

IDEOLOGY: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

Men are living in the midst of a world pervaded by ideas.* Ideas, which provide men with help in their will to act and to think according to rules, which offer them guidance in their lives, are mustered into systems which are called ideologies.

Ideologies are issued by the inclusive society, by special, functional groups inside the society and, beginning with a given stage in the development of human society, by ideological movements which profess to provide men not only with guidance for special tasks or functions, but for life as a whole. So, individual men are faced with various sets of ideologies, more or less in agreement between themselves, more or less authoritative for them. They must choose between the suggestions, the rules, the orders given to them. As men are always in search of some degree of consistency in their ways of thinking and acting, they fit together the ideas they choose, unconsciously, into systems, into personal, private, individual ideologies.

Social ideologies, designed for inclusive societies, special groups or ideological movements, are intended to endure for a long time, or even forever, according to the foolish propensities by which men delude themselves. Private, individual ideologies are known by everyone to come to an end with a person's death.

* Slightly modified text of a lecture given April 25, 1975, at the London School of Economics on the occasion of the author's receipt of the Isaac Deutscher Prize for the English edition, published in 1974, of his *Islam et Capitalisme*.

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Social ideologies are intended to offer guidance to men in their social life. Social life for them is centered around many tasks, some essential and some secondary, for the performance of which the inclusive society and groups are designed. These tasks are defined by society as a whole and by special groups because they answer the needs of men, basic needs or secondary needs. So, the social ideologies are more or less molded by these needs, and these needs are enduring needs, needs of man as a biological being and as a social being, and also as a being with a special psychological organization, with certain impulses, wants, desires. But, as social organizations and social ideologies which attend them are necessarily more or less enduring, they cannot but meet these impulses, these wants, these desires in the long run, under the form they take at a given time, and then for a long period there is no change in their fabric.

But everything is always in the process of change. Impulses, wants, desires, needs change, at least in form, in the course of time. Social ideologies cannot always take into account these numerous changes. There is a strong measure of inertia in them. But there are the private, the personal ideologies which are by far more able to follow the tempo of change, to incorporate new elements. And they can equally incorporate personal elements which are not able to enter into the framework of a social ideology because they could be detrimental to the task it has to perform, or are considered to be so.

There is a special kind of logic according to which ideological systems must be built, as there is a logic for fabricating a mechanical apparatus. You cannot satisfy all the requirements of man with a single apparatus. Some requirements must be sacrificed to others. Special ideologies, group ideologies have a propensity to sacrifice most of the other requirements to the special goals they are intended to reach. The inclusive ideology of the inclusive society is professedly intended to reach all reachable goals. But, first, this is not within the bounds of possibility. Secondly, the combination of things and ideas into any system implies necessary subjection of some to others, a degree of levelling, discarding altogether some things deemed inessential. Thirdly, those men and groups who detain the primacy in the process of building an ideology have a natural propensity to

favor their own requirements to the detriment of those of others.

Private ideologies are always pervaded by public ideologies, inclusive or special. But nevertheless, they offer to the individual the possibility to reintroduce what has been discarded, to emphasize what has been reduced to a lower place, to vindicate the rights of the neglected impulses, wishes or wants, biological or psychological, to give revenge to what has been sacrificed. If the public ideologies are partly or wholly the opiate of the people—all, more or less, play this part—private ideologies are able to give some outlet to the hungers and thirsts of the opium addict which are not satisfied by the drug. And if public ideologies lay down rules, even necessary rules, which are too hard to be easily borne, private ideologies could in turn provide people with a merciful opium.

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In the beginning, all was unity, homogeneity, order. Such was the theoretical scheme suggested by powerful schools of human thought for a long time, but especially in the period when the Darwinist theories were paramount. Why do we now see the sky high above the earth? One of the more or less natural answers was: because, in the beginning, it was fastened to the earth, and something dissociated them, as did the god Shu in the Egyptian myth. Another scheme, inversely, put at the beginning disorder and struggle as in the Hobbesian view of things and in the Book of Genesis: in the beginning the earth was confusion and emptiness, *tobu wa-bohu*. God imposed order on the chaos, but the beginning of human society was marked by two rebellions against order: first Adam and Eve and then Cain, a fugitive and a wanderer throughout the earth.

