

Some of the most revealing aspects of the analysis pertain to interethnic relations within the battalions and in the Soviet Union more broadly. Early on, the contingents were heavily drawn from Central Asian republics. Conscripts barely out of school were subjected to hazing, and minorities suffered from prejudice. And the Balts, Ukrainians, and citizens in the Caucasus were at the forefront of antiwar protest and dissent, not least because of their own experiences of fighting Russia's colonial policies.

The book places the war within the broader context of Soviet socioeconomic inequalities. Conscripts were drawn from some of the poorest communities. Over time, as citizens became aware of the war, people learned to evade the draft through bribery, forged medical exemptions, and the like, but again, it was only the best-connected and most affluent citizens who could afford to do so.

Ro'i is careful to identify the methodological issues inherent in reliance on a small sample of survey respondents and is transparent about the issues of representativeness. For instance, many surveyed citizens were based in Israel in the 1990s, and Ro'i acknowledges that Jews mostly resided in the USSR's urban areas, and hence were less likely to be drafted to fight. If I were to offer one slight criticism of the survey data, it would be concerning presentation. The tables with survey results do not give information on sample size or other information about the survey itself; this information is buried in the text but should have been presented for each table.

Though Ro'i does not anchor his analysis in political science theorizing, the findings have strong theoretical relevance. Autocracies can be successful at manipulating public opinion. Over time it becomes increasingly hard to keep tabs on information. In tight-knit communities, a funeral becomes an event in which the entire village grieves. Gossip, rumors, and hearsay become mixed up with facts. And soldiers write letters to families back home and often write truthfully. The war served to amplify extant grievances. Whatever their ethnicity or social background, soldiers came home traumatized, and often maimed and in poor health, wondering what their mission had been.

The book is thought provoking for students of international relations who want to understand Russian and Soviet foreign policy. One rationale for invading Afghanistan was the imperative to protect domestic borders—border regions included the Central Asian republics, territories that Tzarist Russia colonized to extract resources and protect its expanding frontiers. Brezhnev not only feared “losing Afghanistan,” but he and his entourage also agonized over US influence in Central Asia. Soviet leaders feared that the US could place surveillance technology along the USSR's southern borders. Iran had just deposed the shah and established an Islamic regime, and concerns

emerged that the Soviets would have a “Muslim problem” on their borders.

The question is: where does one stop? If Russia had—hypothetically—kept control over Afghanistan, there would arise the imperative to fear any threats from within the new outer perimeter of the empire. Again, Russia's war against Ukraine comes to mind, and the staunch support for Ukraine that countries like Poland have shown throughout Russia's invasion, for they had for centuries been vulnerable to the unstoppable march of Russia's expansionist ambitions. Ro'i's masterful analysis of the war in Afghanistan demonstrates the catastrophic consequences of the logic of imperial expansion. Ro'i cites one Russian antiwar commentator who ascribes the invasion to “[the] imperial damn-foolishness of the septuagenarian leaders with their outdated mentality stemming only from the lessons drawn from World War Two and in the Cold War environment” (p. 178). Over forty years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the material in the book remains prescient. This book should be on the shelves of every scholar seeking to understand the effect of violence on social cohesion, and on the durability of autocracies fighting wars.

Frenemies: When Ideological Enemies Ally. By

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There is arguably no stronger vindication of realist thinking in international politics than when two states that are bitter ideological adversaries join forces to counter a third state that threatens both. Such alliances of convenience have ranked among the most consequential geopolitical events of the last century, memorialized by the now (in) famous photographs of Franklin Roosevelt (and Winston Churchill) sitting alongside Joseph Stalin at Yalta during the closing months of World War II and of Donald Rumsfeld enthusiastically shaking hands with Saddam Hussein at the height of the Iran-Iraq War. The springboard for Mark Haas's excellent book *Frenemies* is that realist theories are glaringly incapable of explaining the several less memorable, but no less consequential, instances in which states failed to create such frenemy alliances, which he defines as “security cooperation between ideological enemies when those rivals confront a common and pressing security threat” (p. 13). Haas valuably identifies the ideological factors that facilitate or inhibit the formation of these alliances, enabling policy makers to better ascertain their prospects in future geopolitical confrontations.

Haas argues that two variables determine whether a frenemy alliance will emerge among endangered states. The first is *regime vulnerability*: whether an endangered state's regime (or its dominant ideology) is vulnerable to

being subverted domestically by a rival ideology. This variable establishes how costly a frenemy alliance will likely be to the regime. If it is highly vulnerable to ideological subversion, the domestic costs of allying with an ideological enemy will be high, and it will consequently be disinclined to form a frenemy alliance. Conversely, if it is minimally vulnerable to ideological subversion, the costs of allying with an ideological enemy will be low, and it will be amenable to a frenemy alliance.

