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POLYBIUS ON THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION

I

FOR many years it has been recognized that serious contradictions exist in Polybius' theory of the Roman constitution, as he expounds it in Book VI. The position has been summarized in a review of a recent publication which attempts, not very successfully, to dispose of these inconsistencies.¹ 'The only point of controversy', writes De Sanctis,² 'can be whether these contradictory elements were innate in Polybius' political philosophy and in his judgement on Rome, or whether they represent two successive stages in the historian's thought, and two successive drafts of the book itself, which either the author or the editor failed to co-ordinate.' De Sanctis' own view is, of course, the second;³ and indeed, ever since 1902, when Cuntz, following hints thrown out by La-Roche, Meyer, and Susemihl, first propounded the theory of a revised edition of Polybius' *Staatstheorie*, it has exercised a dominating influence over all work on the subject.

Cuntz himself attributed only a handful of passages, in which Polybius foretold the approaching decline of the Roman constitution,⁴ to a second working-over of the book under the influence of the events of 133. But subsequent investigation led to more drastic dissection; and in 1913 there appeared two simultaneous but independent studies by Svoboda and Laqueur, which have controlled the main lines followed by recent work.⁵ Unfortunately the unacceptable character of much of Laqueur's book, with its attempt to isolate successive editions of the *Histories*, served to obscure the merits of what he had to say on Book VI; and De Sanctis' concise and very valuable discussion in his *Storia dei Romani*,⁶ based largely on Laqueur, has scarcely had the attention it merited, at least in Germany, where it was perhaps overlooked owing to its inaccessibility at the time of its publication. At any rate, the most recent work in the Cuntz tradition, that of Kornemann,⁷ depends in important respects on Svoboda, and does not even mention De Sanctis.

Meanwhile the unitarian position had not been surrendered without a struggle. In 1922 and 1935 works were published by Taeger and Bilz which attempted to maintain the unity of Polybius vi against its critics; and in 1936 an important paper was published by L. Zancan, which, although in some ways a return to the position of La-Roche, nevertheless advanced the question considerably.⁸ In 1857 Paul La-Roche

Note. This paper has been read by Dr. A. Momigliano, Dr. Piero Treves, and Dr. F. Heichelheim, to all of whom I owe valuable suggestions and criticism: they must not be regarded, however, as necessarily accepting my conclusions.

¹ K. Bilz, *Die Politik des P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus*, (Würzb. Stud. Heft vii, 1936): published originally as a Würzburg dissertation, 1935. Bilz, pp. 9 ff., develops the thesis of F. Taeger, *Die Archäologie des Polybios* (1922), 108, that Polybius vi was written in a single piece, and has no inconsistencies or traces of successive versions.

² *Riv. Fil.* lxxv, 1937, 83-4.

³ *Storia dei Romani*, iii. 1 (1916), 205-9; *Encic. ital.* xxvii (1935), s.v. 'Polibio', p. 629. The other alternative is accepted by P. Zillig, *Die Theorie von der gemischten Verfassung in*

ihrer literarischen Entwicklung im Altertum usw. (Diss. Würzburg, 1915), 54-5 (a reference which I owe to Taeger, op. cit. 108, n. 20).

⁴ O. Cuntz, *Polybius und sein Werk* (1902), 37-42. The passages were vi. 9. 10-14; 10. 7 (*ἐνὶ πολὺ* inserted); 51. 3-8; 57.

⁵ K. Svoboda, *Hermes*, lxxii, 1913, 55-83 (particularly 472-8): 'Die Abfassungszeit des Geschichtswerkes des Polybios'; R. Laqueur, *Polybios* (1913), 223-49 (cf. also *Phil. Woch.* 1924, col. 336, reviewing Taeger, op. cit., and *Hermes*, lxxv, 1930, 164-6).

⁶ See above, n. 3.

⁷ E. Kornemann, *Philol.* lxxxvi, 1931, 169-84: 'Zum Staatsrecht des Polybios'.

⁸ L. Zancan, *Rend. Ist. Lombardo*, lxix, 1936, 499-512: 'Dottrina delle costituzioni e decadenza politica in Polibio'.

had published an excellent little pamphlet,¹ in which he traced certain apparent contradictions in Book VI,² and explained them as deriving from the character of Polybius, a man prone to hesitation between opposite principles and incapable of reconciling his ideal constitution with the picture presented by his own unprejudiced observation of the Roman State. Similarly Zancan now argued that the fundamental contradiction between the theory of the mixed constitution and that of circular political development, or *anacyclosis*, did not correspond to any change in Polybius' judgement on the Roman State, but simply to his failure to co-ordinate two inconsistent theories, which he had taken over from his predecessors in the attempt to answer two distinct problems, viz. (1) why had Rome been so phenomenally successful? (2) what was the cause of certain contemporary signs of decadence? The revolutionary aspect of Zancan's treatment lay, however, in his definition of the contradiction presented by the two theories contained in Book VI. Hitherto it had been commonly assumed that Polybius' view of the Roman constitution as a mixture of the three simple forms, and so free from the tendency to deteriorate, which was inseparable from these, also implied its immortality; while the *anacyclosis* was adopted by him to explain certain indications of approaching decay. This view Zancan completely reversed; the 'mixed constitution', he insisted, was only relatively stable, whereas the *anacyclosis*, by reason of its schematic, circular form, left no place for decadence. Herein lay the contradiction between the two conceptions: but it was a contradiction innate in Polybius' own mind and philosophy. Not *Quellenforschung*, but psychological analysis was the clue to the problem.

Now it cannot be denied that Zancan's insistence on psychology has been fruitful; and his argument deserves close study. As he observes, the closed circle of the *anacyclosis*, by which one constitutional form is resolved into another *κατὰ φύσιν*, until eventually the cycle returns to the original form, has no place in it, *logically*, for the idea of decadence;³ on the other hand, in three places at least⁴ it is made very clear that the mixed constitution is only *relatively* stable. What then of those passages which envisage the decline of the Roman constitution, and which Laqueur and Svoboda, and their successors, had connected with the theory of *anacyclosis* (vi. 9. 12-14 (the conclusion of the description of the *anacyclosis*); 51. 3-8; 57)? They are, Zancan replies quite correctly, inconsistent with the *anacyclosis* theory. What vi. 9. 12-14 states is that the Roman constitution has been formed and has grown up naturally (*κατὰ φύσιν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἔχουσιν τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν*) and will undergo a natural decline and change to its contrary (*κατὰ φύσιν ἔξειν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὰναντία μεταβολήν*); and similarly in 51. 3-8 and in 57 it is because all bodies or states have their periods first of growth, then of prime, and finally of decay *κατὰ φύσιν*, and because

¹ Paul La-Roche, *Charakteristik des Polybios* (1857), 18 ff.; particularly p. 31 and n. 2.

² La-Roche pointed out the seeming inconsistency between vi. 9. 13 (linked with 51. 4), in which Polybius envisages the natural decline of the Roman constitution, and 18. 5 f., which describes the equilibrium of the mixed state; and between the definition of the Roman State as a mixed constitution and 51. 5 f., where the Roman success against Carthage is attributed to the predominance of the Senate. La-Roche's view appears almost unchanged in R. Heinze, *Hermes*, lix, 1924, 87 (= p. 160 in *Vom Geiste des Römeriums*, ed. E. Burck, 1938, pp. 142-70).

³ Op. cit. 504-5. This is speaking *logically* and

theoretically. In practice, as we shall see, Polybius maintained his own political preferences even within the closed circle.

⁴ viz. 10. 11 where Lycurgus is said to have preserved freedom at Sparta *πλείστον ὅν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν χρόνον*; 10. 14 where the Roman, like the Spartan constitution, is *κάλλιστον σύστημα τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτειῶν*; 11. 1 where the former is said to have been *κάλλιστον καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς Ἀννιβαϊκοῖς καιροῖς*. Cf. also 10. 7: the mixed constitution remains in a state of equilibrium *ἐπὶ πολὺ* (cf. Taeger, op. cit. 112). See further Bilz, op. cit. 10, who anticipated Zancan in drawing attention to these passages.

Rome is above all others a state whose development is *κατὰ φύσιν* (cf. 9. 13–14), that she too must ultimately decline.

In fact it was nothing new to demonstrate that these passages did not fit in logically with the theory of *anacyclosis*; Cuntz¹ had already analysed the inconsistency in 51. 3–8, and explained it as an attempt to link Polybius' later conviction that the Roman constitution was in decay with his earlier belief in the stability of the mixed constitution. What Zancan did was to put his finger on the equivocation under which Polybius slid over, almost imperceptibly, from the one order of thought to the other. It was in the criterion of *φύσις*.² Both the *anacyclosis* and the conception of the constitution as an organism, subject to growth, prime, and decay, are alike regarded as processes *κατὰ φύσιν*. The phrase is constantly used of either;³ and it serves to hide the approximation of two different conceptions of political development.

