A NATION DIVIDED:
The Quest for Caribbean Integration

W. Marvin Will
University of Tulsa

Recognizing that the traditional five-state subregion of Central America departed from European colonialism as a federated entity, Ralph Lee Woodward subtitled his seminal history of Central America "A Nation Divided." In his view, "the social and economic history of the isthmus suggests that its peoples share considerably in their problems and circumstances, even though their political experience has been diverse. But it is also clear that their social and economic unity has been limited by their political disunity" (Woodward 1985, vii). Following a period of colonial tutelage equal to that of Hispanic Central America, the Commonwealth Caribbean or English-speaking Caribbean also began to edge away from colonization as a federation of ten nations: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts–Nevis–Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Montserrat. Applying Woodward's criteria, these former British colonies in the West Indies appear to have an even stronger claim than Hispanic Central America to substantial past and future national integration. According to Jamaican-American historian Franklin Knight and theorist Gordon Lewis, this subregion demonstrates more cultural and physical commonalities than differences (Knight 1978, x–xi; G. Lewis 1983). Despite the frictions induced by negotiations for independence, substantial regional integration of the nation-states of the English-speaking Caribbean was achieved during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These efforts atrophied in the years prior to 1987, however, because of internal divisions and external pressures.

In attempting to explain past failures and present efforts, this article will draw in part on several propositions set forth by political sociologist Amitai Etzioni in *Political Unification:* the fewer the national units to be integrated, the more successful the integration movement; enhanced communication and political representation aid integration; and if regional integration does not occur prior to the rise of individual nation-state sovereignty and national pride, the next critical juncture for such development tends to occur after the systems have weakened (Etzioni 1965, 94–96). If indeed the third generalization is relevant to the Caribbean, then the severe downturns in the political economies of much

3

FIGURE 1 The Caribbean

of the region during the 1980s may yet produce positive regional benefits by inducing efforts toward integration. It might be generalized that this outcome appears all the more possible because of a substantial trend in regional leadership patterns toward younger, more pragmatic individuals. Expanded membership in the subregional community, in contrast, would probably tend to retard the integration process.

This article also hypothesizes that this group of small nations will remain only partially linked in the near future due to metropolitan influences, cultural parochialism, and the personal and turf-protective policies of some insular leaders. These same factors appear to have ensured the failure of previous integration attempts in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Finally, should present integration efforts fail, it is highly probable that efforts at integration will be renewed. But before pursuing these hypotheses, a backward glance is in order.

4

THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Viewed from outer space or a superjet flying over the seldom-out-of-sight Lesser Antilles, the dots of emerald, coral, lava, and sediment that lie below in seemingly close proximity can be readily perceived as natural candidates for integration (see figure 1). Indeed, some degree of unity existed among the Taino-Arawak and Carib tribes in these territories prior to the imposed Iberian order that linked the region legally until the early seventeenth century.

Between the 1620s and the turn of the twentieth century, a British West Indies developed among these territories partially because of almost continuous European-Caribbean wars. One colonial official, James Pope-Hennessy, referred to the British West Indies as "pieces in Elizabethan schemes of empire, objects of Caroline and Cromwellian enterprise, [and] loot of eighteenth-century wars" (cited in Bolitho 1947, 174). As a result, the twelve independent states and five dependent territories now comprising the English-speaking or Commonwealth Caribbean had imposed on them a new colonial order involving a harbinger of integration (see table 1).

FACTORS THAT DIVIDE: THE POLITICS OF DISINTEGRATION

Cultural and Developmental Problems

Integration, however, implies far more than a common sovereign. Integrated status is achieved only with great difficulty, as evidenced by the experience of contemporary multistate efforts at integration. Its complexity is also evident in theory, as reflected in Bela Balassa's five-step integration typology (Nye 1971, 29).[1] Whether it is attempted at the level of a single island or a great or small archipelago, integration relies on shared feelings or attitudes toward unification and identity that grow from actual or imagined common experiences. In the Caribbean, such attitudes have not been strongly developed even among the Caribbean colonies of single European states because of the vagaries of nature and geographical distance. Moreover, the colonizing countries compounded

1. The Balassa ideal type of integration model suggests a wide range: from free trade (no internal tariffs, a condition reached with great difficulty, as so-called free-trade zones and even the several de jure, but not de facto, common markets suggest), to de facto common markets (with a common external tariff), to "unification of policies [and] political institutions" (Nye 1971, 29). Multistate political mergers occur only rarely, and as Nye observes, "political integration is by far the most ambiguous and the most difficult for which to develop satisfactory indices" (Nye 1971, 36). He perceives major problems in the Balassa "list" but cites it for heuristic appeal. For the Balassa taxonomy to be relevant to Caribbean integration, however, one or more new first steps and perhaps an intermediate step would be necessary to reflect more accurately the de facto pre-free-trade and pre-common-market realities experienced in the Caribbean. Policy harmonization categories two and three (common external tariffs and free flow of factors) probably should be collapsed, and language changes must be made throughout Balassa's classification system, especially in the final integrative category.

5

TABLE 1 *Economic Indicators of Caribbean Countries in 1988*

Country	Area (in square kilometers)	Mid-Year Population in 1988	Annual Rate of Population Increase 1985–88 (%)	Average Labor Force 1988
Anguilla	91	7,300	1.3	
Antigua and Barbuda	440	77,900	1.0	
Bahamas	13,942	244,600	2.0	124,300
Barbados	431	253,800	0.1	123,800
Belize	22,960	179,600	2.6	
British Virgin Islands	150	12,400	1.4	
Cayman Islands	260	24,900	6.2	
Dominica	750	81,200	0.6	
Grenada	345	99,200	2.1	
Guyana	214,970	755,800	–0.1	
Jamaica	11,424	2,356,600	0.7	1,078,400
Montserrat	102	12,000	0.3	
St. Kitts and Nevis	269	43,000	–0.8	
St. Lucia	616	145,400	2.0	
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	388	113,100	1.1	
Trinidad and Tobago	5,128	1,211,500	1.6	476,800
Turks and Caicos Islands	417	14,000	11.9	

Source: Adapted from Caribbean Development Bank, *Annual Report, 1989* (St. Michael, Barbados: Leachworth Press, 1989), p. 15, with the permission of the Caribbean Development Bank.

the problem by inducing destructive racial and class divisions, imposing Eurocentristic and often ethnocentristic educational programs, and erecting political, linguistic, monetary and trade barriers. As Daniel Guérin observed, "Cut off, withdrawing into themselves, the islands' 'insularity' [and] stagnation [resulted]. Even when attached to the same governing 'mother country,' their reciprocal contacts are very limited . . . [and they] form . . . aloof little worlds" (Guérin 1961, 15).

As colonizer, Britain can also be blamed for massive political underdevelopment and considerable developmental unevenness from one British West Indies colony to the next, which would prove detrimental to future efforts to federate. This unevenness ranged from variations in

6

Average Rate of Unemployment 1988 (%)	Annual Change in Consumer Prices 1988 (%)	GDP at Current Market Prices 1988 (in millions of dollars)	GDP per Capita in 1988 dollars	Real Rate of Growth in GDP 1988 (%)
	4.5	28.0	3,856	9.7
	3.4	321.1	4,123	7.1
11.0	4.7	2,153.1	8,802	
17.4	4.8	1,456.9	5,740	
15.0	0.4	285.1	1,587	8.3
	0.0	132.5	10,685	8.0
	5.2	463.2	18,603	15.3
	1.7	137.4	1,692	5.6
	6.5	166.2	1,675	5.3
	45.8	413.8	547	–3.0
18.7	8.8	3,183.3	1,351	1.6
	3.6	54.2	4,516	12.4
	1.0	108.4	2,521	4.7
	0.8	211.4	1,454	6.8
	1.6	154.4	1,365	5.0
21.0	7.8	4,481.6	3,699	–3.7
		63.1	4,507	19.6

the constitutional status of individual colonies in the British West Indies to variances in the amount of political party and semi-ministerial development that was encouraged or allowed. For instance, Barbados and the Bahamas maintained the traditional old representative system with its largely independent legislature, which often yielded relatively weak governors (especially in Barbados).[2] Meanwhile, Jamaica and most of the remaining units were governed more directly as Crown Colonies. Further, the smaller islands were likely to be assigned colonial administrators, such

2. For a survey of the great difficulties facing a British governor in highly nationalistic and sometimes semi-independent Barbados, see James Pope-Hennessy (1964).

7

as "the failed Oxford 'passman' [with his] own brand of British racial superiority" (G. Lewis 1987, 9). Westminister actively encouraged uneven levels of political development within the West Indies, apparently perceiving that the older, less racially divided colonies of Jamaica and Barbados were more prepared for party development and semi-ministerial status than the other islands and racially bifurcated Guyana. The West India Royal Commission (often referred to as the Moyne Commission) found that "a substantial body of public opinion in the West Indies is convinced that far-reaching measures of social reconstruction depend, both for their initiation and their effective administration, upon greater participation of the people in the business of government" (U.K. Colonial Office 1945, 303). Genuine reluctance in the United Kingdom, however, discouraged democratic development in many of its West Indies colonies until the eve of independence (Wood 1968; Williams 1970; G. Lewis 1968).

Jamaica experienced direct involvement by British Labourite politicians in the formation of the Peoples' National Party (PNP) in the late 1930s. By 1946 British pressure had brought a kind of cabinet government with greater party responsibility to Jamaica and Barbados as well. On these two islands and Trinidad, the British provided considerable assistance in lowering the franchise gates, a course perceived as "truly conservative" in that it permitted small and gradual changes as an antidote to massive protest. This approach contributed to significant expansion of suffrage (500 percent in Barbados and an even larger increase in Jamaica) in the interlude between the release of the Moyne Report in 1945 and the West Indies Federation (1958–1962).

