

REASON AND UNREASON IN PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE. By E. B. Strauss.

Foreword by Sir Russell Brain. (H. K. Lewis; 8s. 6d.)

This slim volume binds with the author's memorable address, *Quo Vadimus?* (delivered to the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society in 1946), his two 1952 Croonian Lectures on *The Concept of Causality* and *Causality and Psychological Medicine*. Both offer us the reflections of a cultured, philosophically-orientated psychiatrist on the present situation in medical psychology, and will be read with profit by many besides those professional colleagues for whom they were originally intended.

The layman, whose acquaintance with contemporary psychology is gained mostly from a literature far in advance of what is easily accessible to the overworked practitioner, may be astonished that Dr Strauss finds it necessary to expend such energy in flogging horses he had fondly supposed dead for decades. Reason and experience will both support the author's vindication of multiple etiology in mental and emotional disorder, and his rejection of the facile simplicities of the earliest days of psycho-analysis. But recognition should surely be given to the extent to which Freud himself (to say nothing of Jung and functional psychologists generally) came to displace etiology of any sort by the concepts of quantitative relations and distribution of *libido*.

But there is plenty of sound Reason, with explicit reliance on thomist thought (as mediated by Fr Gilby's *Barbara Celarent*), in these pages. Multiple causality is presented as a theoretic basis for eclecticism in practice, but sometimes this eclecticism spills back into theory in a way which is somewhat perplexing: is it possible, for instance, to accept Kretschner's ego-centred definition of the psyche (to the extent that it is intelligible at all as it is here extracted from its context) and yet to make such concessions to Jung? If Unreason is kept at bay, this is not always so apparent as some readers could wish. There seems to be some hiatus in the argument for making psychotherapy a physician's preserve, and the author's distinction of 'soul' from 'psyche' (offensive to this reviewer's Thomism as well as to his semi-Jungianism) demands much clearer statement and detailed argument than he gives it in this book.

AN INTRODUCTION TO JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGY. By Frieda Fordham. (Penguin Books; 2s.)

To present Jung's psychology in language which (as another reviewer has put it) would not be out of place in 'Mrs Dale's Diary' is a formidable undertaking, and one from which many, sensible of the complexities of the subject, might reasonably shrink. Mrs Fordham, though the wife of one of the most distinguished Jungian analysts in England, is, we are told, only now 'training as an analyst'. This may help to explain her courage, as well as the fact that her exposition carries no trace of a patronising

'writing down' to the masses. To have expounded the elements of Jung's psychology in simple language, with little technical jargon, no translator's English, and many homely examples and parallels, is an achievement for which we must be truly thankful.

Yet such extreme simplification is perhaps impossible without serious, even dangerous, distortions, and—notwithstanding Jung's own stamp of approval in a Foreword—we do not think Mrs Fordham has avoided them. She has set out, quite explicitly on her first page, to 'draw a map' of the human psyche as seen by Jung, and she duly warns us that it 'conveys as little of the true nature of psychology as of the seas and continents that make our globe'. But human psyches are no fixed globes with settled features in determined places, but rather ever shifting, dynamic energies whose features change from person to person, from hour to hour. It is the great merit of Jung to have recognised this, to have seen that fixed maps are impossible, and yet to have provided us with compasses to find our way about from observable features, features which themselves demand direct observation in each case. Mrs Fordham's all too static and universalised 'map' comes to grief especially in her presentation of the 'Shadow' as 'the unconscious natural side of man . . . inferior, primitive'—the equivalent, in short, of the Freudian *Id*. It may be so, it often is so: but not necessarily, for experience shows that 'super-ego' contents are often no less the complementary, compensating opposite of conscious attitudes. The Jungian categories (and they are neither more nor less) of Ego, Persona, Shadow, Soul-Image are categories of quantitative relations whose qualitative content cannot be determined in advance, but only observed in each individual case, which case will itself be subject to constant changes and fluctuations.

There are, undoubtedly, ideas which are difficult to convey in the concrete language required for the Light Programme; but it might be a mistake to give the impression that Jung's psychology demands less mental effort than is required of the readers of other Pelican Books. The danger is less that Jung's psychology should be distorted by excessive simplification (and of that it is not for us to complain, where he himself is satisfied) but that the uninitiated reader should be led to fit in his own psychic features with a map not made for him. But, given that such a task of popularisation should have been attempted at all, he will find no more congenial and lucid guide than Mrs Fordham.

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TOLERANCE ET COMMUNAUTE HUMAINE: Chrétiens dans un Monde Divisé. (Cahiers de l'Actualité Religieuse. Casterman, Paris.)

What should the attitude of the Christian be, in a world divided by so many religious differences, divided indeed yet more radically between believers and unbelievers? Do Catholics demand liberty of conscience when they are in a minority but refuse it to others (on principle) when they are