To have shown this was a great step forward. But Zancan had still to refute the theory of two successive editions of Polybius vi. For this he relied on the three passages which imply that even the mixed state cannot last for ever (10. 11; 10. 14; 11. 1).⁴ That Polybius' words in these passages contain this implication there can be no doubt; but in any case it was self-evident. In view of the irrefutable fact that Lycurgan Sparta no longer existed, it would have been idle for Polybius, once he had introduced that classical example of a mixed constitution,⁵ to pretend to maintain that this type of constitution was immortal. And so, logically, it must follow that the Roman constitution would some day also come to an end. In ch. 18. 1–8 (a passage which Zancan ignores) this doctrine appears to be contradicted; but in fact all that Polybius says there is that the mixed constitution is the best that can possibly be attained (§ 1), irresistible in its foreign policy (§ 4), and by reason of its delicate system of checks and balances adequate to maintain the *status quo* against all tendency to excess on the part of any of its constituent elements (§§ 5–8). But Polybius is here analysing the *mechanics* of its stability—the means by which, so long as it maintains itself at its prime, it avoids the deterioration peculiar to the simple constitutional forms. There is no contradiction, fundamentally, with the view that ultimately this finely balanced organism, like all others, will decline *κατὰ φύσιν*.⁶ Hence Polybius believes⁷ quite consistently that, though the difficulties are greater, nevertheless with the proper effort it is possible to foresee the future of the Roman (mixed) constitution, like that of other states.

However—and this is the important point—it is not for its ultimate decline that Polybius is interested in the mixed constitution, but for its stability. In one or two places he may betray the fact that *logically* the mixed constitution also is subject to the laws of nature. But the parts of his discussion which stress the *organic* conception of the State (growth, prime, decadence) are all closely connected with the theory of the *anacyclosis*. In 9. 12–14 he is completing his account of that theory; in 51. 3–8

¹ Cuntz, op. cit. 40–1; cf. De Sanctis, *Storia*, iii. 1. 206.

² Zancan, op. cit. 508.

³ e.g. for *anacyclosis*, 4. 7 *φυσικῶς*; 4. 9 *κατὰ φύσιν*; 4. 11; 4. 13; for the 'organic' idea, 9. 13; 9. 14; 51. 4; 57. 1 *ἢ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκη*. But this is not an exhaustive list.

⁴ See above, p. 74, n. 4. De Sanctis (*Storia*, iii. 1. 207; cf. Svoboda, op. cit. 474–5) argues that 11. 1 is one of the passages introduced later to reconcile the mixed constitution with the *anacyclosis*; on this view Polybius, having jettisoned the conception of the Roman constitution as unchangeable, puts its acme at the

time of the Hannibalic War. However, a reference to the Hannibalic War seems wholly in place here, since it is in connexion with the Roman recovery after Cannae that Polybius sets out to discuss the Roman constitution at all (vi. 2. 4 f.). Kornemann seems (op. cit. 170, n. 8) to have ignored this passage, when he claims ch. 11 as one which 'betont vor allem die Stabilität der römischen Mischverfassung'.

⁵ Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* ii. 6. 1265^b, 33 f.

⁶ This point was already seen by Bilz, op. cit. 10, and approved by E. Lincke, *Phil. Woch.* 1936, col. 1168.

⁷ Polyb. vi. 3. 3; see below, p. 80.

Carthage is already in the hands of the *δημος*, while the Roman acme is identified not with the mixed constitution but with the predominance of the Senate (51. 6); finally 57, as Zancan admits,¹ is full of phraseology which closely suggests the last stages of the *anacyclosis*. In short, when he was considering the mixed constitution Polybius was not concerned with the question of ultimate deterioration. As a practical politician he saw no signs of this before 150,² and (as I shall have reason to stress below) Polybius was first and foremost a man of action, who adopted theories to explain what he had observed. 'Vuole essere osservato subito', remarks Zancan with justice,³ 'che Polibio non è, nè pretende di essere, pensatore rigoroso.' Accordingly, we must seek the clues to his thought in the association of ideas which his book actually reveals (*viz.* the association of the mixed constitution with the idea of relative permanence) rather than in such conclusions as his theories may warrant when pressed beyond the point at which he normally left them (*viz.* the conclusion that the idea of the mixed constitution is logically compatible with that of decline).

The first criticism of Zancan's theory is, then, that by forcing Polybius' ideas farther than he himself developed them he seeks paradoxically to associate the idea of decline with the mixed constitution. And as the corollary of this he leaves no place at all in his scheme for the *anacyclosis*. To Zancan the explanation of Roman success lies in the mixed constitution; and the contemporary signs of Roman disintegration spring from the fact that it is the nature of all organisms and constitutions to undergo a process of growth, acme, and decline.⁴ If the sixth book of Polybius was composed in a single piece, no further explanation was required; and the intricate scheme of circular development, elaborated in chapters 4-9, but applying to none of the mixed constitutions (Carthage, Sparta, or Rome), is entirely superfluous;⁵ hence, when in 9. 12-14 Polybius asserts that the theory of the *anacyclosis* will facilitate his readers' comprehension of the future development of the Roman State, he is evidently the victim of serious (and inexplicable) mental confusion.

In fact, though Zancan's analysis of the nature of the mixed constitution successfully explains certain of the alleged inconsistencies in Book VI, it fails to explain why a single draft, composed before the destruction of Carthage in 146, should contain the idea of *anacyclosis* at all. And therefore, pursuing cautiously the lines of criticism developed since 1902, our next task will be to consider whether there is any fresh criterion which will assist in distinguishing that later layer in Polybius' theory which the 'separatists' postulate and Zancan's view denies.

II

A word in common use in Polybius is *μόναρχος* (*μοναρχία*). Usually it means 'tyrant (tyranny)'. Thus Aratus' object was to expel the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, *τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας καταλῦσαι*, and to establish in each state its *πάτριον ἐλευθερίαν* (ii. 43. 8). Somewhat earlier the *μόναρχος* of Bura had joined the Achaean

¹ Op. cit. 507, n. 11. It is true that the approach is not entirely that of the *anacyclosis*, for reasons to be considered below (pp. 83, ff.).

² It is significant that when he undertook to discuss the Roman constitution at all, he was not originally concerned with deterioration, but solely with the explanation of Roman success; cf. iii. 2. 6; 118. 9 f.; v. 111. 10. Zancan, with his assumption of a *double* problem (see above, p. 74), ignores the clear indication of these three passages. I owe this point to Dr. Treves.

³ Op. cit. 500.

⁴ This was, of course, a commonplace by the time of Thucydides; cf. Thuc. ii. 64. 3 (Pericles' defence): *πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι*.

⁵ Taeger, op. cit. 109 (cf. the review by V. Ehrenberg, *Hist. Zeit.* 130 (3. Folge, 34), 1924, 478) believes that the *anacyclosis* was the means by which the Roman mixed constitution grew to its ideal prime; but there is no justification in Polybius for this particular combination, which he arrives at only by a somewhat arbitrary 'reconstruction' of Polybius from Cicero's *De re publica*.

League (ii. 41. 14); and on the death of Demetrius II *οἱ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ μόναρχοι* were much cast down (ii. 44. 3), and very soon Aristomachus of Argos, Xenon of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, *ἀποθέμενοι τὰς μοναρχίας ἐκούωνῆσαν τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δημοκρατίας* (ii. 44. 6). The outrageous behaviour of Philip V at Argos in 209 is described as *μοναρχικώτερος* (x. 26. 2);¹ and similarly at the time of the Third Punic War certain of Rome's critics asserted that her policy savoured of *μοναρχικῆς πραγματοποιίας* rather than of the principles of a civilized state (xxxvi. 9. 11). Elsewhere, discussing the behaviour of mercenaries under democracy and tyranny (xi. 13. 5–8), the historian equates *μόναρχος* with *τύραννος*; and in another passage the tyranny of Molpagoras of Cius is referred to as *μοναρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν* (xv. 21. 2).²

In all these examples *μόναρχος* has the meaning of 'tyrant'. But sometimes it means simply a 'monarch' in a general sense.³ Thus in viii. 8. 4 Polybius criticizes certain writers who have omitted any reference to the Messenian events *διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μονάρχους εὐνοίαν*, viz. autocratic rulers in general and particularly Philip V, the lawful king of Macedon; and a little later, in reference to Philip II and Philip V, he adds (8. 7) that one ought not to revile nor extol *τοὺς μονάρχους* falsely. Such examples are, however, comparatively few, and Polybius' usage may be summed up by saying that for him *μόναρχος* usually means 'tyrant' in a pejorative sense, but that very occasionally the word is used in the neutral sense of 'monarch'.