Structural Problems and Policy Inconsistencies

On the eve of independence, even such obvious linkage structures as trade, personnel, and mail transport remained poorly developed in the West Indies. As E. F. L. Wood (later Lord Halifax) observed during an official visit to the British West Indies before World War II, "Jamaica is separated from the Lesser Antilles and British Guiana by a journey longer in time than from England to Jamaica. It would have been totally out of the question for us to effect our tour of the West Indian Colonies had it not been for the fact that we were conveyed . . . in one of the ships of His Majesty's Navy especially detailed for this service. . . . The postal authorities in Jamaica are usually compelled to send mails for Trinidad, Barbados, and British Guiana via either England, New York or Halifax."[3] Compounding the situation were inconsistencies in British policy, as

3. U.K., Cmd. 1679, quoted in Historical Society of Trinidad and Tobago, *British West Indian Federation* ([Port of Spain], Trinidad and Tobago: Government Printing Office, 1954), 49, 47–53.

8

observed by Guyanese writer Clive Thomas. As early as 1882, a royal commission proposed an "ultimate" West Indies federation, but in 1897 a royal commission opposed such "strong unity" and even objected to the integrated civil service that had been proposed earlier. As Trinidadian Eric Williams explained, "The West Indian territories were divided, and so Britain ruled easily" (Williams 1970, 296).

Such "ease of rule" was eventually threatened by the world depression, however. Following extensive rioting and violence that caused almost five hundred casualties between 1935 and 1937, the previously noted Moyne Commission was appointed to investigate the situation. This body found major problems in colonial policy and delineated charges so potentially damaging to support needed by the empire for the pending war effort that the Moyne Report was not released until after World War II.

When finally released in 1945, the Moyne Commission's report emphasized the need for greater integration among the colonies of the British West Indies. But it also stressed the great difficulties to be confronted in providing the effective and affordable intercolony transport and communication infrastructure required for even the most basic economic integration. The report concluded that federation was at best a far-off ideal. This finding apparently varied with British policy because almost as soon as the report was released, representatives of the British government began meeting with British West Indies territorial representatives to discuss federation (U.K. Colonial Office 1945, 379ff; Thomas 1988, 303; Williams 1970, 296).

THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION, 1958–1962

A Policy of Economics First

The demolished infrastructure and economic collapse of the United Kingdom resulting from World War II modified the British agenda for independence for the British West Indies. These changes converted what in 1938 appeared a far-off need to an immediate one, a need "to force all the little birds to fly." The loss of India, the Raj's crown jewel, in 1947 began the countdown of the demise of the second era of European colonialism. The Caribbean, which had once financed the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom by producing wealth then superior to that of the North American colonies, was now increasingly perceived as an economic liability.

Although British efforts had been made intermittently for "closer union" (the title of a 1932 conference), from the initial settlement in the 1620s to discussions of federation of the British West Indies in the postwar period in the 1945 Montego Bay conference, it seems that Whitehall actions were not committed to the goal of national viability for an in-

9

dependent integrated British Caribbean. As Gordon Lewis reported, "Examination of the voluminous documentation of . . . Westminister debates, royal commission reports, Colonial Office memoranda and the published correspondence between the Colonial Secretary and individual West Indian governors shows that the most persistently recurring reason evoked in support of federation was the greater economy and the improved administrative efficiency it supposed federation would bring" (G. Lewis 1968, 345).[4]

Britain's use of federation as a primary means of advancing metropolitan colonial goals rather than assisting its West Indies colonies to achieve viable independent nationhood was instrumental in dooming the process (Thomas 1979, 285). Even during negotiations, startling errors were made that can be laid directly at Whitehall's door: delaying the second federation conference until 1953, three years after the reports were submitted and after the individual islands learned that they could gain separate independence; failing to follow the precedent of earlier colonial officers and inform Jamaican Premier Norman Manley that secession was unthinkable; and failing to use the Colonial Office's considerable weight in resolving pertinent issues ranging from site selection of the federal capital[5] to transferral of adequate power to the central government of the Federation and designating a four-year (rather than a two-year) period for constitutional review.

Caribbean Interests and Personality Politics

Many Caribbean leaders have acknowledged for generations what Gordon Lewis has termed "the seminal truth": that only an economically and politically integrated Caribbean could maximize the subregion's economic and political power and provide insulation against its provincial divisions (1968, 343). Thus when formation of the West Indies Federation was being negotiated, numerous leaders gave federation their full support, at least in the abstract. The Eastern Caribbean, with its closer physical and cultural ties, was especially well represented in federation talks.

These negotiations were attended by British West Indian leaders,

4. For the history of this period, see Mordecai (1968, 18–74) and Levy (1980, 138–59).
5. The eventual selection of Trinidad as the federal capital certainly did not reassure Jamaica. The selection process itself exemplified the parochial and personality fights, economic concerns, and metropolitan mistakes hypothesized at the outset of this research. Even though Jamaica was the largest political and economic unit in the West Indies Federation and was thus crucially important to the future of the subregion, it was not chosen as the capital site because of its relative isolation from the Eastern Caribbean. Much of the current lack of rapport between Jamaica and fellow CARICOM units harks back to serious integrative neglect during the colonial era and misunderstandings during the negotiation periods preceding the ill-fated West Indies Federation and the Little Eight attempt.

10

except for those from the Bahamas, who were absent along with representatives of the mainland territories. Those present advanced a concerted demand for federation to the leaders gathered at the Roseau Conference held in Dominica in 1932 (Mordecai 1968, 22). Sir Arthur Lewis characterized three leaders in particular—Norman Manley of Jamaica, Dr. Eric Williams of Trinidad-Tobago, and Sir Grantley Adams of Barbados—as "men of the highest quality, in any definition of that word. Their talents were outstanding, and their education (all three had won scholarships to Oxford) the envy of mankind. They were men of immaculate integrity and selfless devotion to public service. Each was at the top of his profession before entering public life, and gained neither [inordinate] prestige nor money from politics. Each would be recognized in any country in the world as a public servant of the highest calibre" (W. A. Lewis 1965, 457). According to Sir Arthur (St. Lucia's Nobel laureate), Manley, Williams, and Adams, the political leaders of the three largest states participating in the West Indies Federation (1958–1962), were especially supportive throughout most of the negotiation period.

Yet the federation collapsed just four years later, and when its inaugural period was analyzed, the personality politics and shortsightedness of these same leaders received major blame. Like many subsequent Caribbean leaders, these three were first and foremost provincial nationalists who became great men in their home countries but were hesitant to accept compromise. Thus the West Indies Federation failed in part because its leaders did not accept and utilize this crucial aspect of nation-building (W. A. Lewis 1965, 454–62).

"One from Ten Leaves Nought"

These prophetic words were uttered by Trinidad-Tobago Premier Dr. Eric Williams when he learned in March 1962 that Jamaica intended to pursue singular independence. This action followed the loss by Norman Manley and his PNP of a referendum on 19 September 1961 to Alexander Bustamante and his Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). The JLP had mounted a year-long door-to-door campaign against federation. As Wendell Bell's 1958 elite survey data indicated, suspicion had arisen that the federation might impede eventual full self-government in Jamaica. The data also reflected a general feeling that Jamaica would suffer economically from federation (Bell 1960, 862–79).

FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL INTEGRATION

The Williams-PNM Response

The referendum results in Jamaica and the negative reaction in Trinidad spelled bad news for the eastern Caribbean states. Trinidad's

11

positive participation in the 1932 Roseau Conference nonetheless sparked a ray of hope among these states that the federation could survive the loss of its largest member. Sir Arthur Lewis's report on a survey of eastern Caribbean leaders can be usefully summarized:

Barbadians and the Windward and Leeward Islanders had close links with Trinidad; members of their families live there; their songs, their news, their political excitements, the novelists who articulate daily Caribbean life mostly come from Trinidad. To make foreigners of people so bound by customs and culture would come as an immeasurable tragedy which leaders could not justify in history. . . . This was a new opportunity to fashion a strong Federation. While there was profound sentimental regret at the loss of Jamaica, the loss was seen as making possible in the Eastern Caribbean a much more meaningful and practicable federation. They would start off not only with emotional ties, quite absent in the case of Jamaica, but with accustomed patterns of trade and treatment of mutual economic problems. Adversity had also assisted them to overcome their dislike for *Economics of Nationhood* [Williams's blueprint for government], and all were now ready to consider a strongly centred federation. (W. A. Lewis 1968, 429)

But times had changed since 1959, when Eric Williams had offered to fund small-island development. He was now evincing the bitterness of the past four years in an increasingly nationalistic and personalistic tone. Williams especially abhorred the frequent battles with Grantley Adams of Barbados and the even more provincial leaders of the Leeward and Windward Islands. Williams also deplored the lack of West Indian nationalism and the lack of coherence in the so-called Federal party. At this point, he felt that the best opportunity for positive change rested in his two-island state and his own Peoples' National Movement (PNM). On 14 January 1962, Williams proposed formation of a unitary state centered in Trinidad.[6]

This news was even more shocking to the Leeward and Windward Islands and Barbados than Jamaica's withdrawal from the West Indies Federation. Except for a brief period of consideration by Grenada, the Trinidad proposal was rejected outright.

A Federation of the "Little Eight"?

Of the ten members of the original federation, there remained only Barbados and seven smaller British West Indies colonies still being aided by metropolitan grants. If Jamaica, a leading bauxite producer with a population of two million, and Trinidad, with nearly a million and the only substantial oil production in the West Indian territory, could not assume the reins of leadership and help "carry" the small and poorer islands, how could Barbados take the lead with merely a quarter-million people, a scant 166 square miles of relatively unendowed land, and the

6. See editorials in *The* [PNM] *Nation,* 1962, published by the People's National Movement.

12

lowest income of the "Big Three"? The economic burden required to bring the "Little Seven" up to Barbadian standards would be massive indeed.