Against this view, Spencer and Durkheim put the order at the beginning. According to Durkheim, the first society was the realm of common uninterrupted assent to social values, social laws, social conscience.

We have by now given up the hope of knowing so much about human beginnings. But evolutionists were right to a certain extent. The first human societies certainly did not know agriculture nor graded classes. We can only deduce the ways of thinking and acting in such societies from similar ones still extant in recent times.

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Already in the simplest, least divided societies, where there is no functional division of labor (except division of labor according to the sexes which is universally known), we can easily see that there are conflicts between some ideological systems, and others, private interpretations of the common system, conformists and dissenters.

If social values, social ideas, social rules were paramount, if private values, private ideas fell always into line with the social ones, there would be no dissenters, no evildoers, no transgression of the moral law which is present everywhere. Now there are such transgressions in every society, however simple it may be, some justified by necessity, even if necessity is not so cogent, and we know that at times man is capable of dying to avoid infringing his law. Among the Alakaluf of Tierra del Fuego, one of the simplest societies known, eating dog-flesh is assumed to be bad, but men find tricks to justify eating it at times.¹ When we find among such societies entire classes of transgressors how could we imagine that they are without some system of justification in their own sight, some group ideology set against the inclusive social ideology, as there must be private ideologies of every transgressor set against all social ideologies? So, among the Pygmies of Gaboon, very simple societies too, there are transgressors of all kinds: sorcerers using black magic, criminals, thieves, adulteresses and the like, even man-eaters looked on as horrifying beings. But some transgressions, formerly disapproved, perhaps punished, are now admitted because of necessity. Thus unions between close relations—not very close ones nonetheless—are condoned because groups became so small! Chiefs say: “Yes indeed, it is not good, we know it, it is not the Law; our fathers did not act in this way and the Spirit got angry with us. But . . . what could we do?”²

So, even in the midst of such simple societies, and all the more so within more complex ones, there are transgressors, implying that there are private ideologies and counter-ideologies proceeding from some groups or from some categories of per-

¹ J. Emperaire, *Les Nomades de la mer*, Paris, Gallimard, 1955 (*L'Espèce humaine*, 11), p. 255.

² R. P. H. Trilles, *Les Pygmées de la forêt équatoriale*, Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1932, p. 410.

sons. Just as the deepest divisions in human societies—the deepest at least among the simplest ones, and often even in complex ones in special times, in some circumstances, in some respects—are between men and women, young people and elders, there are, within the inclusive social ideology, ideologies of the two sexes and ideologies of age-classes.

Actually, as long as there is no state, no centralized apparatus enforcing obedience above the level of clans and tribes, and even as long as the state is not so strong, there is room for the tolerant coexistence of many sectional ideologies inside the inclusive society. Private ideologies are generally allowed to have free play under fairly lenient conditions. Punishment of deviation is often left to the gods or spirits. Outlets are very often provided for non-conformists. There are festivals in which they could give free play to their repressed impulses. There are special rôles admitted for them. As an example, men who are frightened by the severe trials implied by the male condition, painful initiation rites, obligation to go to war and the like can choose to live as women or within the bounds of an institutionalized intermediate status. There are even ritual, institutionalized rebellions which are innocuous for the general course of law and order.

The state is more exacting. It puts forth precise laws and well defined penalties for infringing them. It is provided with a special machinery for enforcing and punishing. It is especially interested in what is essential to it: to collect dues and taxes, to obtain military duty, to maintain the hierarchy of grades, ranks, orders and classes. Outside this realm, it could be lax, all the more so as it has no great means to enforce a wide range of rules among many people. But the ideology of the state can deem many things as linked with these essential rules, which seem to us very far from them. And there are some types of societies, some kinds of rulers which are more prone than others to yield to the tendency to erect structures for domination in order to keep more and more things under their rule.

