artificial nutrition and hydration is ordinary and proportionate care. It may have been worthwhile adding at least a reference to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith's response to the American Catholic Bishops in 2007 that dealt with 'clarifications' in terms of the traditional moral theological distinction between physical and moral impossibility with regard to positive precepts. The book ends rather abruptly with a comment on Dr Kevorkian and physician-assisted suicide.

As the title of the book explains, this is 'An Introduction to Catholic Bioethics'. As such an account of the context of Catholic moral theology in bioethics and more broadly in philosophical ethics seems entirely appropriate. However in the effort to cover perhaps too much ground Kane defines or interprets certain terms such as the natural law and conscience either rather loosely or reductively; he deals all too briefly with important issues for moral theology such as the place of scripture; his generalisations are at times sweeping and appear confusing, for instance he says that 'it is clear that the cause of death for most people is related to their choices' and that 'although we could theoretically make all the right choices . . . we still cannot stop the eventual deterioration of our bodies' (p. 76). This could have been partially remedied by greater attention to footnotes. For instance, in Chapter 1 footnote 2 speaks in general terms on the interpretation of scripture, footnote 13 gives a more than hazy account of infallibility. In both cases some direction towards a source seems required. Some of the footnotes do not seem to fit: for instance footnote 10 of Chapter 1 suggests a note on the practice of abandoning female children that, Kane says 'continues today in cultures that are polytheistic' (p. 11). The note gives a reference to sources on abandonment in late antiquity. Footnote 29 (p. 94) refers to an address by Pope John Paul that Kane entitles '*Amados hermanos'* (Beloved brothers). Its more accepted title is the speech to the Third General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate. Moreover frequent references to the Judeo-Christian context seem to detract from a distinctively Christian and Catholic bioethics. Curiously Kane does not mention Pope John Paul's 1995 encyclical *Evangelium vitae*. This encyclical places the blessing of life in the deeper context of a fullness that exceeds earthly existence, a point that is hugely significant for a Catholic bioethics.

PIA MATTHEWS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL HABIT OF MIND: RHETORIC AND PERSON IN JOHN HENRY NEWMAN'S *DUBLIN WRITINGS* by Angelo Bottone, *Zeta Books*, Bucharest, 2010, pp. 248, £20

This is an excellent study of Newman on education. The opening chapter identifies what falls under the description 'Dublin Writings'. They are all connected with the project of the Catholic University, were intended as public or official statements, and are concerned with Newman's 'Dublin period' (September 1851 to August 1859). They include *The Idea of a University* (the *Lectures and Essays* as well as the *Discourses*), the papers gathered in *Rise and Progress of Universities* (2001), some sermons, reports, and other papers, as well as articles that appeared in two publications of the Catholic University, its *Gazette* and *Atlantis*.

The first chapter identifies the relevant works, contextualises them in the events of Newman's time in Dublin, and summarises the thinking they contain. His understanding of the human person is central because it is fundamental to his philosophy of education.

The second chapter considers Newman's interlocutors in developing his ideas on the human person. In descending order of importance, and ascending order of critical reception by Newman, they are Aristotle, Cicero, and Locke.

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Bottone shows how in these writings Newman depends significantly on Aristotle. Most important are *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*, the old Oxford curriculum of Newman's undergraduate days which, curiously, he did not use again until after he became a Catholic. Newman admires Aristotle for what he says about the human person while making original use of his ideas, applying them to the social body that is a university and developing his comments on intellectual virtue. Representing the liberal, educated man, Cicero, whose rhetoric also contributes significantly to the philosophy of education, helps Newman to show the achievements and limits of pagan humanism. Newman believed that philosophies of education based on utility undervalue the human person and he regarded Locke as the ultimate source of all such philosophies. By comparing their divergent approaches to the study of ancient and foreign languages, Bottone shows that Newman is correct in this view of Locke.

The third chapter is a systematic reflection on the idea of the human person as developed by Newman under the influence of these interlocutors and in view of the project of a Catholic University. The constitutive elements of the human person are intellectual, moral, and aesthetic. The direct object of a University is the development of the mind. Intellectual virtues are needed if human beings are to acquire knowledge, unify it appropriately, and use it wisely. A common-sense realist in epistemology, Newman presumes the possibility of knowledge and is more interested in its meaning.