Errol Barrow, the newly elected Premier of Barbados, was especially angered by the Williams-PNM announcement because he believed that Williams had assured him that further federation negotiations would ensue. Despite this setback, Barrow remained committed to federation if joining with smaller neighbors could offer more positives than negatives for the economic and political well-being of Barbados. What he feared most, like the Jamaican and Trinidadian leaders before him, was that union with the Little Seven would engender economic disaster for his island and political defeat for him and his party. But with apparent strong backing from U.K. Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling and active support from Vere Bird, the leader of Antigua and Barbuda, Barrow and the remaining leaders were induced to act immediately to form a federation of the Little Eight.

Maudling was informed of this intention the day after the PNM announced its withdrawal, along with Barrow's two conditions for staying the course: that there be no waiting period for independence for the remaining eight colonies like that imposed by the United Kingdom on the 1958–1962 effort; and that the United Kingdom would supply generous financial support to advance development of the poorer units in the proposed new federation. In just three days, a preliminary constitution and budget were drafted. This unusually swift progress indicated the substantial degree of interest elicited by the new integrative movement. The constitution, which provided much stronger central authority than the previous ten-state effort, was sent on its way through the ratification process in the insular legislatures by June 1962. Included were powers over national income, customs, and excise taxes and a proposed national police, a federal judiciary, and sweeping regulatory authority.

Ratification within two years seemed assured and progress appeared excellent, especially in comparison with the previous effort. But insurmountable obstacles soon began to intrude into the process. An election in St. Lucia produced new faces and new problems; in Grenada the scandal-ridden but pro-federation government of Eric Gairy was replaced by the first Herbert Blaize administration, which was oriented toward seeking unitary linkage with Trinidad; and by 1965, opposition movements had emerged in Antigua as well as in Montserrat, the smallest territory in the federation group.

Much of this unrest could be traced to economic factors that could have been eased had Britain shouldered the financial burden for the subregion's development at the necessary level. The amount needed had been determined by Carleen O'Loughlin's British-commissioned study in 1963 to be sixty-six million pounds, to be provided in a development fund spread over ten years. This sum was commensurate with French outlay

13

for Martinique and Guadeloupe and averaged less on a per capita basis than U.S. expenditures on the Virgin Islands. Yet Britain, financially strapped, responded to the findings by funding only one-sixth of the necessary amount for the first year and agreeing to extend that limited assistance for only five years more. In short, as the most viable member of the new coalition, Barbados began to feel singled out to bear the responsibilities recently rejected by its larger neighbors, a burden that the Barrow government did not wish to assume (Barbados 1965, 2–9; O'Loughlin 1963, 120–36; O'Loughlin 1968, 222–30).

As if these hindrances were not enough to undermine the faltering status of the Federation of the Little Eight, the United Kingdom again did not discourage the possibility of singular independence for these eastern Caribbean actors. Serious errors by provincial local leaders also became formidable stumbling blocks and as occurred with the West Indies Federation process, goals of personal survival seemed to take precedence over those of federation. The bickering over minor items that once seemed settled—including a Grenadian demand to issue its own postage stamps—suggested a refractory pattern. One Little Seven minister worried about the treatment these countries would receive after federation, fearing that after "independence we would resign ourselves to a future of dictation by Barbados" (Cheltenham 1971, 223–24).

By December 1963, Barrow had reached his limit with Britain's "footdragging" and the "pettifogging" of local politicians. He announced that his government had moved to secure singular independence by 1966, concluding defiantly, "if it is not granted, it will be declared because I do not feel that we should have to ask for it!"[7] On 30 November 1966, Barbados became the fourth Commonwealth Caribbean state to achieve independence, following Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and, just six months earlier, Guyana.

By this time, Barrow (who had attended the London School of Economics) appeared to place greater emphasis on economic linkages in advance of political ties than on the reverse.[8] Thus the formation of economic linkages became the next focal point in the integration saga of the English-speaking Caribbean.

THE POLITICS OF CARIFTA

In 1965, one year prior to Barbadian and Guyanese independence, secret negotiations had already taken place between Premiers Barrow and

7. Interview with Errol Barrow, Prime Minister of Barbados, in St. Michael, Barbados, 14 July 1970. See also editorial in *Advocate,* 26 Dec. 1963.

8. Much of Errol Barrow's integration theory was based on economic functionalism as a requisite step toward political integration. For insight into the European prototype of this theory, which developed following World War II, see Balassa (1961), Haas (1964), Etzioni (1965), Yalem (1965), Russett (1967), and Nye (1971).

14

Forbes Burnham. These talks built on existing and potential economic ties to produce the announcement that by 1966, these two leaders intended to form a free trade area. Their decision was no doubt influenced by potentially successful integration movements forged in Europe and Hispanic America. An especially significant inducement for this latest effort at integration, however, was the appearance in 1965 of a slender but prescient book, *The Economics of Development of Small Countries,* by respected West Indian scholar Dr. William Demas.

Demas argued that the substantial postwar growth in gross national product experienced by several British West Indian countries, including Jamaica (a factor in the island's rejecting the West Indies Federation), had produced results far short of real economic development. In his view, development requires a substantial economic redistribution, reduction in severe levels of unemployment and underemployment, and an attack on socioeconomic maladies that provoke the so-called misery index. Promoting light industrial development and agricultural diversification would positively address these problems by better utilizing the well-developed infrastructure and highly educated work force of the region while simultaneously broadening the market base (Demas 1965; W. A. Lewis 1954; W. A. Lewis 1965).[9]

The organization proposed for achieving this goal was to be called the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), and the plan was to invite the participation of other British West Indies territories. Although proposing only a free-trade area initially, it also envisioned "creation of a Customs Union and a viable Economic Community for all the Caribbean territories who so desire." Cynical observers speculated the movement was part of a game designed to "get back at Williams," but if revenge was an understandable element, the stance on open membership soon eclipsed this personal grudge. The agreement establishing CARIFTA was signed on 15 December 1965 in Antigua. Designed to eliminate internal tariffs and import quotas, the treaty was scheduled to take effect in three years (Payne 1980, 56–66).

The cause of regional economic integration was advanced further by several supportive studies in the late 1960s, most of them authored by academics attached to the three-campus University of the West Indies, the single major multistate institution that survived breakup of the federation (1958–1962). Although Jamaica and Trinidad (the two largest British West Indies states) had initially demonstrated little open support for integra-

9. Sir Arthur Lewis was another contributor to early Caribbean integration and development theory. He was feted at the opening meeting of the May 1989 conference of the Caribbean Studies Association in Barbados for his balanced approach to regional development. His version emphasized implementing a balanced program of agricultural diversification and light industry utilizing indigenous resources as well as the integral role of government and educators in the total process (McComie 1989).

15

tion, Trinidad's Prime Minister Williams went on record favoring West Indian economic linkages and ultimate West Indian unity. It thus appeared that positive support for CARIFTA and further integration of the West Indies were being forged (Payne 1980, 67–85; see also Brewster and Thomas 1967; Beckford 1975; Best and Levitt 1969).

FROM CARIFTA TO CARICOM

Within three months after the 1 May 1968 inauguration of the CARIFTA treaty, membership had expanded to include the ten states of the original federation as well as Guyana. This new intergovernmental organization experienced economic success, as evidenced by export expansion from 85 million U.S. dollars in 1970 to 233 million in 1974. Imports expanded comparably during the same period.

Another incentive for affiliating with CARIFTA was to maximize leverage opportunities in international negotiations. For example, Britain's anticipated membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) was expected to jeopardize the region's preferred market status in the United Kingdom, and a major achievement of Caribbean integration would be negotiating associate status in the EEC for CARIFTA states (along with former European colonies in Africa and the Pacific).[10]

Beyond the initial benefits that member states garnered from CARIFTA, however, the reality remained that CARIFTA's economic potential was restricted by its being neither a customs union nor a common market. Caribbean integration could not maximize the region's potential nor advance significantly without major acceleration in the relatively small functional steps that CARIFTA was able to implement (Thomas 1988, 307–8). Steps toward corrective changes occurred with the Treaty of Chaguaramas signed in Trinidad on 4 July 1973. The stage was now set for CARIFTA to evolve into the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY

The newly restructured community was projected as a major functional advance over its predecessor and incorporated two distinct divisions, the Caribbean Community and the Caribbean Common Market. These entities are controlled by the Heads of Government Conference— the supreme decision-making organ—and the Council of Ministers.

10. In the case of Burnham and probably also Williams, a secondary factor in pursuing integration may have been the ultimate potential for population movement and its ramifications in terms of a possible black creole counterweight to the Asian majority in Guyana and the soon-to-be Asian plurality in Trinidad and Tobago.

16

CARICOM's organizational structure also includes a secretariat based in Guyana and several ancillary institutions, committees, and agencies, including the Caribbean Development Bank formed in 1966 and based in Barbados.

One major goal of the Caribbean Community has been the harmonizing among member states of seven Standing Ministerial Committees on health, education, labor, finance, mines, agriculture, and foreign affairs. Of these, the goal of foreign-policy harmonization (underscored in Article 17 of the Chaguaramas Treaty) holds the greatest integrative potential. It has also set precedent in that not even the European Community has formally structured this level of coordination. To quote from the treaty, "Member states aim at the fullest possible co-ordination of their foreign policies . . . and seek to adopt, as far as possible, common positions in major international issues. . . . The Committee shall have the power to make recommendations to the Governments of Member States represented on the Committee (CARICOM)." The treaty goes on to state that decisions will be made by the "affirmative vote of all Member States . . . participating."[11]

As provided in an annex to the treaty, the common market is envisioned as encompassing the overall economic dimensions of Caribbean integration, including internal trade liberalization, a common external tariff, and the general coordination of economic policies and planning for development among the member states (for example, fiscal policy, industrial promotion, and agricultural marketing). A special program was set forth for the Little Seven less-developed countries, including a commitment to remove nontariff trade barriers progressively, harmonize fiscal incentives, and free capital movements. When fully implemented, these goals will be farsighted developments indeed (Manigat 1988, 95–97; Thomas 1988, 308–9).[12] According to one Trinidadian scholar, CARICOM "is perhaps the most successful regional arrangement for the promotion of economic integration outside of the European Community" (Maingot 1989, 283).