This is the normal usage, and it is that found in a large number of passages in Book VI. Thus in 3. 9, discussing the corruptions of the three pure forms of government, kingship (*βασιλεία*), aristocracy, and democracy, Polybius speaks of *μοναρχικὰς καὶ τυραννικὰς . . . πολιτείας*, which are very different from the kingship they resemble; hence (3. 10) the eagerness of *μόναρχοι* to appropriate the name of *βασιλεία*.⁴ Accordingly (4. 2), *οὔτε πᾶσαν δήπου μοναρχίαν εὐθέως βασιλείαν ῥητέον*, but only that which is voluntarily accepted by the subjects and where they are governed by an appeal to reason. That *μοναρχία* is here used as the equivalent of 'tyranny', and not in its neutral sense, is clear from the next section (4. 3), where Polybius goes on to say that not every *oligarchy* can be considered an aristocracy; and further, in 4. 6 he defines *μοναρχία* as the specific corruption of *βασιλεία*.

In chapter 10 Polybius again speaks of the three simple forms of constitution, each with its own vice engendered in it and inseparable from it; and again for kingship (*βασιλεία*) it is *ὁ μοναρχικὸς λεγόμενος τρόπος*, for aristocracy oligarchy, and for democracy *ὁ θηριώδης καὶ χειροκρατικὸς*. Here the *μοναρχικὸς τρόπος* clearly corresponds to tyranny. But in 11. 11, where Polybius speaks of the inability of even a native to say with certainty whether the Roman system was aristocratic, democratic, *ἢ μοναρχικόν*, the word appears to be used in a neutral, or even approving sense. From certain points of view, Polybius adds (12. 9), one may pronounce the Roman constitution to be *μοναρχικὸν ἀπλῶς καὶ βασιλικόν*; again the sense is favourable or at least neutral.

From these examples it is clear that in Book VI, as elsewhere, Polybius uses *μόναρχος* normally in the sense of 'tyrant', but also occasionally as a neutral or even favourable term for a monarch in general.⁵ In short, his usage in this book corresponds to that elsewhere in the *Histories*.

¹ He behaved with *ἀσέλγεια* and *παρανομία*, offending *τοὺς μετρίους ἄνδρας*; the context of ideas is that of the 'tyrant', not the 'legitimate monarch'.

² On the use of *τύραννος* (*τυραννίς*) Schweighaeuser's index is inadequate; but it is clearly not so common in Polybius as *μόναρχος*.

³ Similarly in Aristot. *Pol.* v. 10. 1310^b, 1 f.,

βασιλεία and *τυραννίς* are the two forms of the neutral *μοναρχία*.

⁴ Was he perhaps thinking of Nabis, to the Achaeans a tyrant, to others a king? Cf. *Syll.*³ 584 (*IG.* xi. 4. 716); *IG.* v. 1. 885.

⁵ It is worth noting that the only two cases in this book where *μοναρχικώτερος* has its favourable or neutral sense (11. 11 and 12. 9)—*μόναρχος*

But we have yet to consider the use of the word in chapters 4–9 or, more correctly, in the section 4. 7–9. 14. Here, where Polybius is describing the dynamics of the *anacyclosis*, his usage is somewhat different. Having stated in 4. 6 that there are not three forms, but *six* (including the corruptions *μοναρχία*, oligarchy, and ochlocracy), he goes on to say that the first of these to arise *ἀκατασκευώς και φυσικῶς* is *μοναρχία* (4. 7). The next form to follow and spring up out of this *μετὰ κατασκευῆς και διορθώσεως* is *βασιλεία* (4. 7); and this in turn changes into *τὰ συμφυῆ κακά, λέγω δ' εἰς τυραννίδα*.¹ Next come aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and ochlocracy in turn; we need not trace the process in detail. But lest there should be any doubt as to whether Polybius' meaning has been correctly indicated, it may be noted that when he proceeds, a little later, to analyse the series in full detail, and to trace the process by which each change is effected *κατὰ φύσιν*, the first form of human organization, in which men herded together like animals, following the lead of the strongest and bravest, so that the ruler's strength is the sole limit to his power, is again termed *μοναρχία* (5. 9). When men conceived ideas of sociability and companionship, *τοῦτ' ἀρχῆ βασιλείας φύεται* (5. 10: process analysed in ch. 6).² Subsequently, Polybius continues (ch. 7), there ensues a deterioration, by which *ἐγένετο ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας τυραννίς*. The rest of the *anacyclosis* then follows, ending in ochlocracy and chaos, in which people, now become savages again, find a *δεσπότην και μόναρχον*; and the process begins anew.

In this section *μόναρχος* has acquired a new sense. *μοναρχία* is here the stage in the *anacyclosis* preceding *βασιλεία*, while *τυραννίς* follows it. In short, the *anacyclosis* is a succession not of *six* forms (to which Polybius refers in 4. 6: *γένη μὲν ἕξ εἶναι ῥητέον πολιτειῶν*), but of *seven*. This distinction between monarchy and tyranny has been ignored by most scholars who have recently studied this book,³ though it was clear to La-Roche⁴ who distinguished *μοναρχία*, the 'Naturstaat' based on *ισχύς*, from the first 'Rechtsstaat', *βασιλεία*, based on *δικαιοσύνη*, which grew out of it. Nevertheless, *μοναρχία* is an essential stage in Polybius' *anacyclosis*, closing the otherwise unbridgeable gap between the chaos of ochlocracy and the reasoned government of *βασιλεία*; with six state forms the *anacyclosis* simply does not function. Neglect of this vital link of *μοναρχία* is the fruit of excessive concentration on the three *ὄρθαι*

is nowhere so used—are in descriptions of the mixed constitution, where the possibility of the deterioration of the simple form could not arise, and therefore only the three main forms needed to be considered. Even so, in 12. 9 Polybius has added the defining words *και βασιλικόν*. A possible reason for this is suggested below (p. 84, n. 2).

¹ It is particularly regrettable that Paton in the Loeb edition should at this point have translated *μεταβαλλούσης δὲ ταύτης* (antecedent *βασιλεία*) by 'Monarchy first changes . . .', thus introducing a double error and confusion.

² The analysis ends (6. 12) with the words: *και δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βασιλεὺς ἐκ μονάρχου λανθάνει γενόμενος κτλ.*

³ I will give a single example, *tanti nominis causa*. De Sanctis, *Encic. ital.*, loc. cit., states that Polybius vi contains two contradictory theories, that of the mixed constitution and that of the circular development: both of these presuppose *six* constitutional forms. Taeger, op. cit. 27, on the other hand, makes the distinction

between monarchy and *basileia*, but without seeing its importance for the problem of composition; and A. Menzel, *Wien. Sitz.-ber.* (Phil.-hist. Klasse), 216. 1 (1936), 195, n. 1, asks (without answering) what type of *monarchia* is meant by Polybius as the form of government succeeding to ochlocracy (9. 9). This question touches the root of the matter. Menzel envisages the three alternatives—monarch, *basileus*, and tyrant. But it is difficult to believe that the *basileus*, whose rule is associated with *συντροφία, συνήθεια*, and the ideas of goodness and justice, is here to be equated with the *δεσπότης και μόναρχος*, ruling over perfect savages (*ἀποθετηριώμενον πάλιν*); and if the tyrant is meant, we reduce the number of forms in the cycle from six to five and upset the whole scheme of degeneration. In short, there can be little doubt that the *μόναρχος* of the constitution which *πάλιν εἰς αὐτὰ καταντᾷ* (9. 16) is the same as the *μόναρχος* from which the cycle began (4. 7; 5. 9). Cf. R. von Scala, *Die Studien des Polybios* i (1890), 138.

⁴ Op. cit. 20.

πολιτεῖαι and their three related παρεκβάσεις, and not enough attention to Polybius' detailed description of the actual dynamics of the μεταβολή.

Unfortunately, to demand complete consistency in Polybius' use of technical language is to invite disappointment.¹ In the very middle of his account of the *anacyclosis* he twice uses μοναρχία or μονάρχος in its non-technical sense of 'tyrant'. When the behaviour of the tyrant became intolerable, the people combined with the best of their leaders (the future aristocrats) and τὸ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας καὶ μοναρχίας εἶδος ἄρδην ἀνῆρείτο, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἀθθὶς ἀρχὴν ἐλάμβανε καὶ γένεσιν (8. 1); and out of gratitude to τοῖς καταλύσασι τοὺς μονάρχους, they make them their leaders (8. 2). Here the fall of the tyranny is described as the fall of the kingship and the tyranny together, presumably because the tyrant is regarded as a corrupt form of the βασιλεύς. But for τύραννος Polybius has written μονάρχος. Why? Primarily, I think, for the simple reason that he found technicalities irksome, and where he was not likely to be misunderstood would tend to dispense with them. But here there is a special as well as a general explanation. In describing the expulsion of tyrants the successor and admirer of Aratus was on well-trodden ground. Aratus had carried out a persistent campaign, trying wherever possible τὰς μοναρχίας καταλύσαι (ii. 3. 8: quoted above). And so here Polybius writes τοῖς καταλύσασι τοὺς μονάρχους: the familiar event has conjured up the familiar phrase. The stylist and the Achaean politician have combined to catch the political theorist unawares.