This was one of the chief points discussed among the old Chinese schools of government. The so-called legists were asking for more and more rules, stringent rules to make the people respect Order. Others put more faith in the goodness of human

nature or in the virtue of good example given by the ruler. Master K'ung said: "When a ruler is right in himself, things will get done without his giving orders. When he is not right in himself, he may give orders, but they will not be obeyed".³ Master Meng said: "When men are subdued by force, they do not submit in their minds, but only because their strength is inadequate. When men are subdued by power in personality, they are pleased to their very heart's core and do really submit".⁴ Of course, this was not a purely intellectual controversy between men who had somehow obtained different ideas. This was linked with the struggles between classes in the ancient Chinese society, e.g. between the party of the "feudal" lords and those who were interested in making the state paramount.

When the state is strong and if the legists or their analogues in other lands get the upper hand, if at the same time the society is complex with many sections, many kinds of relationships between the sections, commercial and intellectual, many trends of thought consequently arising spontaneously from this structure, dissenters must resort to many tricks to provide themselves with some outlet for their hidden thoughts. This could be very difficult at times as, for example, there is a story about a smile being punished at the Chinese court. For people having a vested interest in maintaining law and order, profiting by it, privileged by the state, they could use among them irony, smiling and the like, towards rules, ideas linked supposedly with the order but in which they had no more faith. This was the way in which their private ideology was protesting against the public one. You know that Cato the Elder, a very frank old man and a strong supporter of old manners, used to say that two augurs could not meet without laughing.⁵ Vespasian, at the point of death, could not refrain from laughing at the official faith in his own apotheosis, a faith which had been very profitable

³ *Lun-Yü*, XIII, 6, in E. R. Hughes (ed.), *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*, London, J. M. Dent and New York, E. P. Dutton, 1942 (Everyman's Library, 973), p. 25.

⁴ *The Book of Mencius*, II A 4, in E. R. Hughes, *ibid.*, p. 108. II, 1: 3, in J. Legge, *The Chinese Classic*, II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1895, p. 196.

⁵ Cicero, *De divinatione*, II, 24.

to his power: *Vae, inquit, puto deus fio*: "Woe! It seems to me that I am turning into a god!"⁶

But, at the same time, they had to act openly as if they retained their faith in these ideas, these rites, these rules. This is what is called cynicism or perhaps shamelessness. The same Vespasian, at the beginning of his reign, was asked in Alexandria by a blind man to spit in his eyes and by a lame one or a paralytic to heal him in a similar miraculous way. He was reluctant, hesitated for a long time, took the advice of physicians. But, at last, he gave in to his followers who urged on him the political usefulness of the deed, of complying with the wishes of the two sick men, no doubt actuated by some members of his propaganda staff.⁷ He was a comparatively honest man. So many did and do not hesitate at all.

With the exception of rather short periods in general and a few very exacting states which were moreover endowed with strong means, the state asked its subjects for no more than lip-service to its official ideologies. In addition, it could be more or less dangerous according to circumstances to disagree openly or to be known as disagreeing secretly with the current, lurking, implicit ideologies of the society. But, generally speaking, there was room for maintaining in the heart, or even at many times for expressing, dissident ideas. Even in one of the strongest states in Antiquity, in Pharaonic Egypt, texts have been written which express a strong disagreement with current values, with the current working of society, even if it is—as always—in the name of other values felt as permanent. In the so-called 'Dialogue of a Misanthrope with his own soul,' someone explains plaintively how many people look at him with disapproval:

Lo, my name is abhorred
Lo, more than the odor of fishermen
By the shores of the marshes when they have fished.

He contemplates taking refuge in pleasures which could be extracted from everyday life—a very common refuge in every

⁶ Suetonius, *De vita Caesarum, Divus Vespasianus*, XXIII, 4.

⁷ Suetonius, *op. cit.*, VII, 2; Tacitus, *Historiae*, IV, 81.

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time and every society for all those who have lost faith in common values and one very willingly allowed by the great of this world, the leaders of states and parties since it does not question their power. But the Misanthrope, or the Desperate as the Egyptologists used to call him, finds that this, too, is vanity and that death alone is the escape and the solution:

Death is before me to-day
Like the recovery of a sick man
Like going forth into a garden after sickness.⁸

A solution not so gladly received by some other leaders because it could raise doubts among people on the goodness of the working of the society along the lines they have chosen. But they can hardly prevent it.