CARICOM PROBLEMS, POTENTIAL AND REAL

Although this renewed and expanded attempt at integration has promoted optimism, the problems facing CARICOM are many. The difficulties result from flaws in the CARICOM structure itself, from differing levels of development among the participating states, and from disso-

---

11. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community and Annex, 1972, printed in "Organizations and Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere," *International Organization and Integration* 2, E.5.a–5.a.i. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

12. Ibid.

nance created by divergent policy goals and disparate perceptions among elites in an expanded and diffuse membership base.

First of all, some instances of structural problems should be examined. When Belize joined CARICOM in 1974, it insisted on retaining its tariff policy and thus created an anomaly within the agreement. A similar variance by tiny Montserrat sparked a comparable dilemma. A second kind of anomaly resulted from the coexisting Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM), a subsystem formed on 11 June 1968 by the Little Seven or Associated States, the states "left behind" when Barbados withdrew from the Little Eight federation attempt. By 1981 the Little Seven had furthered subregional integration within CARICOM by forming the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which subsumed both the ECCM and the Secretariat of the Associated States while incorporating political, economic, and security functions.[13]

Thus although CARICOM offered member states benefits as a result of enlarged membership and geographic scope, such expansion also brought potential problems in the form of specific variances negotiated by the smaller or weaker states as part of their association agreement to compensate for their status as less-developed countries. This pattern is not unique to CARICOM, as can be seen in concessions to Honduras by the Central American Common Market or to Bolivia by the Andean Pact.

A second obstacle presented by the expanded membership base of CARICOM was the increase in potential among member states for a weakened sense of community and for divergent policy goals resulting from disparate elite perceptions and even ideological cleavages. For example, the increase in CARICOM membership to thirteen with the admission of the Bahamas in 1983 was positive because the Bahamians have the highest per capita income among independent states in geopolitical Latin America. At the same time, however, CARICOM faced a potential dilution of regional consensus in that the Bahamas, a sprawling 550-mile archipelago situated within fifty miles of the U.S. mainland, share greater historic and cultural links with South Florida than with traditional CARICOM members. Further, of the three CARICOM states that had not joined any of the various British West Indies federation attempts, only the Bahamas had never even participated in federation discussions.

But the Bahamian archipelago (which has not posed major problems within CARICOM aside from embarrassment stemming from the alleged ties of the Lynden Pindling government to drug trafficking) at least shared the English language and political order based on borrowed British institutions. In contrast, a perceived lack of such shared norms and existing trade differences have raised barriers to admitting applicants

13. Treaty Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 1981, printed in Hopkins (1985).

18

from the Hispanic, Dutch-speaking, and Francophone Caribbean, specifically the Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Haiti. These states have nevertheless been accorded observer status in CARICOM. Despite the expanded trade and prestige that might be realized from admitting them, incongruous communication linkages would be problematic and irreconcilable differences could arise in coordinating policy and aligning foreign policy, not to mention concerns related to domestic, economic, and political development. Even so, the return to civilian rule by two of the three states and significant democratization in the Dominican Republic may hasten their eventual membership.

Incongruity in policy coordination can result even when member states do not represent differing linguistic blocs or the geographic periphery of the region. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the English-speaking member states of CARICOM came face-to-face with two additional factors potentially dividing their community: a sharp economic downturn and widening ideological cleavages, particularly following the 1979 Grenadian Revolution. Personality and insular politics as well as metropolitan inputs compounded these variables. All of them severely tested CARICOM's unity and durability during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s.

THE UPS AND DOWNS OF CARICOM POLICY COORDINATION

Variances in Goal-Seeking and Elite Perceptions

The foreign-policy goals sought by most nation-states include national protection or security, prosperity or economic development, prestige, and the often unstated but very real goal of political survival for incumbents. Heading the list in most West Indian states is the goal of prosperity or a sound domestic economy, with prestige second, followed by security needs. The last-named goal is pursued by a variety of means, including multinational programs and efforts to avoid friction with neighboring states (Will 1979, 29; Preiswerk 1969, 1–24).

Although external security is not the primary concern for most CARICOM states, it is especially significant to Guyana and Belize because both are involved in disputes that threaten their territorial integrity. From another angle, East-West rapprochement is perceived as positively affecting Caribbean development and integration in that fiscal dividends could accrue from peace.

Because all the CARICOM states are relatively open plural democracies at present, political survival is closely tied to economic prosperity, the essential factor of jobs, and ultimately to regime survival. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner has formulated five conclusions in this regard:

Caribbean states pursue goals of security, economic development and prestige/

19

status in the international system. . . . Economic development will normally be given priority but not when threats are perceived to the security of the state. . . . Absent any perception of threat, the behavior of the Eastern Caribbean states is best analyzed in terms of their search for economic development. . . . Absent any perception of threat, the behavior of the larger states is best analyzed in terms of their search for both prestige and economic development. . . . Left-leaning states/governments have given more priority to the goal of prestige than have states with more conservative political orientations. (Braveboy-Wagner 1989)

Despite the diversity noted in goal-seeking between larger and smaller nations, the CARICOM states were relatively successful in sub-regional caucusing and multilateral diplomacy through the mid-1970s, especially in various agencies and organs of the United Nations. This trend changed in a negative direction in the 1980s, when narrow provincial interests took priority.

Cooperation among the CARICOM states has also been evident in the Commonwealth of Nations, particularly under the leadership of the late Tom Adams of Barbados, prompting observers to marvel at the considerable influence generated by such small states.[14] Significant coordination among these states was shown in helping form the sixty-five-member African-Caribbean-Pacific group in 1984 and its successful access to the European Economic Community.[15] A current priority is negotiating the Lômé III Treaty. In addition, a strong, unified stance has been demonstrated in the perennial territorial battles involving Venezuela's claim to five-eighths of Guyana and Guatemala's claim to all of Belize. In the latter case, the United States and the Hispanic intermediate powers in the Caribbean Basin have been important allies of Belize and the supportive CARICOM bloc.

The potential for successful policy coordination within CARICOM remains strong as a result of the common colonial heritage and these states' patterns before independence. Positive aspects of these patterns reach back to the Canada–West Indies agreement of 1925 and include the initial negotiations for collective independence. Policy coordination and even frank discussion of options became increasingly difficult, however, in the face of ideological divisions, alleged or real external interventions, and what DeLisle Worrell has described as the balance of payments and monetary mysteries of the 1970s and 1980s, all of which exacted a stressful toll on collective action (Worrell 1987, chaps. 2–3). But it was the Grenada

14. It should be noted that all CARICOM states are members of both the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations and that seven of the larger CARICOM states also belong to the Group of 77.
15. See "Africa-Caribbean-Pacific European Community," *The Courier* 89, special issue with complete text of the Lômé Treaties (Jan.–Feb. 1985), esp. 26–27. An example of lost cohesion within CARICOM, even in the late 1980s, was the failure of CARICOM countries to support adequately the candidacy of Dame Nina Barrow of Barbados for president of the UN General Assembly in 1988.

20

crisis and U.S. reactions to the revolutionary Spice Island that proved to be the most divisive issue of all.

The Grenada Crisis

The advent of the New Jewel Movement's coup-turned-revolution in Grenada on 13 March 1979 created major tensions within CARICOM. It divided conservatives (Tom Adams of Barbados, Eugenia Charles of Dominica, and, after 1980, Edward Seaga of Jamaica) from left-socialist leaders like Grenada's Maurice Bishop, Guyana's Forbes Burnham, and, for a time, leaders in St. Lucia, Dominica, and Jamaica. The spotlighting of ideological cleavages in the region disrupted official government relations and contributed to refractory policy stances as well as to postponement and cancellation of CARICOM summits. It also stymied policy coordination. For example, the George Chambers government of Trinidad did not officially communicate with the Bishop government from its rise to power in 1979 until 1982, and contacts between Bishop and Adams and Seaga were minimal. When questioned in May 1982 about the failure to coordinate policies within CARICOM, Prime Minister Seaga asked rhetorically, "How can there be policy consultation when one member [of CARICOM] is Marxist?"[16]

CARICOM Heads of Government had convened only twice prior to 1979, largely as a result of the worsening economy. These meetings were then delayed three more years before members agreed to convene in Jamaica at Ocho Rios in November 1982. As might be anticipated, sessions at this third meeting were often tense. Planks containing contentious language on human rights and pluralism were proposed by feuding Grenada and Barbados (Will 1984, 618–31).[17] These official differ-

16. Interview with Edward Seaga, Prime Minister of Jamaica, in Kingston, Jamaica, 27 May 1982.

17. At the Ocho Rios meeting, Prime Minister Adams formally proposed an amendment to the CARICOM treaty that, with obvious reference to Grenada, would have committed member states "to the principle of political liberty and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual through adherence to the principles of the rule of law and the practice of free, fair, and regular elections." Bishop's response called for "appointment of a multidisciplinary working group of public opinion experts . . . to undertake a series of surveys in each CARICOM member country to determine the people's perception of human rights and to determine to what extent these rights have been violated, abused, eroded or strengthened over the last five years." The compromise resolution affirmed commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also reiterated "the right of self-determination of all peoples including the right to choose their own path of social, political and economic development. . . ." Other resolutions accepted included support for Belizian security, a peaceful settlement of the Guyana-Venezuela boundary dispute, seabed authority to be established in Jamaica, and concern about growing economic protectionism and the failures of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Serious work also began on trade, air, and sea transport, as well as on industrial, agricultural, and energy development, all of which were continued at the Trinidad meeting. See *Caribbean Contact*, December 1982, 1, 8–9.