In any case, this exception does not affect the points I wish to make; and these are two. First, inside the chapters 4. 7–9. 14, the word μονάρχος (μοναρχία) is found in a special, technical sense, which occurs nowhere else either in Book VI or elsewhere in the *Histories*; and as a corollary to this, the conception of the 'monarch' developed in these chapters is quite isolated, and without any influence on the remainder of Polybius' sociological treatise. Secondly, the *anacyclosis* is described here as a succession of seven constitutional forms, not six, as is claimed in the neighbouring passage, 4. 6. Together, these two considerations seem to me conclusive of the fact that the theory of the *anacyclosis*, as described in 4. 7–9. 14, was conceived at a *different* time, and at a *later* time than the bulk of Book VI; otherwise these two remarkable features might be expected to find some reflection instead of the starkest contradiction in other parts of the discussion.²

III

This conclusion supports the general opinion that the sixth book of Polybius contains two separate strands, written at different times. And it will also be observed that the analysis of Polybius' use of μονάρχος has led us to fix upon 4. 7 as the beginning of the later insertion which describes the process of *anacyclosis*. This confirms the hypothesis of Laqueur, who also placed the break at this point,³ and is in contradiction to that of De Sanctis, who began the section at 3. 1,⁴ and Kornemann, who began it at 3. 9 (καὶ μὴν).⁵ The latter view has already been disposed of by both Zancan and Mesk,⁶ who point out that Kornemann's division splits Polybius in the middle of a continuous argument, and what is virtually a μὲν . . . δέ construction.

¹ For the truth of this, as it concerns *political* technicalities, see A. Aymard's notable study, *Les assemblées de la confédération achaienne* (1938), *passim*.

² There is one possible exception. In 3. 9 the double expression μοναρχικὰς καὶ τυραννικὰς ἤδη τινὰς τεθεάμεθα πολιτείας (see above, p. 77) probably represents a slight attempt at adjustment to a terminology more strictly in accord-

ance with that of the *anacyclosis* passage, which begins a chapter later. I regard it as probable, therefore, that the words καὶ τυραννικὰς were added at the same time as ch. 4. 7–9. 14.

³ Laqueur, *op. cit.* 245.

⁴ *Storia*, iii. 1. 208.

⁵ Kornemann, *op. cit.* 178.

⁶ Zancan, *op. cit.*, 503 and n. 3; J. Mesk, *Phil. Woch.* 1931, cols. 796–8.

Many authorities, says Polybius, distinguish three forms of constitution; we should ask them (3. 6) whether they consider these three *ὡς μόνας ἢ καὶ νῆ Δί' ὡς ἀρίστας τῶν πολιτειῶν*. In both respects they would be wrong; for clearly we must regard as *ἀρίστην μὲν* the constitution that is a combination of all three (3. 7). *καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς μόνας ταύτας προσδεκτέον* (3. 9); for we have witnessed the several debased forms of these three, viz. tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy (3. 9-4. 5). Therefore we should say that there are not three forms but six (4. 6). Plainly this argument, with its double criticism of the view which identifies only three constitutions, is all of a piece and not to be arbitrarily split up. Kornemann's view may therefore be discarded.¹ The *anacyclosis* must begin at 4. 7 or else early in chapter 3.

De Sanctis commences it at 3. 1, on the grounds that 3. 1-4 contains the idea of foretelling the future from the past, which is an essential characteristic of the philosophy of *anacyclosis*. We have already had reason to think, however, that Polybius maintained the belief that one could foretell the future of a state—a fundamental tenet for a historian with a utilitarian purpose²—in connexion with the mixed constitution, and that quite logically, since the latter was not everlasting.³ This view is confirmed by an analysis of the present passage. What Polybius says here is that in the case of those Greek states which have often suffered a rise to greatness and then a change to the opposite, one may describe the past and foretell the future without difficulty, since it is easy to ascertain the known facts of their history and to foretell the future by inference from them (3. 1-2). But in the case of Rome (*a*) the facts are difficult to ascertain *διὰ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῆς πολιτείας*, (*b*) it is difficult to foretell the future *διὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ αὐτοῦς ἰδιωμάτων καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν*. Hence the need for particular attention.

This passage contains a double contrast, partly expressed, partly implied. The ups and downs of the Greek states are opposed to the relative stability of the Roman constitution; and the ease of securing knowledge about the past of the Greeks is contrasted with our ignorance of the 'peculiar features of public and private life at Rome in the past'; hence the difficulty in foretelling the future in the case of Rome. The stability of the Roman constitution is not specifically mentioned; but it is implied in *τὴν ποικιλίαν τῆς πολιτείας*, which is a reference to the mixed constitution by which stability is secured.

Once this double contrast is observed, the purpose of the passage is clear. It is in fact a programme in which Polybius announces his intention of describing (*a*) the *ποικιλία* of the Roman constitution (fulfilled in chs. 11-18), and (*b*) the past institutions of Rome (fulfilled in the *archaeologia* of which fragments only survive in 11 *a*). The contrast with the Greek states is a convenient form of introduction for Polybius' Greek readers. And the reference to foretelling the future is merely a reassertion of the general principle behind the *Histories*; it does not imply the theory of *anacyclosis*, which is not in fact provided for in the programme as here laid down. Chapter 3. 1-4 is thus a further confirmation that the *anacyclosis* section is a later insertion.⁴

From this it follows that 3. 1-4. 6 and 10 are part of the original plan; and in fact

¹ It also follows that Kornemann's termination of the *anacyclosis* section at 10. 6 (*ἄ προϊδέμενος*) must also be rejected, since it rests on a hypothetical continuation of the reference to Lycurgus in 3. 8.

² Cf. xii. 25 b. 3: *ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκείους μεταφερομένων καιροῦς ἀφορμαὶ γίνονται καὶ προλήψεις εἰς τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον*.

³ See above, p. 75 f.

⁴ I agree with Kornemann, *op. cit.* 173, that

the chapters on the army (19-42) look like 'ein gleichzeitig oder nicht allzu lang nachher ausgearbeiteter Nachtrag zum ersten Entwurf'. They do not figure in the programme as laid down in 3. 1-4 (which in any case only covers the first part of the book down to ch. 18); but they undoubtedly reflect Polybius' personal interest in military matters, and there is no reason for thinking them late.

these two passages fit very well together as an introduction to Polybius' detailed discussion of the mixed constitution. The first of these two has been outlined above; in the second Polybius briefly describes Lycurgus' attempt to avoid the deteriorations implicit in each of the simple constitutions by setting up a 'mixed state', similar to that which grew up gradually at Rome, οὐ μὴν διὰ λόγου, διὰ δὲ πολλῶν ἀγώνων καὶ πραγμάτων (10. 14).¹ For such a description of the mixed constitution it was, of course, essential that Polybius should describe not only the three main forms but also their respective παρεκβάσεις, the κακία which τῶν πολιτειῶν συγγενᾶται κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάστη καὶ παρέπεται (10. 4), and which the mixed constitution was designed to eliminate. Thus, after the 'programme' passage (3. 1-4), 3. 5-4. 6 and 10 reinforce and supplement each other, and serve as a preliminary sketch for the more elaborate description of the mixed constitution in 11-18; and at the same time the analogy between Rome and Sparta (the traditional example of the mixed constitution) foreshadows the comparison of constitutions in 43-58. This short preliminary broaching of a topic is typical of Polybius' didactic method; it occurs again in the *anacyclosis* section, where as we saw, 4. 7-4. 10 outlines the process later elaborated in 5. 4-9. 9.

The view that Polybius' comparison of constitutions (43-58) was part of the first draft of Book VI is that of Laqueur and De Sanctis.² Kornemann, however, follows Svoboda in linking it with the *anacyclosis* and regards it as part of the second draft.³ For this view he offers four reasons: (1) In these chapters the comparison is extended to other constitutions, the Athenian, Theban, Mantinean, Cretan, and Carthaginian as well as the Lycurgan. (2) The comparison goes deeper; the moral life of the people (47. 1: ἔθῃ καὶ νόμοι) is now taken into account.⁴ (3) The theory of evolution is now pressed throughout, in contrast to the emphasis on the 'mixed state', characteristic of the first draft. (4) Polybius now formulates the possibility of 'foreseeing the future' (57. 4: προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος), which depends on the *anacyclosis*. These points, unequal in weight though they are, require some consideration.