Inside such complex societies, with or without a state, there is division of labor, by far exceeding the primitive and universal one according to the sexes. Besides those engaged in work, in government, in defense and war, in the definition of the official ideology and practice of the ritual this ideology requires—peasants and craftsmen, kings and leaders, warriors, priests, engaged in activities required by all societies and reflected in the oldest classifications of social classes or layers—there were people now specialized in trade, in knowledge, in art. There were pursuits likewise necessary for comparatively many people above a certain threshold. But these kinds of specializations have a logic of their own, not necessarily always the logic of the society as a whole. Traders come in contact with other societies and could become more or less detached from the values of their own, all the more if trade is not officially organized by the state as a branch of its management of the society, as was the case, long before the Soviet Union, among the Aztecs, more or less among the Assyrians and at times in India as ideally reflected in Kautilya's Arthaśāstra. Scholars and artists—even primitive ones—could easily fall victims to the wiles of their specialization. There is a

⁸ According to the translations in J. H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience*, New York and London, Ch. Scribner, 1944, p. 172, 174. See too John A. Wilson, in *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, ed. by J. A. Pritchard, 2nd ed., Princeton N. J., Princeton University Press, 1955, pp. 405-407.

general human propensity to what could be called the autonomization of tasks. One engaged in a fascinating task inclines easily to carry on his business to the very end, unshackled, without regard to anything else. For workers, leaders, warriors, priests, generally this tendency is nevertheless for the good of the society. It is not necessarily so for traders, scholars and artists.

Traders, scholars and artists mold their own sectional ideologies and, of course, private ones within the bounds of these sectional ideologies. At times, their ideology, private or sectional, can contradict the ideology of the inclusive society. Private traders incline to lay down their private profit as the supreme value and, on the other hand, to find among foreigners values better prized than those of their own society. Scholars, exercising the mental faculty present everywhere in more or less different forms which is commonly called reason, could be led to inferences at variance with official tenets of their society. Artists fond of their art may become unconcerned by these tenets; this is a common way to go so far as to question them.

Everywhere, when formations take shape above the level of the clans and tribes, which could be called peoples, ethnic groups and even at times nations, with or without a central state, the numerous gods worshipped in adjoining towns or districts begin to get a following outside their primary abode. Colleges of priests begin to look for new worshippers of their own god so as to increase their power and their income. In this way, they begin to vie with one another. Private individuals have a choice to make. Of course, they can worship many gods at the same time. But they often have preferences, they often lay emphasis on one or some of them. Everyone is able to combine his private mixture, at times even to choose a god to the exclusion of all others.

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As societies became larger and larger, more and more complex, grouping in their bosom more and more primary units, as relations between societies became more and more common, as exchange of goods, of persons, of ideas increased, private individuals were more and more faced with making many choices,

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choices between pursuits in life, values, gods. More and more individuals became more or less detached from the ties of a regular life in which everybody knows exactly what to do and how to do it, what to think, whom to worship. They began to think of themselves as private individuals, with private ideas, and not so much as parts of a social whole. They began to want to be saved, themselves and not only their tribe or their people as a whole. And saved for ever.

There is a human longing for the absolute, for carrying things and ideas to their very end. Among every group of men, there are always at least some enthusiasts, some fanatics who incline to endow their private choices with a supreme value. Their god must be better, more powerful than the other gods, he must be universal, he must be unique, he must maintain one's soul in life for ever and this in the most glorious condition.

When there is no choice but to follow strictly the ways of thought and action prescribed by the society and by the functional, specialized groups inside the inclusive society, persons endowed with some quality of mind suffer like people in prison. But when there is choice, more and more choices, people suffer for being without guidance. They ask for some advice, some instructions, some model pointing to the ways of thinking correctly, of acting rightly, of reaching salvation. The less exacting way to receive this guidance is to have good information, put in a convenient and easy way, about the world and what is outside the world, and well-defined precepts about good behavior in this life.

The old ways to find this necessary guidance were no longer in fashion. Many private ideologies were no more in line with the public ones. There were many contradictions between the official gods and what the official priesthoods taught. Even if one wanted to retain some traditional creed, like the devotion to one's people or state, one had to justify that choice. In China, for example, Master Kung was for the most part an upholder of traditional ways, but he said: "There may be those who act without knowledge. I do not. Hearing much and selecting what is good in what I hear and following this; seeing much and

making note of it; this is the secondary kind of knowledge".⁹ Selection implies at least some kind of reasoning.