21

ences were papered over enough to permit compromises, however, and CARICOM leaders managed to move on to discussing such pressing regional problems as interstate communications, freedom of trade, and financing of the multi-island University of the West Indies. The leaders even initiated debate on collective security and peace goals, substantive issues that were to be addressed further at the fourth conference of Heads of Government scheduled to meet in Trinidad in 1983. But the cleavages remained, leading to an emergency CARICOM "mini-summit" in Barbados in May 1983 that attempted to avert a trade war. By the fall of 1983, a shooting war had engulfed Grenada, embroiling the region in the deepest of misunderstandings and suspicions.

Military intervention in Grenada on 25 October 1983 was supported by leadership from the OECS, Barbados, and Jamaica. Strong opposition was voiced by leaders from Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, the Bahamas, and Belize, and also by the opposition parties in Jamaica and Barbados.[18] These contradictory responses engendered new divisions and misunderstandings within CARICOM that yielded severe repercussions. For example, Trinidad and Barbados clashed angrily over whether Trinidad had been advised that an immediate invasion of Grenada would occur in the aftermath of a "not well-advertised" OECS meeting in Barbados on 22 October 1983, to which Jamaica and Barbados (neither of them OECS members) sent representatives.[19] Trinidad was all the more incensed because its prime minister, George Chambers, had chaired a simultaneous emergency meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government in Trinidad (22–23 October 1983) that voted to suspend Grenada from CARICOM immediately but specifically opposed regional military participation in the crisis at that time (UN Security Council 1983a; Brana-Shute and Brana-Shute 1985, 887–90).[20] As a result of this rift, Trinidad

18. A more typical response among Eastern Caribbean leaders was that of Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds of St. Kitts–Nevis, who apparently used the Grenadian action to garner electoral support for his victorious coalition ticket in the May–June 1984 general election. The murder of Maurice Bishop (and his revolution) was most repugnant to West Indians, especially those in the Eastern Caribbean, where inter-island colonial, economic, and familial links are prominent.

19. According to Rosemary and Gary Brana-Shute, rumors persist in the OECS that this meeting was a partial response to "feelers" from the Reagan administration (1985, 887–89).

20. One of the most complete defenses of the Barbadian (and Jamaican and OECS) position can be found in the Barbadian report made to the UN Security Council on 18 October 1983. Four noteworthy reasons were cited: Barbados had regularly defended the Bishop regime from U.S. intervention, despite differences with the Bishop government; especially strong blood and cultural ties among the Eastern Caribbean islands; the murders of Maurice Bishop and others, plus fear of spreading violence and the imposition of a "draconian 96-hour curfew" by the countercoup clique in Grenada; and economic, political, and security treaties by which Barbados felt bound, including the Regional Defense Pact (UN 1983a). It should be noted that the Reagan administration had sought support within the U.S. government and in the Caribbean for militarily overthrowing the Bishop government, beginning with "Operation Ocean Venture," in which twelve thousand troops, 240 warships, and a thousand planes

22

and Barbados withdrew their respective envoys and did not exchange high commissioners again until mid-1985. Such outcomes threatened a major setback for Caribbean integration.

Errol Barrow, who was leading the opposition in Barbados (the island from which the Grenadian attack was launched) harshly castigated the intervention participants, calling them "camp followers . . . conscripted by the U.S. to give credibility to the decaying political image of the American president . . . [and] to send messages to Nicaragua, Cuba . . . and other left-leaning forces!" (Barrow 1983, 3–4). Barrow and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica were still not communicating in 1986 when Barrow was elected to serve a second term as Prime Minister of Barbados. More important, Barrow expressed grave concern regarding the potential "dismantling of the Caribbean Community," not to mention damage to Caribbean sovereignty and self-respect and the integrity of the Commonwealth and the OAS (Barrow 1983, 3–4). Until his untimely death in 1987, Barrow feared deeply that the damage in mutual trust and institutional self-respect inflicted on an already economically debilitated CARICOM could never be reversed. The jury is still out on this troubling assessment, although resumption of cordial relations among CARICOM leaders suggests that a healing process is under way.

U.S. Pressure via the Caribbean Development Bank

The Grenada issue also undermined one of CARICOM's most successful multilateral institutions, the Caribbean Development Bank. Created in 1969, membership in the CDB today includes all seventeen former British states and territories in the subregion, the thirteen CARICOM members as well as the four dependencies—the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and Anguilla, which broke away from St. Kitts–Nevis in a "mouse that roared" incident prior to the latter's independence. The "other regional members" of the Caribbean Development Bank are Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico, while Canada, France, and the United Kingdom are included as nonregional members.

Although the United States is not a member of the Caribbean Development Bank, officials of the U.S. Agency for International Development praised it in testimony to Congress in 1980 as an effective and desirable institution for promoting stable Caribbean governments that provide a "basis for cooperative U.S.-Caribbean relations" (USAID 1980, 22–23). Buttressing this acclaim, the Carter administration contributed 32 percent of the total resources of the institution in 1979–80. By 1986–87, however, the Reagan administration had reduced U.S. contributions to the

---

conducted a "warm-up" operation to rescue Americans from "Amber and the Amberdines," a clear reference to Grenada and the Grenadines. See Payne (1984, 55).

23

CDB by nearly 10 percent (to 23 percent), 4 percent less than the contributions made by France and Britain (CDB 1979–87). Some U.S. cutbacks to the bank during this period stemmed from policy disagreements, but the reductions primarily reflected increased opposition to multinational programs and institutions by the Reagan-Bush administration in comparison with the preceding Democratic administration.

While reduced U.S. support for the CDB presented a serious obstacle, the greatest reverberation of U.S. policy on the bank occurred in 1981 in conjunction with Washington's attempts to destabilize the Grenadian revolution. At that time, the Reagan administration stipulated that any U.S. financial grant to the CDB was conditional on the institution's exclusion of educational loans to Grenada. This action was collectively protested by the foreign ministers of CARICOM as an effort "to subvert Caribbean regional institutions" (Payne 1984, 55).

Tom Adams, the conservative Prime Minister of Barbados who was probably the greatest foe of the Bishop regime among CARICOM leaders, was so outraged by this U.S. restriction that he instructed his representative to the CDB Board of Directors to organize opposition to accepting the conditional U.S. grant. Also infuriated was Karl Hudson-Phillips, leader of the conservative Organisation for National Reconstruction (ONR) in Trinidad and one of the region's premier international law practitioners. Hudson-Phillips expressed his dismay by asking, "Why would the United States attempt to destroy our regional institutions by forcing a violation of the [CDB] constitution?" The conditional U.S. aid was rejected unanimously by the Caribbean Development Bank.[21]

Despite this victory for prestige and regional pride, cohesiveness within the CARICOM organization had been weakened by the ideological cleavages within the region between the more conservative regimes and those considered revolutionary (Grenada, Forbes Burnham's Guyana, and Jamaica between 1976 and 1980). The CARICOM Heads of Government Conferences, which convened only infrequently during the ten years prior to 1987, tended to eschew controversial policy issues or confront them only indirectly. These discords were exacerbated by metropolitan perceptions and actions. But even if events in Grenada and the East-West struggle had not occurred, the goals of individual CARICOM states would have varied greatly. Substantial disintegration may also have occurred due to the rapidly deteriorating economy.

The Economic Down Staircase

Serious intra-CARICOM divisions have emerged from differing trade and debt-servicing policies implemented in response to the massive

---

21. Interview with Karl Hudson-Phillips, party chairman of the ONR and noted international legal specialist, in Port of Spain, Trinidad, 8 October 1981.

24

economic crisis that has engulfed the region since the late 1970s. During the 1980s, massive regional problems were introduced as these once prosperous nations found themselves encountering economic breakdown. This outcome was especially true for the crucial "Big Four" countries, who must carry a substantial share of the burden if regional integration is to be achieved.

Among the CARICOM Big Four (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados), Guyana and Jamaica were the first to face economic crisis, driven by attempts to transform their dependent economies and by the perceived need (especially in Jamaica) to adapt to clientelist democratic pressures. Both countries depleted international reserves and had severe conditionalities imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of mandatory program cutbacks. These actions triggered domestic political unrest that exacerbated external problems with metropolitan countries controlling the IMF, especially the United States.

For example, Guyana's 1975 per capita gross domestic product of nearly eight hundred U.S. dollars declined to five hundred dollars by the mid-1980s, the lowest per capita GDP of the CARICOM states. By 1990 it was among the lower per capita incomes in the region. Further damage to the community ensued when Guyana defaulted on intra-CARICOM loans, especially those contracted within the region's Caribbean Multilateral Clearing Facility, which was soon to be suspended. Guyana's debt involved an unpaid obligation of ninety-six million dollars, more than sixty million of which were owed to Barbados. Guyana's default started a negative ripple that weakened CARICOM itself.

Jamaica, a GDP growth leader in the early 1960s, experienced escalating financial woes by the mid-1970s that drove the Manley government from power in 1980. The country's economic difficulties continued to mount throughout the 1980s, despite the election of Edward Seaga as Prime Minister in 1980 and the resulting infusion of massive U.S. and IMF assistance. The Jamaican national debt soon reached a level that many consider unpayable, and the continuing economic downturn proved instrumental in overturning the Seaga government in the 1989 general election. To compound Jamaica's economic woes, major cuts were made in U.S. assistance in 1990.

By 1983 Jamaica was forced to use a two-tier and then a three-tier currency. Under this system, the Jamaican dollar traded at a domestic level that differed from that in trade within the community, and at yet a third level for financial transactions. These measures induced countermeasures by other Caribbean actors, with regional trade suffering as a consequence.