The second and fourth are briefly dealt with. It is of course true that Polybius goes beyond merely constitutional questions, and penetrates to the moral qualities of the states he discusses. But there is no reason why this broadening of scope should be associated with the *anacyclosis* rather than the mixed constitution. Once a comparison is instituted, it is a natural development to extend it to include general aspects of the peoples compared; and Polybius could have made this equally well at any time.⁵ Similarly, as we have already seen,⁶ the idea of foreseeing the future is common to both the *anacyclosis* and the mixed constitution. The passage to which Kornemann refers (57. 4) is, as it happens, closely connected with the conception of the future determination of Roman society, and is probably, as Cuntz saw, a later

¹ In ch. 10. 1-2 the words "ἐκεῖνος (i.e. Lycurgus) γὰρ ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων συννόσας ἀναγκαίως καὶ φυσικῶς ἐπιτελούμενα, κτλ." must in their present form be a link, introduced to join the *anacyclosis* section with what follows (cf. Laqueur, op. cit. 245). But there is no reason to follow Laqueur and Cuntz in seeing further insertions or adaptations in 10. 4-5 and 10. 7.

² Laqueur, op. cit. 243 ff. (the elaborate stratification and the chronology are to be rejected); De Sanctis, *Storia*, iii. 1. 206 f.

³ Kornemann, op. cit. 173 ff.; Svoboda, op. cit. 473.

⁴ This argument was given prominence by A. Passerini, *Stud. ital. fil. class.* N.S. xi, 1934,

43, who, like Kornemann, assumed that such passages as ch. 57 contain a genuine prophecy of the disruption of Roman society. Subsequently, in a review of Bilz, op. cit., in *Gnomon*, xiii, 1937, 238, Passerini declared himself converted to the complete 'unitarian' position; the attempt to detect contradictions and different strata in Polybius vi was now rejected as 'una critica ora, sembra, superata'.

⁵ Cf. i. 13. 12: at the time of the first Punic War both Rome and Carthage were uncorrupted in morals. Clearly Polybius was interested in this aspect from the start.

⁶ See above pp. 75-6 and 80, criticizing De Sanctis' view that 3. 1-4 is to be associated with the *anacyclosis* section.

insertion. But this has nothing at all to do with the use of the phrase *προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος*; and the futility of trying to use this as a criterion of stratification or chronology is evident from the fact that 3. 1-4, which contains exactly the same phrase (3. 2), is (rightly) attributed by Kornemann to the first draft.¹

The extension of the comparison geographically from Lycurgan Sparta to Athens, Thebes, Mantinea, Crete, Carthage, and even Plato's *Republic* is also alleged by Kornemann to indicate the late composition of the comparative chapters. However, Athens and Thebes are only mentioned to be ruled out of court, nominally to help at arriving at a clear conception of what was being compared, actually to give the Achaean statesman a chance to castigate two states for which he shows a marked dislike.² Mantinea is not mentioned again after the preliminary reference in 43. 1;³ and Crete is only introduced in order that its inferiority to Lycurgan Sparta may be stressed. Both in the case of Crete and in that of Plato's *Republic*, which is also dismissed as irrelevant to the discussion (47. 7-10), the tone of polemic against previous writers is unmistakable.⁴ Eventually the only new state actually brought into comparison with Rome proves to be Carthage. And since the discussion of the Roman constitution was deliberately introduced at a point in the *Histories* which links it closely with Rome's success against Hannibal, viz. after the account of the battle of Cannae at the end of Book III,⁵ it is difficult to imagine that Polybius did not plan this comparison in his first draft, as an essential feature of any constitutional discussion at this juncture.⁶

In this connexion a strong argument against Kornemann exists in chapter 51, which undoubtedly falls into the context of passages which apply the conception of a natural rise, acme, and decline to all states. Various features serve to divide this chapter from 52, which completes the comparison of Rome and Carthage.⁷ The comparison is specifically applied to the time of the Hannibalic War, not cast in general terms, as in the next chapter; and, what is more important, Carthage is represented as having been at that time already on the decline, because the *δῆμος* had acquired the chief voice in deliberations, whereas Rome was still at her prime, since *ἀκμὴν εἶχεν ἢ σύγκλητος*. While it would be an exaggeration to say that this chapter falls completely into line with the theory of the *anacyclosis*, its ideas are decidedly not those of the mixed constitution, however much one stresses the evolutionary background of this theory; for clearly it is a contradiction of the 'mixed constitution' to attribute the prime of the Roman constitution to a time when the aristocratical element was predominant.⁸ This chapter 51 will be discussed again below; let it

¹ Op. cit. 172; 178. Kornemann believes the insertion of the second draft to have begun at 3. 9.

² Examples of Polybius' well-known prejudice against Athens and Thebes (or Boeotia) are: v. 106. 6-8; xviii. 14. 10; xxx. 20. 1-7 (Athens); iv. 31. 5; xx. 5. 1 f.; xxii. 4 (Boeotia).

³ Mantinea is not classed with Athens and Thebes. But it can be assumed that Polybius intended to treat it severely. His attitude towards the town may be judged from ii. 48, a passage which Kornemann mentions, though it militates against his view (op. cit. 174, n. 21) that 'Polybios nahm an dieser Stadt . . . besonderen Anteil'.

⁴ Cf. 45. 1, with its references to Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato (Crete); 47. 7: *ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τινὲς τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐξυμνοῦσιν* (Plato's *Republic*).

⁵ Cf. iii. 2. 6; 118. 9 f.; v. 111. 10. Books IV and V are devoted to the contemporary events in Greece and Syria.

⁶ It is noteworthy that Cato had discussed the Carthaginian constitution as an example of the *μικτή*: Serv. ad *Aen.* iv. 682.

⁷ These features do *not*, however, include the past tenses of 51, which De Sanctis (*Storia*, iii. 1. 206) regards as a proof that ch. 51 was composed after 146. As I have explained, I think this exceedingly likely. But the past tenses have nothing to do with whether Carthage still existed; they merely indicate that Polybius was dealing with a definite time in the past. See further below, p. 84, n. 1.

⁸ Bilz, op. cit. 10 f., is aware of this difficulty; but his solution of it is inadequate. He argues: (1) vi. 10. 12 reveals the same view of the growth of the Roman constitution as the work of many

suffice here to stress that its ideas suggest a late origin. Kornemann, having committed himself to the view that the comparative chapters belong to the second draft, is obliged, by reason of chapters 52 and 56, which speak of Carthage as still in existence, to date this second draft to the period *before* 146. But if 51 is later than 52, one is then in a dilemma from which the only escape is Laqueur's desperate and unacceptable hypothesis of a series of successively modified editions.

Finally, it is alleged that the evolutionary idea is stressed throughout the comparative chapters. Admittedly growth and decline are mentioned in connexion with Athens and Thebes (43-4), and for this reason De Sanctis too attributes these chapters to the second draft. It is, however, a complete fallacy to assume that *any* reference to the growth and decline of *any* state stamps the passage in which it occurs as part of the later draft, and associates it with the theory of *anacyclosis*. Apart from the fact that the mixed constitution had its growth and ultimate decline, Polybius insists throughout that swift corruption was an inseparable feature of all the simple constitutional forms. And it is not suggested that Athens and Thebes were ever stable constitutions. On the contrary, Polybius stresses (43. 5-44. 2) that both owed their short-lived success not to their constitution but to a few brilliant individuals; the normal and usual condition of these two states is described (44. 9) in terms approximating to those applicable to ochlocracy.¹ The Lycurgan constitution, on the contrary, though earlier traditions may have seen it as part of a defined process,² is to Polybius a divine dispensation—*θειοτέραν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων*—a phrase which suggests the reverse of evolutionary development.³ In short, once those passages which we have reason to regard as part of the second draft (51 in its present form; 57) are subtracted, there is nothing in 43-57 which is not entirely consistent with the theory of the mixed constitution.

To sum up: Polybius' sixth book appears to contain two strands. The earlier version⁴ (including 2-4. 6; 10; 11-18; 19-42 (probably); 43-50; 52-6 of the present Book VI) was a study of the Roman constitution as the best example of the *μικτή*, a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, which avoids the tendency of each of the simple forms to deteriorate into its peculiar corruption, and so achieves a considerable degree of stability and relative permanence. After a short introduction in which the nature of the *μικτή* is briefly outlined, and a comparison drawn between the constitutions of Rome and Lycurgan Sparta, Polybius proceeds to give first an account of the early Roman institutions and history, and after it a full analysis of the constitution. Finally, after a discussion of the Roman army, which was an equally

men, not one (like the Spartan), that appears as Cato's opinion in Cic. *De rep.* ii. 1. 2, i.e. that it is typically aristocratic—to which the answer is that the contrast which Polybius stresses is not that between one and many, but between *φύσις* and *λόγος*. (2) The mixed constitution has only a 'verfassungsrechtlich' triple form; actually the Senate is predominant, cf. vi. 13. 9. Bilz, after the manner of La-Roche, then concludes that Polybius, seeing a successful form of compromise at Rome, forced it violently into the scheme of the 'mixed constitution' of Greek theory. This is really no explanation at all of why Polybius in one place speaks of a mixed constitution and in another of an aristocracy!

¹ It need hardly be said that this does not necessarily link these chapters to the theory of *anacyclosis*; ochlocracy is the specific corruption

of democracy, which is avoided by the setting up of a mixed constitution.