Guidance presupposes guides. Peoples were asking for new guides, a new kind of guides. In Greece, there were the philosophers. They started from the well-known precepts for knowing the things of this world, for handling them. But they applied them consistently and for all purposes, coming to build all-embracing systems. This was ideology too, getting people out of the maze of the *doxa*, of the common contradictory opinion. But it was too subtle, too intricate for common use. Everyone had to work too hard to find in this whole and complex make-up what could be of use for himself, practical hints for his thought and action.

Marx was in a way unfair to the philosophers of the past when he said that all of them had only before him "interpreted the world in various ways". Many wanted to change it too. But they found no other means than to convince the individuals of the truth of their theories and to leave to them the task of translating these theories into practical acts. People of experience always knew that this was a very long process and not a very efficient one. In a more practical way, some philosophers tried to gain kings and rulers to their views as Plato had done, but this too showed itself to be a method fraught with many pitfalls.

Pythagoras found another way: to set up what I have called a constituted ideological movement. It was a group open to all people convinced of the truth of his ideas, committed to putting them into practice, with rules of conduct, symbols, rites, a hierarchy among the membership, and rules for joining the group and for climbing the rungs of the internal ladder. Significantly, the ideas of the sect were not, like those of other philosophers, outside the realm of religion, but took sides on properly religious matters. Pythagoreanism in the end influenced a Jewish sect called the Essenes which was not without influence itself on the ideas and practice of the founders of Christianity. But this is another story.

People asked as ever for practical guidance, giving hints on

⁹ *Lun-yü*, VII, 27 (not XV, 30 !), ap. E. R. Hughes, *ibid.*, p. 29.

how to act here and now, without too much intellectual search, answering all their problems at the same time, problems about this world and about what could be beyond this world. This guidance must include or replace religion, not leave it outside. Prophets have such answers to give; this is why they always come before philosophers. In the past, there were, as always, national and social struggles. But social and national liberation alone was not a sufficient goal for many people. They knew even then that hegemony for a class or self-government for a people were unlikely to bring all kinds of struggles to an end, they were doubtful that a society without classes and with different peoples on an equal footing could possibly be created unless the powers above were involved. A happy material future for all mankind was obviously out of reach. People could not even imagine, as some do now, that suffering and injustice could be overcome in this world. They wanted to know remedies not only for the ailments of social life but for those of private life too. Such remedies could obviously come only from the other world. Prophets had to be religious prophets.

Most philosophers are in search of a way to salvation as are the prophets. All of them start from a private ideology evolved in their hearts under the contradictory influences of social ideologies and their personalities. So do the prophets. It is an idealist delusion—strangely enough frequent among the followers of a materialist philosophy—to fancy both as first moved by theoretical ideas. Marx started from the ideas of the Age of Enlightenment, as widely popularized among the middle classes when he was a young man, before studying Hegel. Lenin and Trotsky were stirred up by the novel of Chernyshevsky *What is to be done?* before reading Marx. The same story was true for more remote times.

Philosophers and prophets are equally in search of the mystery hidden in the depths of things and of the way to live correctly. But philosophers are more interested in knowledge for knowledge's sake. They want to go into details in this matter, they proceed by reasoning in a more or less cautious way, at a moderate speed, they resign themselves to being able to convince only an elite, picked men, rather than taking short cuts, bypassing a step in the process of reasoning. They may have faith in the

gods, but the revelations of the gods seem to them a too easy way to truth, asking at least for detailed clarification. Prophets are more interested in practice, in finding quickly a teaching which could be received and accepted by the masses, which could guide them on the right path. They take more easily for granted the private ideology from which they started—with or without gods—and the ideas fit to lead the masses to reach the goals assumed to be good by this ideology.

Of course, there were many people in the middle, wavering between the two ways. Such were perhaps the Buddha, Plato, Marx.