The relationship between knowledge and morality is not straightforward. Newman's gentleman is not yet a Christian saint: the famous portrait is ironic since the gentleman might yet place his knowledge and 'virtue' at the service of purposes that are less than Christian. Newman is critical of utilitarian, deontological, and sentimentalist approaches to ethics, Bottone claiming him (plausibly) as a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist who anticipates Anscombe and MacIntyre. Certainly Newman is interested in the kind of character developed through education. He rejects utilitarian reductions of the purpose of the University, saying that whereas the good is always useful, the useful is not necessarily good. Knowledge is something desirable for itself and not just for the uses to which it can be put or for the consequences it might be presumed to entail. As well as knowledge and morality, Newman speaks also of the aesthetic. For Newman, rhetoric is not just about sophistry, nor is poetry an outsider to the quest for truth. Assigning poetry to the Benedictines, science to the Dominicans, and practical action to the Jesuits, Newman says the educated person will have something of each, though the first seems to be the one he personally found most congenial.

The fourth chapter develops what Newman says about knowledge, morality, and 'the religion of philosophy'. Bottone describes Newman's answer to the question of faith and reason as complex. On the one hand there is a natural, secular, level of knowledge and morality, served by what the University is in its *essence*. On the other hand there is what the University in its *integrity* can achieve. This distinction of essence and integrity (*being* and *well-being*) is Newman's version here of nature and grace. He relates it to the direct object of the University (knowledge) and its indirect objects (the formation of character). The full flourishing of the University comes when philosophy and theology are accorded their proper place. Without them a University loses its claim to the name since it would exclude some kinds of knowledge. Philosophy is 'the science of sciences', a unifying activity. Theology clearly does not replace the work of other sciences but 'steadies' them in their work. The gentleman is not dismissed when his limits are recognised since the saint will also be a gentleman. But for Newman these limits are real and concern motivation and action, depth and consistency. The integrity, or flourishing, of the gentleman is possible only by God's grace: what he still needs is the help of grace to resist temptation and to make actual the virtues to which he aspires.

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The final chapter reflects further on the paradox and failure of Newman's idea of the educated man. The 'philosophical habit of mind' is the ability to unify knowledge and for Newman the University is the place where such unification takes place. It can only be done in this kind of community of learning and teaching. For Newman the greatest danger is fragmentation, already increasing in the 19th century and making the unification of knowledge ever more difficult. Newman began to think of modern cities as 'virtual Universities', the 'atmosphere of intellect' having moved from the seats of learning to the centres of civil government, to the literary world, and (we will now add) to the media of social communication. For Bottone Newman's ideal is impossible in the contemporary world but remains necessary as a regulative ideal. When compared with alternative ideas of the university – the nationalist one of Humboldt, or the techno-bureaucratic one of 'excellence, performance and productivity' – it seems clear that Newman's is best because of the value it gives to the human person and to the project of knowledge as such. Perhaps the term 'university' should no longer be used since, as thinkers like Derrida and MacIntyre argue, the institutions that currently claim this title are so far from representing what its (medieval and Catholic) originators had in mind. Newman's idea continues to fascinate, and Bottone's book is an intriguing consideration of it.

VIVIAN BOLAND OP

DEATH BE NOT PROUD: THE PROBLEM OF THE AFTERLIFE by Mark Corner, Religions and Discourse Vol. 46, *Peter Lang*, Bern, 2011, pp. x + 283, £38, pbk

This fascinating study of the meaning of death and the idea of life after death comes from an author equally at home in the worlds of philosophy and theology, and is much to be recommended. It restricts itself, for the most part, to western philosophy and the Christian tradition, but it will also be of great interest to readers from other spheres of world philosophy and religion, where comparable problems arise.

Part One concerns itself with general reflections on the meaning of death. The inevitability and the moral significance of our mortality are well brought out, and the folly of attempts to acquire, or even to hope for, more and more of the same kind of life is clearly demonstrated.

Part Two turns to the theology of Heaven and Hell. Again, the difficulty of imagining Heaven and the moral grotesqueness of traditional images of Hell are convincingly stressed, as are the problems of envisioning some purgatorial intermediate state. The influence of Donald MacKinnon's powerful writings is discernible behind these reflections.

Part Three examines the difficulties attending both the idea of the immortality of the soul and also that of the resurrection of the body, as we find these ideas articulated in the New Testament and in the post-biblical period. Again the problems of some kind of intermediate state between death and resurrection are stressed. It is suggested – a suggestion to be developed later in the book – that these problems are eased if the idea of our translation into God's eternity replaces that of life after death, certainly if 'after' means continuation of time as we experience it here.

Part Four turns to the treatment of these issues by philosophers of religion. Familiar critiques of the idea of a disembodied soul are rehearsed, though insufficient justice is perhaps done to the mind/body dualism espoused by Richard Swinburne and H. D. Lewis (the latter being rather oddly referred to as a theologian). John Hick's 'replica' theory is subjected to trenchant criticism.

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