² Cf. V. Ehrenberg, reviewing Taeger, op. cit., in *Hist. Zeit.* cxxx (3. Folge, 34), 1924, 479, quoting various fourth- and third-century authorities; following Taeger, Ehrenberg here identifies aristocracy with the mixed constitution.

³ Even if one agrees to give it only a conventional meaning; cf. Ehrenberg, *Alexander and the Greeks* (1938), 73, n. 1.

⁴ This earlier version clearly links up with Polybius' first plan for a history going down to 167; see R. Thommen, *Hermes*, xx, 1885, 205 f., who compares vi. 2. 3 (with its reference to the whole world falling under Roman domination in less than 53 years) with the similar statement in i. 1. 5. Cf. above, p. 76, n. 2.

important factor in Roman success, he appends a comparison of the Roman, Spartan, and Carthaginian constitutions: of these the Spartan is introduced as the classical example of the *μικτὴ πολιτεία*, the Carthaginian because it is in connexion with the aftermath of Cannae that the Roman constitution is discussed at all. Later Polybius added a second strand to his discussion (4. 7–9. 14; addition or substitution of 51. 4–8;¹ 57; perhaps, but not necessarily, 58; and a few insertions here and there)² when the deterioration of the Roman constitution, always a theoretical possibility, had begun to loom prominently before his eyes. These later insertions are, as we saw above when discussing Zancan's theory,³ not all consistent with each other. Not only is there a contradiction between the earlier stratum which, while logically admitting the evolution of the Roman constitution, in fact laid all its emphasis on its stability, and the later passages which are permeated with the idea of change; but in these late passages there is a contradiction between that which outlines the schematic *anacyclosis* and those which speak of a law of growth, acme, and decline—a contradiction partially concealed under Polybius' equivocal use of the concept of 'nature'.⁴ It is these latter passages which seem to reveal the results of Polybius' own observation and so to provide an indication of why he was led to modify his philosophy of the Roman constitution.

IV

The possibility that Polybius derived his idea of the mixed constitution from Dicaearchus of Messana⁵ was considered by Schmekel and Susemihl, but rejected by the former because Dicaearchus believed in an early blessed condition of mankind.⁶ So long as Book VI was treated as a whole, there were indeed serious obstacles to accepting Dicaearchus as Polybius' source. But once Cuntz had propounded the theory of two drafts, it became clear that the earlier layer, with its belief in the relatively stable mixed constitution as an explanation of Roman success, was an inheri-

¹ As we saw, 51 differs from 52 in applying the constitutional comparison specifically to the time of the Hannibalic War (whereas the other features of comparison in 52 are mentioned in general terms). This difference may well go back to the first draft (see above, p. 75, n. 4); but the *details* of the comparison in 50 definitely brand it as a later insertion. Hence it is possible that §§ 4–8 (Laqueur would begin at *χείρον* in § 3) represent a later substitution for a version which corresponded more closely to the presumptions of the theory of the mixed constitution.

² Some scholars, particularly Cuntz, Laqueur, and De Sanctis, have suggested several insertions in chs. 10–12, viz. 10. 1 (reference to the *anacyclosis*); 11. 1 (Roman constitution at its height at the time of the Hannibalic War); 11. 11–13 (past tenses and transition to presents in 11. 13); 12. 10 (vague reference to future changes). With the exception of the first reference (10. 1: discussed above, p. 81, n. 1), all these are explicable as part of the first draft, on the assumption (a) that the mixed constitution was not everlasting, (b) that Polybius was *specifically* concerned with the period in reference to which he inserted his discussion at this point (viz. the years after Cannae), but tended for convenience to express much of his discussion of the Roman constitu-

tion, as later much of his comparison between the Roman and Carthaginian constitutions, in *general* terms, using present tenses. It was only afterwards, when he was impressed by the imminence of Roman decline, that this gap between the Hannibalic War and his own time assumed a real significance. It has already been suggested that in 12. 9 the words *καὶ βασιλικόν* (like the addition *καὶ πυρηνικός* in 3. 9: see above, p. 79, n. 2) were inserted later, probably in an attempt to adjust the earlier expression to fit the more precise terminology of the *anacyclosis* passage (see above, p. 77, n. 5).

³ See above, pp. 74 f.

⁴ These passages are 9. 12–14; 51. 4–8; 57. In chs. 43–4 Polybius had already applied the conception of growth, acme, and decline in discussing the unstable constitutions of Athens and Thebes (see above, p. 83).

⁵ It is of course older than Dicaearchus; see above, p. 75, n. 5.

⁶ A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (1892), 64–5; Susemihl, *Gesch. der gr. Litt. in der Alexandrinerzeit*, ii (1892), 99, n. 75. The suggestion also appears in Newman, *Politics of Arist. ii* (1887), p. xiv; it was first made by Osann, *Beitr. zur gr. u. röm. Literaturgesch.* (1839), 23 ff.

tance from Dicaearchus' *Τριπολιτικός*, with its discussion of what Photius termed the *εἶδος πολιτείας Δικαιαρχικόν*.¹ This theory was suggested by Bury in 1909,² but first clearly developed by Laqueur, who also claimed to see some influence from Cato on Polybius' first draft.³ The later conception of the *anacyclosis* both Bury and Laqueur attributed to Panaetius of Rhodes, the representative of the Middle Stoa, whose association with the Scipionic circle is well known,⁴ and this division, already foreshadowed by Susemihl,⁵ has found general acceptance.⁶ It is, however, worth noting that in discussions of the *anacyclosis* two quite distinct questions have tended to be confounded; for it has been assumed that to ask 'When did Polybius first become acquainted with the theory of *anacyclosis*?' is the same as asking 'When did he first admit its application to the Roman constitution?' I stress this, because unless we are prepared to assume quite arbitrarily that viii. 24. 1 is a late insertion, this passage on Tarentum suggests that at a fairly early date Polybius was acquainted with the conception of a natural evolution of democracy (*ἐλευθερία* cf. vi. 57. 9) into despotism (*ζητεῖ δεσπότην*). This is something very near to the *anacyclosis*,⁷ and we may note at the outset that it suggests that Polybius was *acquainted* with the theory long before he could have learnt it from Panaetius.

However, to distinguish two layers and assign these to Dicaearchus and either Panaetius or his predecessors is of little use in itself. What we have to decide is why and when Polybius came to modify his earlier view. A popular explanation, suggested by Unger and Ed. Meyer,⁸ was that Polybius was convinced of the coming fall of the Roman constitution after witnessing the events of Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate; and Meyer pointed out a reference to Flaminius' land-law of 232 as *ἀρχηγὸν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ δήμου διαστροφῆς* (ii. 21. 8)—a judgement only intelligible in the light of events of a century later. Meyer's view was adopted by Cuntz and Bury, and by De Sanctis,⁹

¹ Photius, *cod.* 37, p. 8 a, 2 f. For the most recent discussion of Dicaearchus see F. Solmsen, *Philol.* lxxxviii, 1933, 238 ff., and F. Egermann, *Wien. Sitz.-ber.* ccciv. 3 (1932), 55 ff., and particularly 61, n. 1. Egermann rightly rejects Wilamowitz's explanation of *Δικαιαρχικόν* as a common formation, meaning *ubi regnat iustitia* (*Hellen. Dichtung*, i. 64, n. 1). The *Τριπολιτικός*, in which the theory of the mixed constitution is most probably developed, is mentioned by Cicero, *ad Att.* xii. 32 and by Athen. iv. 141 a (extract quoted). See Martini, P.-W., s. v. 'Dikaiarchos', cols. 550-2.

² *Ancient Greek Historians*, 204 ff.

³ Op. cit. 248 ff.; cf. *Hermes*, lv, 1930, 165. The influence of Cato is also assumed by Schmekel, op. cit. 84; Ciaceri, *Rend. Linc.* (Sc. Mor.), S.V. xxvii, 1918, 236-49, 266-78; 303-15; Kornemann, op. cit. 171, n. 11; Bilz, op. cit. 10; E. Sarrazin, *Das Führerideal des Polybios* (Diss. Breslau, 1934), 57-8; and see above, p. 82, n. 6. But as Ehrenberg points out (*Hist. Zeit.* cxxx (3. Folge, 34), 1924, 480), it is not susceptible of proof.

⁴ See Susemihl, op. cit. ii. 63-80.

⁵ *Ibid.* 73; 74, n. 56; 99, n. 75.