Momentous differences appear especially at the stage of the disciples. Private ideologies are embodied in philosophical systems or in prophetic visions, proclamations and appeals. Disciples of philosophers, if philosophers themselves, found schools to teach the intricacies of the system to a chosen intellectually gifted few. Disciples of prophets found churches, chapels, places of worship, organizations, units in which they can give way to their inner fervent feelings, express their faith, debate on the ways and means to disseminate the truth. If they succeed, a comprehensive, large, at times enormous organization can develop with a directing center, branches, and specialized organs.

There are prophets who are kings or rulers at the same time. So were Amenhotep IV (Akhnaton) and Akbar for example. They had all the power of the state to disseminate their ideas. Nevertheless they did not succeed where men without any power like Jesus of Nazareth and Paul of Tarsus launched a worldwide church. To be a armed prophet, as said Isaac Deutscher after Machiavelli, is very useful, but it is not enough. Ideas must appeal to the minds of many people, meet their needs. But one must take into account too that the antagonists of Akhnaton and Akbar, priests of Amon and Moslem *fuqahā'* (divines) were far from being without arms.

If there are kings and rulers who do not succeed in founding a lasting community of followers, a sect, a church, success is even more rare when the prophets are common people, even if there are very striking exceptions as has just been said. When times are ripe for ideological change, many people develop personal ideologies in their hearts, and some voice them openly. Among

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those vocal ideologists, some exercise an influence in their circle and at times in many quarters. In modern times, and in some very complex societies of the past, it is especially so with men of letters. All the constellation of individuals, small groups, circles, and audiences feeling and speaking according to the same lines of thought could be said to be part of a social and ideological movement.

Among all these people, some are really prophets in the sense defined a few minutes ago, founders of a lasting group with a devoted following. They start what could be called a founded or a constituted ideological movement. At times, more often than not indeed, this movement remains a small one and dies after a while. But, in a few cases, it becomes larger and larger, with more and more success among more and more people.

In the midst of such founded ideological movements, many specialized functions, organs and branches develop as in the bosom of a state. But, while the state asks primarily for physical subjection—even if it could be brought to require more—the founded ideological movement, by virtue of its very nature, asks for subjection of minds.

It lays down a ritual by which its members are often reminded that they must think and act in such a way. Like the animals turned into human beings in *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, the well-known fiction by Herbert George Wells, they have to repeat every day: “You must do that, you must not do that, that is the Law”. There are frequent meetings, common prayers, sessions of common study, common repetition of slogans, of dogmatic tenets, of articles of faith, of pledges to be faithful and to act rightly. Even mechanical gestures duly codified could express this subjection of mind. Even when alone the member is supposed to manifest his devotion in the same way. Big Brother or Big Father is supposed to be present everywhere to see the pious performances of the faithful, in the privacy of his most secret abode. The guardians of ideology, especially in Judaism and Islam, have codified meticulously, going into the most insignificant details, the ways to act correctly in all the matters of everyday life, how to eat, how to wipe one’s nose, how to go to the bathroom, so as to be a good Jew or a faithful Moslem. Good, bad, rather good, rather bad, neutral ways of

doing all these necessary acts were classified. Things were not carried to this point in all founded ideologies of the past nor in the present ones. But there is always a tendency in this direction. A common slogan in the Communist movement, at the time of Stalin, was that one must be a Communist twenty-four hours a day.

Fundamentals of the common faith must be protected from oblivion, recorded somewhere so as to be easily referred to if some doubt or some discussion arises, so as to be easily memorized, so as to furnish the faithful with guidelines for his spirit in all circumstances. So, there are books full of precepts of the Law, stories about the lives of the founders and of their forerunners. If these books are too bulky or too abstruse, people draw up abstracts, abridgements, reminders, catechisms, Little Red or Green Books or the like. For the details, there are commentaries, abridgements of commentaries, commentaries of commentaries, handbooks.

All things, all acts, all thoughts are thus fixed and established and are understood as being settled forever. "Make a fence around the Law," said the Rabbis¹⁰ and, inside the fenced space, it would seem that there is no room left for private initiative, for private thought and private ideas, for any discordance, for any bending of the Law, for any change. *E pur si muove*. And yet things are moving.

