

tives for survival in a changing world system generate pressures for this in any event. Instead, they are efforts of the peasant periphery or the middle-class semiperiphery, respectively, to find original paths out of dependency.

One advantage of this approach is that it provides an explanation of right-wing movements that are otherwise apt to be dismissed as transient irrationalities. Indeed, it is a strength of this collection that all the authors, even those who do not use dependency theory, clarify issues that are broader than the Rumanian particulars they discuss. For this reason, I have the feeling that some of the ideas Jowitt and his collaborators bring forward will have considerable impact on the direction of East European studies over the next few years.

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CLASH OVER ROMANIA: BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD ROMANIA, 1938–1947. By *Paul D. Quinlan*. Los Angeles: American Romanian Academy, 1977. 173 pp. Paper.

Although not identified as such, this monograph probably began as a dissertation. The author's adviser should have restrained his candidate from the herculean effort of researching the overwhelming amount of materials for the period and the topics under study. Dr. Quinlan waded into a tidal wave in a vain effort to produce a study of diplomatic, military, economic, and social history of the period preceding, during, and following the Second World War. In so doing, he could not investigate all relevant archival materials in Britain and the United States, so essential for understanding Anglo-American actions regarding the Balkan states. For example, Quinlan devotes about one page to the Churchill-Stalin agreement on the Balkans reached in Moscow on October 9, 1944, whereas Albert Resis, in "The Churchill-Stalin Secret Percentages Agreement on the Balkans" (*American Historical Review*, 83, no. 2 [April 1978]: 368–87), refers to more sources on that event alone than on all the sources cited by Quinlan put together!

When such unwittingly bold studies appear in print, one wonders what motivates a young scholar to attempt the impossible. Is this study a polemic? Is it intended to postulate some thesis? If, as Dr. Quinlan asserts, "by the summer of 1943 it had become evident that most of the Balkans would fall within the military sphere of the Red Army" (p. 159), why does he fail to follow up this view with some analysis of Roosevelt's and Churchill's efforts at Teheran and Yalta to mitigate this apparently inevitable development? It is precisely Quinlan's selective, and not inclusive, outline which gives this reviewer the impression that this is an undertaking which requires infinitely more research and analysis. One outstanding virtue of historical research in the West is that it has the right to produce works of this kind. But academic freedom also requires examination of *all* available evidence, not merely those items which can substantiate some vague thesis.

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KARA MUSTAFA POD WIEDNIEM: ŹRÓDŁA MUZUŁMAŃSKIE DO DZIEJÓW WYPRAWY WIEDEŃSKIEJ 1683 ROKU. By *Zygmunt Abrahamowicz*. Cracow: Wydawnictwo literackie, 1973. 410 pp. Illus. 75 zł.

This is a timely publication of Turkish sources concerning the Vienna campaign of 1683. Dr. Abrahamowicz has translated a selection of Ottoman chronicles and letters pertaining to the campaign of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa (1638–83), which cover