⁶ For discussion of Panaetius and Polybius see, besides the works of Schmekel and Susemihl (above, p. 84, n. 6), R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, ii (1892), Exkursus 7, 841 ff.; and R. von Scala, *Die*

Studien des Polybios, i (1890), 223 ff. (cf. Kornemann, op. cit. 179-80). Dicaearchus receives attention in the recent discussion on the sources of Cicero's *De re publica*; see the bibliography by E. Burck in R. Heinze's *Vom Geiste des Römertums* (1938), pp. 291-2, and add W. Jaeger, *Berlin. Sitz.-ber.* 1928, 420-1: 'Über Ursprung u. Kreislauf des philosophischen Lebensideals' (Dr. Treves informs me that an enlarged edition of this essay appeared in Italian as an appendix to the Italian translation of Jaeger's *Aristotle* (1935); on Dicaearchus see p. 599 f.; 616-17); R. Philippson, *Phil. Woch.*, 1930, cols. 1171-84 (reviewing N. Wilsing, *Aufbau u. Quellen von Ciceros Schrift 'De re publica'* (Diss. Leipzig, 1929)); P.-W., s.v. 'M. Tullius Cicero' (1939), col. 1116; W. Schur, *Klio*, xxix, 1936, 64-5. In his *Reden u. Vorträge*, ii² (1926), 199, Wilamowitz denies any influence of Panaetius on Polybius; cf. *Glaube der Hellenen*, ii. 394, 396.

⁷ Cf. W. Hoffmann, *Hermes*, lxxi, 1936, 18.

⁸ Unger, *Philol.* xli, 1882, 617, n. 15; Ed. Meyer, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gracchen* (1894), 8 (= *Kleine Schriften*, i² (1924), 374).

⁹ Cuntz, op. cit. 41; Bury, op. cit. 208; De Sanctis, *Storia*, iii. 1. 206; cf. too Laqueur, *Hermes*, lxxv, 1930, 165; W. Schur, *Sallust als Historiker* (1934), 62 f. It appears most recently in G. Boccadoro, *La civiltà cattolica*, i. 1938,

who rightly neglected Svoboda's objections,¹ and insisted that the passages in which Polybius foresees the rise of popular elements at Rome may well be a *vaticinium ex eventu*. Recently, however, Kornemann has attempted to explain Polybius' change of view as purely philosophical in origin, and connected with the influence of Panaetius operating (even before 146) in the salons of the Scipionic circle.²

Now quite apart from any argument to be drawn from viii. 24. 1,³ it cannot be too strongly emphasized that Polybius was first and foremost a man of action, an Achaean politician, statesman, and general; that his *Histories* dealt with political action and were designed to assist future politicians; and that they everywhere reflect these origins and this purpose.⁴ Polybius was not a philosopher. Not only was he incapable of fabricating a system so complicated as the *anacyclosis*—this is generally admitted—but he is unlikely to have been moved to apply such a system to the Roman constitution on purely philosophical grounds. On the face of it, then, Kornemann's theory bears the stamp of improbability, because it is inconsistent with what we know of the historian's character.⁵ If gradually Polybius felt constrained to lay more and more emphasis on the mortality of the Roman constitution, and less upon its relative stability, it was because events forced this view upon him, and because in fact he personally believed that he saw signs of imminent decay. This is clear from a consideration of one of those passages which, we have seen, develop the conception of growth, acme, and decline, which was always implicit, but scarcely more, in the theory of the mixed constitution, and so serve to bridge the gap which separates the latter theory from that of the *anacyclosis*.

In chapter 57 Polybius rounds off his comparison of the Roman with the Spartan and Carthaginian constitutions with a prophecy of the decline of the former into ochlocracy or mob-rule. The process by which this is to come about is carefully analysed and bears a close resemblance to the last stage but one in the *anacyclosis* as outlined in 9. 4–9; but there are two differences. First, Polybius betrays the sympathies of the Achaean oligarch when he characterizes this last stage as τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων τὸ κάλλιστον . . . , τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν, τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων τὸ χεῖριστον, τὴν ὀχλοκρατίαν (57. 9).⁶ In this formulation—quite distinct from that of the *anacyclosis* section, where democracy and ochlocracy are two successive stages in an eternal progression—we hear the authentic voice of prejudice, of the Achaean leader and friend of Scipio; here is the freshness of experience personally apprehended and not yet accommodated to a dry, philosophical scheme. Secondly, the decline into democracy-ochlocracy takes its start not from something abstract—the internal movement of society κατὰ φύσιν—but from the extravagance and rivalry of one citizen against another which inevitably follows upon a period of long-established prosperity, based on supremacy and uncontested sovereignty—ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδμήριτον—in short, as one of the fruits of empire.⁷

This supremacy and uncontested sovereignty was of course no figment of political theory; it was a fact of history dating from the destruction of Carthage and Corinth in 146. Polybius witnessed the fall of Carthage in Scipio's company;⁸ his confused

145–58: 'L'idea di Roma in Polibio', an essay from which Dr. Treves kindly sent me a résumé of the relevant passages.

¹ Svoboda, *op. cit.* 472–3, dates the composition of ch. 51 before 146, on the grounds that it is part of the comparison of constitutions, which presupposes the existence of Carthage!

² *Op. cit.* 180 ff.

³ See above, p. 85.

⁴ Cf. ix. 2. 5; and see Bury, *op. cit.* 199 f.

⁵ On this point I am in complete agreement

with Bilz, *op. cit.* 9.

⁶ Similarly in 51. 6 the acme at Rome is identified with aristocracy.

⁷ It is noteworthy that Polybius' observation of this process has influenced his schematic account also; the passage from democracy to ochlocracy within the *anacyclosis* is more fully described than any of the other changes (9. 4–9). This point is recognized by Laqueur, *Hermes*, lxxv, 1930, 166.

⁸ Polyb. xxxviii. 22. 3 (= App. *Pun.* 132).

feelings about the second catastrophe are reflected in his uneasy analysis of how the Greeks reacted to it (xxxvi. 9).¹ That he regarded the year 146 as decisive in the evolution of Rome is here made abundantly clear. Standing aside himself—explicitly and exceptionally²—he puts forward as the view of certain of the Greeks that, whereas formerly Rome had been satisfied with an admission of defeat, she now exterminated her enemies root and branch; while others condemned the Roman action as smacking of *μοναρχικῆς πραγματοποιίας . . . μάλλον ἢ πολιτικῆς καὶ Ῥωμαϊκῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ προσεοικὸς ἀσεβήματι καὶ παρασπονδήματι*. As Gelzer observes, Polybius regretted the process, but admitted its inseparability from the conquest of ἀρχή (9. 4) and δυναστεία (9. 3); and in a formula now preserved only in Diodorus (xxxii. 2 and 4), but certainly deriving from Polybius,³ the whole matter is succinctly stated: ὅτι οἱ τὰς ἡγεμονίας περιποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι κτάνται μὲν αὐτὰς ἀνδρεία καὶ συνέσει, πρὸς αὐξήσῃν δὲ μεγάλην ἀγούσιν ἐπεικεῖα καὶ φιλανθρωπία, ἀσφαλίζεται δὲ φόβῳ καὶ καταπλήξει.⁴

According to Plutarch, *Cato*, 27. 3 f., Nasicas's opposition to the destruction of Carthage sprang from a fear of the people;⁵ and Gelzer⁶ has underlined some of the incidents of the years following 151 which may have alarmed him. It is unnecessary to repeat his arguments here. The point I would make is that whether Polybius was finally led to assume the imminence of a decline of the Roman constitution as a result of Tiberius Gracchus' tribunate or not—and I regard the evidence on this point as still indecisive⁷—those events are not to be regarded as isolated or entirely novel, but rather as part of a movement which was already thrusting itself on the notice of members of the Scipionic circle by about 150 B.C.;⁸ and that from the time of the

¹ This chapter receives detailed attention in the essay of Ch. Saumagne, *Rev. Hist.* clxvii, 1931, 225–53; clxviii, 1931, 1–42: 'Les prétextes juridiques de la IIIe guerre punique'. Saumagne points out the juridical form taken both by the pro-Roman and anti-Roman propaganda, as Polybius reveals it here; but his assertion that Polybius himself accepted this Roman case entirely at its face value (op. cit. clxviii, 1931, 10) is not convincing. Polybius saw deeper than that (cf. xxxvi. 2. 1–4); he had at least the perception of a Nasicas Corculum. See also Bilz, op. cit. 30–1, and L. Zancan, *Atti del r. Ist. Veneto*, xcv. 2, 1935–6, 529–601: 'Le cause della terza guerra punica'. (Zancan—whose work was written at the time of the Italo-Abyssinian War—tries to show that the Third Punic War was due ultimately to the unaccommodating attitude of Carthage, and her attempt to pursue a policy disproportionate to her strength, 'contro la realtà'.)

² Cf. xxxvi. 1. 1–7.

³ Cf. E. Schwartz, P.-W., s.v. 'Diodoros (38)', cols. 689–90.

⁴ It is no contradiction of the above that in xxxviii. 1. 5, contrasting the Carthaginians with the Achaeans, Polybius asserts with stylistic meiosis that the former τὸν ἔσχατον ἀπολογίας γε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους περὶ σφῶν ἀπέλειπον. Much of this paragraph depends on the excellent essay of M. Gelzer, *Philol.* lxxxvi, 1931, 261–99: 'Nasicas Widerspruch gegen die Zerstörung Karthagos', the relevance of which for the question of Polybius' political views is observed by Zancan, *Rend. Ist. Lombardo*, lxix, 1936, 520.