In wide popular ideological movements, e.g., in the nationalistic revolutions without a constituted organization, people join the movement spontaneously because they suffer from the situation against which it is struggling. According to the ups and downs of the struggle, they can vary in their attitudes, at times ready to submit to an order of things which seems to be unshakeable for the time being and even, since one is always in search of justification for doing what he wants to do or what he is compelled to do, they are able to find some virtues in this situation. But, if some people keep on struggling, the others often have a guilty conscience. When the times are ripe for victory, they join the movement—at least those who have not gone too far in compromising with people in power—forgetting

¹⁰ *Mishnah, Aboth*, I, 1.

easily their former wavering or justifying it. All this gives rise to many shades of private ideologies.

At the beginning of founded or constituted ideological movements and in the times and places of their expansion, people enlist themselves in support of them, join the religion, the denomination, or the party with a full faith and a spirit of self-denial which could easily carry them to the extremes of martyrdom, a joyful martyrdom. Masochism goes very often hand in hand with faith in a cause. But, after a while, the members are only the sons and daughters of the faithful. They are faithful themselves in most cases, of course, either because they have no special reason to doubt the teaching they have received in their childhood, or because the denomination is now strong, perhaps in power, and there are advantages in membership. It could be that they have been convinced enough by internal propaganda, by the regular indoctrination carried out by the church or the party, to such a pitch that they are as faithful as their fathers and mothers have been. It could be ...

Indeed it is so in many cases. But faith no longer has the same meaning. To sacrifice everything in the interests of the cause is a normal consequence of the faith among the first believers, the founders, the conquerors, those dedicated to preaching among unbelievers and some others. But in a very large society there must be workers, peasants, traders, all kinds of civil servants and the like. They have to work, to love, to marry, to beget and to rear children, to build houses, to attend to their households, their undertakings. Most want to be faithful to their God, their King, their Church, their Party all the same. But God, the King, the Church, the Party say that you must live in a normal fashion. Jesus could say at the beginning: "Follow me, and let the dead bury their own dead" (*Matthew*, 8: 22). But now you have to follow him *and* bury your dead. The dead must be buried somehow and there are no more unbelievers to do it. Life is powerful. Through the process of living, of earning one's bread, of loving, of begetting children, of managing one's household and business, of having all kinds of relationships with others, one feels all the fundamental needs of man, all his wishes, wants, impulses and temptations. They ask to be heard, they suggest many things beyond the range of one's professed

ideology and at times against it. And all people cannot always turn a deaf ear to all these suggestions.

Many people try to compromise with them. They could know that some are against the Law they accept. But they begin to think that the Law, in its strict wording, was not made for common people like them. Or perhaps one may put another construction on the wording of the Law. This, perhaps, could not be said openly, lest bad people should misuse in a very bad way the construed, bent Law. In their hearts they begin to build their private rendering of the Law imbued with things which do not come from the Law. This is a private ideology too.

Rulers and clever ideological leaders understand all this process very soon. They know by experience that it is no use trying to make all people follow all the time the Law according to its right construction—right to their minds, of course. One could turn people into rebels or criminals. There is more wisdom in taking for granted their will to stay within the ranks of the community, in leaving them to have their own way within defined bounds, in taking steps to ensure that these shifts will not affect law and order, the good working of the organization, its prosperity, its success, its advance in this wide world full of dangers.

At times, people too get ideas into their heads. Ideas coming from all the world of things not foreseen by the founders, by the Law, by the leaders. Strange ideas sometimes. Things are changing, new problems arise, there are plenty of new experiences, people come in contact with other, foreign ideologies. Some are beginning to think that all was not said in the old body of precepts, perhaps that the leaders have not transmitted the right construction of the Law, have revised it or twisted it. Some are reading the holy books and are struck by the fact that what is written down in their texts is not entirely in agreement with the common interpretation, with the present teaching of the authorities. Courageous people among them publish their discovery abroad at the risk of a punishment which could be easily appalling. Most keep the discovery in their hearts. But this private ideology kept secretly weighs heavily, even in spite of themselves, on their words, on their thoughts, on their deeds and, in this way, on others.