The second independent variable is *the configuration of ideological distance* between a state and both its potential frenemy and the militarily threatening third party. This variable establishes the degree of necessity associated with the prospective alliance. The degree of necessity and a state's willingness to ally with an ideological enemy will be low in three scenarios: (1) the state and the shared material threat possess the same ideology, which is different from that of the prospective frenemy (Haas dubs this scenario "ideological betrayal"); (2) the prospective frenemy represents the state's foremost ideological danger, and the shared material threat is its foremost material danger ("divided threats"); and (3) the state, the potential frenemy, and the material threat all exhibit different ideologies ("ideological equidistance"). By contrast, the degree of necessity and a state's willingness to ally with an ideological enemy will be high in two other scenarios: (4) the state's most pressing ideological threat also happens to be its foremost material threat ("double threat") and (5) the state's prospective frenemy and the shared material threat possess the same ideology, which differs from that of the state ("ideological outsider"). Consequently, a state is most likely to form a frenemy alliance if the domestic costs are low and the necessity is high, and it is least likely to do so if the costs are high and the necessity low.

Haas tests the theory in three impressively researched empirical cases, drawn from the interwar, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. During the 1930s, Britain and France failed to ally with the USSR despite the escalating material threat posed to all three states by Hitler's Germany. This is because, for most of this period, conservative or moderate governments that were very fearful of the domestic and international spread of communism held power in London and Paris. During the 1970s, Chinese foreign policy shifted dramatically from spurning anti-Soviet security cooperation with the United States during communist hardliner Mao Zedong's final years in power (1972–76) to actively seeking it under his successor Deng Xiaoping, who pursued market reforms that narrowed the Sino-US ideological gap (1979). During the late aughts, the Islamist and increasingly illiberal AKP Party that had governed Turkey since 2002 abrogated anti-Iran security cooperation with Israel because of its weakening grip on political power and ideological alienation from liberal democratic Israel. Notably, at the end of each case, Haas carefully rules out alternative realist explanations for the

absence, delay, or attenuation of the frenemy alliance, such as the potential frenemies' desire to buckpass or avoid intensifying the security dilemma against the shared material threat.

Haas's book exemplifies how qualitative research in IR can be theoretically innovative, methodologically rigorous, and empirically exhaustive, while at the same time being highly accessible and policy relevant. The most important policy implication of Haas's theory is that US policy makers should not overestimate the likelihood that illiberal Asian states that are materially threatened by China's rise—a lengthy roster that includes Russia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, as well as the US treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines—would be willing to balance Chinese power alongside the United States.

Although Haas's theory and findings are persuasive, they nevertheless leave some lingering questions in their wake. First, why was the Nixon administration so eager to ally with China in the early 1970s in the face of Mao's stubborn reluctance to reciprocate? From the perspective of Haas's theory, it is puzzling that Nixon, a rabidly anticommunist conservative Republican, courted Mao far more aggressively than his two Democratic predecessors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Although the gap in ideology between all three liberal (small-d) democratic presidents and Mao's regime was wide, it was slightly narrower between Nixon's two more left-leaning (big-D) Democratic predecessors and the communist Chinese leader. This means that Kennedy and Johnson should not have been less inclined to ally with China than Nixon. The conventional wisdom among foreign policy analysts is that "only a Nixon could go to China" or, in other words, that only a vociferously anticommunist Republican could strike a rapprochement with the Chinese communists without being eviscerated by right-wing domestic opponents. Haas's theory does not easily accommodate the possibility that an ideological hardliner may be more likely to possess the domestic political capital to ally with a state exhibiting an enemy ideology than a moderate who is closer ideologically to the prospective frenemy.

Second, how should scholars code the ideology of the United States under Donald Trump? At this point, it is hard to dispute that Trump was *sui generis* among US presidents because of his illiberal and antidemocratic beliefs, as epitomized by his incitement of the January 2021 insurrection on Capitol Hill. In Haas's concluding chapter, he argues that Rodrigo Duterte's 2016 election to the presidency of the Philippines precipitated a weakening of the US–Philippine alliance because Duterte's illiberal left-wing populist ideology more closely resembled that of China, the shared material threat, than that of the liberal democratic United States. This interpretation of Philippine policy becomes more problematic if the United States under Trump is recoded as having exhibited an illiberal

right-wing populist ideology that narrowed the United States' ideological distance from Duterte's Philippines.

