

*apartheid* policy and its ideological background. Its impact upon missionary work, especially in connection with religious education, is shown, and a clearly written synopsis included of the three joint pastorals, issued by the hierarchy, setting out in firm and decisive terms the Catholic attitude to *apartheid* and the problems it creates.

The part played by the religious orders in missionary work and education is outstanding. This is notably so in the case of the priests of the Order of Mary Immaculate and of the experiment of the German Cistercians begun in 1882 under Abbot Franz Pfanner and settled at Mariannahill in Natal, later separating from the Cistercian Order and becoming an independent Congregation. A special point of interest for BLACKFRIARS readers will be the possibilities which lie in the future for the Dominican Fathers, English and Dutch, and the existing accomplishment of the Dominican Third Order Sisters.

*The Catholic Church in South Africa* is indispensable as a guide, for those who need it, to the work of the Church in a country where the rise of African nationalism is significant for the future of world development and where Catholicism is significant for the future trends of African nationalism.

HENRY ST JOHN, O.P.

MAN AND MORALS. By D. J. B. Hawkins. (Sheed and Ward; 10s. 6d.)

In this little work, Dr Hawkins has attempted 'an old-fashioned survey in the field of ethics'. But it is not as old-fashioned as the author's disclaimer in the foreword would suggest. The style is contemporary English, and the manner is that of contemporary British philosophical writing: chatty, pipe-puffing, non-dogmatic. It will, however, add little to its author's stature as a philosopher.

The first two chapters ('Man as Thinking Being', and 'Soul and Body') contain some strange ideas. In a somewhat ambiguous paragraph on page 4, we read that the Aristotelian account of the two levels of mind (sense and intellect) 'lets us in for some of the more embarrassing problems of the Aristotelian tradition'. It is not clear whether or not Dr Hawkins believes that 'individuality is a primary and self-explanatory character of the real', but he seems to think so. Is it true psychologically that 'awareness of the primary object and awareness of awareness are a unity' in the real situation? Is 'consciousness primitively an awareness of our sensations'? Is it true that 'the majority of perceptual judgments are inferences from sensation of greater or less probability'? This is Russellian language, and almost impossible to reconcile with Thomistic ideas. Is there really any primacy of tactile sensation ('through the experience of contact . . . because in contact there is mutual compression of mass')? Have we 'intuitive knowledge of other minds in moments of complete sympathy and communication'? This may be an attempt to deal with the treatment of the problem of our knowledge of other minds in *Mind* over the last few years, but if so it is altogether too cavalier. To hold that 'thought is primarily an awareness of real singular things' appears to require the rejection of a good deal of the *Prima Pars*.

But it is the second chapter which really makes one sit up. Substituting 'mere voluminousness' for *materia prima* is not going to satisfy any philosopher. Substantial form is the next to go (in its place we are left with unity of sentience), and then, as one might expect, we are given a doctrine of plurality of forms. The author hopes that his account of 'Thomistic man' is not Platonic or Cartesian!

The rest of the work, on moral philosophy, is not very deep. Starting with Kant and moral experience, we move rapidly into the Prichard-Moore-Ross debate, and on to some problems of special ethics: law and morality, reward and punishment, and property. The final chapter, rather unconvincingly, moves from morality through love to religion.

E. F. O'DOHERTY

GOD IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By James Collins. (Routledge and Kegan Paul; 40s.)

There are two ways by which we can come to know something of God, the way up and the way down. The way up, the traditional *via ascensus*, is by a reflexive assimilation of the manifold data of the everyday world into a self-exigent pattern: it is, basically, a certain way of making life point beyond itself. The question is simply why there is anything at all, and the answer amounts to seeing the world as something that sets a problem, as something with a presupposition, a *primum principium*, which is what we call God. It has always been a hazardous and grudging way.

This book, by the professor of philosophy at St Louis, Missouri, is a reliable encyclopedia of what philosophers have made of it in the last five hundred years. The history of philosophy does not engage the interest of many serious philosophers in this country now, at least in as synoptic and compendious a form as this; and in any case it would not be easy to persuade many of them that there could be much sense in asking why there is anything at all. But even if there were enough curiosity and solicitude about the mysterious nature of human destiny to drive people to raise *die Gottesfrage* in earnest, if not in desperation, one might be forgiven for feeling somewhat depressed at the poverty and confusion of a great deal of what Professor Collins has to record. And even allowing for Newman, it must be said that there is very little in the way of any major, coherent act of philosophical reflection on the problem of God exercised from the heart of orthodox Christian experience.

Surely, one feels, something better might be said about God than all this? And yet perhaps not; or at least not until we have seen that the way up and the way down are ultimately one and the same. The way down, the *via descensus*, is the self-disclosure in the process of history of the God who searches the hearts of men and who raised Jesus from the dead. This is the God before whom we have the grace to be open, in faith, in the ordinary events of Christian living. Philosophy belongs to a whole form of life, and this God can never be in parentheses: perhaps we may look for more satisfying philosophical reflections about the problem of God to emerge from a renewed practice of the common responsibilities of what it is to be