not plausible to think that the operators of the nuclear missile submarines should be expected to do their job without really believing that they might one day be ordered to use the weapons—and be willing to do so. However, in general, he must be correct in saying that unilateralism is a means, not an end, and that every step ought to be used in the bargaining process.

But Kenny's proposals suppose that it is the West that takes the initiative. The opposite seems to be true, and Western declarations of multilateral intent now stand exposed as mere rhetoric aimed at public relations. The question now is not how to get the Russians to follow, but how to follow them. As for the dangers of renunciation, Kenny is right in pointing out that nuclear blackmail is a danger for any policy at all that stops short of a willingness to directly destroy populations. It is not something that only the unilateralist has to face. The real and insurmountable question for the supporters of deterrence is how they can reconcile that willingness with any rational or moral principle at all.

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SAINT AUGUSTINE ON SLAVERY, *STUDIA EPHEMEREDIS 'AUGUSTINIANUM'*, 22.
Rome: *Institutum Patristicum 'Augustinianum'*, 1966. 102 pp.

The present study is a revision of the author's doctoral thesis of 1978 with the addition of material contained in the group of Augustine's letters published in 1981 (CSEL, 88). Dr. Corcoran begins with an examination of slavery in North Africa in Augustine's day; he goes on to explore Augustine's comments on the principle of obedience, on punishment, on liberation from bondage. These topics might perhaps have been better placed in the second section; they necessarily anticipate points made there, and they bring us to the discussion of Augustine's theory of slavery which is the subject of Part II. Here the author considers slavery in the context of Augustine's doctrine of evil, beginning with human relationships before the fall, and examining the way slavery began through sin, its evils and the useful purposes it serves.

The whole study is balanced and clear and makes sensible use of the sources. For Augustine slavery, like the need for government, is a consequence of sin; its burden is the oppression of man's fallen condition. His thinking on slavery, as a department of his ideas on politics, must be understood in the context of the problem of sin and the working of providence for man's rescue. God 'in his providence' uses slavery 'to prevent chaos in a sinful world. Like the state, it helps to establish an earthly peace' (p. 86). To be a slave to sin is serious; to be another man's slave is nothing of importance. Interwoven with the analysis of the ramifications of the idea of slavery, the practical details touched on by Augustine are allowed to add liveliness and particularity.

G.R. EVANS
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