Trinidad and Tobago, the only CARICOM country to produce oil for export, also enjoyed a boom economy in the 1970s that pushed its per capita income close to the top in the hemisphere. By 1982, however, a

series of consecutive GDP declines began, including a seventeen-billion-dollar plunge between 1985 and 1986, a 78 percent currency devaluation in 1986, and an admission by the government in 1986 that the treasury was empty. That year witnessed the first national defeat of the People's National Movement since independence in 1962. The continuing economic crisis later took its toll on the government of A. N. R. Robinson, which faced rioting in 1989, IMF conditionalities in 1990, and almost certain replacement by the PNM in the general election of 1991. This probability was compounded during 1990 when, following a year of galloping inflation, Prime Minister Robinson and some of his cabinet were held captive in a bloody coup attempt.

In reacting to the economic crisis of the 1980s, Trinidad felt impelled to place import licensing and other restrictions on its CARICOM trade. The regional impact of this move, combined with the Jamaican and Guyanese actions, was dramatic because these three countries are the largest CARICOM partners, not only in population but also in trade potential.

Barbados was able to avoid IMF conditionalities during the 1970s primarily because of two decades of impressive growth, the longest period of sustained growth in the Caribbean community. But after 1980, the Barbadian economy faltered and remained virtually flat from 1982 to 1985. By the early 1980s, Barbados too faced IMF conditionalities and growing unemployment. In response to these economic pressures and perceived discriminatory trade treatment by Jamaica, Barbados allowed its currency to float temporarily against the Jamaican dollar and then imposed a tax on CARICOM goods. Despite a 5 percent recovery in 1986, the cumulative impact of the economic slowdown played a significant part in the massive electoral defeat of the Barbados Labour party government in early 1986 and in serious labor problems and even racial tension during 1989–90 in the face of demands for increased economic democracy.

Thus by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the national economies of the Big Four, as well as several of the smaller states in CARICOM, were severely stressed and encountering major threats to their goals for political survival, and the community was compromising its original free trade standards. CARICOM's regional trade declined during much of the 1980s, despite the program for trade, aid, and investment promoted by the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In 1986 CARICOM trade plunged a record 33 percent, dropping to less than half of its 1981 level. With the clash over Grenada finally receding, the 1986 trade collapse provided the incentive that was to induce regional leadership to attempt a serious effort at regional resuscitation.

26

A POSSIBLE CARICOM RECOMMITMENT AND
NEW MOVEMENTS IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

CARICOM Resuscitation

If a significant resurgence of CARICOM is at all possible, a beginning may have been made in July 1987 at the eighth Heads of Government summit in Castries, St. Lucia. Stimulated by half-steps taken in previous conferences like that in Nassau in 1984 and faced with the 1986 trade debacle, the leaders hammered out an agreement calling for the removal of "all measures restricting intra-regional trade" by September 1988, a deadline subsequently extended. Participants in the St. Lucia summit also formulated a plan for developing the Caribbean Export Bank (CEB) to replace the now-defunct Caribbean Multilateral Clearing Facility. The CEB, which is to be structured on a sound financial footing, became a separate entity of the Caribbean Development Bank in Barbados.

In other actions at the Castries summit, plans were initiated for obtaining much-needed cooperation in resolving territorial claims, securing access to and policing national oceanic economic and fishing zones, and promoting a limited "Caribbean citizenship" status for CARICOM notables. Much discussion also ensued on controlling the drug trade, upgrading inter-CARICOM communication, promoting CARIFEST (an important but economically short-changed regional cultural event), and monitoring soaring debts in the three largest CARICOM states, although few specific solutions were suggested beyond hope for expanded trade.

Of greater importance, Barbados and Guyana initiated a call to proceed on regional integration of customs services and cooperation among senior police, judicial, health, and legal services. With a view toward reducing costs, they also proposed a system of sharing representation in intergovernmental organization memberships, particularly those relating to UN functional activities and agencies (the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Labour Office, the World Meteorological Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization et al.) and diplomats at international conferences (V. Lewis 1988, 90). The idea of sharing diplomats has a historical precedent in that Barbados and Guyana once shared the services of High Commissioner S. S. Ramphal at the Court of St. James in the late 1960s.

Selective integration, or at least cooperation, among regional police, court, and customs facilities is long overdue given the increasing flow of drugs and contraband through the region and the ongoing potential for terrorist acts, like the attempted Ku Klux Klan intervention in Dominica and the sabotage of a Cuban plane as it exited Barbadian air space. Questions relating to maritime delimitation in connection with the new Law of the Sea Treaty must be negotiated by the early 1990s, and serious problems remain relating to reform of the region's monetary system.

27

Experts have agreed since 1981 that the latter is a key issue in expanding integration within CARICOM. According to the report issued by the Group of Caribbean Experts, efforts toward monetary reform must focus "on matters such as the CARICOM Multi-Lateral Clearing Facility, which should be progressively enlarged so as to finance a higher proportion of inter-regional trade . . . ; prior consultation before changes are made in exchange rates; a greater degree of coordination of exchange control policies and practices; and the maintenance of a common intervention currency" (V. Lewis 1988, 90–91).

In the foreign-policy sphere, the 1987 CARICOM summit issued resolutions supporting a negotiated peace in Central America and implementing strong sanctions against the Botha regime in South Africa. Both of these stances contradicted the perceptions of the U.S. Reagan administration then in office.

No action at the 1987 summit in St. Lucia was more important or required greater compromise from the CARICOM national governments than revitalizing the goal of free trade within CARICOM. If the community is to reach its full potential, it must perform in this area as it was constituted. Thus far, however, free trade—the point from which CARICOM was to have embarked—has remained an elusive goal. With CARICOM and many of the domestic economies in the region facing a literal trade collapse, by 1986 it was indeed time to act. The degree of commitment by individual states, especially Trinidad and Jamaica, will determine the future of the community.

Efforts to revitalize regional trade began to bear fruit as early as 1989, CARICOM Secretary General Roderick Rainford announced, as overall intra-CARICOM trade expanded by 20 percent, a good omen on entering the 1990s. Rainford also noted, however, that "while the economies of a few [the Bahamas and selected OECS countries] showed some buoyancy during 1989, the larger economies continued to be mired down in problems, [the] major one being . . . external debt."[22] Plans to reduce trade barriers within CARICOM are also being realized. It is to be hoped that the resolve demonstrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s to transform the economic sector of CARICOM and pursue expanded political linkages will trigger a phase of regional linkages.

Signs remain positive. For example, the July 1989 CARICOM summit in Grenada yielded agreements to proceed with revising local constitutions to allow establishment of a common Caribbean citizenship and to abandon subregional customs barriers by 1991.[23] In October 1988, Barbadian Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford and his Guyanese counterpart, Desmond Hoyte, agreed to support the plan by the Caribbean

22. *Grenadian Voice*, 30 December 1989, p. 11.
23. "CARICOM Approves Economic Unity Steps," *The Times of the Americas*, 26 July 1989.

28

Heads of Government to establish a long-needed Caribbean court of appeals. They also agreed, at least in principle, to pursue a Caribbean parliament. A. N. R. Robinson, Prime Minister of Trinidad, has stated that quick action on the proposal for a regional court is crucial, that "CARICOM shouldn't allow the lukewarm attitudes of one or two states to block the court from coming into being" (Best 1988, 8).

Prime Minister Sandiford recently reminded the press that he is "unapologetically a firm advocate of maximum Caribbean integration." His position was backed by his foreign minister, Maurice King, who observed in a May 1989 interview that "regional integration is the best way [that Barbados] can achieve its primary national interests. . . . We must be willing to sacrifice some sovereignty to bring it off."[24] In much the same vein, Guyanese Prime Minster Hoyte has exhorted regional businessmen to "avoid the temptation of believing that we can act individually even to protect our individual national interests. Huge economic groupings are going to dominate the world economy and [we] cannot face these powerful groupings individually" (Braveboy-Wagner 1990, 9).

Thus efforts toward Caribbean integration remain alive and seemingly well, even though most West Indians retain understandable skepticism and the "need to be shown." There is no lack of appropriate theory to guide such new beginnings (Emmanuel 1988, 101–25; Bryan 1984, 71–94; McIntyre 1984, 14–26). But the need always remains for forward-looking leadership. In the region, this stimulus and leadership are being provided by the Eastern Caribbean.

New Integration Movements in the Eastern Caribbean?

Activity on behalf of intra-CARICOM integration and the development of regional intergovernmental organizations has been concentrated in the Eastern Caribbean since the late 1970s. There the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) was implemented, as was a subregional court. Most important, since the inauguration of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), both political and economic sectors have emerged in its permanent secretariat. By 1983 its Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority had evolved into a central banking facility. An OECS council of manufacturers, a drug-abatement program, and a sports desk have all been established. Plans have also been initiated for harmonizing foreign and economic policies, and by 1988, four OECS states were sharing a mission in London while all six shared one in Canada.

Another important although controversial linkage now in place

24. Interview with Maurice King, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Barbados, in Christ Church, Barbados, 23 May 1989.

among the Eastern Caribbean states is the Regional Security System (RSS). Arising from the Grenada crisis, the RSS is largely financed by Barbados, where it is located, but has significant OECS participation and an initial contribution of fifteen million dollars from the United States for weaponry and training. This force, which includes a multinational coast guard, originated in a five-nation memorandum of understanding issued in 1982. Although it was ostensibly formed to protect fisheries, interdict drugs and smuggled goods, and provide rescue support, Antigua's Prime Minister Vere Bird has fueled new suspicions by suggesting that the force should also be utilized to protect governments from domestic disorder. Nevertheless, this cooperative venture in the military sphere currently appears to be a positive force for the Eastern Caribbean in launching rescue operations and stymieing mercenary threats (Brana-Shute and Brana-Shute 1985, 890–91; Thomas 1988, 317–18).