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Leaders and theoreticians have private ideologies of their own. Most of the leaders are faithful in the beginning, few in later days. They know many things which are concealed from the rank and file, they have opportunities for knowing the inside story and for coming into contact with foreigners, even for questioning the transgressors and the heretics. They know that many things must not be disclosed before the masses, lest they lose their faith and destroy the good order of things. This is for their own good of course. But some leaders could begin to think that this is primarily not so much for the good of the masses as for the good of the leaders themselves. Many think that things could be permitted to those burdened by the hard task of guiding others which must not be allowed to common people. Some others (or the same ones) begin to think that, not only at the practical level, but even at the theoretical one, things are unlike what is taught by the doctrine. But this must not be disclosed lest society break up, the good and moral leaders feel. It must not be disclosed lest we lose our power and our privileges, think the selfish and the shameless.

The theoreticians have been given the task of defining and defending the faith. So, they have the right and the duty to argue about it. This is a very dangerous exercise. At least, they are quick to understand that things are not so simple and clear as common people fancy. They find that there is no use in teaching the intricacies of theory to the multitude. So, they keep for themselves their private version of the common teaching. This is an opportunity to develop this version in some special direction, perhaps in a new one, perhaps in a heretic one. They have too to discuss with heretics and unbelievers in order to reduce them to silence. But Bishop Colenso was not the first nor the last to have been convinced by those it was his duty to convince.

* * *

You know that the great linguist Ferdinand de Saussure showed, sixty-five years ago or so, that one must distinguish between language and speech. Language is the abstract, the social model, nowhere present in its fullness, more or less recorded in the

dictionaries and grammars, according to which all those who use a given tongue speak. Speech is what is spoken by every individual, the realization of language in given circumstances, a concrete fact which one can record precisely by writing or in using a tape recorder. Language is a social fact, speech is an individual one. In concretizing the language by the act of speaking everyone gives a personal version of it, with faults, with a special accent, with special features, with all kinds of idiosyncracies. From the mass of private speeches, always in movement, develops a modified norm, a new form of the language.

Society is not language, notwithstanding what some new schools of thought teach. But there are many parallels between them. Private ideologies make the social ideologies move and change. This is the process we can see at work in the whole history of mankind. But this is not a sufficient reason for supposing that perhaps things will go on in this way forever. Power now has much more strength, is endowed with many more means than was the case in the past. It can enforce more strongly than ever conformity to the ideology it has chosen, it can indoctrinate the masses more vigorously than could be done in times past, it has mass media with an unforeseen power to persuade, it could mobilize a whole host of civil servants to disseminate its truth. We are coming near to 1984.

But it seems to me that the factors I have tried to describe for the past in a very shortened, defective and perhaps distorted way are still at work, deep-seated in the very nature of human society, and are tightly linked with necessary features of every possible human society.

Despite the strength of the State and of its means for indoctrinating the masses, everywhere, even in the most totalitarian regimes, the global social ideology meets with dissenters. The prisons, camps, and psychiatric hospitals are an eloquent witness to this fact. If an apparent silence over long periods covers the unexpressed ideologies of these dissidents, the lightest relaxation of the imposed discipline is enough for these ideologies to show themselves, like hundreds of flowers suddenly bursting into bloom. The hidden social struggles, of class, category, clan or clique, attest to the divergencies which group ideologies cannot cover. A thousand examples show us that even those who adhere

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with the greatest fidelity to society's ideology elaborate personal versions of it. The struggles between nations, ethno-national groups, or States do not show the slightest sign of making way for a worldwide unification of the aspirations and ideas which are their expression. Everything works together to show that pure rationality is not enough to give a universal system of values which would integrate in the same way desire, love, suffering and death. No universally acceptable response has yet been given to the questions which men find it unbearable not to be able to answer, and to which their existential orientations, their group interests and aspirations suggest different solutions. They still need guidelines for choosing among the numerous possibilities left open by rational analysis, to find lines of action toward which knowledge can at most orient them and furnish a hope which knowledge cannot guarantee. The time of the prophets, the creators of ideologies and ideological movements with its permanent dialectics of collective elaboration, prophetic synthesis and personal interpretation, of deception and renescent hope gives no sign of running into the harmonious *eschaton* of rational unanimity.