Despite these and other quibbles, *Frenemies* stands out amidst an increasingly crowded IR literature on alliances because Haas's ideational theory deftly fills a large explanatory gap left by the realist theories that have dominated that literature to date. It thereby merits a prominent place on the bookshelves and syllabi of international security scholars.

The Grand Design: The Evolution of the International Peace Architecture. By Oliver P. Richmond. Oxford: Oxford

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Oliver P. Richmond's *The Grand Design: The Evolution of the International Peace Architecture* is a timely and sophisticated examination of the historical and theoretical processes for the establishment of a peaceful international order. The study of modern international relations has long addressed questions pertaining to the breakdown of international order, hegemonic conflicts, and the attempt to reestablish a more resilient political order that can, more or less, adjudicate interstate disputes without resorting to cataclysmic violence. The book is certainly timely because of a sense that hegemonic conflicts have returned to contemporary international politics and that, in the twenty-first century, the proliferation of digital technologies, climate change, and reactionary politics entail a constellation of events that radically call into question the durability of a liberal international order.

Richmond approaches the questions of peacemaking or peace building in a remarkably compelling way. First, he lays out for his readers a conceptual vocabulary for drawing attention to historical continuities across centuries. In fact, Richmond does not frame the question of peace within a preconceived notion of political order; rather, he deploys the concept of an international peace architecture (IPA) as a “partially planned, partially fortuitous, partially resisted or blocked, intergenerational set of practices (e.g., military intervention, humanitarianism, peacekeeping, mediation, social movements, etc.) aimed at ending war” (p. 9). The IPA need not be internally coherent nor free of contradiction; it may—in fact, often—reflect forms of political hierarchies that are predicated on ubiquitous forms of violence and determinative of who counts and who is recognized as a political agent. Richmond also uses terms such as layers, stages, and sediments to render intelligible the imbrications of the IPA with the “historical dynamics of war, and to their geopolitical, institutional, constitutional and civil peace responses” (p. 11). Second, Richmond recognizes the historical and conceptual Eurocentrism that has been at work for centuries in defining the very meaning of

what counts as a peaceful order. And yet, political contestation by the “subaltern”—whether civil society activists or claims from the peripheries of the global system—must figure in a larger story about the evolution of the IPA and its potential future.

The historical story Richmond tells is rich in nuance and detail. It is organized according to five stages or layers, with speculation about a future sixth. The story begins with the period roughly between Westphalia (1648) and the emergence of the modern state-system to the Concert System in 1815 (Stage/Layer 1). As is well known, the language of the balance of power, European diplomacy, and the emergence of an imperial system of hierarchies figure as references for international peace. The decline and collapse of this order beginning in the late nineteenth century reframed what was necessary for international peace: international institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, designed to limit sovereign prerogative (Stage/Layer 2). In contrast, Stage/Layer 3 emerges with a broadly Marxist critique of capitalism and liberalism to advance a framework of political and economic rights that became the catalyst for decolonization, nonaligned movements, and struggles for forms of global social democracy. Stage/Layer 4 continues this pluralization of international peace with a focus on a cosmopolitan project of human rights, social development, and security. By the 2000s, Stage/Layer 5 represents a reactionary project focused on neoliberal state-building and American neo-imperial missions across the world. As Richmond writes, “Stage five rested on a rejection of the connection between peace, justice, and social legitimacy, instead foregrounding the geopolitical needs of hegemonic states in the global North and their interests in capital” (p. 147).

Of key interest then is what comprises Stage/Layer 6 (our current moment), which is still in its infancy. Given the failure of the muscular American-centric attempt to redefine peace through forceful democratization and neoliberal state-building, Richmond argues that there are contradictory forces at work here. On the one hand, there are significant initiatives to return to a Stage/Layer 4 program of expansion of rights and civil society in the wake of a legitimacy crisis associated with the previous stage, including issues pertaining to sustainable development and the UN's Sustaining Peace Agenda. On the other, as Richmond correctly points out, an evolving nexus of “state, capital, and technology” creates the conditions of a ubiquitous surveillance society that challenges traditional conceptions of rights and autonomy. Digital governmentality is an emergent mode of governing that increasingly asserts forms of extractive capital with disciplinary techniques. What this implies for the IPA in the future is a crucial problem because it renders the meaning and nature of global peace increasingly ambiguous.

The Grand Design is an ambitious book. It covers a span of five centuries of political thought and action in a coherent