Perhaps the most ambitious OECS undertaking of all was discussion in 1987 of a pending intra-OECS political union of as many as seven states, an idea promoted by Prime Ministers James Mitchell of St. Vincent and John Compton of St. Lucia. Mitchell noted a "strong sense of worry about the twentieth century closing and leaving us all stranded,"[25] and a feeling that such integration would probably facilitate increased U.S. assistance (a point by no means assured). Mitchell made his case for a unitary nation-state to delegates at a May 1987 conference in the British Virgin Islands at Tortola. One of a new breed of increasingly pragmatic West Indian leaders, Mitchell has long advocated Caribbean integration. He has consistently argued that "independence has hardly protected [us] from what remains essentially the geography of the Caribbean. The rest of the world sees the Caribbean . . . as one region, and the Caribbean needs to greet the rest of the world with one voice if we are to exert any influence on the international forces controlling our destiny" (Mitchell 1973, 10).

Unity discussions continued in St. Lucia after the July 1987 meeting of the thirteen-member CARICOM summit, and at one point, six of the seven Eastern Caribbean leaders were endorsing political union by 1989 (Richards 1987, 1, 4, 14).[26] Momentum slowed, however, as opposition surfaced from several sources: Vere Bird, Prime Minister of Antigua (the only negotiator from the 1950s federation attempt still holding political office), several provincial OECS opposition party leaders, and the vocal but provincial local press. Another problem was presented by uneven economic growth and excessive overlap of agricultural exports

25. Mitchell's remark about "leaving us all stranded" no doubt anticipated a weakening CARICOM position within the expanding European system. With the Iberian and Eastern Mediterranean countries joining the EEC, many traditional Caribbean products will no longer have sufficient access to these markets.

26. See Jeremy Taylor, "Mini-States Plan to Merge as a Nation," *The Times* (London), 24 July 1987, p. 9.

30

among OECS members. Finally, a growing perception that this latest integration idea had been incubated and "hatched" in Washington occasioned genuine skepticism.

Should political union occur within the OECS, the most likely subset would be led by St. Vincent, with Grenada, St. Lucia, and possibly Dominica participating. George Brizan, economics minister and a deputy leader of Grenada's National Democratic Congress government (1990–1995), spoke encouragingly of this possibility in March 1990: "Due to the market and resource limitations of our small states, and to the integration patterns now emerging in Europe and North America, we in the Eastern Caribbean must further integrate in order to survive."[27]

Grenadian Prime Minister Nicholas Braithwaite has carried this same message to Dominica and other OECS states. Antigua appears to be the key to inclusion of the northern three countries in any federation effort by the total OECS bloc because St. Kitts–Nevis and soon-to-be-independent Montserrat will likely follow the Antiguan lead. A prerequisite to moving such a process forward may be replacement of the aging Vere Bird. In the meantime, these appear to be prescient times for the larger Caribbean community and its OECS subset.

FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the Commonwealth Caribbean, especially in the Eastern Caribbean with its frequent colonial links, the lengthy tradition of shared history is stronger than among the five traditional states of Central America or even the multilingual European community. Karl Deutsch has argued that integration can take place only after the likelihood of war has been eliminated (Deutsch 1988). Unlike the Central American isthmus or Western Europe, however, the Caribbean has never suffered intrastate warfare. Moreover, cultural and familial linkages among West Indian communities are very strong in comparison with other regions.

Yet the thirteen nations that now comprise CARICOM and even the seven OECS states remain "a nation divided," despite recent attempts to transform their fragile economic community and to strengthen political linkages. Unlike Europe, which anticipates full common-market status by 1992, the Caribbean has often found itself constrained by an overabundance of political leaders with inordinately provincial and myopic orientations. Unfortunately, such perspectives also enjoy considerable cultural support. Too often, as St. Vincent Prime Minister Mitchell has observed, "residents of these small islands have not grasped the significance (or the insignificance) of their size . . . [and are] oblivious to

---

27. Interview with George Brizan, Co-Deputy Leader of the governing National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, in St. George's, Grenada, 12 March 1990.

31

the world market forces and the insignificant role in trade reciprocity that a market of 100,000 people can play. Protected by the cloak of our chauvinism, some of us seriously feel that the rest of the world knows or cares about the difference between Anguilla and Antigua, or between Grenada and Tobago" (Mitchell 1973, 10).

Yet integration efforts—some with political overtones but most with an economic emphasis—are still being pursued in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as they have been sporadically for centuries, albeit with better results when local leadership is less provincial and more pragmatic. Contemporary CARICOM and OECS political leaders tend to be more pragmatic in outlook than their frequently personalist and mesmeric predecessors. This trend has undoubtedly contributed to the recent intensification of integration activity in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and it would seem especially applicable to current political leadership in St. Vincent, Barbados, Grenada, and possibly Trinidad, St. Lucia, Dominica, and Guyana.

In his epilogue to John Mordecai's history of federation failures during the 1950s and early 1960s, Sir Arthur Lewis sadly concluded, "The current political leaders are so scarred by the mutual hatred and contempt which they acquired for each other on the last round [of federation talks] that they are not likely to make [further] effort. However they will . . . yield to a new generation. Then West Indians will once more face their destiny, which is to come together as a nation" (W. A. Lewis 1968, 462). That new generation has almost arrived as an increasingly younger, more pragmatic, and better educated group of individuals assume leadership in the West Indies. With a bit of assistance and support from their metropolitan friends, the not-always-pragmatic press, and their very practical West Indian constituents, these new leaders have the potential to attain the national destiny forecast by Sir Arthur.

There is at least one other explanation for the latest surge of rhetoric and planning for regional integration. First, the generalization adapted from Etzioni at the outset of this article suggests that if integration cannot not be fostered prior to the rise of state sovereignty and power, then the next propitious time arises when these factors have weakened. With the region experiencing its worst economic downturns since the great depression, many of the subregion's political economies have surely been weakened. But is the corresponding integration effort a product of this environment or merely a coincidence? If integration has indeed been encouraged by the economic crisis in the Caribbean, then perhaps scrutiny of other crisis-impacted subregions in geopolitical Latin America and the Third World would be useful. In only two such areas—Central America and Yemen—economic weakness indeed appears to have been a major factor in recent efforts at reintegration.

The spirit of integration continues to be nourished by the Carib-

32

bean people, who are neighbors and friends of the United States living on the U.S. doorstep rather than, as too many in Washington elect to project, in its backyard. The individual and collective national interests of the English-speaking Caribbean are not and should not be cloned from their northern neighbor. It is true, however, that their conservative values and their ongoing quest for democratic governance, progressive policy change in the socioeconomic arena, and integration all tend to be congruent with long-term Western and U.S. interests.[28] The United States in particular should respect these neighbors by assisting them in achieving their goals, especially when they support mutual interests like economic and political integration. U.S. assistance in addressing the burgeoning debt problems of these countries, aided by the return to a less polarizing and less militarizing policy of East-West relations, could positively encourage this end.[29] These are prescient times.

28. Even if the Grenada of 1979–1983 or Cheddi Jagan's Guyana of the 1960s had a Marxist bias, the United States could wisely reflect on the authoritarian nature of the Grenadian system that stimulated Bishop's socialist revolution, the authoritarianism of the Burnham regime following the U.S.-British intervention in Guyana, and the authoritarianism and severe human rights abuses that followed U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954. Washington might also reflect on Bishop's many attempts to establish a dialogue with his neighbor to the north, especially through the office of U.S. Ambassador Milan Bish. In fact, Bishop was in Washington seeking dialogue and pledging greater openness immediately prior to his incarceration and subsequent assassination in October 1983, again to no avail. It is highly possible that a more diligent and sensitive U.S. policy reflecting genuine long-term U.S. interests could have strengthened the forces of moderation and political openness both in pre-Burnham Guyana and in pre-Coard-Austin Grenada. In the 1940s, British Colonial Governor Sir Gratton Bushe advocated assisting the evolution of gradual change to forestall sudden overturning change. In this regard, the "new" metropolitan power in the Caribbean could learn from the old.

29. Trade assistance from Washington in the form of a resuscitated Caribbean Basin Initiative II with increased sensitivity to and consultation with small-unit producers throughout CARICOM, plus increased quotas for the region's sugar, would be mutually beneficial for both the United States and CARICOM. If combined with multilateral leveraging, these measures could also promote regional integration.