Gelzer's essay should be studied in conjunction with the very suggestive work of Saumagne, quoted above, n. 1.

⁵ Cf. App. *Pun.* 69; Diod. xxxiv. 33. 4–6; Oros. iv. 23. 9; Florus, i. 31. 5; Zon. ix. 30. 7. See further, Bilz, op. cit. 22 f. The analogy between this argument and the analysis of Polyb. vi. 57 has not escaped notice; cf. Gelzer, op. cit. 277; Bilz, op. cit. 25 (who seems, however, to contradict himself later, 31, when he identifies the standpoint of Polybius with that of Cato).

⁶ Op. cit. 285 ff. Also Saumagne's analysis of Nasicas's arguments (*Rev. Hist.* clxviii, 1931, 30 ff.), which is based on Gsell's hypothesis (*Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, iii. 329, n. 6; cf. L. Zancan, *Atti del r. Ist. Veneto*, xcv. 2, 1935–6, 577, n. 42; 591, n. 54) that the arguments in Appian, *Pun.* 61 f., which nominally refer to 202, in fact reflect those used by Nasicas at the time of the Third Punic War, is substantially in accordance with this interpretation.

⁷ Polybius' criticism of Flaminius' land bill in ii. 21. 8 (see above, p. 85) is not decisive, since the significance and the implications of land-legislation must have been clear to the Scipionic circle at least as early as the successful attempt to dissuade C. Laelius from such legislation during his consulship in 140 B.C.; on Laelius' land-bill (Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 8. 5) see Münzer, P.-W., s.v. 'C. Laelius (3)', col. 406; Bilz, op. cit. 47–8; J. Göhler, *Rom und Italien* (= Breslauer hist. Forsch., Heft 13, 1939), 99–100.

⁸ Cf. Bilz, op. cit. 13; G. Busolt–H. Swoboda, *Griech. Staatskunde*, i (1920), 99.

destruction of Carthage and Corinth, Polybius was being compelled by the pressure of events to change the emphasis in his view of the Roman constitution, until eventually he had reached a frame of mind in which he recognized in the Stoic *anacyclosis* a more adequate explanation of its development than in the mixed constitution of Dicaearchus.¹ Accordingly, at some date subsequent to 146 he drafted the new chapters, both those in which he expressed the convictions based on his new observations (51 and 57), and the schematic account of the *anacyclosis*, including the concluding paragraphs (9. 12–14) which act as a link between old and new; for, either because the mixed constitution had never been regarded as *absolutely* permanent and Polybius' conversion to the idea of change had been gradual, or because the book was not given a final revision, the earlier chapters were never excised, and the mixed constitution remained, with the stress now laid upon its role at the time of the Hannibalic War.

V

This essay has a twofold purpose. First, I have not tried to propound any novel or striking theory of the composition of Book VI of Polybius, but rather to re-examine and co-ordinate the arguments which various scholars have at divers times put forward; in particular, I have attempted to sort the wheat from the chaff in the two papers of Kornemann and Zancan, both of which possess positive merits but must, I suggest, be regarded as retrograde in their general conclusions. Secondly, I hope to have reinforced the view that the development in Polybius' *Staatstheorie* represents its author's reaction to the issues raised by the growth of the Roman Empire in the second century B.C.² Surveying the process from outside, as a foreigner, yet in close contact with the keen sensibilities of the Scipios and their circle, Polybius could not but be deeply moved by the growing antithesis between *ἐπιείκεια* and *δυναστεία*—an antithesis which was first explicit in the open opposition of a minority in the Senate to the 'nova et callida sapientia' of Q. Marcius Philippus in 172,³ but became clearer in the process which led to the annihilation of Carthage in 146—by the retribution which the empire manifestly held in store for the ruling oligarchy that consolidated it—a fate clearly foreseen by Scipio Aemilianus as he gazed upon the ruins of Carthage:

*ἔσσειται ἡμᾶρ ὅταν ποτ' ἀλώλη Ἴλιος ἱρή
καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς εὐμμελίῳ Πριάμοιο*

—and by the shadow of coming disaster thrown already over the internal history of Rome by the accumulation of foreign conquests.⁴ As he witnessed the opening stages of this sequence, which held implicit within it the decay of the Roman system which had beaten Hannibal, Polybius was first of all overwhelmed with the idea of imminent change and mortality; but sooner or later, as he sought to reduce these disturbing ideas to order, and so to the service of pragmatismal historiography, he was attracted to the Stoic doctrine of the *anacyclosis*, which he knew of before, but which perhaps now received additional emphasis through his contact with Panaetius. In a flash of illumination the *bourgeois* historian of Megalopolis began to recognize in the first signs of popular unrest, in the first symptomatic challenge from within to the rulers of an empire now unchallengeable from without, the herald of approaching ochlocracy.

¹ He must have been considerably helped by the ease with which the early history of Rome (the monarchy of Romulus, the kingship of Numa, the tyranny of Tarquin, and the aristocracy of the early republic) fit into the scheme of the *anacyclosis*; cf. Newman, *Politics of Aristotle*, ii, p. xiv.

² Cf. Polyb. iii. 2. 6: *ὀποδείξομεν ὅτι μέγιστα*

συνεβάλετ' αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ιδιότης . . . πρὸς τὸ κρατήσαντας τῷ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίων ἔνοιαν σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὄλων ἐπιβολῆς.

³ Cf. Saumagne, *Rev. Hist.* clxviii, 1931, 27; I have discussed the details of this embassy in *JRS.* xxxi, 1941, 82–93.

⁴ Polyb. xxxviii. 22. 2; see in particular Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, i². 374.

In Scipio Nasica Corculum's opposition to the imperialism of Cato and that of his own son Serapio to Tiberius Gracchus was typified the vain resistance of the old senatorial class to two stages—the *ὑβρις* and the *νέμεσις*—of a single, inevitable movement; and it is the consciousness of this inevitability that weighs heavily upon Polybius, tingeing at least the parts of his work which he wrote last with a sombre, pessimistic hue. He will attempt analysis, but he has no effective remedy to prescribe.

Thus in his sixth book the social and moral contradictions of the second century, a time of gestation before the painful and protracted birth pangs of a new order, are reflected in those inner inconsistencies which La-Roche sensed without clearly defining, certainly without observing how they developed spontaneously as the Achaean historian tried to adjust his outlook to the changing relations of imperial city and provinces, of governors and governed, of Rome and Greece. For these relations in turn had their repercussions upon the social struggle in both countries alike; if Rome was hastening towards a crisis that still lay in the future, the ruling classes within the Greek leagues and cities were already caught on the horns of a dilemma, born of the separation of society into rich and poor, and the consequent contrasts between Hellenic patriotism and class interests. But this contradiction in the very structure of second-century society lay beyond Polybius' scope; his whole upbringing combined to prevent his coming to grips with it.

'His schooling as an Arcadian landowner and the ethics of Stoicism', observes Von Scala,¹ 'conspired together to conceal from Polybius the deep significance of the social structure; together they bear the responsibility for the fact that he lacks even the inclination to portray the inner developments, that the violent fermentation evoked at Rome by the twin forces of plutocracy and pauperism finds no place at all in his account, and the profound economic confusion in Greece before her political overthrow only incidental mention.'

The condemnation is just. Both at Rome and in his native land Polybius was faced with a series of problems which he could not fully formulate, still less solve. His study of the Roman constitution in the sixth book, with its imperfect sutures, its successive and ultimately irreconcilable theories of the state, alike in their jejune and schematic nature, yet revealing at points a politician's eye, keen within its own limitations, is very much the measure of the man who wrote it. As a contribution to sociology it is practically worthless; its culminating thesis of the *anacyclosis* had already been refuted in essence by Aristotle,² and to the political scientist its main interest perhaps lies in its influence on Cicero's *De re publica*, and on such Renaissance and post-Renaissance theories as those of Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Vico. But as a study of the details of the second-century constitution of Rome in practice, Book VI of Polybius, if doctrinaire, is still useful material for the historian; and for the philosopher, as an example of how ideas come to be modified in response to the stimulus of events, it holds a secure place among Greek political writings.

F. W. WALBANK.

THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL.

¹ Op. cit. i. 255.

² Cf. *Polit.* v. 12. 1316^a, 1 f. (criticizing Plato, *Republic*, viii, 546 B.C.). Aristotle points out that in practice any type of constitution can turn into almost any other. Moreover, Polybius himself in a less doctrinaire passage (ii. 44. 6) speaks

of tyrannies giving way to τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δημοκρατίας; and in ii. 41. 5 the Achaeans themselves, being dissatisfied with their kings, the sons of Ogyges, ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ νομίμως, ἀλλὰ δεσποτικῶς αὐτῶν ἄρχειν, μετέστησαν εἰς δημοκρατίαν τὴν πολυτείαν.