REFERENCES

BALASSA, BELA
  1961   *The Theory of Economic Integration.* Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin.
BARBADOS, GOVERNMENT OF
  1965   *The Federal Negotiations, 1962–65, and Constitutional Proposals for Barbados.* [St. Michael], Barbados: Government Printing Office.
BARROW, ERROL
  1983   "The Danger of Rescue Missions." *Caribbean Review* (Fall):3–4.
BECKFORD, GEORGE L., ED.
  1975   *Caribbean Economy: Dependence and Backwardness.* Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies.
BELL, WENDELL
  1960   "Attitude of Jamaican Elites towards Federation." *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 83 (January):862–79. Special issue edited by Vera Rubin.
BEST, LLOYD, AND KARI LEVITT
  1969   "Externally Propelled Industrialisation and Growth in the Caribbean since the War." Mimeo, Montreal.
BEST, TONY
  1988   "Support for Regional Movement." *Caribbean Contact* 16, no. 2 (July):8.
BOLITHO, HECTOR, ED.
  1947   *The British Empire.* London: B. T. Bosford.
BOUSQUET, EARL
  1989   "A Union Divided." *Caribbean Contact* 16 (Jan.):8–9.
BRANA-SHUTE, ROSEMARY, AND GARY BRANA-SHUTE
  1985   "St Lucia." In HOPKINS 1985, 875–92.
BRAVEBOY-WAGNER, JACQUELINE ANNE
  1989   *The Caribbean in World Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the English-Speaking States.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
  1990   "Tracking a Political Sea Change." *Hemisfile* 1, no. 1 (Jan.):9.
BREWSTER, HAVELOCK, AND CLIVE Y. THOMAS
  1967   *The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration.* Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies.
BRYAN, ANTHONY T.
  1984   "The CARICOM and Latin American Integration Experiences." In IDB 1984, 71–94.
CANABUSINE$$
  1989   *Canabusine$$,* September.
  1990   *Canabusine$$,* March.
CARIBBEAN CONTACT
  1982   *Caribbean Contact* 9 (Dec.):8–9.
  1987   "OECS Federation: Yes or No?" *Caribbean Contact* 15, no. 3 (Aug.):8–9.
  1988a   "Church, Unions Address OECS Unity: Caribbean Unity Part of God's Plan." *Caribbean Contact* 15, no. 8 (Jan.):8–9.
  1988b   "Barbados-Guyana Relations Improved." *Caribbean Contact* 16, no. 6 (November).
CDB (CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK)
  1979–   *Annual Report.* St. Michael, Barbados: Leachworth Press for the Caribbean Devel-
  1989   opment Bank.
CHELTENHAM, RICHARD
  1971   "Constitutional and Political Development in Barbados: 1946–1966." Ph.D. diss., University of Manchester, England.
CORKRAN, HERBERT
  1976   *Mini-Nations and Macro-Cooperation: The Caribbean and the South Pacific.* Washington, D.C.: North American International.
CRASSWELLER, ROBERT
  1972   *The Caribbean Community.* New York: Praeger Publishers for the Council on Foreign Relations.

DEMAS, WILLIAM G.
  1965   *The Economics of Development of Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean.* Montreal: McGill University Press.
DEUTSCH, KARL W.
  1988   *The Analysis of International Relations.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
EMMANUEL, PATRICK
  1988   "Political Unity in the OECS: New Approaches to Caribbean Integration." *Caribbean Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar.):101–25.
ETZIONI, AMITAI
  1965   *Political Unification.* New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
GIRVAN, NORMAN, AND O. JEFFERSON
  1971   *Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean.* Trinidad: New World Group.
GOOD, ALEXANDER H.
  1988   "Progress in the Caribbean Basin: A Special Report by the CBI Ombudsman." *Caribbean Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar.):16–28.
GUERIN, DANIEL
  1961   *The West Indies and the Future.* Translated by Austryn Wainhouse. London: Dennis Hobson.
HAAS, ERNST B.
  1964   *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism in International Organization.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
HEMLOCK, DOREEN
  1987   "Eastern Caribbean Nations Try to Form One New Nation." *Caribbean Business,* 23 July.
HERZ, JOHN
  1959   *International Politics in the Atomic Age.* New York: Columbia University Press.
HOPKINS, JACK W., ED.
  1985   *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record,* vol. 3., *1983–1984.* New York: Holmes and Meier.
IDB (INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK)
  1984   *Ten Years of CARICOM.* Washington, D.C.: IDB.
KEOHANE, ROBERT O., AND JOSEPH S. NYE, EDS.
  1971   *Transnational Relations and World Politics.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
KNIGHT, FRANKLIN W.
  1978   *The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism.* New York: Oxford University Press.
LESTRADE, SWINBURNE
  1984   "The Less Developed Countries within CARICOM." In IDB 1984, 265–82.
LEVY, CLAUDE
  1980   *Emancipation, Sugar, and Federalism: Barbados and the West Indies, 1833–1876.* Gainesville: University Presses of Florida.
LEWIS, GORDON K.
  1968   *The Growth of the Modern West Indies.* New York: Monthly Review Press.
  1983   *Main Currents in Caribbean Thought: The Historic Valuation of Caribbean Society in its Ideological Aspects, 1492–1900.* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  1984   "The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Integration Experience: The Historical and Cultural Background." In *Ten Years of CARICOM.* Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.
  1987   *Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled.* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
LEWIS, VAUGHAN A.
  1988   "Some Perspectives on Caribbean Community Integration." *Caribbean Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar.):85–100.
LEWIS, W. ARTHUR
  1954   "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour." *Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies* 22 (May):139–91.
  1965   *The Agony of the Eight.* Bridgetown, Barbados: Advocate Press.
  1968   Epilogue to *Federation of the West Indies,* by John Mordecai. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

35

MCCOMIE, VALERIE T.
  1989   Address of Tribute to Sir Arthur Lewis presented at the Caribbean Studies Asso-
          ciation conference in Christ Church, Barbados, 23 May.
MCINTYRE, ALISTER
  1984   "Review of Integration Movements in the Third World with Particular Reference
          to the Caribbean Community." In *Ten Years of CARICOM.* Washington, D.C.: Inter-
          American Development Bank.
MAINGOT, ANTHONY P.
  1989   "Caribbean International Relations." In *The Modern Caribbean,* edited by Frank-
          lin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
          Press.
MANIGAT, MIRLANDE
  1988   "CARICOM at Ten." In *The Caribbean and World Politics,* edited by Jorge Heine and
          Leslie Manigat. New York: Holmes and Meier.
MANLEY, ROBERT H.
  1979   *Guyana Emergent.* Cambridge, Mass.: Shenkman.
MITCHELL, JAMES F.
  1973   "The Caribbean Mini-State: The Exquisite Isles." Paper presented at the World
          Affairs Council, Northern California, San Francisco, 21 November.
MORDECAI, JOHN
  1968   *Federation of the West Indies.* Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
  1990   "Hurricane, IMF, World Bank, U.S. AID in the Caribbean." *NACLA Report on the
          Americas* 23, no. 5 (February):13–40.
NETTLEFORD, REX
  1972   *Identity, Race, and Protest in Jamaica.* New York: William Morrow.
NYE, J. S.
  1971   *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization.* Boston: Little,
          Brown.
O'LOUGHLIN, CARLEEN
  1963   *A Survey of Economic Potential and Capital Needs of the Leeward Islands, Windward
          Islands, and Barbados.* [U.K.] Department of Technical Co-operative Overseas
          Research, no. 5. London: HMSO.
  1968   *Economic and Political Change in the Leeward and Windward Islands.* New Haven,
          Conn.: Yale University Press.
PAYNE, ANTHONY J.
  1980   *The Politics of the Caribbean: Regional Intervention among New States.* New York: St.
          Martin's Press.
  1984   *The International Crisis of the Caribbean.* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
          Press.
PEARSON, FREDERIC S., AND J. MARTIN ROCHESTER
  1988   *International Relations: The Global Condition in the Late Twentieth Century.* New
          York: Random House.
POPE-HENNESSY, JAMES
  1964   *Verandah.* London: George Allen and Unwin.
PREISWERK, ROY
  1969   *Regionalism and the Commonwealth Caribbean.* Port of Spain, Trinidad: Institute of
          International Relations, University of the West Indies.
RAINFORD, RODERICK G.
  1989   "Reflections on the Lessons to be Learnt from the Caribbean Community." *Carib-
          bean Affairs* 2, no. 4 (Oct.–Dec.):6–20.
RAMJEET, OSCAR
  1989   "Montserrat's Independence Seems Imminent." *Caribbean Contact* 12, no. 9
          (Feb.):10.
RICHARDS, MIKE
  1987   "A Successful Summit." *Caribbean Contact* 15, no. 3 (Aug.):1, 14.
RUSSETT, BRUCE M.
  1967   *International Regions and the International System.* Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally.

RYAN, SELWYN
  1984   Plenary presentation at the meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association, St. Kitts–Nevis, 20 May–2 June.
SANDERS, RON
  1989   "Political Union in the OECS: An Opportunity Squandered?" *Caribbean Affairs* 2, no. 2 (Apr.–June):114–24.
SUTTON, PAUL
  1989   "The European Economic Community and the Caribbean: Main Dimensions and Key Issues." Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association International Congress, Miami, 4–6 December.
THOMAS, CLIVE
  1979   "Neo-Colonialism and Caribbean Integration." In *Contemporary International Relations of the Caribbean,* edited by Basil A. Ince. St. Augustine, Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies.
  1988   *The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean.* New York: Monthly Review.
U.K. COLONIAL OFFICE
  1945   *West India Royal Commission Report, 1938–39.* Cmd. 6607. London: HMSO. Generally referred to in this article as the Moyne Report.
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
  1983a   Document S/16070, 25 October.
  1983b   Document S/16090, 27 October.
USAID (U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT)
  1980   *Congressional Presentation,* Latin America and the Caribbean, Annex III. Washington, DC: GPO.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
  1986   *Atlas of United States Foreign Relations,* Annex III. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
WILL, W. MARVIN
  1979   "Caribbean International Politics." In *The Restless Caribbean: Changing Patterns of International Relations,* edited by Richard Millet and W. Marvin Will. New York: Praeger.
  1984   "Barbados." In HOPKINS 1985.
WILLIAMS, ERIC
  1970   *From Columbus to Castro.* London: Andre Deutsch.
  1981   *Forged from the Love of Liberty: Selected Speeches of Dr. Eric Williams,* compiled by Paul K. Sutton. Port of Spain, Trinidad: College Press.
WOOD, DONALD
  1968   *Trinidad in Transition.* London: Oxford University Press for the Institute for Race Relations.
WOODWARD, RALPH LEE
  1985   *Central America: A Nation Divided.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WORLD BANK
  1978   *The Commonwealth Caribbean: The Integration Experience.* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
WORRELL, DELISLE
  1987   *Small Island Economies: Structure and Performance in the English-Speaking Caribbean since 1970.* New York: Praeger.
YALEM, RONALD
  1965   *Regionalism and World Order.* Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press.